159 SC 06 E

Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Presented by:

 

Mr Julio Miranda Calha (Portugal),

General Rapporteur of the Defence and Security Committee and

 

Mr Bert Koenders (Netherlands),

General Rapporteur of the Political Committee

 

 

Text for consideration by the Standing Committee in Brussels on

Friday, 29 September 2006

 

Amendments to the text must be presented to the Assembly's

International Secretariat by 18:00 on Friday 15 September 2006

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.         Introduction

 

1.1       The Riga summit of Alliance Heads of State and Government provides an opportunity for Alliance leaders to reconfirm the continuing relevance of NATO as the key transatlantic forum to ensure our collective security. In today’s global environment threats to our security are many and diverse. They result frequently from a combination of failed or failing states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. NATO’s core mission of collective defence must now address these new threats.  The Riga Summit should give leadership and direction to this process.

 

1.2       NATO’s ability to contribute to dealing with these new security challenges will depend on its continuing transformation. It will also require the support of Alliance publics and parliaments. As recent experience has shown this support cannot be taken for granted. As parliamentarians with authorising powers over budgets and deployments and direct accountability to our electorates, we have a unique responsibility to provide direction for Alliance policies and priorities.

 

1.3       As representatives of Nato’s 26 parliaments we call upon Alliance leaders to address as a matter of urgency the following issues:

 

• The use of the Alliance framework for consultation and coordination on all key security issues, including the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Middle East.
• The further evolution of Alliance partnerships.
• The creation of new forms of association for contributing non-partner countries.
• The future membership and geographic limits of the Alliance.
• The need for more effective cooperation with the European Union.
• The shortfalls and deficiencies in Alliance operational capabilities.
• The need for more appropriate funding arrangements for overseas missions.
• The inadequate levels of defence expenditures.
• The challenging security situation in Afghanistan.

 

2.         A More Political NATO and the Harmonization of Political Aspirations and Military Capabilities

 

2.1.      A central element of NATO's new role must be the commitment of all the Allies to use the Alliance framework for political consultation and coordination on the most important security challenges. This has to be done more regularly and in the framework of in-depth discussions by our political leaders. We must assess on a case-by-case basis where NATO’s collective capabilities and experience can be utilized, either independently or in close cooperation with other international organizations.

 

2.2.      In making such assessments, political ambitions must be harmonized with the resources and capabilities available.  We cannot accept a situation where nations agree to a mission and then refuse to produce the capabilities.  Mutual solidarity is urgently called for. Civil and military planning must be done together and in a more integrated manner.  At all times, NATO should abide by the principles of international humanitarian law.

 

3.         Cooperation with International Organizations

 

3.1.      Current and future security challenges demand the most effective use of collective resources - civil and military - and the closest possible cooperation and coordination with relevant organizations. This means further improvement of NATO’s relationships with other international organisations, in particular with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). The Riga Summit should give a firm impetus to developing these relationships in a concrete manner.  The existence of the NATO Response Force and its potential for use in crisis situations should be a catalyst to developing these relationships.

 

4.         Relations with the European Union

 

4.1.      The scale and scope of current security threats requires a co-operative NATO-EU relationship that maximizes the assets of both organisations and an end to institutional bickering.  A more systematic process of consultation and coordination is now imperative to ensure that resources are used effectively and that the plans and responses of NATO and the EU are better balanced and more harmonized.

 

5.         Partnerships

 

5.1       NATO's partnership programs perform an important stabilizing function through assistance to countries in different stages of political, economic and social transition. Alliance expertise is effective in helping countries implement much needed reform of their security sectors. The Assembly has itself contributed through parallel programs of assistance to partner parliaments in developing effective parliamentary oversight.

 

5.2.      Funding for NATO’s many partnerships remains modest.  If NATO’s partnerships are to be genuinely deepened and broadened, the Alliance must augment the resources committed.

 

5.3.      Assistance to the Balkans and the south Caucasus must remain a priority. The Alliance should give serious consideration to the requirements of a future military presence in Kosovo, in cooperation with other international organizations.

 

5.4.      The Alliance should continue its partnership with countries of Central Asia but the Alliance should review the continued participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of participants who do not fulfil their commitments to democratic standards.

 

5.5.      In developing partnerships, special emphasis should be placed on the value of NATO's long-standing expertise in the protection of civilian populations against disasters and other civil emergencies has grown in the light of the threat of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  The Alliance’s planning, logistic and operational capabilities can provide unique support for national preparedness and response efforts.

 

6.         The Middle East and North Africa

 

6.1.      The Middle East and North Africa are regions of critical strategic importance. Again, the Assembly plays a complementary role to NATO's programs by integrating members of parliament from these countries into its many activities.  The Alliance should expand its engagement with neighbouring states by developing existing programmes like the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue using the experience and assets of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.  This could include a training initiative involving the creation of a training facility in a Mediterranean Dialogue or Istanbul Co-operation Initiative country.  A greater emphasis should be placed on cooperation with countries that develop democratic structures and respect human rights.

 

7.         Russia

 

7.1.      The development of a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia remains essential.  The work of the NATO Russia Council represents a considerable achievement and should be strengthened. However, the development of genuine partnership continues to be hindered by deep-rooted suspicions and misperceptions. Issues such as human rights and the situations in neighbouring countries should be discussed in an open and confidence-building manner. Issues of common interest must be addressed in order to create the necessary foundation of confidence. In enhancing its own relationship with the Russian parliament, the Assembly will play its part in reconciling misperceptions and creating a much-needed basis of mutual trust. 

 

 

8.         Ukraine

 

8.1.      Recognizing Ukraine’s importance as a strategic partner and noting that Ukraine remains committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, NATO should continue to develop its relationship with Ukraine through the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan, Intensified Dialogue and the PfP Trust Fund. 

 

8.2.      The role of public opinion regarding NATO should be addressed, and NATO should assist the Ukrainian government to the maximum extent possible in disseminating information about the Alliance’s role and activities.

 

9.         New Partnerships

 

9.1.      The Alliance should give attention to developing more formal co‑operation mechanisms with geographically distant partners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, who share the Alliance’s values and also participate alongside NATO forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. At the same time, NATO should be alert to the need to safeguard its cohesiveness, particularly within its decision-making structures.

 

10.       Enlargement

 

10.1     Membership of the Alliance must remain open to those aspirants who demonstrate their adherence to the common values of the Alliance and are assessed by member countries as being ready for membership.

 

10.2.    At the Riga Summit Alliance leaders should provide clear guidance to Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as to when they can expect invitations to join the Alliance. 

 

10.3.    Encouragement and support should be given to Georgia through the launch of an Intensified Dialogue on Georgia’s aspirations to NATO membership.

 

10.4.    Alliance leaders should begin to formulate a strategic vision on the long-term future of enlargement to determine where the ultimate borders of the Alliance might lie.

 

11.       Interoperability and Effectiveness

 

11.1.    Interoperability and compatible communications are essential for Alliance military effectiveness.  Fulfilment of the Prague Capabilities Commitments must remain a priority.  The emphasis should be on task specialization and investments to ensure that sufficient troops can be deployed for complex stabilization missions.

 

11.2.    Interoperability will also depend on the development and integration of military information networks to share and exploit relevant information in real time.   The United States and its Allies must therefore develop technology transfer policies to facilitate the effective sharing of relevant technical information.

 

11.3.    Forces deployed for NATO missions must have the flexibility to perform the range of operations demanded by a particular mission.  All efforts should therefore be made to reduce the use of national caveats which all too often restrict national contingents from participating in operations to their full capability.

 

11.4.    In view of the critical role of special forces in NATO’s missions, particular attention should be devoted to enhancing their interoperability.

 

11.5     In addition, NATO should redress its shortfall in long-range, heavy airlift by purchasing and operating suitable aircraft in a manner along the lines of its AWACS fleet.

12.       Funding Transformation and Operations

 

12.1.    The current system of having the costs of operations borne only by the participants in those operations should cease.  The increased use of “on-call” NATO forces such as the NATO Response Force demands a means of sharing the financial burden of deploying those forces across the Alliance in an equitable manner.

 

12.2.    A mechanism for the common funding of operations should be accompanied by commitments by individual members to devote sufficient resources to defence to meet the global challenges to our security.  NATO members should at the very least commit themselves to making no further cuts in their national defence expenditures, and the Riga Summit should give an incentive to a better and more transparent common funding mechanism.  Parliamentarians regard the development of a more equitable system as a matter of urgency.

 

12.3.    The transformation of the Alliance and the fulfilment of its commitments will depend upon appropriate levels of spending as well as improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of defence spending.  Redoubled efforts should therefore be made to improve the effective use of defence resources through co-operation in all stages of procurement.  The Alliance should also set a firm date for all members to achieve the Istanbul usability goals for ground forces of 40 per cent deployability and eight per cent sustainability. Similar targets should be set for air and naval forces.

 

13.       The Situation in Afghanistan

 

13.1.    The situation in the southern part of Afghanistan has deteriorated in recent months.  NATO's commitment to Afghanistan constitutes a test of its ability to face the challenges of the new security order.  In view of its commitment to extend security throughout the country and the challenges it faces as it expands its mission, member countries must decide to redouble their efforts to provide the assets required to achieve this goal. NATO should also redouble its efforts to build trust with the Afghan people and agree on common policies towards the political and reconstruction efforts in the country. A failed Afghanistan will also be a failed NATO.

 

14.       Relations between NATO and the NATO PA

 

14.1.    The Assembly is a visible manifestation of the Alliance’s shared commitment to parliamentary democracy. Its activities enhance the collective accountability of NATO. They also contribute to the transparency of NATO and its policies and to improving public scrutiny and awareness. Assembly activities in outreach and partnership reinforce and complement parallel activities by NATO.  The Assembly welcomes its growing cooperation with NATO and enhanced dialogue with the North Atlantic Council.  We welcome the complementarity between the work of the Assembly and NATO particularly regarding partner nations.  The Assembly urges Heads of State and government to acknowledge this role in their Riga Declaration and to reaffirm their support for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the shared goal of promoting democratic values.

 

 

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