1.      Twenty members of the
Sub-committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities and the Sub-committee
on Democratic Governance visited Armenia and Georgia on 12-16 June 2006. Led
by Vahit Erdem (Turkey) and Tchetin Kazak (Bulgaria), the delegation met with
parliamentary and governmental officials, military commanders, as well as
representatives of the international community and civil society. The
delegation also visited the Adjara region of Georgia and met with local
officials.
2.      Both countries are developing
their relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions. They also share a number of
common concerns and threats, including the so-called frozen conflicts, energy
security, corruption, and organized crime. Armenia and Georgia, however, have very different foreign policy objectives and strategies. Georgia has stated clearly its ambition to become a full‑fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic
community, while Armenia favours maintaining a balance between the
Euro-Atlantic community and Russia.  Â
II. Armenia
3.      The delegation was particularly
interested in the future direction of the country’s relations with
Euro-Atlantic institutions. The unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia’s relations with Turkey, defence and security sector reform, as well as the state of
democratic reforms in the country, were the other main issues of discussion.
4.      Armenia’s foreign policy is
based on maintaining a balance between their ambitions to be part of the wider
European community and their close relationship with Russia. Government
representatives and members of parliament repeatedly addressed this theme of
“complementarityâ€. They see no reason why Armenia should be put in the
position of making choices that will alienate their partners. As Vardan
Oskanyan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained, a small country such as Armenia with only two open borders must maintain flexibility in its foreign relations.Â
Several members of the delegation questioned this position, noting that this
appears difficult to sustain and that a policy of complementarity is simply a
euphemism for indecisiveness, but Armenian officials maintained that
complementarity is a sound basis for the conduct of the country’s foreign
affairs.
5.      Armenian officials were clear in
their intention to move toward integration into European institutions. They
emphasized that they understand that Armenia is not yet ready to be considered
for EU membership, but that they have long-term ambitions for closer
integration. Membership of NATO however is not on the agenda. Discussions
with several speakers revealed that Armenia seems to be more interested in the
benefits of the integration process, including a dialogue on values and the
achievements of certain standards, rather than in the final goal of membership.
This position reflects a consensus between the major political parties in Armenia, as well as in the public opinion.
6.      Several Armenian officials also
discussed the tense relationship with Turkey. The Minister of Foreign Affairs
emphasized his desire to see a pragmatic relationship develop with Turkey and believed that the two countries should deal with their relationship separately from that
of other complex issues such as Armenia’s relationship with Azerbaijan. Some Armenian members of parliament were less inclined to take this view and
regarded Turkey as a potential security threat.
7.      Regardless, it is clear that Armenia’s relationship with Turkey turns on several points of conflict. One is historical, related
to the controversy over the culpability for the massive number of deaths among
Armenians during the final years of the Ottoman Empire, but the other two
relate to the border between the two countries and the ongoing conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The meetings in Armenia demonstrated that all of those issues remain extremely sensitive and show little
indication of being resolved in the foreseeable future.
8.        The delegation also enquired
about Armenia’s relations with Iran. Both countries developed good relations
and recently signed an agreement for the construction of a gas pipeline, which
would allow Armenia to reduce its dependency on Russian gas. Foreign diplomats
raised concerns regarding Armenia’s relationship with Iran in the context of the current crisis regarding Iran’s nuclear program. But they note that Iran is a lifeline for Armenia serving as one of its two open borders. As long as the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain closed, Iran will remain an important link to the outside world for
this land-locked country.
9.      The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict featured
prominently in the discussions with Armenian officials. Many expressed hope
that some progress could be made with the recent meetings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Rambouillet, France and in Bucharest, Romania, but those meetings did not
move the two toward a solution.  Varuzhan Nersessian, Head of the OSCE
Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia explained that because
of political and electoral cycles, 2006 represented a window of opportunity for
negotiations. However a number of outstanding issues remain. In particular,
there was still no agreement as to how best to reconcile the well-established
principles of territorial integrity on the one hand and that of
self-determination on the other. Mr Nersessian insisted that creating an
atmosphere of confidence and trust was crucial to the success of the
negotiation process. The current state of negotiations, however, does not
leave much room for optimism for significant progress in the near future.
10.    The delegation met with, Michael
Harutyunyan Chief of Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces. He outlined the
history of Armenia’s cooperation with NATO and its current activities in
defence reform. Armenia began a program of cooperation with NATO in 2000 and
has intensified its engagement since then. It entered the PARP in 2002 and has
gone through several iterations of the process since then. Another milestone
in Armenia’s cooperation with NATO was hosting a military exercise in 2004. In
December 2005 NATO accepted Armenia’s plan for defence reform. Armenia has been working steadily since then to implement its defence reforms including
creating an interagency commission to oversee the military. A national
security strategy is under development and will be submitted to the parliament
for its consideration in the coming year. Once the strategy is approved, the
military will begin implementation in 2008.Â
11.    Armenia is already taking steps
to make its military more compatible with NATO and is participating in NATO operations.Â
Armenia has created a demining centre and has deployed forces to Kosovo with
the Greek contingent. Armenia aims to have one brigade at NATO standards by
2010. The Chief of Staff emphasized the willingness of Armenia to cooperate with NATO and underlined the many bilateral programs it has with NATO members,
particularly Greece and the United States.
12.    Questions focused on Armenia’s defence expenditures, the structure of the military, its relationship with Russia and the accountability of the military to parliament.  The Chief of Staff noted
that Armenia spends approximately 3 percent of GDP on defence and the military
is a mix of conscripts and professionals, although some units are entirely
professional. The total size of the armed forces is 44,000. The military is
accountable to parliament and the Chief of Staff noted that he has been called
on to testify in parliament and answer questions about defence expenditures.Â
As with other Armenian officials, he emphasized that the relationship with Russia does not affect Armenia’s ability or willingness to cooperate with NATO.Â
13.    Armenia’s emergency management
services have also undergone a major transformation. Edik Barseghyan, Head of
the Emergency Management Administration (EMA), presented to the delegation the
main steps of the transition from the Soviet era civil defence services placed
under the authority of the Ministry of Defence to the current agency,
demilitarized, staffed with civilians and under the authority of the Prime
Minister. Â However, in several cases, the EMA acts jointly with the armed
forces and the Ministry of Defence, which remains responsible for civil
defence, including the evacuation of populations in case of emergency.
14.    The EMA oversees and coordinates
all rescue services in the country. It also runs an academy and a regional
training centre, which Armenia would like to see specialize in the management
of nuclear accidents. Several partnerships link the EMA with sister
administrations in the region, including in the framework the Organization of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation or the Commonwealth of Independent States.Â
Programs may also be developed with NATO as part of Armenia’s IPAP. However,
Mr Barseghyan acknowledged that the current structure was far from perfect.Â
The EMA was still under-equipped and dealing with the heritage of the Soviet
era. Yet, risks run high, since Armenia finds itself in a disaster-prone
area.   Â
15.    The delegation received
contrasting briefings about the state of democracy in Armenia. Although government officials focused on Armenia’s achievements, many NGO
representatives highlighted the flaws in implementation of democratic reforms.Â
As one NGO representative stated, Armenia was at a crucial moment in its
history, where it must choose between “managed democracy†and “real
democracyâ€. Several other NGO representatives underlined that this was a time
of transition for Armenia. Tigran Torosyan, Speaker of the Armenian
Parliament, also acknowledged the lack of maturity of Armenia’s political system, which tainted relations between majority and opposition
parties, as well as between political parties and NGOs.
16.    According to many NGO
representatives, freedom of the media provides a good example of the ambiguity
of the situation in Armenia. Overall, media legislation is in conformity with
democratic standards. However, it was implementation of this legislation that
provided room for governmental interference. Moreover, on the one hand, print
media enjoy extensive freedom in their activities, but they only reach a
limited audience. On the other hand, electronic media is the main source of
information, but it is submitted to various direct and indirect restrictions,
including in particular strict rules for the attribution of licenses and issues
relating to ownership of media outlets. Self-censorship is also widespread. Â
17.    The parliamentary elections in
2007 will represent a crucial test and give a precious indication as to the
country’s future orientations. Many NGO representatives criticized the absence
of any investigation into alleged violations in previous elections. However,
Mr Torosyan assured that judicial proceedings were in place for examining
electoral complaints. Moreover, draft amendments to the electoral code were
currently under consideration and would follow the recommendations of the
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Â
18.    At present, support for the
regime remains important and both the opposition and the civil society are weak
and divided. Some NGO representatives expressed concerns about the increasing
role of oligarchs in political life. Others also voiced criticism and
disillusionment at the role of the international community in support of
democratic processes in Armenia. They called upon the international community
to hold Armenian authorities to account and impose respect by Armenia of its commitments. The negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh should not provide an
excuse for a lax attitude towards human rights violations in Armenia. Â
19.    The delegation also met with
Armenian government officials charged with eliminating official corruption.Â
They recognize the drain that pervasive corruption poses on society and
discussed measures to control the problem. An anti-corruption commission has
been created with the Prime Minister as the chair, and a new civil service
model is being implemented where positions are awarded to professional civil
servants based on qualifications rather than political connections.
20.    NGO representatives, however,
also had negative comments about the efforts of the government to attack
corruption in Armenian society. They underlined that in this area as in
others, policies looked good on paper, but implementation was the real
challenge. Moreover, involvement of the civil society in decision-making had
only been marginal.Â
21.    Energy is a major concern for
Armenia, which is relatively isolated in the region and only has limited
domestic resources. Armen Movsisyan, Minister of Energy, outlined the main
challenges and issues of Armenia’s energy policy. Armenia’s production of
electricity currently covers domestic needs. However consumption increases by
10% a year, which has forced the country into a policy of modernization and
diversification. The emphasis remains on hydro-energy, which represents 25% of
the country’s production. The other main sources are two thermal plants and
one nuclear power plant. Armenia is also building wind turbines, which for now
represent only a minimal fraction of the overall production. The Medzamor
nuclear power plant, which had raised safety concerns in the international
community, should be closed by 2016 and replaced by a new facility capable of
producing ten times as much power.
22.    Armenia is completely dependent
on imports for its oil consumption and does not have any refineries. However
the most important challenge for Armenia is gas dependency. According to
various estimates, Armenia’s dependency on Russia for its gas supplies ranges
from 80% to almost 100%. The gas pipeline between Iran and Armenia, which
should be completed by the end of 2006, may allow Armenia to reduce this
dependency somewhat.
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23.    The delegation was particularly
interested in Georgia’s achievements since the Rose Revolution and the
country’s progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration. It also looked at
Georgia’s broader foreign policy priorities, as well as recent developments
regarding the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.Â
24.    The consolidation of democratic
institutions is certainly one of the main achievements of the Rose Revolution.Â
Although the current Constitution establishes a presidential system, the
Parliament enjoys considerable leverage and influence. Nevertheless, the
delegation expressed concerns at the overwhelming weight of the governing
coalition and the protection of the rights of the opposition. Nino Burjanadze,
Chairperson of the Georgian Parliament, reassured the delegation on this point,
explaining that several mechanisms existed to guarantee a fair representation
and participation of the opposition in Parliament. She regretted however that
the opposition had chosen a strategy of confrontation and was still boycotting
parliamentary activities.
25.    Upcoming local elections in the fall
were presented by several speakers as an important moment for Georgia. Giorgi
Barmamidze, State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration,
expressed hope that these elections provide a showcase of self-governance which
could later facilitate negotiations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia about their
own status. However, foreign diplomats view the upcoming elections with some
concern. Important issues still remain to be solved, including the preparation
of voter lists and the setting of a precise date. The voting system, which
combines proportional and majority rule, is also said to be far from ideal.Â
26.    Mr Baramidze briefed the
delegation on the progress Georgia has made since 2003, noting that it was
nearly a failed state three years ago. He outlined the reform process
including efforts to increase the effectiveness of the police force. The
police force has been cut in half and salaries have doubled for the remaining
officers. This has reduced the incentive for corrupt behaviour and the public
shows increasing trust in law enforcement officials. There has also been a
massive increase in government expenditures - approximately a five-fold
increase since 2003. In part this is financed by a cut of 30 percent of the
government workforce, but increased tax revenues from a growing economy are
also a factor. GDP grew by more than 9 percent last year and is projected to be
11 percent in 2006. Mr Baramidze attributed much of this growth to the
economic policies of the government, which are designed to create favourable
conditions for foreign investment and minimize government interference in the
private sector.
27.    Several foreign diplomats,
however, were critical of the direction of the country in recent months. They
are concerned about what they see as retrograde motion after the initial wave
of reforms in the wake of the Rose Revolution, noting the lack of an
independent judiciary and effective opposition to the government. Non‑Governmental
Organizations such as the Georgian Young Lawyers Association and Article 42
echo many of those sentiments and confront the government on a regular basis on
those issues. Georgian officials acknowledge many of those problems, but note
that there is only so much that can be done at any one time. Regardless, it is
important to note the concerns and maintain pressure and support for ongoing
reforms so that progress continues.Â
28.    The Chairman of the Border
Protection Department, Badri Bitsadze, discussed the changes in the border
control policy of Georgia. He emphasized that Georgia has completely
overhauled the border protection service to replace the Soviet model that
Georgia maintained until a few years ago. As such, the Border Protection
Service is now a police force and separate from the military. Â Mr Bitsadze also
emphasized the need to build a better-paid and equipped force. The Department
has recently embarked on a program to double the size of the force actually
patrolling the borders while significantly increasing salaries. This was
accomplished by reducing administrative staff. So although the force is
approximately half the size it was only a few years ago, the number of border
protection police in the field has increased.Â
29.    The reintegration of Adjara is
generally considered as another major achievement of Mr Saakashvili’s
government. The delegation was able to witness the transformations underway in
this region and meet with representatives of the local administration. It was
clear from the delegation’s visit that the Georgian government wishes to
present Adjara as a showcase of the benefits of the Rose Revolution and of the
government’s policy of regional development. In their view, this success story
should provide an incentive and a model for the future reintegration of the two
remaining breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.Â
30.    Adjara provides a fertile ground
for rooting this success story. Its economy is robust, relying on tourism and
trade, particularly thanks to the major Black Sea port of Batumi. Since the reintegration
of Adjara, Georgian authorities have invested considerably in reconstruction
and infrastructure development. Foreign investments have also assisted in the
renaissance of Adjara. Politically, Adjara benefits from a status of autonomy,
with its own self-governing institutions and own budget. However, part of the
NGO community questions the actual level of autonomy that this status permits
and calls for further-reaching self-administration arrangements.Â
31.    The withdrawal of Russian troops
from the military base in Batumi is another important issue in Adjara. In
accordance with an agreement signed by the Russian and Georgian governments in
March 2006, the Batumi base, together with other Russian military bases and
facilities in Georgia, should be closed by 2008. Georgian authorities assured
the delegation that the withdrawal was underway according to the planned
schedule.Â
32.    The delegation also visited the
new military base at Senaki near the Black Sea coast. It is newly constructed
with several buildings still under construction. Although the delegation could
not observe any exercises as the brigade was in training in a different
location, they did meet with base officers and tour the facility. It is
designed to house 3,000 troops, and the facility is in line with bases in NATO
member states. The base is home to the battalion currently serving in Iraq.Â
Although it is impossible to assess a military based on such a brief visit, the
base does show a commitment on the part of the Georgian government to create a
facility capable of maintaining a brigade in conditions similar to that found
in bases in NATO member countries.
33.    Georgia’s ambition to become a
full-fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community was a major theme of
discussions. Gela Bezhuashvili, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, stated
that Euro-Atlantic integration was Georgia’s foreign policy priority. NATO
integration would allow Georgia to consolidate the model of democracy it has
developed and is promoting in the region, through such forums as the Community
of Democratic Choice or the Black Sea - Baltic Sea summit in Vilnius in May
this year.
34.    Mr Baramidze also underlined
Georgia’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. He recalled Georgia’s
contribution to international peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq. Georgia also provides a gateway to the strategically important
region of Central Asia and to its energy resources. Â
35.    Romualds Razuks, NATO Liaison
Officer for the South Caucasus, briefed the delegation on the evolution of
NATO’s partnerships with the three countries of the South Caucasus, Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. He emphasized the defence institution building aspect
of NATO’s engagement in the region. NATO has moved on from promoting
democratic values to assisting the countries of the region in establishing the
foundations for modern democracies with civilian control of the armed forces.Â
As such, programs to assist in legislative oversight of the armed forces and
implementing transparent budgeting processes are increasingly important. The
IPAP also gives some direction to reforms in personnel management, resource
management and generally establishing an affordable and sustainable defence
strategy.
36.    Of the three countries of the
South Caucasus, Georgia is the most advanced in the implementation of its
IPAP. The March 2006 full assessment has been very positive, highlighting the
tremendous progress achieved by Georgia since the Rose Revolution. Mr Razuks
noted that Georgia has established full civilian control over the Ministry of
Defence.
37.    Georgia now hopes to reach the
next level of integration into NATO with the adoption of Intensified Dialogue
(ID). According to Mr Razuks, NATO member states had agreed in principle to
grant ID to Georgia, however, there was still no consensus on a precise
timeline. In this context, several Georgian officials underlined the importance
of the support demonstrated by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly with the
adoption of a resolution on Georgia-NATO relations at the Paris Spring
Session. Support for NATO membership reportedly runs high among the Georgian
population, ranging between 75-85% according to several officials.
38.    Mr Razuks also lauded progress by
Azerbaijan and Armenia. An interim assessment of Azerbaijan’s IPAP, completed
in February 2006, was generally positive, while pinpointing several areas that
required further reforms. Armenian authorities had also proved very diligent
in the initial implementation phase of the IPAP. The priority now is the
adoption of the National Security Strategy and the demilitarization of the
Ministry of Defence.
39.    In contrast to Georgia’s strong
focus on NATO integration, membership in the European Union is considered a
long-term prospect. Mr Baramidze and Mr Bezhuashvili both insisted that
Georgia was far from ready for membership in the EU and that the upcoming
adoption of an action plan for the European Neighbourhood Policy represents the
extent of their current ambitions.Â
40.    Another priority of Georgia’s
foreign policy is the development of regional cooperation.Â
Mr Bezhuashvili underlined Georgia’s role in promoting a Black Sea
identity and regional cooperation frameworks. A good example was the recent
evolution of the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) grouping into the
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (ODED). This
transformation reflected the four countries’ determination to enhance dialogue
and cooperation on energy issues and democratic reforms, but also on terrorism,
separatism and unresolved conflicts. In this context, Georgia is ready to play
a proactive role in energy security. It is also prepared to act as mediator in
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
41.    Relations with Russia still
provide an important source of tension. Bones of contention include, among
others, Russia’s role in the frozen conflicts, the issue of Russian military
bases in Georgia, Russia’s economic boycotts of Georgian products, and energy
issues. However, both Mr Bezhuashvili and Mr Baramidze insisted that
Georgia favoured the pursuit of a dialogue on values and interests with Russia.
42.    Georgian officials repeatedly
assured the delegation of their commitment to a peaceful resolution of
conflicts. Ms Burjanadze underlined that the restoration of the territorial
integrity of Georgia remains a top priority for the current administration.Â
Georgian officials and representatives from NATO agreed that the Abkhazia and
South Ossetia conflicts have different roots and require different responses.
43.    Georgian officials also voiced
their dissatisfaction with current negotiation frameworks and peacekeeping
arrangements. This dissatisfaction was reflected in the resolutions adopted by
the Georgian parliament calling for a withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers in the
breakaway regions, which some foreign diplomats lauded as relatively moderate.Â
Georgian officials instead call for an international peacekeeping presence in
the region.Â
44.    The role of NATO in relation to
the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was also discussed in
several meetings. Mr Razuks made it clear that NATO did not aspire to a role
in the negotiation process, but that it would be ready to assist in any
post-settlement arrangement. Georgian officials insisted for their part that
the resolution of conflicts should not be considered as a pre-condition for
membership in NATO. According to them, this would mean granting a veto power
to Russia because Russia has tremendous influence over those two regions and
can prevent a resolution as long as it is in their interest to block Georgia’s
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
45.      Both Armenia and Georgia face
some similar challenges as small states going through the process of transition
from post-Soviet states to functioning democracies. Despite this broad
similarity, the two have developed very different foreign policy strategies for
furthering their national interests. Armenia has opted to balance its relationship
between west and east, while Georgia has clearly made a choice to join NATO as
soon as possible. As their interests and approaches to NATO differ, so must
NATO’s approach to them. It is in the interest of all concerned that NATO
maintain a flexible approach to the region, offering assistance based on the
needs and desires of the individual countries without becoming embroiled in the
conflicts that fragment the area. NATO should maintain consistent emphasis on
the reform process in all the countries of the South Caucasus, and help them
develop in a manner that would enable their further integration into
Euro-Atlantic structures over the long term.
