I.
Executive Summary
1.        Members of the
Science and Technology Committee's Subcommittee on Proliferation of Military
Technology visited Vienna, Austria and Geneva, Switzerland from 10-13 April
2006. The delegation of 24 legislators from member and associate countries, led
by Subcommittee Chairman Jérôme Rivière
(France) and Committee Chairman Michael
Mates (UK), met with representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The
NATO PA delegation also met with several key ambassadors to the IAEA and the UN
Conference on Disarmament. Members of the Subcommittee also visited the IAEA
Analytical Laboratories at Seibersdorf.
2.        Most of the
discussion at the IAEA focused on implications of Iran's nuclear policy. The
Agency's officials pointed out that Iranian authorities have not yet dispelled
concerns over Tehran's nuclear endeavours and some questions remain unanswered.
The Ambassadors of France and the United Kingdom to the IAEA criticised Tehran's posture and its reluctance to cooperate with the international community. They
regretted that Iran's decision to decline constructive proposals from the EU
and Russia left very little ground for optimism.
3.        During the visit,
NATO Parliamentarians also discussed other important issues, including nuclear
safety in power plants, the relevance and prospects of the CTBT, missile
defence and weapons in space, small arms control, challenges for the Conference
on Disarmament, humanitarian demining, social and economic benefits of climatic
research, prevention of natural disasters, the impact of emerging new military
technologies and the prospects of the Biological Weapons Convention.
II.
Meetings at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
4.        Mr. Tariq Rauf,
Head of Verification and Security Policy Co-ordination, briefed NATO
Parliamentarians about the objectives, functions and structure of the Agency,
emphasising that the IAEA serves as the world's nuclear verification
"watch dog" and is the world's foremost forum for scientific and
technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. He described
in detail the instruments possessed by the IAEA to verify the compliance of the
countries-signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The
traditional instruments are remote monitoring (installing cameras, seals and
sensors in nuclear facilities) and the analysis of environmental samplings
carried out in a network of analytical laboratories. The Additional Protocol is
of particular value because it allows the Agency to make more intrusive
inspections on two-hours notice and to receive more detailed information
related to the country's nuclear activities.
5.        With regard to Iran, Mr. Rauf pointed out that the information Tehran initially provided on its nuclear fuel cycle activities
was often incorrect and incomplete. Later on, however, Iranian authorities
provided acceptable answers to the majority of the IAEA's requests.
Nevertheless, three issues of concern remain:
1)
the origin of highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) and low-enriched uranium (LEU) particles found by IAEA inspectors
in the environmental samplings taken from Iranian uranium enrichment
centrifuges;
2)
the full extent of Iranian efforts
to acquire P-1 and P-2 centrifuges for the enrichment. The IAEA requested that Iran give access to the records of such efforts in order to ascertain that Iran does not have undeclared enrichment technologies;
3)
the refusal of Iranian authorities
to grant the Agency additional access to certain military bases in Iran that, according to some unofficial reports, might have been engaged in clandestine
uranium enrichment activities.
6.        Overall, Mr. Rauf
concluded that all the declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted
for, but the Agency was still not in a position to confirm that there are no
undeclared activities. Mr. Rauf also briefed the NATO PA delegation about the
history and the current status of the Agency's relations with North Korea.
7.        Answering the
questions of NATO parliamentarians, the speaker admitted that the IAEA does not
have institutionalised access to relevant intelligence information gathered by
NPT member states. The Agency would accept such information if a country
decided to share it. With regard to another set of questions related to non-NPT
countries, such as India or Israel, Mr. Rauf noted that the Agency had no power
to induce these countries to join the Treaty and to embrace commitments under
the IAEA Safeguards Agreements. The Agency is not responsible for the
universalisation of the NPT and the countries themselves should take an
initiative.
8.        Another speaker,
Mr. Ken E. Brockman, Director of the Division of Nuclear Installation Safety,
addressed the issue of nuclear safety. The international legal basis in this
field is quite developed and rests primarily of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, which provides a framework for a comprehensive dialog between nuclear
experts and officials from 56 contracting parties. In addition, the Code of
Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors deals with important issue of safety
of research reactors, some of which are in poor condition. The IAEA supports
the initiative to reorganise research reactors to operate on LEU, rather than
HEU. The Agency is also responsible for promulgating international standards
for the safety of nuclear installation operations. The IAEA standards cover not
only the safety of nuclear reactors, but also safety culture, human
performance, preparation to deal with possible emergencies and natural
disasters as well as data overload and effectiveness of decision-making. Asked
by NATO parliamentarians to assess the likelihood of a Chernobyl-type disaster,
Mr. Brockman stated that nuclear plants in Europe are safe and the likelihood
of such a disaster is extremely low.
9.        Mr. Miroslav
Gregoric, Office of Nuclear Security, made a presentation on the issue of the
security of nuclear materials. According to the records of the IAEA Illicit
Trafficking Database Programme, there are almost 700 confirmed trafficking
cases. Mr. Gregoric stressed the need for a comprehensive approach in dealing
with this issue, including sustainable prevention (first line of defence),
enhanced detection and monitoring (second line of defence), and effective
response (the third line of defence). Along those lines, the IAEA Board of
Governors (BoG) approved a new four-year Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009. A particularly worrying trend was the increased interest of sub-state actors in nuclear and
radioactive material. Efforts to deal with this threat are still in the initial
phase. The main challenge is to adopt a sustained andf consolidated effort
rather than an hoc approach. Asked by Lord Joppling (UK) about the
effectiveness of existing detection technologies, Mr. Gregoric observed
considerable progress in this area, but noted that if dangerous material is
well-shielded even the most advanced technologies might not detect it.
10.      In a separate
meeting, Ambassadors François-Xavier Deniau, Representative of France to the
IAEA, and Peter Redmond Jenkins, Representative of the United Kingdom, discussed the efforts of the European Troika to address the issue of Iran's nuclear policy. Ambassador Deniau admitted that there was no direct evidence that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons capability yet a variety of facts can hardly have another
explanation. After 18 years of deception and non-compliance and subsequent
years of grudging co-operation, Iran has largely lost its credibility, which
could be restored by a series of confidence-building measures. The European
Troika was determined to build a diplomatic solution that would both satisfy Iran's energy security needs and appease the concerns of the international community.
Unfortunately, Iran rejected the European proposals and withdrew from the Paris
Agreement. The IAEA will continue its work with Iran, but the ball is in the
court of the UN Security Council (UNSC).
11.      STC Chairman
Michael Mates questioned if there was a clear plan of action if Iran continued to ignore the resolutions of the IAEA BoG and the UNSC. Ambassador Jenkins
acknowledged that there was no consensus among the members of the UNSC: while
Western countries are in favour of curtailing the deadlines, Russia, for example, evidently opposes rigorous language with respect to Iran. Russia can hardly be persuaded to endorse sanctions as Russia's own economic interests in might be
harmed. Mrs. Ana Gomes (European Parliament) noted that the very integrity of
the NPT is at stake not least because of mixed signals sent by US authorities
engaging in nuclear cooperation with India, a non-NPT state. The ambassadors
replied by suggesting that one not ignore the positive outcomes of the US-India
deal for nuclear safety and security in the world. Mr. Yuly Kvistinsky (Russian federation) asserted that the West pursues a policy of double standards towards Iran and warned that this might lead to 'another Iraq'. The Ambassadors strongly disagreed with this
allegation and pointed out that the 'Iranian crisis' was exclusively a
proliferation crisis and a crisis of confidence. The reports of the IAEA
unambiguously indicate that Iran breached its commitments under the Safeguards
Agreement. Furthermore, there are strong indications that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons capacity. "It's the risk the international community
cannot run", said ambassador Deniau. Mr. Mario Palombo suggested that we
not be naïve about Iran's true intentions and that we have the courage to take
resolute actions. Asked by the Sub-Committee Chairman Jérôme Riviere to comment
on the likelihood and consequences of hypothetical military action against Iran, Ambassador Deniau stressed that he believed in negotiations which are the only right
solution.
12.      The Sub-Committee
delegation also visited IAEA Analytical Laboratories in Seibersdorf, near Vienna, where scientists explained how nuclear energy
could be used for a variety of peaceful purposes from optimising soil and water management practices to
increasing genetic diversity for crop improvement. NATO parliamentarians could
also visit the IAEA Clean Laboratory for Safeguards where analysis of
environmental samplings takes place to detect clandestine or undeclared nuclear
activities in countries subject to full-scope safeguards.
III.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)
13.      Ambassador Tibor
Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, gave
an overview of the current status of the CTBT. The Treaty is signed by 176
countries and ratified by 132. However, the lack of key ratifications means
that the treaty has yet to enter into force. The Treaty still needs to be
ratified by India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, the Peoples Republic of China, the United States, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia and Columbia. In spite of that,
the CTBTO is already well advanced in developing the International Monitoring
System (IMS), a network of stations using 4 types of technologies
(seismological, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide) to detect nuclear
explosions. The collected data can also be used to detect and even forecast
earthquakes, tsunamis, volcano eruptions and other natural events as well as
conventional explosions. Data is relayed from stations to the CTBTO
International Data Centre (IDC) for data processing. Although still only 50%
operational, IMS picks up thousands of events every year, albeit only a tiny
part of them are actually relevant. Due to the novelty of the system it is
still not quite clear how it could be used in the civil sector. The experts of
the CTBTO presented in detail the technologies used by its stations, the work of
the IDC and preparations for possible on-site inspections - an additional tool
of the CTBTO verification regime that cannot be invoked before the entry into
force of the Treaty.
14.      During the
discussion, Ambassador Tóth underscored the importance of Treaty ratification.
The existing uncertainty seriously limits the use of CTBTO verification system.
For example, the IDC is in provisional operation mode and will not operate 24
hours-a-day before the entry into force of the Treaty. Ms. Gomes (European Parliament)
asked if the CTBTO system shared its information with respective governments
during the tsunami disaster in the South-East Asia. Ambassador Tóth explained
that the IMS had recorded the earthquake
west of northern Sumatra. The first automatic event list containing the Sumatra earthquake was released by the IDC to states-signatories about two hours after the
event. The IMS detectors proved to be remarkably accurate. The CTBTO
representatives stressed, however, that their system provides nothing but raw
data and it is up to the countries themselves to make conclusions and take
necessary actions.
IV.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
15.      The visit of the
STC delegation in Geneva started with briefings at the UNIDIR. Dr. Christophe
Carle, Deputy Director of the UNIDIR, presented research activities of the
Institute which was established to assist diplomatic negotiations and
disarmament efforts and to engage the arms control and disarmament community on
a variety of current topics. In
his presentation, Dr. Carle emphasised several salient security issues that so
far lack appropriate attention. MANPADs ("Man-Portable Air-Defence
System") - shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles - present an enormous
security challenge especially in an era plagued with terrorism. MANPADs are not
covered by exisiting international regulations, perhaps with the exception of
the Wassenaar Arangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies (40 member states). During recent conflicts and
turmoils, a considerable number of MANPADs have been stolen. Easy to use and
readily available on the black market, MANPADS pose an acute threat to military
aircraft and civilian airliners. Dr. Carle said that humanity was rather lucky so
far to have avoided such attacks, but we cannot count on luck for long. He
called for extending the Wassenaar Arrangement and introducing additional
worldwide international regulations in this area.
16.      With regard
to missile defence (MD) systems, Dr. Carle observed that the proliferation of
MD systems is greater than proliferation of missiles themselves. The debate
whether MD has a future is pointless: these systems are already being developed
and deployed progressively by a number of countries in the world, including Russia, China and North Korea. It is important to avoid, however, a new arms race in MD systems and
new international initiatives are needed. One possible way could be using the
model of the Russian-proposed Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation
of Missiles and Missile Technology.
17.      Dr. Carle
also urged to pay particular attention to the question of space debris which is
dangerously increasing. Even smallest particles spinning around the Earth at
enormous speed could cause substantial damage for space assets, further
increase debris and thus invoke a chain reaction which would bring disastrous
consequences for our civilisation.
18.      Mr. Palombo
(Italy) emphasised the reality of the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles
for the civilian aircraft. These missiles could be launched from trucks outside
the guarded airport territory. Several members of the Assembly underlined the
need to account for these missiles by imposing a system to follow the route of
a missile from producers to end-users. Dr. Carle noted that the UNIDIR is
actually working on the list of producers of such missiles. As far as military
uses of space are concerned, Mr. Rafael Gimalov (Russia) stated that the
existing international regulatory system is outdated and needs to be ammended
to encompass new challenges. Dr. Carle replied by ensuring that the UNIDIR is
preparing documents to review the outer space law, but regretted that
substantial breakthrough in this area is currently not possible due to the
deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
19.      Ms. Valerie
Yankey-Wayne, UNIDIR Researcher, spoke specifically on the issue of small
arms and light weapons (SALW). She reviewed the international instruments and
regional initiatives including NATO PfP Trust Fund that deals with illicit
manufacturing, trafficking and destruction SALW. Ms. Yankey-Wayne identified
the black market of SALW as a huge problem. Referring to parliamentary
contribution, she urged legislators to join the Parliamentary Forum on SALW (the
international platform designed to support
parliamentarians in their small arms related work); and to join their
government delegations to UN
Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its
Aspects, New York, 9-20 January 2006.
V.
United Nations Conference on Disarmament
20.      In Geneva,
the delegation also met with three CD ambassadors: the current Chairman of
the CD Mr. Doru Romulus Costea
(Romania), previous Chairman Mr.
Zdzisław Rapacki (Poland), and Mr. Eduardas Borisovas
(Lithuania), the co-ordinator of the working group on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).
21.      Ambassador
Costea gave a brief overview of CD's accomplishments in negotiating treaties
such as NPT, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and
CTBT. However, since the conclusion of the CTBT in 1995, no other treaty has
been concluded at the CD. The Conference is unable to reach consensus on any of
its four core issues: Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), nuclear
disarmament, Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and negative security assurance.
22.      There are
several reasons for the deadlock:
1)
some delegations tend to
sustain a very tight linkage between all four issues. In other words, they
require progress in all four areas, making a progress in one conditional on the
progress in another;
2)
the agenda itself is
considered outdated by some countries;
3)
national priorities differ
and sometimes are mutually exclusive;
4)
some nations abuse the
principle of consensus even when it comes to procedural matters.
23.      Ambassador
Rapacki elaborated on the steps undertaken by the previous Polish presidency to
break the deadlock. As the substantial reform of the CD is not plausible, in
order to get the Conference moving, thematic debates were introduced for each
presidency. For example, under the Romanian leadership, the debate focuses on
FMTC, while the upcoming Russian presidency will embark upon the issues related
to the outer space. The Polish diplomat believed it is necessary to address
issues in a piecemeal manner and to forget about conditionality. Asked by the
Committee Chairman Mr. Mates and Lord Joppling (UK) to name specific countries
that stall the work of the CD, both ambassador Costea and ambassador Rapacki
said they were not in a position to do that but mentioned that different
countries block different initiatives.
24.      Ambassador
Borisovas discussed the acute issue of explosive remnants of war. The Protocol
V of the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) deals with this problem, but it is yet to enter
into force due to the lack of two additional ratifications. Mr. Borisovas urged
the parliamentarians to support ratification of the Protocol if their parliaments
had not done so yet.
VI.
Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
25.      The issues
of humanitarian demining were discussed during the meeting with Mr. Robert
Diethelm, Support Director of GICHD and Mr. Tim Lardner, Mine Action
Specialist. Two international instruments deal with the issue: 1) the Protocol
II of the CCW, which
restricts (not prohibits) the use of all land-mines; 2) the Ottawa
Convention, which prohibits the anti-personnel mines (APMs). The Ottawa convention is a real success. It is signed by 150 states, but unfortunately, some
key countries such as the US, Russia and China are absent. APMs pose an immense
challenge as they are difficult to find and remove. Mr. Diethelm identified
major elements of the Mine Action programme: education programmes (teaching
communities how to live near mines), mine clearing, stockpile destruction,
victim assistance and the international advocacy of demining. It is important
to note that the actual demining has to be carried by local deminers. The
international assistance focuses merely on providing funding, equipment,
know-how, advice and management. It is also extremely important to use
available resources wisely, i.e., to ensure that clearing mines near inhabited
places is a priority.
26.      According
to Mr. Lardner, the progress in demining technologies has been steady albeit
not remarkable. No fundamentally new techniques were introduced, but the
traditional ones are being increasingly enhanced and mastered. These techniques
include:
1)
odour detection, a popular
and effective technique that employs the scent of specially trained sniffer
dogs, rats and sometimes other animals such as pigs or bees. A new methodology
called REST is being developed based on remote sensing. REST involves scent from a source being collected on
filters and presented to animals for analysis (detection).
2)
mechanical applications
such as tractors carrying massive metal detectors, are irreplaceable for
certain missions, for example, clearing roads in Sudan. However, maintenance of
such machines may prove to be extremely complicated.
3)
manual clearing, the
slowest but still the most reliable technique.
VII.
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
27.      Due to the
constant interest of the STC in climate issues, briefings were organised for
the delegation at the WMO, a specialised agency of the UN for meteorology (weather and climate),
operational hydrology and related geophysical sciences. Mr. Gilles Sommeria, Senior Scientific Officer at the World Climate
Research Programme, addressed specifically the issue of global warming. A
worldwide network of ground-, sea- and air-based stations as well as satellites
provides an enormous amount of data on change of temperature and levels of
greenhouse gases in different parts of the world. The scientific analysis
suggests that a dramatic increase in temperatures in the last 100 years is
related to human activity. All estimates indicate that the global warming
trends will continue in future. Therefore, the international community has to
be prepared to deal with negative consequences including coastal erosion,
desertification, increases in natural disasters such as storms, increases in
health risks in the tropics, increases in floods and precipitation in humid
areas and permafrost decrease, etc. An
increase in natural disasters as a result of global warming could cost the
world over $300 billion annually by the year 2050.
28.      Mr.
Rodolfo de Guzman, Director of the Strategic Planning Office, stressed that
the importance of the social and economic benefits of weather-, climate- and
water research is often unappreciated due to low visibility of meteorological
services. However, credible meteorological data is crucial in many areas
including agriculture, fishery, energy sector, transportation, tourism, health
and so forth. Investing in meteorology results in 400-500% return of
investments, Mr de Guzman stressed.
29.      According
to Ms. Maryam Golnaraghi, Chief of the Natural Disaster Prevention and
Mitigation Programme, hydro-meteorological natural disasters (HMNDs) such as
storms, avalanches, floods and droughts are more frequent and disastrous than
geological ones (earthquakes and volcano eruptions). HMNDs have an increasingly
negative impact on economy, food security, water resources, health and other
aspects of life. This is especially the case for the developing countries. HMDs
cannot be avoided but it is possible to avoid or at least diminish losses in
human lives. Effective meteorological services are crucial in order to achieve
this. Many countries of the world are still very much in a reactive mode,
instead they need to focus more on prevention.
30.      The experts at the
WMO refused to comment on explicitly political issues, such as ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol, but urged the politicians to take necessary decisions based
on evidence provided by the scientific community.
VIII. International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
31.      On the last day of
the visit, members of the Subcommittee visited the headquarters of the ICRC. Mr.
Louis Maresca, Legal
Adviser at the ICRC Legal Division, discussed the current status of and main
challenges for the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL seeks to minimise
effects of armed conflicts on people who no longer participate in fighting. The
main principle of the IHL: it is prohibited to use weapons of a nature that
might cause superfluous injury and suffering. IHL succeeded in prohibiting or
restricting the use of exploding bullets, chemical and biological weapons,
non-detectable fragments, mines, incendiary weapons, blinding lasers and the
explosive remnants of war. The ICRC experts are involved in promoting IHL and
developing respective international conventions.
32.      Dr. Robin Coupland, adviser on armed violence and the effects of weapons for the ICRC, addressed
the issue of biological weapons (BW). He admitted that one could foresee the
emergence of new, exotic and attractive agents that are easier to produce and
to deliver. Even the feasibility of 'ethnic targeting' can no longer be
completely ruled out. The sense of responsibility and consciousness of the
scientific community is of utmost importance. Scientists must realise that some
of their publications might serve as a cookbook for terrorists. He stressed
that scientists often are not aware that production of BW is legally
prohibited. The future biologists should be informed of that at university.
However, it is difficult to effectively stop BW research and development due to
the dual-use nature of many bio agents. Dr. Coupland especially underscored the
need for the upcoming BWC Review Conference to send a clear signal in order to
uphold the norm of prohibition. However, he was 'slightly pessimistic' about
the success of this conference due to the evident lack of consensus among the
countries on the future of the BWC.
33.      Dr. Coupland also
spoke about an interesting issue of "Non-Lethal Weapons" (NLWs). He
asserted that NLW is merely an attractive marketing term because most of these
weapons can cause serious damage and even lethality. Some NLWs are strikingly
inhuman, for example blinding lasers that are prohibited by a separate
convention. Dr. Coupland presented different types of NLWs, such as acoustic,
electric, electromagnetic, etc. He stressed that the ICRC is neither
"for" nor "against" NLWs. Some of them might indeed be
irreplaceable, for example, in hostage crisis situations. The main issue is how
to distinguish truly non-lethal weapons from those that cause serious damage to
a victim.
34.      The Subcommittee
delegation also visited the impressive International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Museum.
