I.
Introduction
1.        Seven
members of the Defence and Security and Political Committees visited Afghanistan from 17-21 May. Led by Sven Mikser (Estonia), the group met with military
commanders, Afghan officials and representatives of international organizations
working to improve conditions in Afghanistan. The delegation also visited the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) at Feyzabad in Afghanistan’s northeastern
Badakshan province to view first hand the developments in that part of the
country.
2.        In
general, the delegation found that while much has been accomplished, a
tremendous amount remains to be done before Afghanistan can stand on its own.Â
The elements of a democratic state are in place and becoming stronger, but the
central government has limited control over large parts of the south and east
of the country. Many development projects are progressing well but ensuring
security is vital if self-sustaining economic development is to take root.Â
Nonetheless, given the tribal structure and more than 30 years of civil war Afghanistan will remain one of the least developed countries in the world in the
foreseeable future. The Afghan National Security Forces, in particular the
Army, are making impressive progress, but corruption is prevalent in the police
force, especially the highway police.
3.        The
delegation visit coincided with a critical time in the mission as NATO is
taking control of overall operations in the south of Afghanistan. This move
represents a new degree of synergy between ISAF and the US-led coalition forces
currently operating in the region. It is a difficult area marked by Taliban
violence and NATO forces will more than double the number of troops in the
region. Military commanders were careful to underline that the mission is not
a peacekeeping operation and that NATO forces will only be useful if they have
the flexibility to be used for a wide range of missions.
4.        Military
and civilian officials alike emphasised the need to increase the commitment of
resources to the mission. Military commanders consistently noted the lack of
air transportation assets, which hinders their ability to assist the government
of Afghanistan extend its legitimate authority into the more troubled parts of
the country. Development officials noted the vast infrastructural projects
needed to improve the overall situation in Afghanistan. In particular,
irrigation, road construction and energy projects could both speed the economic
development of Afghanistan and allow for greater entrenchment of the central
government in remote areas.
5.        The
challenges that Afghanistan faces are many and intertwined. Development cannot
take place without security, but there will be no lasting security without
development. While there are many signs of improvement, more ‘concentration of
effort’ among the civilian donors as well as between the civil and the military
side is necessary. The success of the counter-narcotics programme heavily
hinges on the ability to provide viable alternative livelihoods, but this is
dependent on building roads and irrigation systems that make other crops a
viable alternative. Yet, projects of this nature are virtually impossible
without some level of security against those forces that seek to arrest Afghanistan’s progress and drag it back to the medieval governance of the Taliban years.Â
II.
Meetings with Military Commanders and NATO
Officials
6.        The
delegation met with Minister Hikmet Cetin, the NATO Senior Civilian
Representative, the Commander of ISAF, Lt. General David Richards, and
the Chief of Staff of ISAF, Maj. General Chris Brown as well as
the deputy commander of British forces in Afghanistan Col. Stewart Douglas.
7.        The
military commanders emphasised the importance of Stage 3 in which NATO takes
control of operations in the south of Afghanistan. With this step, NATO is
taking on the most demanding operation in its history. Military commanders
underlined that this is a combat operation and the larger number of troops in
that troubled region would only be useful if they could be used robustly. Gen.
Richards in particular was adamant about the need for flexible forces that can
be used for a range of missions. The General and others informed the
delegation that national caveats have further been eliminated, but that further
improvements in this area are required.
8.        Meetings
with the military leadership also alleviated some of the confusion resulting
from the distinction between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism and the
respective roles of ISAF and the US-led coalition. Counter-insurgency operations
involve the use of a basket of tools and seek to deprive insurgents of safe
havens from which they can cause instability in the region. Gen. Richards
referred to the “ink spot†strategy of creating areas of stability and relative
prosperity that would spread and eventually link together, thus depriving the
insurgents of areas where they can operate with impunity. Counter-terrorist
operations are more narrowly tailored operations to kill or capture particular
high-value Al-Qaida terrorists operating in the region. ISAF will do the
former task, which will involve combat operations. The latter task will be
conducted by the US-led coalition, which is coming under the command of ISAF.Â
The commanders who met with the delegation acknowledged that it is often a
subtle distinction and that the soldier on the ground cannot be expected to
distinguish between the two.
9.        Gen.
Richards also emphasised the need for a quick transition from Stage 3 to Stage
4 when ISAF will take command of all operations in the country including
eastern Afghanistan. This will insure that there will not be any artificial
line between ISAF and the US-led coalition currently in control of operations
in eastern Afghanistan.Â
10.      Gen
Richards in particular underlined the importance of setting developmental
priorities and creating a seamless web between security and development
efforts. Security and development efforts are currently not sufficiently
synchronized but they must become so to ensure lasting success. He strongly
suggested to provide more focus to the ongoing reconstruction:Â priority should
be given to projects in the sectors of irrigation, roads and energy supply.Â
Significant improvements in those areas would allow farmers to grow viable
crops other than opium poppies and transport them to market. By focusing on
irrigation and roads, the international community could make a stronger
contribution to basic infrastructure that would improve the reach of the
central government and make it possible to have a sustained counter-narcotics
programme.
11.      All military as well as
civilian leaders also emphasised that their presence is only at the request of
the government of Afghanistan. The overall mission is to the support the
government of Afghanistan in its efforts to create a stable environment that
will allow the sort of development that has passed Afghanistan by for several
decades. NATO forces will leave if and when the government of Afghanistan
requests that foreign troops leave the country. But all the officials that the
delegation met with expected that the mission will last for years to come.
III.
Meetings with Afghan officials and Other
Civilian OfficIals
12.      The
delegation met with President Hamid Karzai, Deputy Minister of the
Interior Sediqi, several western Ambassadors, and representatives of the UN
and the EU. During a dinner the delegation also the opportunity to meet and
discuss with several members of the parliament of Afghanistan including Mrs
Fawzia Koofi, Deputy Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) and the
Afghan conciliator, Professor Modjaddidi Sebghatollah.
13.      President
Karzai expressed his deep appreciation for the continued support of the
international community and NATO in particular. However, he warned against the
misperception that Afghanistan would be a “done jobâ€. He acknowledged,
however, that there is still a long way to go before Afghanistan can be
considered stable. The most important factor to him was the continuation of
the war on terror with a more strategic outlook. President Karzai was critical
of the role of Pakistan and emphasised the need to tackle the problem on that
side of the border where radical madrasses turn out large numbers of
radicalized students eager to participate in jihad in Afghanistan. In addition
to improving border control, Islamabad must also do more to tackle Taliban
training camps on its side of the border. He urged western governments to take
a stronger line with Pakistan. He acknowledged the steps that the government
of Pakistan has already taken, but believed that more should be done to control
the spread of radicalism from Pakistan.
14.      UN and
EU officials noted that the security situation in the country is quite complex
and is not simply driven by Taliban insurgents. According to the most recent
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) analysis of violent
conflict in Afghanistan, less than 20 percent of the violent incidents in the
country could be attributed to insurgency. The bulk of the violence in the
country is driven by tribal conflict, or personal disputes over land and other
factors. The insurgency, however, does cause nearly 70 percent of the
casualties given that it increasingly uses indiscriminant weapons such as
improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers.
15.      Western
Ambassadors and military commanders alike noted that the insurgency is very
limited in its reach and popular appeal, but the increased use of terror
tactics such as improvised explosive devices increases the level of attention
focused on it. The general assessment of the Taliban insurgency is that their
active fighters have dwindled to number in the hundreds at any one time and
they cannot take and hold territory.Â
IV.
Visit to PRT at Feyzabad
16.      In
addition to the meetings in the capital Kabul, the delegation also visited the
PRT in the Badakhshan province in the northeast of Afghanistan. The PRT is
under German command but features troops from a number of countries including
Denmark, the Czech Republic and Belgium. It is one of the larger PRTs with some
400 troops, but it covers an area the size of Denmark with a population of
approximately 1 million. There are no paved roads in the entire province and
much of the region is simply impassable with any vehicle. The PRT has no
helicopters although air support can be called in from Termez or Kabul. As a
result, the soldiers cannot patrol significant parts of the province,
especially in the east and north. The difficult terrain also limits the
possibility for effective border control. As the delegation learned, much of
the drugs produced in Afghanistan are being transferred via this border.
17.      The PRT
is designed to support the government of Afghanistan in building its
institutions in the region. The province is a particularly poor and remote
part of the country, even by Afghan standards. Therefore, the PRT’s mission is
to secure the region, show a visible presence, and assist in development by
making the area more stable and secure. As part of this mission the PRT also
offers some support to the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) and the
counter-narcotics programme.
18.      Describing
the security situation as “mainly calm, but unstable†the commander of the PRT
outlined the tenuous position of Afghan government institutions in the area.Â
The Governor is a reportedly capable administrator, but coming from a different
ethnic group he does not have broad support among the other regional players.Â
So called “local power brokers†remain important even after the dismantlement
of the large militias. One in particular maintains a clan-based network with
ties into drug production and smuggling that reaches into the local police and
the highway police. The problem is that he was a key player in fighting off
the Russian military and in preventing the Taliban from establishing a grip on
the province. Thus, he has considerable popular support in the region and any
rapid moves against him would likely backfire against the government
institutions and the PRT.Â
19.      Similar problems restrict the
efficacy of the poppy elimination programme. Although the area is not a centre
of poppy cultivation, poppy fields could be seen from the main road. The town
was filled with posters and notices telling the population that the cultivation
of poppy is illegal and that their poppy crops would be destroyed, but the
tractors designated for the eradication programme were parked in the centre of
town. PRT officials said that it would be unlikely that they would get the
fuel to move out to the fields given the general hostility to the programme. Â
It is expected that the poppy harvest in the region will increase this year.Â
PRT officials emphasised that the poppy eradication programme will be stalled
until there is substantial material support for the alternative livelihoods programme.
V.
Conclusions
20.      Afghanistan
continues to make progress towards stability on a variety of levels. Although
governing institutions remain weak, they have continuously improved over the
last few years. The large militias have been disbanded and their leaders
either co-opted or marginalized. The threat from the Taliban remains serious
but it is by all accounts incapable of mounting a serious challenge to the
central government. Corruption in the police force is endemic, but Afghan
National Police units performed well in recent engagements with insurgents and
the Afghan National Army shows signs of continual improvement.Â
21.      The
counter-narcotics effort stands out as one area where all efforts so far have
not generated positive change. To some extent the problem may be intractable
until it is possible to create viable alternative livelihoods for Afghan
farmers. Until irrigation systems are repaired and roads are constructed to
allow farmers to get crops to the market, opium will remain one of the few
viable crops in many regions. It is also critical to address the demand side
of the problem. Afghan farmers grow opium poppies to meet the demand for
heroin in Europe. If demand fell, so would the financial incentive to produce
opium.Â
