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ISAF Mission Update NATO Parliamentary Assembly – 17 May

'NATO has to deliver. The NATO allies have to show their solidarity. This is not just an operation where the one or the other ally decides in its own right.'

NATO Sec Gen Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – 9 Jan 06



Agenda





- ARRC
- Afghanistan
- COMISAF Intent
- Current ISAF IX
 - Transition
 - Stage 3
 - Stage 4
 - ISAF X
- Key Issues



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
ARRC – Potted History





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Graduated Readiness Forces



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Assessed Mission



HQ ARRC, as a High Readiness Force (Land) HQ is to be prepared to deploy under NATO, EU or coalition auspices to a designated area, to undertake combined and joint operations across the operational spectrum as:


- A Corps HQ
- A Land Component Command (LCC) HQ, including NRF and Combined Joint Operations (CJFLCC)

in order to support crisis management options or the sustainment of extant operations.



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National Contributions 2006



292 Officers

(437 All Ranks)

+ (BE) Liaison Officer



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NATO and EU Operations



NRF

2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
JFCS	JHQ Lisbon	JFCB	JFCS	JHQ Lisbon	JFCB
IT (3)	GE/NL (4)	SP (5)	UK (6)	Eu (7)	TU (8)
			IT (9)	GE/NL (10)	SP (12)
					UK (13)

ISAF

2004	2005	2006	2007
Eu (6)	TU (7)	IT (8)	UK (9)
			Composite HQ

EUFOR

2004	2005	2006
UK	UK	IT



Bonn Process – Key Achievements



- Security
 - ↳ Haven for terrorists
- Government
 - ↳ Taliban controlled
 - ↳ Civil War
- Socio-Economics
 - ↳ Crumbling/non-existent infrastructure

2001



OEF
Oct 01



Bonn I
Dec 01



ISAF
Feb 02




Bonn II
Dec 02



NATO/ISAF
Aug 03



Parliamentary Elections
Sep 05



Parliamentary Elections
Sep 05

A moderate, stable, and representative Afghanistan capable of controlling and governing its territory

2005

- Security
 - ↳ Shrinking refuge
 - ↳ Development of Afghan National Security Forces
- Governance & Justice
 - ↳ President Elected
 - ↳ Successful National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections
- Economic & Strategic Reconstruction
 - ↳ International reconstruction underway


Significant progress; challenges remain



Political Overview



- AFG elections (NAPCE) broadly a success.
- Confirmation of 20 (of 25) GOA Ministers now completed;
- Wolesi now considering proposed Supreme Court Judges and draft budget while awaiting new nominations in place of the 5 rejected Ministers.
- GOA can now concentrate on:
 - Continuing to build administrative capacity
 - Working with Parliament
 - Extending reach of government, targeting criminality & factionalism
- AFG has strong international backing and good relations with neighbours – PAK possible exception
 - Continued gradual progress in the AFG/PAK Mil-Mil Coalition/ISAF Mentored Tri-partite process.



NAPCE Results 2005:



Law Makers versus Law Breakers

- 40 members have on-going links with illegal armed groups
- 24 members have links to criminal gangs
- 17 members are drug traffickers
- 19 members face serious allegations of war crimes and human rights violations
- A more pessimistic assessment given by the AIHRC was that “more than 80% of winning candidates in the provinces and more than 60% in Kabul have links to armed groups.”




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Poppy Cultivation '03-05 & Expected Trends '06



Afghanistan: Opium Poppy Cultivation by province 2003-2005



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
(as at Nov 05)



Overview of Afghan Economy




Structure of Afghan Economy



Informal economic in different sectors

Sector	% of total	% share inf.
Manufacturing	9%	0-10%
Public administration	3%	0-10%
Mining	0%	0-10%
Construction	3%	0-10%
Other services	3%	10-50%
Trade	6%	10-50%
Transp, tel, power	8%	10-50%
Livestock	4%	50-90%
Other crops	2%	50-90%
Cereals	27%	90-100%
Opium	35%	100%


Source: WB, Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth and reducing Poverty, 9 Sept 2004



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AFG Donor Funding

(2004 MOI figures - pledged 2002-2009 *)



Through Kabul

- USA \$5.04bn (2002-4 only)
- World Bank \$1.47bn
- ADB \$1.3bn
- EC \$1.28bn
- Japan \$0.9bn
- UK \$0.86bn
- Germany \$0.7bn
- Other \$0.12bn (Saudi, Iran, Kuwait, India, Pakistan)

U.S. CERP Funding (2005-2006)

- CJTF-76 \$67m
- CFC-A \$50m (Distributed to U.S. PRTs)
- CG \$16m
- TF Phoenix \$2m



The Afghanistan Compact



- Agreed by 50 Nations at the London Conference on 31 Jan – 01 Feb 06, co-chaired by UK and Government of Afghanistan (GOA)
- Supports the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals and the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy
- Three critical and interdependent pillars of activity for the 5 years of the Compact
 - Security
 - Genuine security remains a fundamental prerequisite. To be achieved through strengthening AFG institutions to meet the security needs
 - Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights
 - Democratic governance and the protection of human rights constitute the cornerstone of sustained political progress in AFG
 - Economic and Social Development
 - Pursue high rates of sustainable economic growth with the aim to reduce hunger, poverty and unemployment
- **Counter-Narcotics, a cross-cutting priority**
 - Aim to achieve a sustained and significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view to complete elimination



ARRC Deployment as ISAF IX




- 9 month deployment to AFG as part of a seamless 18 month NATO transition, in partnership with NRDC-IT
 - NRDC IT ISAF VIII Aug 05 to May 06
 - HQ ARRC ISAF IX May 06 to Feb 07
- 5 Phase NATO Operation
 - Phase 1 – Assessment and Preparation: **COMPLETE**
 - Phase 2 – Geographic Expansion
 - Stage 1 North : **COMPLETE**
 - Stage 2 West : **COMPLETE**
 - Stage 3 South
 - Stage 4 East
 - Phase 3 – Stabilisation
 - Phase 4 – Transition
 - Phase 5 – Redeployment



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ISAF - CONOPS




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Current Force Laydown






North and West: RACs, FSBS and PRTs



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


ISAF IX Mission Analysis

Key Points (1)

Grand Strategic Aim: ***NATO as a confident, expeditionary force able to be used on the most demanding operations***

- Success in Afghanistan key to future of NATO
- Conversely, perceived failure has big implications for NATO's future
- Regional Stability, Global Counter-Terrorism and West/PK relationship



ISAF IX Mission Analysis

Key Points (2)

Strategic Aim: *HQ ISAF IX must leave Afghanistan demonstrably 'better' than when it arrived*

- Long term COIN campaign, including CN, ANA and broader SSR, to set the conditions in which economic growth can occur will be key
- US keen to handover to NATO and reduce force levels, but will only do so if confident that NATO will deliver, and beyond HQ ARRC's tenure.
- Need to keep US engaged
- NATO expansion and merged C2 is a key means to achieve success, but not an end in itself
- Significant resource constraints – need to ensure any resources or deployments achieve maximum impact. IO key



ISAF IX Mission Analysis

Key Points (3)

Operational: *Effective, Coordinated Campaign*

- Importance of Governance, Economy, SSR, CN lines of operation as part of the long term COIN campaign. Key will be good coordination
- Handover of south and east to NATO command must be achieved 'seamlessly' as far as possible (simultaneous or minimum air gap)
- Command and Control will, as ever, be key
- Must have operational reach/effect
- Regional relationships, especially with Pakistan, key




ISAF IX Mission Analysis

Key Points (4)

Tactical: Successful, targeted tactical action

- Focus of threat in south and east, but potential for resurgent threat in centre, north and west
- Given national caveats and different standards, need ability to flex capability theatre-wide when necessary
- Need to utilise indigenous forces as much as possible
- Tactical action must reflect needs of economic development

ISAF IX - Transitional HQ





COMISAF IX Main Effort



My Main Effort is to extend and deepen the areas in which the GOA and IAs/NGOs can safely operate in the interests of the people of Afghanistan, enabling the ANSF increasingly to take the lead in achieving this aim. In this way too I will seize the initiative against those who oppose the GOA through violent means, by using appropriate and well considered measures - including the robust use of force, should it be necessary – at times and in places of my choosing thereby forcing them to respond to my design.

1 February 2006



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1 February 2006



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HQ ISAF IX



PIO - LTC Borremann (UK)
 DEVAD - Ms Harkin (UK DFID), Ms Parker (USAID)
 PRISM - Dr Mills

COM
 Lt Col Richard Richards

POLAD - Mr Jagger (UK)
 Media Advisor - Mr Lally (NATO)
 LEGAD - LTC Bullough (UK)

DCOM Stab
 MG Gay (IT)

COS
 MG Brown (UK)

DOS
 Col Hoell (DA)

DCOM SY
 MG Freakley (US)

DCOM AIR
 MG Ahrens (GE)

DCOS Sp
 Brig Dale (UK)

DCOS Ops
 BG(P) Layfield (US)

Dep DCOS Sp
 Col Godfrin (FR)

Dep DCOS Ops
 Col Fernandez (SP)

CJOC Dir
 BG Ammon (GE)

Engr
 Brig Davis (UK)

CJ2
 Col Bailey (UK)

CJ5
 Col Aldridge (UK)

CJ7
 Brig Smith (UK)

JCEB
 Brig Purdy (UK)

LNO
 Col Peterson (DA)

FPM
 Col Giles (UK)

Ch CJ3
 Col Jaskit (GE)

Air Ops Dir
 Col Lornaine (NL)

OAB
 Mr Richardson (UK)

Info Ops
 Col Seifarth (US)

Tgts
 Col Lamanna (IT)

CJ9
 Col Kuipers (NL)

CJ3

FP

CJOC


CJ1
 LTC Jones (UK)

CJ4
 Col McGarr (UK)

CJ6
 Brig Pope (UK)


CJ8
 Col Walker (UK)

CJMed
 Col Kluge (GE)



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
Stage 3 Transition Jul-Aug 06






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
Stage 4 Transition Sep-Nov 06



- Key Issues**
- Seek to influence CONOPS
 - Shape NATO CJSOR for Stage 4 expansion
 - Leverage greater International commitment to Stage 4
 - ~ 5 trained and equipped Afghan National Army Brigades in RC East




ANSF Partnership



- US ETT
- CJTF-76 Partner Unit
- ▲ US ODA Partner Unit
- NATO Partner Unit


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Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)



- Government of Afghanistan lead
- International support led by Japan, UNAMA
- Successor to DDR
- Purpose is Disbandment
 - Disarmament is part of the process
- In each Province, 3 stages:
 - Voluntary
 - Negotiated
 - Enforced
- Full range of levers:
 - Political
 - Economic – but not as precondition or direct reward
 - Social
 - Public Information
 - Law Enforcement
- ISAF in support



Key Strategic Issues



- Commitment – will nations continue to support expanded NATO mission? Is NATO up to it?
- Coordination of campaign across all lines of operation - Coherence: the underpinning purpose
 - Breaking into and re-focussing an established operation, NATO & OEF - a single campaign.
 - Who is the civilian lead? UN, NATO, G8, (EU Role?).
- Nations focus on individual regions and areas of responsibility rather than theatre-wide campaign (e.g. Helmand Province for UK).