1.
Allied operations in Afghanistan are the first test of NATO outside Europe. The country, which became a breeding
ground for internationally active terrorist groups, is central for the security
of the Alliance. Afghanistan is the most important theatre of operations. It
is the litmus test for NATO's ability to act and follow up on what member
states have promised. The Alliance has staked its credibility on the success of
this mission. Therefore, the outcome will also heavily impact on its military and political
cohesion and is part and parcel of the debate on the transformation of the Alliance.Â
2.
This report suggests that
NATO must apply the lessons of the operations in Afghanistan to NATO’s ongoing
military and political transformation. To that end, NATO needs to further
strengthen the expertise and capabilities it has acquired and apply the lessons
learned in future missions. To prevent spill-over of crises from the regions of
Europe’s periphery, NATO is likely to be involved in ‘out-of-area’ missions
that will include longer-term deployments with both military and non-military
components. Today’s complex security challenges will demand more, not less,
NATO. But we need to agree on our level of ambition. We need to apply military,
political, economic, and other instruments in a well-coordinated way. We need
to agree where the limits are of what the Alliance can do. Last, but not least,
the Allies must discuss when, where, how, and with whom to intervene.Â
3.
This report briefly looks at
the lessons that we need to learn from NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and how they could be translated into the continuing transformation of the Alliance, both militarily, but also politically. The autumn report will provide an update
on Afghanistan and will attempt to map out a possible ‘roadmap’ for NATO’s
political adaptation. Â
4.
Security in Afghanistan continues to be tense. In some areas, particularly in the south of the
country, it has even deteriorated over the last year. Insurgents’ attacks in
the southern and eastern regions that border Pakistan led to the bloodiest
summer since the fall of the Taliban. Moreover, terrorist activities, including suicide bombings that were previously unseen in Afghanistan, have increased significantly.Â
However, it is unclear if the increase in violence is an indication of a
general deterioration of security or not. According to the Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim
Wardak, the increase in terrorist incidents and suicide bombings shows the
insurgents are turning to softer targets as the Afghan National Army (ANA) has
gained the upper hand in the battlefield.Â
5.
Positive developments and
unresolved problems offer a mixed overall picture of progress
in Afghanistan. The historic parliamentary elections have been the culmination
of the Bonn process and reflect a remarkable transformation of Afghanistan’s political landscape. The build-up of the ANA appears to have made good
progress. The currently around 30,000 personnel are well trained and have
already participated in limited counter-terrorism operations alongside
international coalition troops. If the present build-up rate continues, the
target date for the ANA to achieve its full strength of five corps with a total
of 70,000 troops in 2009 is feasible. Moreover, opium production appears to
have been slightly reduced and re-construction continues across the country.Â
6.
Despite the assistance
provided by the international community, Afghanistan remains a fragile state.Â
The lack of security and the
weakness of Afghanistan's government institutions, particularly in remote
regions, continue to be major problems. Endemic corruption and the weak economic infrastructure
hamper further progress. Last year’s government revenue totalled about US-$330
million, covering less than 50% of its expenses. The country is one of the
world’s poorest, on a par with sub-Saharan Africa. The production and trafficking of opium and its derivatives
continue to be the major challenge to Afghanistan’s political and economic
development and threatens regional stability. According to a report by the US
Department of State[i]
the opium trade accounts US $2.8 billion, or roughly one-third of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP). Afghanistan still produces nearly 90 percent
of the world’s opium poppy supply. Much of the crop is refined into heroin and
morphine at drug laboratories inside the country and trafficked through neighbouring
Pakistan. Pakistani traffickers in the remote and lawless Baluchistan and
North West Frontier provinces provide financing to Afghan poppy farmers.Â
7.
As in other post-conflict
regions, too, in Afghanistan everything is linked. The reduction of poverty
cannot be separated from combating the insurgency. Counter-narcotics, too is
intimately linked with fighting insurgents but also to re-construction and
development. Any viable long-term stabilisation of the country requires
providing farmers who are relying on the income with an alternative to growing
poppy. At the same time, we need to develop the capabilities of the Afghan
National Police (ANP) and the counter-narcotics police. Thus, we need a
co-ordinated, long-term approach to support the government in developing the
expertise and in building the necessary capacities to become a viable state.Â
8.
The inauguration of Afghanistan’s National Assembly in December 2005 marked the symbolic end of the institution-creating
process outlined in the 2001 Bonn agreement. The “Afghanistan Compactâ€, that
was forged at the London conference early this year, now provides the framework
for the country’s future development. The Compact is based on four pillars: security; governance, rule of law,
and human rights; economic and social development; and counter-narcotics. Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact will
put the country and its international partners to the test.Â
9.
Currently, the NATO-led the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has between 9,000 and 10,000
military personnel from 26 NATO and
10 partner countries stationed in
the northern and western parts of Afghanistan. "Stage Threeâ€, the expansion to the south of the
country, will deploy an additional 6,000
troops to the six south-central
Afghan provinces Daikondi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Oruzgan, and Zabul. Most
of the reinforcements come from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Between 1,200 and 1,400
Dutch forces are currently deployed in the Oruzgan province. Smaller
contingents of Australian, New Zealand and Romanian forces will also be
deployed there.
10.
ISAF’s expansion to the
South will bring it into direct contact with OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom),
the US-led counter-terrorism operation. This might create tensions. OEF is
criticized by governments and human rights organisations. Its detention policy
(Bagram; Gunatanamo Bay) is under scrutiny. The challenge will be to carry out
security operations and winning the hearts and minds of people at the same
time. Therefore, ISAF is
primarily designed to provide basic security and support the Afghan government
to deepen its hold primarily in the areas where it operates the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Depending on the results of the current expansion
to the South as well as the generation of the forces ISAF’s subsequent
expansion into the eastern sector, “Stage Four†could take place towards the
end of 2006.
11.
The expansion of ISAF is a
both necessary and welcome commitment by NATO to secure Afghanistan's long-term stability. It is a crucial prerequisite for the country’s
transformation to a fully-functioning nation-state. However, despite major pledges of financial support and
NATO's promise to extend security through the expansion of the PRTs, progress
on the ground has been slow.Â
12.
The PRTs are at the leading
edge of NATO’s stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. The PRT concept,
originally developed by the US which built on their Vietnam experience, is basically
to provide both improved security
and to facilitate reconstruction and economic development throughout the
country. Focusing on quick impact
projects, i.e., building critical infrastructure like water wells, schools and
the like, PRTs link security with concrete development progress. But there is
no single, standardised concept for the PRTs and all operate to different
guidelines and criteria. Some have very restrictive rules of engagement and do
not go out of their base overnight while others take a much more robust view of
extending security throughout the province. To strengthen coherence but also to
increase the efficiency among PRTs, NATO should develop at least minimally
agreed standards for military-civil co-operation. This could also improve
further co-operation with NATO PartnersÂ
13.
At present NATO is
commanding nine PRTs in the North and West[ii],
providing security in about half of the country’s territory. There are
currently 23 PRTs in Afghanistan of which 14 are lead by OEF (12 US-led, one each
led by Canada and New Zealand). The long-term impact of PRTs in terms of
development in relation to Afghanistan and its reconstruction is still
difficult to assess.Â
14.
As it faces enormous
security challenges and struggles to rebuild its shattered society, Afghanistan needs continued and even increased NATO involvement. The country needs more
training and equipment, such as helicopters and aircraft. According to some,
ISAF’s presence may be needed for about 10 years. Afghanistan’s government
officials have repeatedly expressed a strong interest in entering an enduring
relation with NATO. Therefore, the Alliance is developing a specific
co-operation programme with Afghanistan that will be designed to complement
ISAF’s operational role. The programme, that is being mapped out together with
the Afghan government and built on the principle of Afghan ownership, will
concentrate on supporting the Afghan authorities in defence and security sector
reform.Â
15.
The United Nations (UN) provide the legal framework for the ongoing NATO mission in
Afghanistan. ISAF was deployed under a mandate of the UNSC was taken over by
NATO in August 2003. UN Security Council Resolution 1510 opened the way to a
wider role for ISAF to support the Government of Afghanistan beyond Kabul. Moreover, through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) the UN is, together with
the Afghan Administration, responsible for the co-ordination of all
humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.Â
16.
Established by UN Security
Council resolution 1401 in March 2002, UNAMA’s mandate includes promoting
national reconciliation; fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to
the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, including those related to human
rights, the rule of law and gender issues. Citing Afghanistan’s enormous
security, human rights, governance and other challenges, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan has requested and received on 23 March an extension of UNAMA’s
mandate by another 12 months.Â
17.
There are 19 UN agencies in
the country working together with their Afghan government counterparts and with
national and international NGO partners. An important role is played by the UN
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which, together with the Afghan government,
runs an opium monitoring system and conduct annual opium surveys in Afghanistan. UNODC’s Afghanistan office has twelve
drug control projects and three criminal justice projects, but none of these programmes co-operate with NATO
directly. ISAF works closely with the UN and the Afghan government in support
of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process and the
Heavy Weapons Cantonment programme. Disarmament has been quite successful and
all known heavy weapons have been collected and are now under central
government control. It is now essential that the UN starts working in the east
and south of the nation to make reconstruction in those parts a success.
18.
The European Union (EU) has
been a major contributor to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s fall in 2001. At
the 2002 Tokyo and 2004 Berlin donor conferences the EU and its member states
pledged nearly one third of the assistance. The European Commission oversees an
annual budget of some €200 million in development aid. The EU also has a
Special Representative (EUSR) in residence, who operates on a six month
mandate. While the scale of the EU’s commitments to the country may not be
fully appreciated, the complexity of EU foreign policy structures have limited
the effectiveness of its assistance.Â
19.
A December 2005 report by
the International Crisis Group (ICG) has argued that development funds are too
often used in place of collective political and military action. Therefore,
the report suggests that the EU should adopt a more cohesive policy and
effective action by, for example, agreeing both within itself and with the
Afghan administration on common benchmarks and monitoring mechanisms. The ICG
report also suggested that the EU should develop greater institutional linkages
with NATO and become more involved in the direction of the PRTs. Your
Rapporteur welcomes that the European Commission since the beginning of 2006
finances the civilian parts of the PRTs in which EU member countries are
involved. However, while the EU is playing
more of a development and assistance role, there is no co-operation between
NATO and the EU on Afghan security. This co-operation should be improved.
20.
It is first and foremost the
Afghans themselves that are responsible for the reconstruction of their
country. But warlords still limit the powers of the central government which
remains weak, thereby preventing Afghanistan's shift away from an economy based
on drugs and power. The millions of Afghans displaced in neighbouring countries
will be unlikely to return without dramatic improvements in human security. In
the meantime Afghanistan remains a focus for regional instability. NATO’s role
in the (re-)building of Afghanistan is essential because, as in any post-war
scenario, economic and societal reconstruction and political reforms depend on
a secure environment. As stated above, the UN has tasked NATO to assist the
government of Afghanistan and the international community in maintaining
security within its area of operation.Â
21.
Achieving a secure
environment that allows for reconstruction and development requires a stable,
long-term consensus among the Allies on the political and military goals as well
as the necessary means (both political and military). Forces deployed must operate under a robust
mandate that allows quick adaptation to changing circumstances if necessary.
Rules of engagement should provide a maximum of flexibility allowing commanders
to deal with the broadest spectrum of operations, from peace keeping to
counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations.Â
22.
To be successful, NATO-led
operations must have clear political goals and the corresponding military
missions must be precisely defined. Consensus building over NATO’s
responsibilities has at times been a cumbersome, prolonged exercise. For
example, although it was a commendable and logical step for NATO to assume
command of ISAF, we should remember that one reason for this was that Allies
had problems to identify ‘lead nations’ for the ISAF mission. The ad-hoc
manner in which ISAF has moved outside Kabul further highlights difficulties in
force generation and in finding consensus on NATO’s responsibilities.Â
Sometimes it simply was too little too late.
23.
What NATO's role is when it moves into the south is
still not completely clear. ISAF’s
mandate is too vague. Its task is to conduct "stability and security
operations" in co-ordination with Afghan security forces and to support
the Afghan government’s programmes to "disarm illegally armed
groups."Â According to the Afghanistan Compact all militias have to be
disbanded by 2008. But it is not clear whether ISAF is authorised to use force
if such an approach is adopted by Kabul. Â This applies in particular to NATO's role in helping in the
eradication of the opium business in the southern sector of Afghanistan. Â It is essential to note that active eradication of fields by NATO would immediately lead to
security problems. The lead-policy should be to diversify, to create
alternatives. The UK has the lead in formulating an anti-drugs policy with the
Afghan Government.
24.
The expansion of NATO
activities towards the South will require clear delineation with OEF. ISAF’s
expansion across the country follows a revised Operational Plan that was
endorsed by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2005. The Plan addresses the
tasks and challenges ISAF will face as it continues to expand its area of
operations to the south and subsequently to the east of the country. Command
structures are being streamlined and there will be only one command-and-control
headquarters. ISAF’s deputy commander for security, a US General, is the officer with dual responsibility for ISAF security and co-ordination of the
US Central Command.Â
25.
However, ISAF and OEF will
continue to have separate mandates and missions. ISAF will conduct and focus
on its stabilisation and security mission whilst OEF will continue to carry out
its counter-terrorism mission. But while the differentiation of ISAF’s and
OEF’s mandates may be clear in theory, the reality on the ground will have to
be clarified and NATO will have to take the lead in this. With the PRTs under
its control, OEF also engages in stabilisation efforts. Moreover, as they move
to the South and subsequently to the East of the country ISAF troops are likely
to be involved in counter-terrorism. Also, perceptions of Afghans are
important. Building trust and confidence is difficult as violent protests, including attacks on ISAF troops in February on a NATO-led PRT in Maymana, following publication of
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad that first appeared in a Danish newspaper have demonstrated. It is
doubtful whether ordinary Afghanis understand the different roles of ISAF and
the OEF.Â
26.
Success or failure of
operations often depends on the sufficient allocation of resources.Â
Regrettably, Afghanistan has revealed serious gaps between political rhetoric
and actual commitment. With regard to NATO, member countries have not always
matched political commitments with necessary resources. For example, although
NATO Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance, the
allocation of troops and equipment has been delayed considerably.Â
27.
Improving interoperability
among its forces remains crucially important for the success of NATO’s current
and future operations. While they have been significantly reduced,
national caveats still impose
limitations on to the planning and
execution of NATO operations. There is still concern that existing national caveats can have a
debilitating effect on ISAF as it continues to expand its presence in Afghanistan. For example, some NATO member
countries contributing to ISAF have restricted their participation to exclude
combat operations. As stated in last year’s report, the majority of caveats relate to rules of
engagement (i.e. peace keeping rather than war fighting) and geographical
mobility. Your Rapporteur calls upon NATO member governments and parliaments
to urgently review declared and undeclared caveats in order to remove or at the
very least minimise their use in joint operations. We must eliminate the use of undeclared caveats
and allow the restrictions on a national contingent to be taken into
consideration during the force planning process.Â
28.
Lack of consensus on how
best to adapt funding for joint operations has also limited NATO’s
effectiveness in Afghanistan. We must improve our efficiencies, particularly
how we share resources and how we finance joint operations. Â NATO must urgently
review the issue of common funding for operations. NATO member states have begun to discuss new financing
arrangements, but no decision has been reached. The principle of "costs lie where they fall"
remains in place for most operations. This is problematic, particularly for
operations of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the catalyst of NATO’s military transformation, because it leaves the entire financial burden of
participating in NRF operations on the member countries that are on-call at the
time of the deployment. Given the
lack of key capabilities, especially
in airlift, air-to-ground surveillance, and air-to-air refuelling, in a number of NATO member countries, nations
that can provide these capabilities are likely to be asked to carry an
un-proportional burden.Â
29.
NATO’s funding arrangements
no longer makes sense in an era in which NATO has approximately 30,000 troops
deployed on three continents. It is not only inefficient and unfair, it is a
disincentive for nations to participate in the NRF and other on-call forces. If the Allies do not
address this issue it will negatively affect NATO out-of-area operations in the
future, thus undermining one of the key strategic purposes of the Alliance. We need to enhance common funding of operations, but this should be carefully
balanced between nationally-funded items and those funded commonly by the Alliance. Contributions to common budgets must be seen as part of the overall
burden-sharing assessment. Moreover,
the Alliance should have its own air-to-ground surveillance and commonly
operated airlift capabilities as well as more joint logistics.
30.
In Afghanistan, as in other NATO-led operations like in the Balkans, NATO Partners are making
a critical contribution. For example, 10 Partner countries are currently
contributing to ISAF, New Zealand is leading a PRT and Sweden will soon assume responsibility of the PRT in Mazar-e Sharif. NATO’s Partnerships
activities, particularly, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme have been
highly successful. Over the years, the Alliance developed specific programmes
of co-operation on defence reform, including in areas like combating
trans-border crime, tightening border security, promoting civil-military
relations, and the democratic control of the armed forces.Â
31.
But the Partnerships have
profoundly changed, particularly after the 1999 and 2002 enlargements. As of
today, 26 of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’s (EAPC) member states are
NATO member countries, and 20 are partner countries. Therefore, partnerships
need to evolve further. NATO should make existing partnerships more effective
and build new ones with countries from Asia and elsewhere. With regard to the
former, NATO should consider to differentiate between them, reflecting different
goals, e.g. membership in the Alliance for Balkan countries and primarily
technical assistance and training for the Central Asian Republics.
32.
The nature and complexity of
today’s post-conflict operations call for broadest possible international collaboration.Â
Moreover, while NATO is capable of
deploying powerful forces in large numbers and commands the necessary military and security expertise, it cannot provide the critical economic, financial, legal and other
assistance that is essential to the
success of any nation-building operation. For these and all other civil
implementation the Alliance depends upon other organisations, particularly the
EU and the UN. Nevertheless, NATO will also have to improve its own “political
map†as its missions are in essence an element of nation-building.
33.
Today’s and tomorrow’s
missions require thorough planning
and preparation from the initial engagement to the exit strategy. The
challenge is also to achieve seamless transition from possible combat
operations to peace enforcing. Close
co-operation with partners, particularly the EU and the UN, is required. This
demands a clear delineation of tasks among participating actors and that the
efforts of participating organisations complement and do not compete against each other.Â
Moreover, their mandates must be compatible to each others’ and mutually
reinforcing.Â
34.
The EU plays an increasingly
important role for international security. While the EU is slowly developing a
military muscle, its fledgling military capabilities will remain limited in the
foreseeable future. It is a welcome development that the EU is becoming a
stronger security actor. But the EU must be a partner, not a competitor for
NATO. While the NATO-EU relationship has greatly improved over the years,
further development of the relationship towards a more effective partnership
continues to be very slow and uneven. Progress has been achieved in
staff-to-staff contacts between NATO’s International Staff and the EU Council
as well as, recently, the European Commission. On the ground in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Darfur, NATO-EU co-operation varies, but is generally considered as ‘good’.Â
However, at the political level, the stalemate on co-operation in the NAC is
unacceptable!
35.
Ad-hoc co-ordination of efforts
on the ground can by no means be a supplement for a necessary, and indeed long
overdue, institutional co-operation between NATO and the EU. Therefore, it is
necessary to conclude a more comprehensive framework agreement between NATO and
the EU. NATO-EU relations should not only focus on the EU Council but also
include the European Commission which holds important competences in areas
where closer co-operation with NATO is highly desirable. Europe has a lot to
offer in terms of technical expertise, in terms of reconstruction and
development, in terms of training.Â
36.
19 countries are members of
both the EU and of NATO. Therefore, improvements in the EU’s military
capabilities must not come at the expense of the necessary strengthening of
NATO’s. Member states must avoid any duplication or, worse, competition in
building military capabilities. NATO-EU co-operation can be further strengthen
in the realm of the EU’s non-military capabilities that the EU can bring to
bear in crisis prevention and in post-conflict operations. More reciprocity is
called for and a framework agreement between NATO and the EU should provide the
former with guaranteed access to EU capabilities in areas that are relevant for
post-conflict operations. A more comprehensive NATO-EU framework agreement
should also include an institutional relationship. Thus, the NATO Secretary
General should have a seat at the meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is the
lynchpin of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Likewise, the EU’s High Representative for
the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU, Javier Solana, should be invited to NAC meetings on a
permanent basis.  Â
37.
The other international
actor with whom NATO should develop a closer institutional relationship is the
UN. Despite its deficiencies, the UN remains the only institution that is
considered to provide global legitimacy. Therefore, any NATO-led operation
should preferably be backed by the broadest possible support of the
international community. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and other senior UN
officials have informed the Political Committee during visits to the UN
Headquarters that a growing UN-NATO relationship is highly appreciated.Â
Indeed, the UN is already overstretched in its peace-keeping activities and is
very interested in NATO’s help. According to Centre on International
Co-operation (CIC) at New York University, the number of troops
deployed by the UN worldwide has nearly quintupled since 1999,
from 12,700 to over 60,000 (with civilians and police, the number is over
85,000). Although your Rapporteur is sceptical that NATO member countries will
be able to significantly increase their troop contributions to UN peacekeeping
operations in the short term. NATO could however make additional capabilities,
especially in the areas of military planning and logistics, available to UN
operations.Â
38.
Closer NATO-UN
co-ordination, including a closer institutional relationship between the two,
should be welcome. A NATO-UN ‘Joint Statement’ has been drafted in September
2005 which can provide a deeper and more structured relationship between the
two organisations. It is currently under review at the UN Headquarters. A
concrete practical step for NATO would be to expand its liaison office at the
UN Headquarters in New York, which is currently staffed by one person only.Â
39.
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan reflects how profoundly the Alliance has changed. It is a recognition that today’s and
tomorrows security environment is no longer relatively static or predictable.Â
Alliance members today face a whole range of new and complex threats, including
terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states, and criminal networks trafficking
in people, drugs and weapons. Therefore, a static, reactive approach to
security is no longer sufficient. In fact, NATO is in the midst of a both
physical and philosophical transformation that has already resulted in a more
proactive alliance that is operating beyond its traditional borders to prevent
crisis and conflict.Â
40.
Transformation is an
ongoing, complex, and multi-dimensional process. It requires continuing
adaptations, particularly in the conceptual, military, institutional, and
geographic realms. NATO’s adaptation of a comprehensive security approach means
changes in:Â
-
the way we view security
challenges today, and how we use NATO to address them;Â
-
how we structure our
military forces and how we adapt them to make them more lethal, more deployable
and more sustainable;Â
-
NATO’s relationships,
including institutional ones, with other international players, particularly
with the EU and the UN;Â
-
our geographic areas of
operation, including those beyond the Euro-Atlantic region;Â
-
and how we use NATO as a
forum for transatlantic security discussion and decision.
41.
Unbeknown to a larger part
of our societies, the post-Cold War NATO is very different from the time of the
existing Soviet Block. As we continue our adaptation, the Alliance has taken
on responsibilities that had been unthinkable 15 years ago. We recognise that
so-called ‘soft’ security issues can pose very real ‘hard’ challenges. We
recognise that coping with the aftermath of war and internal conflict is
far more daunting than taking measures early to prevent the outbreak of
conflict. Therefore, we agree that we must accord a far higher priority than
in the past to conflict prevention. Afghanistan, has taught us that ‘failing states’ in far-away regions require our attention.Â
42.
NATO provided relief aid
over an extended period of time to the victims of Pakistan’s October 2005
earthquake. Moreover, the NRF’s maritime component assisted in the relief
effort following Hurricane Katrina which struck the southern US in August last
year. Earlier, parts of the NRF were deployed to provide security for the
Afghan elections. Although the NRF has also been designed to assist in
disaster relief efforts, its primary purpose is a high-intensity, ‘first-entry’
strike force. NRF’s extended use for humanitarian and disaster relief
operations would risk that it would not be available when it would be needed
most, i.e. in an acute crisis. Therefore, we need to address the question
which role the Alliance should have in humanitarian and disaster relief
operations.
43.
The spectrum of Alliance operations has dramatically increased over the last few years, now ranging from
military operations to peace-supporting measures, training, transport and
advisory measures and indeed now operations following natural disasters and the
protection of major sporting events. However, if the Alliance is becoming more
involved in a new set of operations, including stabilisation efforts, including
peace-building, peace keeping and reconstruction business, what does this mean
for its priorities, structures and capabilities?Â
44.
As stated in the previous
report, the Alliance needs to complement its ongoing military transformation by
a profound political transformation. To that end, NATO’s political dialogue must be expanded. The goal must
be to further improve policy co-ordination among the Allies, as well as with
Partners and International Organisations, particularly the EU and the UN. The
Allies must be able to discuss any issue that is relevant for the security of
the Alliance, even if they are not a NATO issue. For example, we need to
discuss and develop common approaches to security challenges, such as how we
tackle Iran. Iran is a direct neighbour of Afghanistan and has, at times, been
helpful in stabilising the country. Teheran has a self-interest in a stable Afghanistan. However, Iran’s nuclear programme and its links with terrorist groups are
major issues of concern not only for the Alliance but for the international
community as a whole. Â
45.
Similarly, stabilisation of Afghanistan requires close co-operation with its
neighbours, including the Central Asian Republics but particularly with Pakistan. More and better co-operation on the borders is necessary to overcome the serious
problems of drug trafficking and insurgents. Pakistan is
both a solution and a hindrance to the stability of Afghanistan. Pakistan became a refuge for remnants of the Taliban as well as
Islamist radicals from other regions, including Chechnya and Central Asia. Afghan
government officials have accused Pakistan of not doing enough to try and catch the Taliban and al-Qaeda
remnants in Waziristan - a charge
that Pakistan denies. Pakistan is also part of the massive Afghan opium
production/refining system. What is more, Pakistan, which has not signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a major proliferator of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD). Abdul
Qadeer Khan was at the centre of an international proliferation network that
has been selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. It is unclear if or to what extend the Pakistani government or the leadership of Pakistan's military and
intelligence establishment knew of or sanctioned Khan’s proliferation activities.
46.
NATO’s political transformation
demands that the Alliance no longer thinks only regionally but indeed
globally. Therefore, NATO must be able to discuss all issues that can impact
the security of its member states. The list of topics for consultations
should, in the view of your Rapporteur, include issues such as Iran, Iraq, Congo, Darfur and energy security, among others.
47.
That said, we must avoid
overburdening the Alliance. Not
every security problem in the world is of direct concern to NATO, and it cannot
solve every issue.  There are many so-called ‘soft’ security issues whether
others, for example the UN, the EU, or the OSCE, can bring more to the table
than NATO. We must avoid duplication
of effort what other organisations can do better. Thus, NATO discussions must
focus on the core business of NATO, namely defence and security.
48.
NATO’s necessary political
transformation naturally also requires adaptation of its consensus building
processes. It is important that the Allies maintain the consensus principle in
decision making, that is, that decisions can only be taken if all Allies agree.
However, the Allies must urgently rectify how they address issues that are
relevant for their security. It would short-sighted if the Allies cannot hold
political discussions on a specific issue because one country exercises its
veto. This would seriously hamper prevent the other 25 members from trying to
build a policy consensus.Â
49.
In a world in which the
demand for effective security policies is overstretching supply, NATO is faced
with multiple challenges at a time of military diminishing resources and a lack
of agreement on practical priorities. Agreement on basic principles is
important to rebuild trust and confidence on NATO’s agenda, its priorities and
the specific mix of policy instruments to be employed.Â
50.
Although this is all too
often overlooked, a number of NATO member states have ‘parliamentary armies’.Â
National parliaments decisively shape the commitments and contributions to the
security of Alliance member countries. Parliaments vote on military and
foreign aid budgets, help frame defence policy and can authorise deployments of
national contingents - including removing restrictions on the level of
participation of national contingents in joint operations.Â
51.
NATO’s political
transformation should also include closer relationship with Parliaments of NATO
member countries. Parliaments’ crucial role was highlighted in the recent
discussions in the Netherlands, where disagreements over the nature of the Afghanistan mission cast in doubt the participation of the Dutch contingent in ISAF’s
southern expansion. The Tweede Kamer eventually approved the deployment, but
only after NATO officials pledged to provide more money for reconstruction,
establishing a ‘security net’ for Dutch troops, mandating human rights
guarantees for prisoners and giving independence to the Dutch contingent in its
area of operation. Another recent example of Parliament’s involvement in
international security is the German Bundestag’s crucial role in agreeing to a German-led military mission of up to 1,450
troops that will help protect elections in Congo.
52.
The NATO Parliamentary
Assembly makes important contributions to the Alliance. Our activities greatly
enhance the transparency of NATO and increase public awareness of the broad
gamut of security issues that are relevant for Member states and Partners. The
continuing, structured debate between NATO and national parliaments also
assists in building parliamentary support for NATO activities. With regard to Afghanistan, the Assembly may consider to assist the Afghan National Parliament in becoming
an effective parliament. Afghan parliamentarians have not participated in a
parliamentary democracy and they have not been prepared for their role. There
is also very little support for staff. The Assembly’s possible assistance
would be an important contribution, especially because the parliament is quite
powerful in a number of respects and is critical to the effective functioning
of the government of Afghanistan.Â
53.
For the reasons mentioned
above, NATO’s political transformation should also further deepen the
relationship between NATO Headquarters and the Assembly. As the NATO PA is
already assisting actively in NATO’s public diplomacy efforts one concrete
proposal could be creating synergies in our public diplomacy efforts by, for
example, doing more programmes between NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the
Assembly.
54.
Afghanistan is NATO’s key operation and its success – or
possible failure – will be crucial for the future of the Alliance. We must
address the open questions as effectively as possible. Therefore Allies need
to live up to their promises and deliver the necessary troops and equipment.Â
Robust peacekeeping forces must be able go where they are needed most and not
to the safest areas. The troops must be not only sufficient in number, quality
and commitment but effectively co-ordinated and with a common understanding of
their mandate and how to apply it. We must address the open questions as
effectively as possible, including the issues of a better demarcation between
ISAF and OEF and of detention policy.Â
55.
As the Alliance will
increasingly operate in a global strategic environment and because available
resources will be limited we need to put a premium on conflict prevention.
Here, too, we need to muster the political will and the necessary military
capabilities to match our level of ambition.Â
56.
However, while NATO needs to
take on a greater role in this area, there are also limits to what it can
achieve. While the Alliance is becoming more active ‘out-of-area’ it is not
becoming ‘globocop’, nor should it. Allies must discuss when, where, how, and
with whom to intervene! For the time being, this should be done on a
case-by-case basis. NATO should expand its set of instruments in this area,
but our guiding principle must be practicality, that is we must avoid
duplicating what other organisations can do and perhaps can do better.
57.
Further strengthening
of co-operation and co-ordination
with other actors, particularly with the EU, is therefore necessary. NATO must also further develop co-operation with partner
countries and develop existing programmes like the Istanbul Co-operation
Initiative (ICI) and the Mediterranean Dialogue.Â
58.
When NATO’s Heads of State
and Government will meet in Riga in November, they have to take the adaptation
of the Alliance further. They have to confirm NATO's expanding commitment to
Afghanistan; they have to agree on measures to better support our operations;
they have to look at the future of our Partnerships, including at how we can
build closer ties to other countries such as Australia or Japan; they have to
reaffirm NATO’s open door policy; and last, but not least, they have to deepen
the political dialogue among the Allies about all subjects of common concern!
59.
Riga will be the first of three summits that are currently
scheduled until 2009. It is the thus the first of a number of steps to identify
and agree on a renovation and expansion of the guiding principles for the Alliance. The 2009 summit should culminate into an updated, new Strategic Concept of the Alliance. Your Rapporteur hopes, that this brief report can make a contribution to the
developing discussion and will provide more detailed suggestions in the Autumn
update.Â
