1.      The end of the Cold War did not
result in elimination of the menace of nuclear war. The threat of nuclear
weapons ending up in 'wrong hands' is probably the greatest global security
challenge. The international community has a rich history of launching various
multinational initiatives agreements, such as Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), designed to contain nuclear threats. Unfortunately, the world's record
of circumventing these agreements is just as rich. Both nuclear- and
non-nuclear-weapons states need to live up their parts of the NPT bargain:
nuclear disarmament and peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy.
2.      Nuclear programme of Iran constitutes a test case for global non-proliferation regime. How to define 'peaceful
nuclear programme'? How to address the question of dual-use technologies? What
instruments are in place for the international community to deal with
transgressors? How to avoid the policy double standards towards certain
countries? These are the fundamental questions that surface when discussing the
case of Iran.
3.      The Euro-Atlantic community, which
our Assembly represents, needs to come up with a clear and unified strategy towards
Iran's nuclear programme. Such a political strategy should be based on a
sound and sober understanding of technological characteristics of this
programme, in order to avoid certain myths that may lead to ill-founded
decisions. Therefore, the goal of this report is to present a condensed
overview of Iran's advancements in nuclear fuel cycle development, attempting
to provide NATO legislators with a background for their political judgement.
Your Rapporteur wishes to seize this opportunity to express her appreciation of
the excellent analysis of nuclear and missile policies of Iran by Committee Rapporteurs Sen. Pierre Claude Nolin and Lothar Ibruegger in their 2004
reports on "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation" and "Missile Defences
and Weapons in Space", respectively.
II.
Iran's nuclear
programme
4.      Iran's nuclear ambitions date back
to mid-1960s, when the pro-Western regime of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
acquired first modest nuclear capabilities from the United States - small
5-megawatt-thermal (MWt) research reactor for the Tehran Nuclear Research
Center (TNRC). To it's credit, Iran agreed to sign the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 (ratified in 1970), and, in 1974,
completed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The geopolitical
developments in early 1970s (Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent oil
crisis) impelled the Shah's government to accelerate country's nuclear
programme. The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) announced ambitious
plans to generate 23,000 MW of nuclear energy within 20 years (to illustrate, a
typical 1,000 MW reactor can provide enough electricity for a modern city of
close to one million people. Iran's population is now almost 70 million,
considerably up from approximately 30 million in mid-1970s). The US authorities, and the administration of G.Ford in particular, together with French and German
companies, were actively engaged in Iran's nuclear programmes, supplying Iran with different elements of nuclear fuel cycle technologies and even training Iranian
nuclear scientists. Considerable progress was achieved in constructing two
nuclear reactors in Bushehr.
5.      These nuclear activities were
halted and all the assistance from the West effectively stopped during and
after the political turmoil in Iran in late 1970s, that resulted in deposition
of the Shah. The new Islamic regime, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, showed little interest in their predecessors' aspirations.
Moreover, many of Iran's top nuclear scientists fled the country. As a result
of the war with Iraq, which broke out in 1980, constructions at Bushehr were
bombed and destroyed. On the other hand, the Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility in 1981, may have also provided disincentives for Tehran to further
develop its nuclear programme. Nevertheless, the weapons research side of Iran's nuclear activities seemed to have continued uninterrupted by the revolution. Uranium
conversion and fuel fabrication technologies have been examined at the Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), and some limited research have been conducted
on uranium enrichment centrifuge technologies, including purchase of designs
and samples from the A.Q.Kahn network in 1987.
6.      In late 1980s, when Khomeini was
replaced by a much more "pro-nuclear" Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Tehran decided to substantially revive its nuclear programme. Iran required considerable
assistance from foreign suppliers, yet a number of countries refused (often under
pressure from the US) to cooperate with Iran on this matter. Nevertheless, Tehran managed to conclude long-term cooperation agreements with Pakistan (in 1987. In mid-1990s, Iran also acquired components of P-1 centrifuges and
blueprints of more advanced P-2 centrifuges from the A.Q.Kahn network) and China (several agreements between 1990 and 1992). China provided Iran with small research
reactors, laser enrichment equipment, conversion technologies, and even shipped
over a ton of natural uranium to Iran. China also reportedly trained Iranian
nuclear technicians and engineers. In 1992, however, Beijing was persuaded by Washington to suspend its assistance to Iran.
7.      In mid-1990s, Russia and Iran were developing plans for extensive cooperation, designed to assist Iran in acquiring full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. However, after the explicit
intervention by President Clinton, the Russia agreed to limit its assistance to
building a light-water reactor at Bushehr. Apart from work on Bushehr plant,
different Russian scientific entities continued to provide know-how assistance
to the Iranian projects, such as the secret 40MW heavy-water production plant
at Arak or the development laser enrichment capabilities.
8.      In the beginning of the new
millennium it became evident that Iran was seeking to develop a full-fledged
nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Substantial reserves of uranium ore
were discovered as far ago as 1985 at Saghand, Yazd province. In 2000, Iran formerly declared the Esfahan conversion facility to the IAEA. At the same time the
Iranian scientists and engineers were already able to begin first
centrifuge-based uranium enrichment tests. In 2000, Iran began construction of a secret pilot- and industrial-scale centrifuge facilities at
Natanz. The heavy water and laser enrichment capabilities were
already briefly mentioned. Tehran denied the existence of Natanz and Arak facilities, until the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an exiled
Iranian opposition group, revealed it in August 2002. These events convinced
many in the West that Iran was developing a nuclear power plan that would rely
solely on indigenous resources.
9.      In February 2003, Iran President Khatami officially acknowledged the existence of Natanz and Arak facilities and full
fuel cycle plans. The IAEA officials visited Iran several times and were
allowed to take environmental samples at the Natanz facility. The analysis of
these samples revealed particles of both LEU and HEU. The Iranian authorities
attributed the particles of HEU to contamination originating from imported
centrifuge components, thereby indirectly admitting that Iran had collaborated with the A.Q.Kahn network. In his report to the IAEA Board of
Governors (BoG), in November 2003, the IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei
revealed the scope of Iran's covert nuclear programme, including development of
uranium enrichment, conversion and reprocessing capabilities. Mr. ElBaradei
concluded that "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement". The BoG reiterated this message in the subsequent
resolution, choosing, however, not to refer the issue to the UN Security
Council, an option preferred by the US.
10.    The foreign ministers of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, the so-called E3, took the initiative, focusing primarily on
engagement with Iran, rather than confrontation. Iran agreed to cooperate with
the IAEA with full transparency, sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT,[i] and suspend all enrichment and reprocessing
activities for an "interim period." Iran signed the Additional
Protocol on 18 December 2003. Although the Iranian parliament never ratified
this Protocol, Iran voluntarily abided it until February 2006, considering it
as a 'voluntary confidence-building measure'.
11.      In 2004, the
cooperation between Iran and the IAEA progressed with mixed success. Despite
suspension, Iran believed it had retained the right to proceed with some, less
sensitive, fuel-cycle-related work. In summer 2004, the BoG of IAEA again
criticized Iran for its failure to provide the agency with "full, timely
and pro-active co-operation". In response to criticism, Iran announced its plans to resume enrichment activities at Natanz as well as conversion activities
at Esfahan. The tensions were partly settled in November 2004, when the foreign
ministers of the E3 and Iran and the EU High Representative Javier Solana
signed a new agreement in Paris. Iran agreed to sustain the suspension,[ii]
while the E3 obliged to prepare a number of proposals to guarantee fuel
supplies to Iran.
12.    In August 2005, when the E3 was
about to present a package of detailed European proposals, Tehran unilaterally
decided to resume uranium conversion activities in Esfahan. Ever since, the
tension seems to be escalating rapidly. Following the IAEA Director General's
report, the BoG adopted a resolution (22 in favour, 12 abstentions and only 1 against)[iii] on 24
September 2005, finding Iran in non-compliance with its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement.
13.    In January 2006, Iran removed U.N. seals at Natanz uranium enrichment plant and resumed research on nuclear.
Iran also announced that it would no longer comply with voluntary measures
(Additional Protocol) designed to enhance international inspectors' access to
its nuclear facilities. On 4 February 2006, the BoG voted to report Iran's nuclear case to the United Nations Security Council, albeit leaving one month for Iran to revise its policy. The resolution, which passed by a vote of 27 to 3 with five
abstentions, reflects increasing suspicion around the world that Iran is
determined to develop nuclear weapons. The latest report of Mr. ElBaradei
(February 2006) once again noted that Iran was advancing its uranium enrichment
program. However, the IAEA still was not able to determine whether the country
was secretly developing nuclear weapons. At the time of writing, the issue of Iran was about to be considered in the Security Council. The year of 2006 is expected to be
a crucial year in the saga surrounding the Iran's nuclear programme.
14.    Iran has its own reserves of
uranium ores, but they are not rich. Proven reserves include more than 3,000
tons uranium oxide (U308). However, it is possible that
further explorations will discover additional resources
at the range of 20,000-30,000 tons of U308.
15.    The largest uranium mine in Saghand
reportedly 1,55 million tons of uranium-bearing ore. However, natural uranium
constitutes only 0.05% of it, or approximately 775 tons. The deposits are
situated deeply below the surface, thus making the extraction process rather
costly. Iran plans to reprocess 100-120 thousand tons of Saghand ore annually,
producing 59-70 tons of yellowcake (containing 50-60 tons of natural uranium). Iran also opened a smaller near surface mine at Gchine, which is expected to supply more
than 20 tons of uranium annually. Construction of milling facilities both at
Saghand[iv] and
Gchine is nearing completion. In developing its mining and milling
capabilities, Iran received significant assistance from Russia and China.
16.    According to media reports, Iran has recently made a new breakthrough in its 'yellowcake' production programme,
successfully using biotechnology. According to the manager of this Iranian project,
"the new technique used for the production of yellowcake will reduce
costs, and efficiency will increase one hundred-fold as well."[v]
17.    Iranian scientists started some
small-scale covert uranium conversion activities (i.e., converting yellowcake
into UF6 gas to make uranium suitable for enrichment in centrifuges) at the
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) already in 1980s, as well as at the
Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in 1990s. Considerable assistance was
once again provided by China, including significant supply of uranium compounds
in 1991, which Iran did not declare to the IAEA. These compounds included 1.9 kg of UF6,
402 kg of UF4 and about 400 kg of natural UO2.
In 2000, the Iranian government informed the IAEA that a plant for uranium
conversion was being constructed at Esfahan. The conversion plant is intended
to have process lines for production of UF6,
unenriched uranium dioxide UO2 (which can be used as fuel in certain reactors, such as heavy-water
reactors), and uranium metal (potentially usable in fabrication of some
elements for reactors as well as for weapons, including nuclear weapons).
Conversion activities in Iran were officially suspended in 2003, and restarted
in August 2005. According to the latest IAEA Director General report, Iran has already produced 85 metric tonnes of UF6 at its uranium-conversion facility in Esfahan since September 2005,
which would be enough for several atomic bombs once Iran masters full-scale
enrichment technology.
18.    Iran's uranium enrichment programme
is based on gas centrifuge technology, although some progress was made in laser
enrichment as well.
19.    Centrifuge programme. As
mentioned before, Iran has been engaged in some initial centrifuge-based
enrichment research and development since 1985. Covert activities mostly took
place at the Kalaye Electric Company facility. In 2003, Iran admitted that gas centrifuges were tested with uranium gas at this site between 1998
and 2002. However, Iran claims that it did not enrich uranium beyond 1.2
percent U-235. Samples of HEU particles, later found by the IAEA inspectors at
Kalaye as well as at Natanz facility, were attributed to imported Pakistani
centrifuges.
20.    As revealed in 2002, Iran has been constructing a pilot-scale centrifuge facility and a larger, as yet incomplete,
industrial-scale centrifuge facility, both located at Natanz, approximately 200 miles south of Tehran. Iran planned to install up to 1,000 P-1 centrifuges (organized in 6
cascades) at the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEF). Before of suspension in
November 2004, the site contained one 164-machine test cascade. The
commercial-scale fuel enrichment facility (FEP) is expected to house over
50,000 centrifuges. In addition to the P-1 centrifuges, designs and components
of which are widely believed to be acquired from the A.Q.Kahn network, Iran has a program to develop the much more advanced P-2 model (which are also associated
with Kahn's network). Revealing of P-2 plans raised suspicions in the West that
Iran was pursuing clandestine military-related enrichment activities in some
undiscovered facilities. Iran has procured magnets useful in the P-2 from Asian
suppliers and has sought to acquire about 4,000 magnets suitable for the P-2,
which indicates that Iran's P-2 centrifuge programme might be larger than
officially declared. However, IAEA inspections were unable to find any evidence
substantiating such claims.
21.    After the suspension period in
2003-2005, Iran announced resumption of uranium enrichment work at Natanz
164-machine test cascade in January 2006. In fact, Iran will first need to repair or replace these test centrifuges, damaged during the
suspension, which will take at least from six months to one year. It will then
need to build new larger cascades able to produce significant amounts of
enriched uranium.
22.    Laser enrichment. Iran's laser enrichment programme dates back to 1970s and is based on two main techniques:
atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular isotope separation
(MLIS). Laser isotope research and development programme was conducted at two
facilities: Lashkar Ab'ad laser laboratory and TNRC's Laser Research Center. Although Iran's initial denial of laser enrichment activities rose some
suspicions, the IAEA believes that these works do not pose serious
non-proliferation threats. Laser enrichment techniques are extremely
sophisticated, and Iran, despite receiving some assistance from China and, allegedly, Russia, was only able to produce insignificant quantities of LEU.
23.    Iran's progress in fuel fabrication
has been rather slow. Iran admitted that, from 1985 to 1993, it conducted a
series of laboratory-scale operations at Fuel Fabrication Laboratory of the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center. However, the plans for construction of a
commercial-scale fuel fabrication plant (FMP) at Esfahan were announced only in
recent times. This facility is expected to produce both low-enriched UO2
fuel pellets (for Bushehr light-water reactor) and natural UO2
pellets (for heavy-water reactors). It is difficult to predict when such a
plant will become operational, yet is likely that the FMP will need years to be
able to produce sufficient quantities of fuel for Bushehr plant.
24.    The light-water plant at
Bushehr, the key element of Iran's nuclear power generation programme, is a
joint project with the Russian Federation. According to the Russian-Iranian
agreement of 1995, Russia was to invest $800 million to build 1,000 MW
pressurised light-water reactor based of Russian designs. By 2006, the Bushehr
facility is almost complete. Since Iran is not yet able to produce enough
indigenous fuel for the Buchehr reactor, it will heavily rely on Russia's supplies in upcoming years. The key pre-condition was the requirement to return the spent fuel back to Russia, thereby depriving Iran of possibility to extract plutonium from the spent fuel. After lengthy negotiations,
in February 2005 Iran and Russia finally reached such an agreement on long-term
Russian nuclear fuel supplies for the Bushehr facility.
25.    The capacity of Busher plant (1,000
MW) is not sufficient to meet Iran's ambitious plans for nuclear power
generation (7,000 MW by 2020). Therefore, Iran is also considering the construction of up to six additional
reactor facilities, which may or may not be located at Bushehr. Russia's assistance is critical to achieve this goal.
26.    Iran also operates four small
research reactors (one in Tehran and three in Esfahan), but they do not seem to
be capable of producing significant quantities of fissile material.
27.    Iran has also been engaged in
efforts to develop heavy water technology. In 2003, Iran announced plans to construct a 40MW heavy water moderated research reactor (IR-40) at Khondab
near Arak. The foundations for IR-40 were laid in 2004, and works proceed at a
rapid pace. Iran claims that IR-40 is designed purely for production of
industrial and medical radioisotopes, many Western experts believe it is larger
than necessary for research. If operating in full capacity, this reactor has a
potential of producing up to 14 kg of plutonium (enough to construct 2 nuclear
bombs) annually.
28.    The heavy water for the IR-40
reactor is to be produced at the Arak Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP), the
construction of which began in 1990s and was revealed in 2002. The plant is
nearly completed by now. While IR-40 requires approximately 80-90 tons of heavy
water, HWPP's official capacity is only 16 tons of heavy water per year. Two
Russian nuclear research institutes are suspected of having assisted Iran in developing its heavy water technologies.
29.    Iran claims that it has no plans to
develop a tangible reprocessing capability. In it's declaration to the IAEA in
2003, Iran admitted that it conducted some laboratory-scale reprocessing
experiments at TNRC in 1990s, using "glove boxes" in a "hot
cell".[vi]
Although the IAEA inspections found some discrepancies to the Iran's report, in general, Iran's progress in reprocessing R&D is not considered significant.
30.    Iran constructed waste storage
sites at Karaj (related to the laser enrichment programme), Anarak and Tehran (in both waste resulting from the processing of the
imported material is being stored). A new storing facility is designed in Esfahan.
31.    This brief overview indicates that Iran is seeking, sometimes with mixed success, to master each step of nuclear fuel cycle.
32.    The attempts to assess Iran’s nuclear programme in terms of its peacefulness is not an easy task. Most of nuclear
fuel cycle technologies can be of dual use, and, as a former chairman of the
Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, David Bergmann put it "...by developing
atomic energy for peaceful uses, you reach the nuclear weapon option. There are
not two atomic energies."[vii]
33.    The very fact that Iran joined the NPT in early 1970s (although Iran could have followed the path of India, Pakistan or Israel) indicates that at least originally the nuclear programme was meant to be
peaceful. Later, numerous reports were published on Iran’s alleged pursuit of
nuclear weapons, yet intelligence was not able to provide indisputable evidence
of that. A 1992 CIA estimate concluded that Iran would have the nuclear bomb by
2000, which clearly did not happen.
34.    Nevertheless, based on totality of
indirect evidence, one can draw some conclusions about the nature of Iran’s nuclear endeavours. Many prominent experts envisage that Iran will become a nuclear
weapons state within several years (most predictions vary within the framework
of 2009 to 2012). Estimations are usually based on the supposed timeframe of
development of Iran’s known nuclear capabilities. However, the possibility of
undisclosed nuclear programme, albeit unlikely, should not be completely ruled
out.[viii]
35.    Looking from a technological
standpoint, and leaving aside political considerations, Iran’s ability to
produce sufficient quantities of weapons-grade fissile material depends on
progress in completing Natanz enrichment facility (for production of HEU), and
the light-water reactor in Bushehr and heavy-water reactor in Arak (for
production of weapons grade plutonium).
36.    The pilot enrichment facility at
Natanz (PFEP) is only partially furnished (164 centrifuges out of planned
1,000), and, according to the analysis of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), it would require no less than 13 to 17 years for such
a 164-centrifuge plant, operating under ideal conditions, to produce enough HEU
for a single nuclear bomb (approximately 25 kg). If operating in full capacity with all 1,000 centrifuges (reports suggest that Iran might be not too far away
from achieving this goal, since Iran has manufactured components for more than
a thousand P-1 centrifuges), PFEP would still need more than two years to
produce 25 kg of HEU. If, however, the large (50,000-centrifuge) commercial
scale facility (FEP) becomes fully operational (which still is at least a
decade away), Iran would be able to produce enough HEU for 1 nuclear bomb
within 2-3 weeks (or for approximately 20 nukes per year).[ix]
37.    The above estimations are based on
the assumption that the enrichment facility operates on natural uranium. Yet,
if LEU is used as feed material, HEU can be produced up to seven times faster.
It should be noted, however, that Iran's PFEF will not be capable of produce
the sufficient amount of LEU in a few years. Another option thus might be using
imported LEU, for example – Russian LEU designated for the Bushehr plant. In
addition, the efficiency would be increased more than two times, if P-1
centrifuges were replaced by more advanced P-2.[x]
38.    On the other hand, technology
reconfiguration factor also needs to be taken into account. Centrifuge cascades
at Natanz pilot plant are designed to produce LEU, and it would take many
months to optimise it for HEU production. If the IAEA monitoring was sustained,
such reconfiguration activities would be impossible to conceal. However, the
large enrichment facility, such as FEP, could potentially start producing HEU
without essential reconfiguration. Various technological hurdles are likely to
put off Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programme at least by one to two years.
39.    To estimate Iran's ability to produce a plutonium-based nuclear bomb is even more difficult. On one
hand, there is very little evidence that Iran is developing spent
fuel-reprocessing capability, apart from covert, laboratory-scale experiments
in 1988-1998, when Iranian scientists produced a small
amount of plutonium outside of the IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, there are
indications that Iran seeks a attain capacity to separate plutonium from spent
fuel. According to French experts, Iran has sought to acquire high-density
radiation shielding windows for hot cells and 28 remote manipulators from the
French nuclear industry. Such equipment is designed for the extraction of
plutonium from spent reactor fuel.[xi]
40.    In addition, heavy-water technology
programme at Arak seems to advance rapidly, thereby providing a potential for Iran to obtain considerable amount of spent fuel from natural uranium. A number of experts
note that the type of heavy-water reactor Iran is constructing is larger than necessary for research, and some countries have used
it to produce bombs.[xii]
41.      The light-water
reactor in Bushehr, although a purely civilian enterprise, might also pose some
proliferation threat. According to a comprehensive study by the US Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
light-water reactors are not nearly so
“proliferation resistant†as they have been widely advertised to be. Theoretically, the Bushehr nuclear power reactor could
produce sufficient amounts of spent fuel to accumulate substantial quantities
of weapons-grade plutonium within only a few months of operating.[xiii]
2.
Iran's record of
concealment
42.      Iran is not the only country in the world that is seeking to develop a full nuclear cycle
capabilities for peaceful uses. Under certain conditions, this right is granted
to all nations under the Article IV of the NPT. The problem lies elsewhere –
there is a lack of trust in Iran due to its long history of concealment of its
nuclear research and activities. Admissions of these activities have been
grudging and piecemeal. Even during the period of relatively extensive
cooperation with the IAEA in 2002-2005, Iran, as outlined in IAEA reports, was
engaged in a systematic practice of denial and misleading statements. For
example:
§
Iran failed to acknowledge its enrichment programme at Natanz until it
was publicly revealed in 2002. Even after the revelation, Tehran presented
false information concerning duration of the enrichment activities.
§
Iran denied the foreign origin of its gas centrifuges until the IAEA
experts found HEU particles in environmental samples taken at the Natanz and
Kalaye facilities.
§
Iran initially denied it
carried out enrichment activities at Kalaye Electric Company facility.
§
At one site called Lavizan, facilities were
bulldozed by Iran before the IAEA could look at them and take samples.
§
Only recently Iran admitted it conducted, for a
number of years, laboratory-scale conversion and laser isotope separation
experiments, using uranium compounds not declared to the IAEA. Iran also conducted undeclared plutonium separation experiments.
43.    Tehran denounces most the
allegations of deception. Iran's ambassador to the IAEA Mr. Ali A.Soltanieh
asserted that, in most cases, these allegations are baseless. The laboratory
scale researches in Iran, he argued, were very limited, and their results were
not deliberately concealed. Plutonium separation activities were paltry, and
effectively terminated in 1993. The dismantled equipment was presented to the
Agency's inspectors. With regard to initially undeclared facilities at Natanz, Iran argues that a country is not obliged to report such facilities to the IAEA
when constructions begin, but rather no earlier that 180 days before nuclear
material is introduced to a facility.
44.      Another source
of mistrust in Iran's nuclear endeavours is related to its past relations with
the clandestine network of Dr. A.Q.Kahn. Iran would not have been able to
achieve so much progress in nuclear technology, had it not received essential
centrifuge equipment, designs and know-how from this Pakistani proliferator.
The specific examples of this cooperation are constantly referred to throughout
our report.
45.    A number of experts question the
peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme by arguing that Iran has no reason to generate nuclear power, since it possesses natural gas and oil in
great abundance.[xiv] Your
Rapporteur does not share such emphatic claims. Indeed, under current rates of
production and consumption, Iran's known oil resources will be depleted in 88
years, and natural oil recourses only in 220 years. However, Iran's population is growing at an incredible pace, more than doubling during last three
decades. Electricity consumption is also growing exponentially. Thus, Tehran has the inalienable right to prepare for the future with some further
diversification of its energy policy and cannot rely exclusively on fossil
energy. In addition, it might appear economically wise to increase exports of
oil and gas by decreasing internal consumption of these resources.
46.      However, it
remains questionable whether Iran really needs to develop all elements of
nuclear fuel cycle. For example, Tehran's investment in uranium ore mining and
milling does not make much sense in economic terms. In addition to being
difficult and costly to extract, Iran's known uranium deposits would not be
sufficient to provide enough fuel for the lifetime of Iran's only Bushehr reactor, yet Iran plans to construct several additional reactors. Even if all
speculative (not proven) uranium deposits were found and extracted, it would
not be possible to sustain seven reactors on indigenous fuel for longer than
several years. On the other hand, theoretically Iranian uranium reserves are
sufficient to produce a significant number of nuclear weapons.
47.      It is obvious
that Iran will have to rely on foreign (most probably Russian) supplies of
nuclear fuel for its civilian reactors. Therefore, there is no clear economic
justification for the huge, 50,000-centrifuges enrichment facility planned at
Natanz.
48.      The
international community is trying to talk Iran from developing all nuclear
cycle capabilities by suggesting other options. The famous "Russian
proposal", which has won support from other UN Security Council members –
including the United States – would allow Iran to obtain the enriched uranium
it needs for civilian nuclear power directly from Russia. All spent fuel would be sent back to Russia. That would remove a key process in the
development of a nuclear program from Iranian hands but still allow Tehran to develop the peaceful energy program it says it wants. Unfortunately, Iranian negotiators seem to object such plan
because they are determined to maintain their right to retain some level of
enrichment activity in Iran.
49.      At this
stage, it’s unclear whether Russia or Iran would be doing the fuel fabrication.
If Iran were allowed to take possession of the low-enriched uranium that has
not been converted into fuel, Iran could potentially use it as input to a
clandestine enrichment plant to make HEU.
50.    Most experts say concrete action on
the Russian plan is unlikely any time soon. The process is likely to dragg on
for months. If the deal does not come through, Iran certainly ran out of
options to gain more time, and UN Security Council intervention is inevitable.
51.      Finally, the
critics of Iran assert that Iranian military is highly involved in country's
nuclear programme, thereby unveiling the genuine purpose of this programme. in
January 2006, the IAEA issued a short report which stated that the IAEA
possesses evidence that indicated possible interconnections between Iran's nuclear programme and Iranian activities of a military nature. For instance, seven
of the 13 Iranian workshops involved in producing centrifuge components are
located on the sites controlled by the Iranian ministry of defense.[xv]
52.      Furthermore, the
NCRI, the Iranian dissident organization, announced that Iran had been testing explosives at Parchin and and Lavizan II military bases for use in an
implosion-type nuclear weapon. IAEA inspectors. IAEA inspectors visited the
Parchin military complex and found nothing suspicious. Nevertheless, it seems
that some doubts still remain, as the IAEA is repeatedly seeking access to these
sites to continue its investigation.
53.    Producing critical mass of missile
material is not enough if a country is determined to become a nuclear weapons
state. Additional devices, such as trigger mechanisms, are also required, as
well as means to deliver a nuclear bomb, i.e., missiles capable of carrying
nuclear warheads.
54.      There
have been no confirmed evidence that Iran has worked on nuclear bomb designs.
However, based on indirect data, some reports suggest that Iran could be trying to make a nuclear device. British, French, German and Belgian
intelligence agencies prepared a 55-page intelligence assessment, dated July 1
2005, which has been used to brief European government ministers. According to
the assessment, Iran has been pursuing, with apparent
success, sophisticated equipment and expertise needed to develop a nuclear bomb
in some European countries.[xvi]
55.    Indications that point to Iran's alleged interest in constructing a nuclear device include:
§
In November 2005, IAEA inspectors discovered
that Iran received information related to casting and machining uranium metal
into hemispherical forms from the A.Q. Khan network. The only known use for
such forms is in nuclear weapons.
§
The production of materials such as uranium
metal points in the direction of military ambitions as well.
§
In September 2003, the IAEA
discovered that Iran had experimented with production of polonium-210 (Po-210).
While this radioisotope also has some civilian applications (such as in nuclear
batteries), the Po-210 is best known for its uses as a trigger for nuclear chain reaction in certain types of
nuclear weapons.
§
Iran also has reportedly sought to acquire deuterium gas from Russia. Deuterium gas can be used to trigger thermonuclear reactions in hydrogen bombs.
§
According to the French
intelligence report, Iran has sought nuclear tests and simulation technology.
§
Media also reported that Iran's unsuccessful attempt to purchase 44 high-voltage switches a German company. These
switches might be used to trigger nuclear weapons.
56.    Along the nuclear program, Iran maintains a serious missile program by means of developing an indigenous missile
production capability. Iran has received substantial technological aid and
know-how from a number of countries, amongst them Russia, North Korea and China. Missile imports in the recent past – notably from North Korea, Syria, and Libya – contributed in a major way to Iran’s arsenal, and also played a significant role
in development.
57.    Currently the Scud B guided missile
forms the core of Iran’s ballistic missile forces. It is a relatively old
Soviet design that first became operational in 1967. With a range of 290-300 kilometres it is capable of hitting cities like Baghdad. It can be equipped with nuclear as well
as biological and chemical warheads. According to most estimates Iran now has
up to 250-300 Scud B missiles, and is capable of manufacturing virtually all
parts of the missile, with the possible exception of the most sophisticated
components. Iran also possesses newer long range North Korean Scuds, often
referred to as Scud C, with ranges near 500 kilometres. Most sources report the number of missiles to be over 100. The older and improved
versions of Scuds are likely to have enough range to give Iran the ability to strike targets on the southern coast of the Gulf and most of the populated areas
in Iraq.
58.    Numerous reports attest that Iran has ordered the North Korean No Dong missile, which was planned to have the capability
to carry nuclear warheads with ranges up to 900 kilometers. The No Dong 1 is liquid fueled missile with a range of up to 1000 to 1300 kilometers. This range would allow the missile to hit virtually any target in the Gulf, Turkey and, Israel. Iran was also interested in the Tapeo Dong 1 and Tapeo Dong 2. The estimated
maximum ranges of them are 2000 and 3500 kilometers respectively.
59.    Since the early 1990, it has become clear that Iran is developing its own longer-range variants of the No Dong with substantial Russian
and Chinese aid. In 1997 Iranian tests included the successful firing of the
Shahab missile. Israeli reports indicated that the Shahab 3 was a liquid fueled
missile with a range of 1200 to 1500 kilometers. It is known to be a very accurate weapon carrying a warhead of one ton. It was first displayed at a military
parade in 1998, with the carrier boring signs saying, “The U.S. can do nothingâ€
and “Israel would be wiped from the mapâ€. According to NCRI and other sources,
the Shahab 4 system with a range of 2000 kilometers, although officially abandoned in 2003, is still in development.
60.    Based on up to date reports, Iran does not yet have long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at its
disposal, neither the capability to manufacture them. Analysis differs on the
likely timing of Iran’s first flight test of an ICBM that could threaten all of
Europe and the continental United States. Assessments include it to be likely
before 2010 and very likely before 2015.
61.    There are numerous conflicting reports, amongst them
some statements made by Iranian officials, on the development of the Shahab
missile family. The Shahab 5 is expected to have a range of anywhere in between
3500 and 4300 kilometers with a one ton warhead, and there is known to be an
improved version, called the Shahab 6 carrying the same warhead to ranges up to
between 5500 and 6200 kilometers. The development status of these missiles
remains unclear; progression however is likely to be slow as it greatly depends
on foreign aid in technology and ‘know-how’.
62.    Some reports speculate that Iran is pursuing a space programme as well. Considerable concern has been expressed that Iran is trying to disguise its ballistic missile program under the pretension of peaceful
space launch programs. According to the former head of Israel's anti-missile program Uzi Rubin, Iran is aggressively pursuing space launch technology that
would make it capable of launching satellites. He calculated that Iran "could launch a 300-kilogram [660-pound] satellite within two years, something that would
pose a strategic threat to both Israel and the U.S."[xvii]
63.    The US 2001 National Intelligence
Estimate indicated that Iran could to launch a space launch vehicle (SLV)
already in the second half of the decade. In 2004, this notion was reiterated
by Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet.
64.    The case of Iran clearly illustrates the
vulnerabilities of the current international system of nuclear
non-proliferation. If unchallenged, Iran’s example could be emulated by its neighbours, thus further
escalating tensions in the region. Under Article IV of the NPT, the Non-Nuclear
Weapons State is given an “inalienable right to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy†only if it agrees to forego nuclear weapons
capability and to fully cooperate with the IAEA under the Safeguards agreement.
The major difficulty is that the present international norm is too
permissive.
65.    The fact that Iran violated the NPT was recorded in June 2003, in Dr. ElBaradei's report to the IAEA
Board of Governors. The IAEA has documented an extensive list of such
instances. However, the NPT does not provide tangible and automatic sanctions
against such violators. Furthermore, the NPT is not able to provide effective
instruments for the international community to deal with possible 'break out'
scenarios. The treaty also fails to effectively address the problem of dual-use
nature of nuclear reactors and fissile materials. Finally, the IAEA's
verification authority remains limited even when a country is found in
non-compliance.
66.    Unfortunately, the NPT Review Conference in New York in May 2005, expected to address
these issues, ended without any results. It is particularly disappointing, as
the next conference will take place only in 2010. The differences over Iran were one of the major reasons for the lack of any positive outcome of the conference.
Despite of the failure of the Review Conference, follow-up meetings should
continue in all possible formats.
67.    Needless to say, the NPT/IAEA
inspection system needs to be more robust. Pierre Goldschmidt, former head of
the IAEA Safeguards department, urged the UN Security Council to adopt a
generic binding resolution establishing automatic consequences when a state has
been found by the IAEA to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
Such consequences should include:
1.      The agency's verification authority should be
immediately widened, giving inspectors immediate access to relevant locations,
individuals and documents.
2.      A state would be obliged to conclude with the
IAEA an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, which would effectively block a
noncompliant state from withdrawing from the NPT.
3.      The 10 years moratorium would be established by the UN
Security Council for sensitive nuclear fuel cycle-related activities.
68.    Various experts, diplomats and
politicians suggested a number of additional measures, such as:
§
Increasing the costs of withdrawal from the
treaty by requiring to surrender and dismantle their nuclear capabilities
obtained within the framework of the NPT. Violators should also lose the right
to no longer receive nuclear assistance or exports from any other NPT member
state.
§
"Carrots" are also very important:
non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) should receive explicit guarantees of
assistance from the nuclear-weapons states and the IAEA.
§
The nuclear-weapons states should also
demonstrate their resolve to uphold their part of the NPT bargain, i.e., to
seek “the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.†The lack of progress in
this area provides an excuse for some NNWS. Israel could also be encouraged to
take the first steps to freeze and dismantle its nuclear capabilities.
§
The essential breakthrough is necessary in the
attempts to prohibit the production of weapons-grade fissile materials.
Unfortunately, the negotiations on fissile material cut-off treaty (FMTC)
reached an impasse, primarily due to the unwillingness of China and scepticism of the US government. Washington's position is based on a notion that effective
verification of this treaty would not be feasible.
However, many experts believe that new technologies, combined with intrusive
inspections, might enable the international verification agency to detect even
tiny amounts of materials for nuclear weapons.
§
It is absolutely essential to make supply of nuclear
technologies and material contingent on states’ accession of and adherence to
the Additional Protocol.
§
IAEA Director General ElBaradei
suggests to multilateralize the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e., a group of countries
would agree among themselves to develop different elements of nuclear fuel
cycle.
69.    The available information on Iran's nuclear programme explains why the questions about its peacefulness are raised by
the international community. It is quite evident that Iran has been seeking to develop all elements of nuclear fuel cycle, although its progress
in different areas is not comparable. For instance, while Iran's ultimate enrichment plans of 50,000-mashine facility are extremely ambitious, Tehran does not seem very resolute to build a plant to fabricate fuel for reactors. Iran is determined to exploit vigorously its modest uranium ore mines and to convert the
'yellowcake' into 'hex' at Esfaghan, yet it so far was not able to present any
tangible plans of building additional power reactors. In other words, Iran seems to make greater progress in those steps of nuclear fuel cycle that can be
potentially used to create a HEU-based nuclear weapon. It is quite safe to
assume that, technologically, Iran is only several years from acquiring such
weapon.
70.    On the other hand, the existing
data does not support the claim that Iran might be actively developing a
plutonium bomb. The purpose and extent of heavy-water-related activities at Arak may not be convincingly reasoned, but there is virtually no indication that Iran has acquired necessary reprocessing capabilities and expertise to extract plutonium
from the spent fuel.
72.    It is practically impossible to
conceal production of nuclear weapons material in a country that permits intrusive
IAEA inspections. For example, to produce HEU at Natanz pilot enrichment plant,
visible reconfiguration of centrifuges would be required. Therefore, inducing Iran to revive its comprehensive cooperation with the Agency, based on the Additional
Protocol, is vital to appease the international community. The presence of IAEA
inspections does not, in any way, impede Iran's declared striving for peaceful
nuclear energy.
73.    The resolution of the current
crisis will have profound impact on global nuclear non-proliferation regime as
a whole. Therefore, the decisions need to be thought-out, well balanced and
based on reliable technological analysis. Although, according to the famous
quote of Dr. ElBaradei, the patience of the international community is running
out, Your Rapporteur is convinced that there is still time and room to try to
engage Iran into cooperation, and avoid drastic measures and confrontation.
The era of nuclear energy started with the
famous Albert Einstein's equation E=mc², which states
that mass and energy are equivalent. Since c (the speed of light) is a
huge amount (300,000 km/s), especially when squared, even a tiny bit of mass
can be converted into an enormous amount of energy. The physicists discovered
that some heavy atoms spontaneously fission, or split, into lighter atoms, and
that considerable amount of energy is yielded during the process.
Uranium is the heaviest of all the
naturally occurring elements. Uranium as found in the earth's crust is a
mixture largely of two isotopes (forms of one chemical element with different
number of neutrons): uranium-238 (U-238), accounting for 99.3% and U-235 about
0.7%.[xviii] The
latter is the cornerstone of nuclear power generation as it is less stable and
therefore undergoes fission much more readily. Hit by a
neutron, U-235 atom splits into lighter elements, such as barium and krypton,
and at the same time emitting 2 or 3 highly energetic neutrons. These neutrons,
in turn, hit other U-235 atoms, thereby causing a chain reaction. The mass of
U-235 plus the neutron coming in is slightly bigger than the aggregate mass of
all the elements after fission. This minuscule lost of mass converts into an
immense outburst of energy, according to the Einstein's formula.
Uranium, or "nuclear", fuel cycle
(NFC) is a complex of techniques for nuclear power generation. NFC is a much
more complicated and compound process than the fuel cycles of oil, natural gas
or coal. NFC can be divided into three major parts:
1.
The "front end" of NFC, i.e.,
preparing uranium for use in a nuclear reactor. The "front end"
includes such steps as:
§
Mining and milling
§
Conversion
§
Enrichment
§
Fuel fabrication
3. Â Â Â Â Â The "back end" of NFC,
i.e., managing the 'spent fuel'. This includes:
§
Temporary spent fuel storage
§
Reprocessing and recycling
§
Waste disposal
Mining and milling. Although uranium occurs naturally in most
rocks and seawater, only a small fraction is found in concentrated ores.
Uranium-bearing ores can be mined on the surface, underground, or using in
situ[xix]
leaching. The mined ore then goes to a milling facility, where, through a
series of mechanical (grinding) and chemical processes, uranium oxide (U308) concentrate
(also known as 'yellowcake') is separated from a waste rock. The yellow cake typically contains more than 60% of uranium. The 'yellowcake' is the form in which
uranium is sold. The waste from the mill, called mill tailings, is 99% of the
weight of the original ore.
Conversion.
Before it can be enriched, uranium has to be in the form of a gas. Therefore at
a conversion facility, the 'yellowcake' (U308) is, through a
number of chemical processes, converted into the gas
uranium hexafluoride (UF6, often referred to as 'Hex'), which is a
gas at relatively low temperatures.[xx] The
process of conversion is also used to remove impurities remaining after
milling. UF6 can also be converted into a uranium metal (this
process is called reduction), which can be used to fabricate some elements for
reactors as well as for nuclear weapons.
Enrichment.
Uranium enrichment process serves to increase the share of a more radioactive
U-235 isotope at the expense of U-238. For most of commercial nuclear power
reactors, it is sufficient to increase the proportion of the U-235 from its
natural level of 0.7% to 3-4%. The research reactors normally use 12-20%
enriched uranium. Uranium enriched above the natural U-235 abundance but to
less than 20 percent is called low enriched (LEU).
Uranium enriched to 20 percent or more
U-235 is called highly enriched (HEU). The nuclear-bomb-grade uranium contains
more than 90% of U-235, though for a crude weapon even 20% might be sufficient.
HEU is also used to power warships, particularly nuclear submarines.
Several enrichment techniques have been
used:
§
Electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), one the earliest techniques, used to produce the Hiroshima bomb.
EMIS employs large magnets to separate ions of the two isotopes.
§
Thermal diffusion, which produces cold and hot convection currents across a thin
liquid or gas. The lighter U-235 gas molecules will diffuse toward the hot
surface, while the heavier U-238 molecules will diffuse toward the cold
surface.
§
Gaseous diffusion,
also an early method, in which a porous barrier material separates the lighter
and faster molecules of UF6 containing U-235. Although still a
popular technique (about 40% of world enrichment capacity), the gaseous
diffusion seems likely to be replaced by a more advanced gas centrifuge
technology.
§
Gas centrifuge,
in which UF6 gas is whirled in centrifuges
spinning at supersonic speed. The centrifugal force
pushes molecules containing the heavier isotope to the outside. The enrichment
level achieved by a single centrifuge is insufficient to obtain the desired
level of 3-5% U-235 in a single step. Therefore, a number of centrifuges are
connected in series and in parallel. Such an arrangement of centrifuges is
termed a cascade. A plant organized in 'diamond-shaped' configurations
is suitable to produce LEU. In principle, by rearranging configurations of
cascades, engineers can produce weapons-grade HEU. The
production of such HEU, however, requires the continuous operation of hundreds
and thousands of centrifuges over a long period, and an enormous sustained
input of electricity. According to estimation of Richard Garwin, a well-known nuclear scientist, 1,300
high-performance centrifuges would have to operate full time for three years to
make the 60 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU.
§
Laser isotope separation (LIS), in which lasers selectively ionise molecules containing one
isotope of uranium. Then the positively charged U-235 ions are attracted to a
negatively charged plate. LIS, although a promising and potentially cheap
technique, appears to be extremely sophisticated even for technically advanced
nations.
Other less known and used techniques
include aerodynamic enrichment processes, chemical and ion exchange, and plasma
separation. At present, the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge techniques are
the commonly used uranium enrichment technologies.
Fuel fabrication. In a fuel fabrication plant, the enriched uranium is changed into
an enriched uranium dioxide (UO2) powder. The powder is manufactured
into small pellets, and loaded into metal tubes, forming fuel rods.
Power generation in reactors. The clusters of fuel rods (fuel assemblies) are put into the core
of the nuclear reactor along with a moderator (used to slow down the chain
reaction inside the reactor). Nuclear fission reactions inside of a reactor
heat up water and produce steam, which drives a turbine connected to a
generator that produces electricity.
The reactors are of different types,
depending on fuel they use (enriched UO2 or natural uranium); type
of coolant (water, heavy water, CO2) and type of moderator (water,
heavy water, graphite). It is interesting to note that If graphite or heavy
water is used
as moderator, it is possible to run a power reactor on natural instead of
enriched uranium. In a heavy-water reactor, plutonium (a by-product of nuclear processes inside
of a reactor) can be bred from natural uranium. Thus, heavy water provides one
more route to produce nuclear weapons.
Research reactors are a separate type of
nuclear reactors. They are much smaller than power reactors, and they are primarily
used for professional training, scientific research,
and medical radioisotope production. Many of them still operate with HEU.
Temporary spent fuel storage. Fuel rods are usually kept in reactors several years. When
removed, spent fuel is still emitting both radiation and heat, and therefore
needs to be cooled, usually in a special pond at the reactor site. However,
keeping spent fuel in such storage is only a temporary measure. Spent fuel
needs either be reprocessed to recover the usable portion of it, or it should
be sent for long-term storage and final disposal.
Reprocessing and recycling. Spent fuel normally contains 96% uranium (of which approximately
1% U-235), 1% plutonium and 3% waste products. Reprocessing is a chemical
process that separates these waste products from uranium and plutonium. Uranium
can be sent back to a conversion facility for a new cycle.
Waste management. Experts are still elaborating plans for nuclear waste management.
The first permanent disposal is expected to occur about 2010. Meanwhile, the
waste products are usually being turned into a special (borosilicate) glass and
kept in steel canisters, while spent fuel rods (that were not recycled) are
being encapsulated in corrosion-resistant metals.
