2.
At the same time, with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq Teheran has occasionally shown that it can be a constructive
international player. It has legitimate security concerns, including to
prevent Afghanistan and Iraq become failed states and the security of the
energy flow through the Straits of Hormuz, all of which it shares with NATO
member countries. Therefore, while our present relationship with Iran can be
characterised as ‘difficult’ there is also great potential for close
co-operation in the future, if Teheran is willing to change its current course
in some areas.
3.
This brief report looks at the pressing security
issues related to Iran. For obvious reasons, Teheran’s Iranian nuclear
programme features prominently in this report, but it also shortly refers to
other issues, including regional security, including Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as international terrorism. The paper argues that NATO Allies need to build
a robust consensus among themselves and with partners on how to engage Iran constructively and avoid a serious crisis. To that end the report suggests that NATO
as an organisation should serve as a forum to discuss and agree on a joint
political agenda to approach Iran. The autumn report will provide an update on
the current nuclear negotiations and offer additional suggestions of how Iran could be induced to co-operate with the international community.Â
II.
Iran’s nuclear
programme
4.
Though its nuclear
activities date back to the 1960s the
international community started paying much closer attention to Iran’s
programme only after a dissident Iranian group helped expose an undeclared uranium enrichment programme
at nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak in August 2002. Teheran has dismissed allegations that it
is clandestinely pursuing a nuclear weapons programme and says that it is
developing nuclear technology purely for civil use. Senior Iranian officials
argue that the country needs nuclear power to replace its dwindling energy
resources and point out that it has the right to obtain knowledge to master the
full nuclear fuel cycle under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).Â
However, for several reasons, Iran’s atomic policy has raised considerable
concern.Â
5.
First, Teheran’s declared nuclear policy is
inconsistent with its energy needs: Iran’s one nuclear power plant under
construction will be powered by Russian fuel. Even if Teheran built many more,
it could obtain more than sufficient nuclear fuel on the international market
at considerably lower costs than enriching it in the country. It is doubtful
that Iran has large
enough deposits of natural uranium to ever be self-sufficient in civil nuclear
power. The deposits are certainly sufficient, however, to enrich into
weapons-grade material for a sizeable stockpile of nuclear weapons.Â
6.
Second, Teheran has not been upfront about its
nuclear activities. It has repeatedly and continuously concealed crucial parts
of its programme and only admitted to them after it was confronted with the
evidence. Moreover, Iran obtained equipment and technology from the A.Q. Kahn
network which has specialised in secretly providing nuclear weapons technology,
equipment, and know-how to countries like Libya and North Korea. Among other
examples, Iran disguised its centrifuge enrichment programme as an
“agricultural centre†and it only disclosed prior Uranium enrichment activities
after it was forced to admit them in October 2003. Similarly, it only
confessed to having given false information on importing components for the
advanced centrifuges after it was confronted with the evidence. As of today, three
years after the discovery of Iran's undeclared programme, the IAEA has not been
able to verify Iran's claim that its nuclear programme is
purely peaceful.Â
7.
To avoid an international crisis over the
nuclear programme, the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) engaged in talks with Iran. The EU and Iran signed agreements in 2003 and in
November 2004. To induce Iran to renounce the parts of its nuclear programme
that could be used for military use, the EU-3 offered Iran a number of incentives, including co-operation in the civil nuclear sector,
technological and economic co-operation and firm commitments on security
issues. In turn, Iran promised to voluntarily freeze all conversion and
enrichment-related activities for the duration of the negotiations with the
EU-3.Â
8.
But the negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 collapsed in January after Iran ended its moratorium on uranium conversion and enrichment research. In September 2005, an IAEA governing board resolution declared Iran in violated of its safeguards obligations, but deferred a decision on referral to the
UN Security Council until some later date. In early February, the IAEA’s board
of governors approved a resolution which reported Iran to the United Nations Security Council for possible action, but following a proposal by Russia and China, postponed any UN
action by one month. Noting a lack of confidence in Iran's intentions because of Teheran's
many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards
Agreement the resolution called upon Teheran to re-establish verifiably the full and
sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and processing activities,
including research and development. The resolution also called Iran to re-consider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water and to
ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol. Â Â
9.
At the time of this writing, Iran has sent contradicting messages
whether it would accept a Russian proposal, backed by
the US, the EU and also China, to enrich Uranium in Russia. Iran has
in the past drawn a distinction between the energy-related work that would go
to Russia and other nuclear-enrichment that is calls “researchâ€.  Â
10.
The possible ramifications of a nuclear-armed Iran are difficult to assess. Estimates of when Iran might have enough fissile material
for a nuclear device range from two years (Israeli intelligence) to ten years
(the latest US National Intelligence Estimate). It is also unclear if Teheran would pursue nuclear weapons or a
‘breakout-capability’, i.e. the ability to quickly develop and produce atomic
weapons when it felt threatened. If the Islamic Republic acquired nuclear weapons
capability it would radically change the strategic
environment in this dangerous, unstable part of the
world. The following scenarios are possible:Â
11.
An Iranian nuclear arsenal could ignite a
regional arms race. In particular, it could lead to the further proliferation of WMD. A number of countries in the region,
for example, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, would have the resources to follow suit. The Islamic Republic could also give nuclear weapons or material
to terrorists. The worst spectre might be the
prospect of nuclear weapons under the control of religious fanatics (or the
Republican Guards) with links to terrorist organisations. Moreover, the Islamic Republic could use a
nuclear arsenal to blackmail its neighbours or other states. In this context, Iran’s ballistic missile programme has raised
considerable concern. The Islamic Republic has an estimated 300 short-range
Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 (based on the Scud-B and Scud-C purchased from the DPRK)
and perhaps as many as 100 medium-range Shahab-3 missile (an Iranian version of
the North-Korean No-dong missile). Teheran continues research on extending the
range of its missiles, which would be extremely dangerous for Israel and Europe when armed with nuclear warheads.
12.
The question of Iranian nuclear weapons is also
linked to Israel and the broader context of Arab-Israeli relations. Iranian
President Ahmadinejad’s remarks that Israel should be "wiped off the map" are worrisome and unacceptable and convey a
confrontational approach of the new Iranian
government. Israel, which is suspected but has never officially acknowledged
to posses nuclear arms, would loose its qualitative military supremacy. As a
consequence, it could change its long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity and
adopt a new military doctrine along the lines of ‘mutually assured destruction’
(MAD). The worst case scenario for Israel would be if an Iranian ‘nuclear
umbrella’ would embolden radical Arabs and even prompt Israel’s more moderate neighbours into acting more aggressively. Although Israel might accelerate the peace process to prevent such a scenario, the victory of radical Islamic
group Hamas in the Palestinian elections at the end of January this year has
complicated the Middle East peace process. The differences
between the Israeli and Palestinian sides are now much deeper, and the chances
for negotiations are much more remote.Â
13.
Iran’s immediate
neighbours have been critical of Teheran’s atomic activities, but have thus far
shied away from confronting Iran directly on its suspected nuclear weapons
programme. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman has repeatedly suggested
the creation of a nuclear-free Gulf, but this has been rejected by Teheran. A
perennial issue for the GCC has been Iran’s 1970 occupation of three small
islands claimed by the UAE - Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa. Pointing
to the role Teheran is playing in affairs of Shiite
minorities outside Iran, some of Iran’s neighbours are concerned that the
leadership in Teheran also exports Islamic extremism outside the country. Others have also voiced concern that Iran's foreign policy is influenced by
nationalistic streaks, which, they argue, dates back to ancient Persian history.Â
14.
Teheran has also connections
with what it calls "resistance groups" or "liberation
movements" like Hizbollah and Hamas. Teheran does not direct these
groups, rather it only admits to providing them with political support.Â
However, there are also allegations that Iran is directly sponsoring terrorist groups, for example in Iraq. Some US and UK officials suspect that Iran is helping the insurgency in Iraq by allowing the transport of arms
and fighters into Iraq to stage attacks. Moreover, the British government had
issued a formal protest to Teheran after sophisticated bombs were used against UK troops in the Basra region. The devices used the same kind of electronic triggers found in bombs
made by the Hizbollah in Lebanon.Â
15.
To avert a serious Iranian crisis we should
avoid aggressive rhetoric and dispel any notion of
‘regime change’. Outside pressure
for change could actually solidify support for the regime. With regard to a
possible ‘military option’ your rapporteur would
concede the case that it would, in principle, not be useful not to remove it
completely at the outset of negotiations. Preventive or pre-emptive military
action against Iran's known or suspected nuclear facilities may destroy
critical infrastructure. However, the intelligence available of Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure is imperfect.Â
16.
Military action against Iran would likely
provoke Teheran to resort to asymmetric warfare and unconventional means
against their attackers. For example, it could encourage attacks by militant
groups such as Hizbollah and Hamas or by Shiite militias in Iraq. In addition
to jeopardising the already difficult stabilisation efforts of the US-led coalition
in Iraq Iran could significantly undermine reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. Though it would do considerable damage to its own economy, it
could threaten oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz, through which more
than one-third of the world's oil flows. Moreover, even a limited military
strike would be likely to provoke anger through the entire Muslim world. Â
17.
Even if successful, military action against
suspected military nuclear installations would likely only delay, but not
prevent, Teheran to obtain nuclear weapons. Moreover, any military action
would reinforce Iran’s determination to obtain nuclear weapons and to withdraw
from the NPT. During the ongoing diplomatic exchanges,
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad even warned that the
country might withdraw from the NPT if international pressure increased.Â
Military action would therefore be likely to be a ‘tactical success but a
strategic failure’, as Joe Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment’ has argued.Â
The 1981 Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in fact
accelerated the Iraqi nuclear programme so that Saddam Hussein was close to
having a nuclear bomb ten years later.Â
18.
In his 2002 ‘State of the Union’ address
President Bush described the Islamic Republic as forming part of an ‘axis of
evil’, along with Iraq under Saddam Hussein and North Korea. This approach has
proven counter-productive and strengthened Iranian hard-liners. What is more,
apart from the fact that the US policy failed to alter Teheran’s behaviour to
the positive, The Islamic Republic is very different from the DPRK and Iraq
under Saddam Hussein. With 10 percent of the world's
known oil reserves and the world’s second-largest natural gas resources
Iran is a very rich country. It earns about 85% of its foreign currency from
oil exports and gets an extra annual 1 billion $ with each $1-per-barrel rise
in global oil prices. Moreover, it has a vibrant
civil society and a complex and diverse internal political system. Iran has a
huge potential:Â Many of the approximately 70 million inhabitants are
young and well educated. It has an estimated three to seven million internet
users, the most in the Middle East.  Â
19.
But Iran is also facing serious economic
problems, which it cannot solve by itself alone. Iran’s real per capita income
is about one third of what it was before the Islamic revolution of 1979. The
Islamic Republic has the highest rate of opiate addiction in the world and
corruption is a major problem. Foreign direct investment continues to lag far behind
that in other country in the region. A faltering
economy has failed to generate enough jobs, resulting in high unemployment,
which is estimated to be up to 30 % (compared to the official unemployment rate
which is around 16%). Among university graduates unemployment is estimated as
high at 20 percent. Therefore, Iran needs more access
to the world markets and thus it needs more engagement with the West.Â
20.
The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has
certainly made the relationship between Iran and the West more difficult and
the tone from Teheran has become more aggressive. The conservatives now
control all levers of power in the Islamic Republic, with opposing factions
effectively neutralised. Despite the change in government it is important to
remember that there is also continuity in Iran. Iran’s un-elected supreme
religious leader, Ayatolla Ali Khamenei, still wields ultimate authority. It
should also be noted that, while the tone of the previous government was more
conciliatory, Iran’s nuclear programme accelerated under Khatami. Although a majority
of Iranians despise the ruling hard-liners, they also support Iran's nuclear
programme, among others because it has become a source of national pride in an
ancient nation with a glorious history.Â
22.
If we want Teheran to abandon its nuclear programme and
to conduct a more constructive foreign policy we need to obtain the broadest
international support for diplomatic initiatives towards the country. When
approaching Iran, it will be particularly important to have Russia and China,
but also India ‘on board’. Teheran has been very successful in averting joint
action against it by dividing the international community, which has thus
allowed it to improve its enrichment programme while negotiations continued on
an on-and-off basis. Iran uses the legalistic arguments to convince the
countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), that the US and EU pursue a
‘neo-colonialist policy’ to deprive Iran of its right to
enrich under the NPT.Â
23.
But building and sustaining a broad
international front towards Iran may not be easy. Close international
co-operation, particularly with the permanent members of the UN Security
Council, will be crucial. Both Russia and China, Iran’s
main nuclear technology partners in the past, have
growing economic stakes in Iran. These interests are likely to grow in the
coming years, especially given China’s need for fossil fuel to meet the demand
of its rapidly expanding economy. The same applies to India, which is torn between its need for energy and the ‘strategic
partnership’ with US.[i]Â
24.
If we want to create the broadest
international consensus towards the Islamic Republic, we must be consistent in
our policy. Iranians accuse the West of ‘double standards’ when the
international community accepts countries like
Pakistan, India, and Israel as nuclear powers but threatens to ban Iran for its
nuclear programme. They also point to the example of North Korea, which is offered security guarantees and aid.Â
Moreover, they cite the US-Indian deal, agreed during the visit of US President
Bush to New Delhi in early March this year, which offers American nuclear
know-how and fuel to India’s civilian nuclear
programme. India is not a NPT member country.Â
25.
The international community has a strong interest that
Iran terminates all enrichment-related activities before
they reach the point where Iran can produce nuclear weapons. To that end, the
best diplomatic solution would require Iran to suspend
its recently resumed uranium enrichment activities and ratify the Additional
Protocol on safeguards. Moreover, to rebuild trust the UN Security Council should authorise the IAEA to
undertake robust inspections in Iran.Â
26.
Teheran has been very legalistic in its argumentation with the IAEA and
the EU-3 and has repeatedly, and correctly, stated that its agreements with the
IAEA and the EU-3 have been on a ‘voluntary, non-legally-binding basis’.Â
Teheran has signed, but not ratified, the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards
Agreement. In the meantime, it agreed on a voluntary basis to implement it.  Â
27.
It is important to provide the IAEA with a significantly
increased verification mandate and authority. IAEA resolutions are not legally
binding and only the UN Security Council can give the IAEA authority for more
intrusive inspections. Only the UN Security Council can make commitments
binding by giving authority, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to the IAEA and
request suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme.Â
28.
We must improve and consolidate the non-proliferation regime. Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has not
completely prevented proliferation, it has, by and large, been rather
successful. In fact, for almost 40 years the NPT has helped convince countries
as diverse as Sweden, South Korea, Brazil and Ukraine that the costs of
acquiring nuclear weapons far outweigh the benefits. Regrettably, there
is a tendency of the international community to only react to crisis and not,
or not sufficiently, draw the lessons from previous crises in order to diminish
the chances that they could reoccur. Your rapporteur must sadly note that the 2005 NPT Review Conference did not produce an agreement on
strengthening the NPT regime. What is more, the UN General Assembly’s
‘Millennium+5 Summit’ last autumn did not agree on single line about non-proliferation
or disarmament.Â
29.
Although, as a signatory of the NPT, Iran
is entitled to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, including uranium
enrichment, it should agree on a 5-year moratorium on
any enrichment and reprocessing activity. Such an agreement should be the
first step to a Fissile Material Cut-Off (FMCT) treaty. This would render
ineffective Iran’s argument that it is singled out and treated unfairly.Â
30.
Strengthening the NPT regime would also include
adoption of a UN Security Council resolution along the
lines of the French proposal to the 2005 NPT review conference, making it
obligatory for a country to resolve any violation committed before withdrawal
from the treaty. A country withdrawing would also be required to give up any
benefits it obtained while it was an NPT member, including the dismantling and
return of any nuclear technology acquired during NPT membership. Â
31.
We also have a stake in the improvement
of the human rights situation in Iran. Iran has a fragmented society with
power distributed among many different political, religious and military
layers. For example, in the military realm there is also considerable
competition between the Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(Republican Guards - IRGC). The role of the latter, which were formed in 1979
by young rebels loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has increased. The IRGC
has now some 150,000 soldiers, about one third of Iran’s military. While there
are no indications of this at present, one of the greatest dangers would be the
risk of a civil war where nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of a
radical faction. In the past, the US and the EU have repeatedly voiced
‘serious doubts’ whether Iran is committed to respecting human rights and the
fundamental freedoms of the Iranian people. According to a new report by Amnesty International entitled, "Iran: New Government Fails To Address Dire Human
Rights Situation," the new government has not addressed the situation rather appears to have intensified repression since it came to office in August 2005.Â
32.
If we advocate reforms in the ‘Broader Middle
East’ we cannot ignore Iran. NATO Allies would lose their credibility if they
were perceived to abandon Iran’s pro-democratic forces. Because of Teheran’s poor human rights record we should have a
continuing dialogue about civil society, democracy, and human rights. That
said, we must acknowledge that the development of democracy is an internal
affair of Iranians in Iran. The West should support them, but not try to
decide for them who should run their country. Instead, we should try to help
strengthen Iranian institutions of civil society. We should support Iran's human
rights and democracy activists wherever possible, and keep them and their cause
in the public eyes. The UN, too, should address the human rights record of the Iranian regime. This could be done by, for example, appointing a special human rights monitor for Iran, and by
raising Iran's human rights record annually at General Assembly.  Â
33.
In addition to requesting ending all its conversion and
enrichment-related activities Iran should cease to test
intermediate-range ballistic missiles of the Shahab missile family and not
deploy them.Â
34.
What is more, Iran should also abandon its
aggressive rhetoric towards Israel, and should recognise its existence.Â
Teheran should also end its obstruction to the Mid-East peace process and
support Israeli-Palestinian understanding. To that end it should influence
Hamas, Hezbollah and other groups to renounce all terrorist activities and
engage in negotiations.Â
35.
In addition to a security dialogue and possible
co-operation as mapped out in the next chapter, governments of NATO Allies
could also assist in improving Iran’s liaison with the IMF and the World Bank
and thus facilitate Iran’s access to the international capital market.Â
Moreover, along the lines of the EU-3 proposals, EU could have access to
pressurised water reactor technology. In addition, existing sanctions could be
lifted. This could include, on the US side, a revocation of the 1986
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, even though it might be difficult to persuade the US
Congress to take these steps. More generally, because the role of the EU is
limited primarily to the economic, technological and diplomatic realms, your
Rapporteur would endorse direct talks between Washington and Teheran. Only the
United States could provide the immediate security incentives that the Iranian
leadership apparently seeks. Your Rapporteur therefore welcomes the recent
call by Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, for a broad, multilateral response.Â
36.
Any viable solution to Iran's nuclear issue
requires close transatlantic co-operation. Since the
beginning of the Islamic Republic 1979, Iran was an issue of contention among
the transatlantic partners. However, co-operation among the Allies has greatly
improved in the recent past. For example, the US administration began to
support the EU-3 negotiations and in March 2005 dropped its objection to Iran’s
application to the WTO and to delivering spare parts for civilian planes. But
there is no long-term Allied consensus on Iran. Therefore, transatlantic
partners urgently need to improve consultation about possible policies that
induce Iran to abandon its nuclear activities and behave as a constructive
international partner. Failing that, NATO allies and partners need to develop
mechanisms that contain and, if necessary, deter Iran.Â
37.
After 9-11 the Persian Gulf and its surroundings
has become increasingly relevant for Euro-Atlantic security. NATO allies and NATO as an organisation should engage with Iran
because it is a strategic country. The Islamic Republic has a direct frontier
with Turkey, a NATO member country, and through ISAF, NATO forces are now
stationed in its eastern neighbour Afghanistan. In addition to its oil and gas
reserves, many problems in Afghanistan, Iraq and other states in the area – of
an ethnic, religious, economic or military nature, along with the problems of
refugees, drug trafficking, terrorism, and separatism – could be addressed more
effectively with Iranian co-operation.Â
38.
Our aim should be to offer Iran official
recognition as a legitimate player in the region but also to increase the cost
for Iran if it continued its non-compliance with the demands of the
international community. The Allies need to focus on persuading Iran to
abandon its nuclear programme and recognise its legitimate security interests.Â
As NATO is developing its relationship with the
countries of the region it may consider offering Iran a
security dialogue. Such a dialogue should be part and parcel of a regional
security dialogue in which all countries of the region could participate and
which could eventually lead to a mutual non-aggression treaty. More precisely,
confidence and security-building measures could include, for example:Â Â
-
the exchange of observers for military
exercises, including Iranian observers during Allied naval exercises and any
large troop movement near Iran’s borders and Allied observers during large
Iranian exercises;Â
-
naval co-operation at sea, including
incidents-at-sea agreement and a Gulf-wide agency for collecting information
about sea hazards;Â
-
and, eventually, commencement of an arms control
agreement along the lines of CFE to limit forces close to the Iraqi-Iranian and
Afghan-Iranian borders. Â
39.
However, before they can entertain the idea of a
security dialogue with Iran, the Allies must design and agree on joint action
towards Teheran. To that end, your rapporteur suggests to make the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) the forum for policy co-ordination among the Allies. In
the NAC, the Allies should agree on incentives for Iran as well as on possible
responses should Tehran pursue its nuclear programme.Â
40.
If negotiations
about Iran’s nuclear programme fail the West should be prepared to apply
diplomatic and economic pressure. Among the
instruments that could dissuade Teheran to pursue its nuclear programme, tough international sanctions against Iran may be hard to
orchestrate and could therefore be ineffective.Â
However, ‘smart’ – or targeted - sanctions might be more effective. The
focus should be on Iran’s energy industry, particularly on restrictions of
foreign investment. For the time being, only Western companies have the
expertise and technology that Iran's energy sector needs. Without new
investment, aging oil fields and growing domestic demand would force Iran to
become a net importer of oil by 2010. He wants to
stress that the goal of the international community is not to punish the
Iranian people with sanctions or overthrow the Islamic Republic.Â
41.
Any policy towards Iran must include a
substantive dialogue with other allies and friends, especially the Gulf
countries. Reaching a comprehensive understanding with Teheran on the issues
mentioned above is no zero sum game that should negatively impact the interests
and the security of our partners in the region. Therefore, we should enhance
co-operation with regional states in all areas, including diplomatic, economic,
and military ones.Â
42.
It must be clear, however, that NAC discussions
would focus on diplomatic and perhaps economic measures only. NATO should not
discuss any military action against the Islamic Republic. If its leadership
rejected an Allied offer and pursued an aggressive policy towards its
neighbours, NATO Allies might consider offering Persian Gulf countries a
security guarantee.   However, apart from activities in the context of
combating internationally active terrorist groups, the role of the Alliance
should primarily be political, rather than military. NATO could also be the
venue where we develop a joint approach with our partners, particularly with
Russia. In this context, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), but also the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), could discuss and agree on a
comprehensive policy for Iran.Â
43.
Iran has the right to develop peaceful nuclear
technology and that its legitimate security interests are being recognised.Â
However, its policies are a serious concern for
regional and international security: the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme has violated the safeguards agreement of the NPT, its support for
radical Islamist groups is a pertinent threat to countries of the region and
worldwide and its human right violations remain a serious concern for human
rights organisations.Â
44.
Iran should commit itself to full co-operation
and transparency with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues. As a gesture
of good will and an essential confidence-building measure Iran should
immediately ratify and strictly adhere to the Additional Protocol. Moreover,
it should agree on ending all its conversion and enrichment-related
activities. Such an agreement should be the first step to a
Fissile Material Cut-Off (FMCT) treaty. Iran should cease to test
intermediate-range ballistic missiles of the Shahab missile family and not
deploy them.Â
45.
NATO, and the NAC in
particular, should become the place for discussion and
agreement on a robust consensus for tackling Iran.Â
NATO should be the forum for developing a primarily diplomatic agenda to
pro-actively engage Iran and the countries of the region in a security
dialogue. What is more, NATO can make a significant
contribution to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.Â
