1.
Following the attacks on 9-11, Central Asian
countries feature much more prominently on NATO’s security agenda. The US-led
intervention in Afghanistan and the subsequent creation of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by NATO under the authority of the UN
Security Council, brought to an acute awareness of the surrounding region’s
importance to the security and stability of Afghanistan. Regional security
concerns, including terrorism, ethnic conflicts, human- and drug-trafficking,
as well as political and economic instability, pose serious risks that impact
beyond the region. In addition, ‘spill-over’ of these security challenges – in
particular, drug- and human-trafficking – directly threatens the interests of
alliance members themselves as opium grown in Afghan fields and trafficked
through porous Central Asian and Caucasus borders eventually finds its way into
the streets of Europe and North-America.
2.
This report provides a short overview of the
security issues in the region as well as NATO’s progress in building a security
relationship with the five countries of Central Asia. As such, it assesses
NATO’s achievements thus far. The autumn report will map out some specific
recommendation of additional measures NATO might initiate towards its Central
Asian partners.
3.
Bordering Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan the Central Asian countries are strategically important. The
region has also become the advanced post in fighting terrorism, religious
extremism and drug trafficking. Among others due to their geographic
remoteness and because of their relatively small, and declining, populations
Central Asian countries are, to varying degrees, weak countries. Mostly feudal Khanates before Russian absorption
in the 19th century, the Central Asian countries have only recently
begun to develop a firm sense of national identity. The ethnic namesakes of
the countries themselves were often nomads divided by narrow tribal loyalties
before they were brutally settled by Soviet collectivisation campaigns in the
1930s. The Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz are related to ancient Mongol tribes; the
Tajiks are regarded as a Persian people; and the Turkmen and Uzbeks are Turkish
in origin. The border demarcations of their respective Soviet Republics did
not, however, follow ethnic lines, in some measure because mixed populations
made demarcation impossible, in larger measure because the Soviets divided
ethnic populations by political boundaries and forced the deportations of
potentially troublesome groups.Â
4.
They suffer from a host of
challenges, including organized crime, corruption, poverty, civil strife,
radicalism and economic and environmental devastation. Small ruling elites
have consolidated political and economic power into their own hands. Three of
the five Central Asia countries have considerable energy resources. But
available energy resources, i.e. oil in Kazakhstan and natural gas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can be a boon or a bane for them. Low-income fuels
corruption and the wealth earned from exported natural resources tends to
consolidate and strengthen the power of ruling elites. Moreover, the ability
of the three energy rich states to extract and export oil and gas has been
significantly hampered by aging infrastructure, underdevelopment and the cost
of transport to markets. They need substantial investments in its energy
infrastructure. Relatively weak
market economies mean that many people depend on the government for their
livelihood, allowing for the maintenance of large patronage networks that in
turn aid the concentration of Presidential power and the repression of
opposition groups. Economic
stagnation (except in Kazakhstan), human rights violations, pervasive
corruption and high levels of poverty have contributed to a gradual erosion of
the legitimacy of Central Asian governments in the eyes of their citizens. Corruption is widespread in all five Central
Asian countries: Out of 159 countries listed in Transparency International's
2005 Corruption Perceptions Index,
Kazakhstan ranked 107 (score 2.6), while Kyrgyzstan ranked 130 (score 2.3),
Uzbekistan 137 (score 2.2), Tajikistan 144 (score 2.1) and Turkmenistan 155
(score 1.8).
5.
All five countries inhabit a
competitive geo-strategic environment dominated by rivalries between
themselves, a resurgent Russia, and a growing and energy-hungry China. The latter has become a key player in
the whole region economically and strategically. Securing energy and water
resources are of strategic importance to China's economic growth. For example,
its oil consumption increased by 33% in 2004. Although its security presence in the region has been
reduced, the Russian Federation continues to play a prominent role in Central Asia. Most are dependent on Russia on energy and trade and in particular, Uzbekistan and possibly Tajikistan have made a deliberate choice to make Russia their primary
strategic partner in the region. Â Central
Asia’s neighbours prefer regimes
that are stable and follow their lead, politically and economically. Thus,
Western concepts of democracy and human rights are not high on the agenda.Â
While Central Asia’s human rights record has somewhat improved, human rights
abuses remain widespread, especially in Uzbekistan. There is often a
significant difference between the stated aims of the authorities on democratic
reform and the human rights agenda.
6.
Central Asian countries also
face very serious ecological challenges, most of which result from the Soviet
legacy:Â More than 456 nuclear explosions, including atmospheric and
underground testing, were conducted between 1947 and 1991 in Kazakhstan, leaving large areas radiologically contaminated. Uzbekistan was an integral part of Soviet biological and chemical
weapons programmes. The main testing ground for biological weapons was an
island in the Aral Sea in western Uzbekistan, which was severely contaminated
with anthrax. Another ecological disaster is the Aral Sea’s dramatic decrease of its water level, due to the excessive and irrational use of
the water from the Amurdaria and Syrdaria rivers. As a consequence, more than
60 million hectares of land are suffering serious erosion and excessive
salinisation. A continuing and growing desertification, contamination of water
and a degradation of the whole ecosystem due to the dissemination of
contaminating elements by the winds. The whole region and its population
suffer a lack of sufficient drinking water and dreadful economic and health
consequences.Â
7.
To different degrees, all
five Central Asian countries are confronted by Islamist radicalism. Until
2002, armed Islamic groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
found safe haven in Afghanistan. Since the US-led overthrow of the Taliban in
late 2001, the IMU has lost much of its cohesion. However, IMU cells and
supporters of the ostensibly non-violent Hizb-ut-Tahrir still exist.Â
8.
Because of their economic
weakness and because they do not have the strong institutions and civil
societies needed to manage the peaceful transfer of power there is a real
possibility that one or more of the Central Asian countries can become failed
states and a source of regional instability. The riots in Kyrgystan in May
2005 are examples of the kinds of instability that could lead to state
failure. These events have demonstrated a clear need for social and political
reforms, as potential risks for stability are more evident than ever. However,
political elites of the five states, with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan after 2005, generally resist change that does not reinforce their hold on power.
In contrast, “coloured revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have led even relatively safe
regimes to consolidate their power further. Following is a brief run-down of
recent political and economic developments in each of the five Central Asian
countries.
9.
Kazakhstan
maintains a political environment that is significant freer than those in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, although not as free as the environment in the post-revolution Kyrgyz Republic. The December 2005 presidential election, which gave Nazarbayev 91% of the
vote with a reported turnout of over 90%, is seen as a step backwards for the
Kazakh political environment. An organised opposition was allowed and
opposition candidates were given substantial airtime on public television
during the campaign. OSCE election observers reported numerous irregularities
with the conduct and count of the vote, although credible exit polls suggest
that even without election-day manipulation it is possible that Nazarbayev
could have gained a large majority of the vote. There are also speculation
signs that Nazarbayev’s rule is becoming increasingly authoritarian. In the
months following the election, several high-profile opposition leaders have
been found shot to death. Recent developments suggest the involvement of
secret services close to the government.Â
10.
Along with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan is considered to have the freest
economy of the Central Asian states. The Republic is in the process of
achieving economic stability due to the increase in oil revenues, large foreign
investments, a high GDP and successful economic reforms and privatizations. Kazakhstan's oil wealth has made it Central Asia's largest economy, and Kazakhstan is the largest
oil producer and exporter in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).Â
With an anticipated 2% by 2010 contribution to global supply Kazakhstan's oil is will be among the top ten oil production nations in the world.
11.
Since the March 2005 Tulip Revolution, politics
in Kyrgyzstan have remained unstable. The new government may have
difficulties managing the north-south tensions that have plagued the domestic
political environment throughout the post-Soviet era. The current governing
coalition, led by the ethnically southern President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and the
northern Prime Minister Feliks Kulov, has already suffered several high-profile
defections. The acting Foreign Affairs Minister, Roza Otunbayeva, could not be
confirmed in her post by the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament), and the President
dismissed Azimbek Barknazarov, a well-known and long-time thorn in the side of
disgraced former President Akayev from his post as prosecutor-general. Both
will now stand for the opposition in parliamentary by-elections scheduled for
November.Â
12.
The economy slowed significantly in mid-2005.Â
GDP is believed to have grown by only 2.5% in 2005, a startlingly slow pace for a developing economy. GDP is expected to rebound, but only to a
modest 4% growth rate in 2006. Corruption and an opaque tax and regulatory
environment continue to discourage higher levels of foreign direct investment.Â
13.
In Tajikistan, President Imomali Rahmonov
has weakened pluralism by imprisoning many of his political opponents and
solidifying state control over the media. Opposition parties remain
demoralised and fragmented, in part because of Rahmovov’s very real popularity
as the guarantor of Tajikistan’s political stability since the peace accord.Â
Ironically, the President is also gradually dismantling the terms of the peace
agreement achieved in 1997 after five years of civil war. Among others, the
peace deal guaranteed that 30% of government positions would be occupied by
members of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) party. Rahmonov has acted
systematically to isolate and neutralise various UTO leaders and sympathisers.
There are clear signs that the 2006 presidential elections will be manipulated
to favour Rahmonov in his quest for a third term in office.
14.
Meanwhile, the Tajik economy continues to grow
at a pace that is a bit slow for one of the poorest countries in the CIS.Â
Having expanded at a 10.6% clip in 2004, it is believed that the Tajik economy
only grew at a 6% pace in 2005 owing in large measure to a poor cotton harvest
and high gas and oil prices. The main industrial export good is aluminium that
finds its way to the Netherlands and Turkey. Russian companies are active
investors both in the Tajik aluminium industry and in the energy sector,
continuing a pattern set in other CIS countries. Owing to the layout of the
Soviet gas and oil pipeline system, Tajikistan must import most of its energy
from Uzbekistan. Relations with its large neighbour are prickly, owing to Uzbekistan’s pretensions for regional hegemony, the large Uzbek population in Tajikistan. The Uzbeks, for their part, believe that Islamic militants and regime
opponents use Tajik territories as staging areas for penetration into their
country and in response Uzbekistan mined its borders with Tajikistan.Â
15.
Turkmenistan’s government is quasi-totalitarian in character with all power
concentrated in the person of President Saparmurd Niyazov. Freedom of the press
is virtually nonexistent. Little reform has taken place since the Soviet
break-up in 1991 and the country’s economy continues to be a command model with
limited private property rights. The President has maintained power by acting
ruthlessly against any real or potential challengers to his rule and through an
elaborate system of state-sponsored patronage.Â
16.
There are indications that economic difficulties
have generated significant strains on Niyazov’s rule. Massive corruption has
rendered the governing apparatus increasingly ineffective, although it has, to
date, been propped up by the proceeds of natural gas exports to Russia and the Ukraine. However, Turkmenistan’s natural gas reserves may be much lower than it
claims. Specifically, official government figures estimate the Dlotabad gas
field to contain 20 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, but Turkmenistan has so far not released the figures of an international audit that may show
much lower levels of gas. To increase its exports, Turkmenistan has showed
great interest in the construction of a gas pipeline that would lead through Afghanistan to Pakistan, thus decreasing its dependence upon Russia. The lingering presence of the
Taliban in Afghanistan, however, has clouded the future of this pipeline.Â
17.
While there is less political repression in Uzbekistan than in Turkmenistan, President Islam Karimov has held his country in an iron grip
since winning a flawed vote in 1991. While consolidating his power through a
vast system of state-sponsored patronage, the President arranged to have the
1996 presidential election postponed until 2000 and declared his previous
nine-year stint to have constituted only one term (since the Constitution,
adopted in 1991, sets a two-term limit on presidencies). The 2000 presidential
election was then run to give Karimov over 90% of the vote – a vote in which
his only declared challenger, Abdulhafiz Jalolov, publicly declared his
intention to vote for Karimov. Finally, a 2002 referendum lengthened his
presidential term from five to seven years, allowing Karimov to stay in office
until at least 2007.Â
18.
Opposition parties have been harassed or
intimidated into irrelevance and the five parties that inhabit the bicameral
parliament – the Ali Majlis – all support the government. The lack of any
legal forum for criticism of Karimov has left only extreme Muslim groups to
carry the banner of the opposition. In turn, the regime has used the threat of
Islamic terrorism to justify a series of crackdowns against groups or persons
considered potential threats. However, terrorism is an issue in Uzbekistan and 15 people died after several car bombs exploded in Tashkent in February 1999. Later
that year, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an extremist paramilitary
group allied to al-Qaeda, attempted to invade the country through the Kyrgyz Republic though the bulk of the force retreated to Tajikistan from where they were
eventually deported. A second incursion by the IMU in August 2000 led to
fierce battles between the group and the Uzbek army, which only inflicted a
defeat upon the insurrectionists with considerable difficulty.Â
19.
A brutally repressed uprising the town of
Andijan in May 2005 led to a wave of reaction against real and suspected
enemies to the regime, including human rights activists and non-governmental
organisations. The US- and UN-brokered evacuation of Andizhan refugees from
Tajikistan to Europe led President Karimov’s to revoke US base rights at the
Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) airport in July 2005 following a declaration by the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation demanding a deadline for the withdrawal of US
troops from Central Asia. The German Army still maintains a base at Termez as
a transit point for Afghan operations.Â
IV.
Central Asia and
NATO
20.
In comparison to other NATO partner countries
Central Asian states differ significantly in a number of areas. First and foremost, the Central Asian
countries are not applying for membership in the Alliance. Central Asian
republics are interested in co-operation with NATO primarily for military and,
to different degrees, also political reasons. Their main motivation is that
they want to gain experience, advice and assistance
from NATO countries to improve the capabilities of their armed forces. To that
end they are eager to build up the military infrastructure necessary to combat
terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. As their frontiers are
very porous they want to strengthen the control of their borders and improving
its security. To them, co-operation with NATO provides
a level of assistance that oftentimes involves the direct transfer of material
such as border monitoring equipment, patrol boats and the like. Contributions
from some NATO Members also enhance security both against outside threats as
well as internationally active terrorist groups and against political enemies.Â
The danger is that NATO engagement will become associated with the repressive
tendencies of the regimes themselves.Â
21.
Moreover, co-operation with NATO provides an
enhanced sense of international legitimacy to the Central Asian countries.Â
This international credibility, brought by NATO cooperation, can be very useful
for attracting foreign direct investment – an important goal for all the
countries in the region, since most sit on natural resources that they have
only part of the expertise and money to fully exploit. Some also consider NATO
involvement a certain level of insurance against possible attempts to re-impose
a ‘hegemonic’ Russian influence.Â
22.
Unlike Eastern European countries that, in the
aftermath of the Soviet break-up, had national militaries, CIS country
militaries were formed out of remnants of the old Soviet Army. In Central
Asia, the officer class was predominantly Russian and disappeared in the 1990s
with Russian emigration, necessitating that an entirely new generation of mid-
to upper-level national officers be recruited and trained. In addition, the
old military structure made no distinction between the civilian and the
military realm.Â
23.
Central Asia states are
largely authoritarian and ruled by former Communist Party officials. The
ruling elites tend to see foreign involvement as a threat to their hold on
power. Unlike the societies of Eastern Europe, those of Central Asia are not
necessarily predisposed toward Western political ideas or values. As stated
above, because Central Asian countries do not pursue
alliance membership, NATO has less leverage on these countries to encourage
military and political reform than in the Western Balkans and the Caucasus.Â
24.
Although NATO’s engagement with Central Asian
countries is primarily “demand driven†it certainly has larger strategic goals
in the region. These involve firstly, achieving, stability and security in
Afghanistan; secondly, implementing defence reforms that contribute to broader
democratic reform; and, thirdly, boosting a modernisation of Central Asian
militaries that could allow interoperability with NATO forces in peacekeeping
operations.Â
25.
The most immediate concern involves spillover
effects from the still fluid situation in Afghanistan. The lingering presence
of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces may inspire underground Islamic radical groups
across the region. Another major cause of concern is Afghan opium harvest
which finds its first buyers in Central Asian countries. In this context, your
rapporteur regrets the recent withdraw of Russian border guard supervisors from
Tajikistan. There is some fear that with the formal departure of Russian
supervision, the border with Afghanistan may become more open to human- and
drug-trafficking from Afghanistan, particularly since most Tajik conscripts
come from poor families. The opium that crosses the border into Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan eventually finds its way into Europe and increasingly into the US
and Canada as heroin. Drug cultivation and trade has not only severe negative
implications for Afghanistan, but it can also increase political instability in
neighbouring countries.Â
26.
Recognising Central Asia’s increasingly
important role for Euro-Atlantic security NATO decided to deepen its engagement
with Central Asian (and Caucasus) countries at the 2004 Istanbul Summit. Among
others, Allies decided to strengthen PfP programmes, particularly by expanding
the PAP-DIB which assists partner countries in the development of more
efficient and democratically responsible defence institutions. In addition,
Allies created the office of the Secretary General’s Special Representative for
the Caucasus and for Central Asia. The Summit also mandated the appointment of
two NATO Liaison Officers, one for the Caucasus and another for Central
Asia.
27.
All five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are PfP members.Â
Their level of participation varies from country to country. For the moment,
Uzbekistan is a PfP member only in name. Uzbek co-operation with the alliance
has been minimal since the Andijan incident and Uzbekistan’s subsequent request
that US forces vacate the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) airbase by the end of 2005. By
contrast, Kazakhstan and NATO have recently agreed on an IPAP and the Kazakh
government appears willing to engage in intensified alliance cooperation.Â
28.
Of the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan
is by far the most advanced in NATO co-operation. Kazakhstan has finished the
approval process for the IPAP, although the real difficulties are expected to
occur during implementation. The plan includes info on Kazakh strategic
objectives and is still classified. The plan will certainly include measures
for increasing Kazakh interoperability with NATO forces. The Kazakhs have some
experience in this regard, having sent a 29-man strong de-mining unit to Iraq
under Polish command. They also have conducted annual military exercises with
the United Kingdom on antiterrorist measures.Â
29.
There is even a fully interoperable Kazakh
battalion in existence – the ‘Kazabat’ whose de-mining unit has demonstrated
its professionalism in Iraq. ‘Kazabat’s’ high-tech equipment was donated by
NATO allies, in particular by the United States. Kazakhstan is the only Central
Asian country participating within the ‘operational capabilities concept,’ a
programme designed for Western European countries to promote advanced interoperability
with NATO, and specifically US/UK, troop deployments. They have committed
significant resources to the programme and there is some belief that they can
fulfil its requirements.
30.
The Kyrgyz Republic’s political
revolution was followed by an appreciable shift in its attitude towards the
alliance. Formerly distant, it now appears interested in further NATO
cooperation, already participating in the IPP process. Their performance up to
now is poor mainly owing to resource problems. Their officer class is small,
their equipment dated. President Bakiyev had called into question the
permanence of the Manas airbase, which provides nearly 7% of Kyrgyz GDP, and
used by US and NATO forces as a transit point into Afghanistan. A July 2005
joint statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation called for a deadline
for US forces to leave Central Asia.Â
31.
Tajikistan
participates in IPP programmes dedicated to enhancing military interoperability
but in a very limited way and they will not be able to participate more until
they have a larger pool of officers. While the Tajiks are generally
enthusiastic about NATO cooperation, receiving approximately $50 million a year
in financial assistance from the US (the largest foreign aid donor), they make
clear that their preferred regional security partner is Russia. France is
operating a military base in Tajikistan, but its presence has been greatly
reduced since the fall 2005 Afghan parliamentary elections.
32.
Turkmenistan
participates only in the IPP process and generally avoids programs devoted to
military interoperability. Given its “permanent neutrality†status (recognised
by the UN in 1995), Turkmenistan does not offer any asset or infrastructure
within the PfP framework. Internal aspects of the regime make it unlikely that
the country will further deepen the relationship. For example, a fundamental
aspect of NATO defence reform is the separation of the military and civilian
spheres and the Turkmeni leadership has, in the past, expressed support for
this idea. Functionally, however, the government uses a large conscripted
military as a domestic surveillance tool that it is unlikely to willingly
dismantle anytime soon.
33.
The 9/11 attacks brought the Uzbeks firmly
suddenly into the US camp in the ‘war against terror,’ although the CIA and the
Uzbek government had cooperated on Afghan surveillance before September 11th.Â
The Uzbeks granted US forces base rights at Karshi-Khanadad (K-2) airport as a
transit point into Afghanistan and the eventual allied intervention in the
country destroyed much of the IMU’s infrastructure and appears to have killed
its military leader, Juma Namangani.Â
34.
The Uzbeks are currently PfP members only in
name, providing the barest minimum level of participation since an eviction notice
was served on US forces at the K-2 airbase. Furthermore, they have refused the
appointment of a NATO Liaison Officer. At most meetings, Uzbek representatives
simply fail to arrive. There has been some discussion about making the Uzbek
army an all-volunteer professional force, but it does not yet appear that
substantive moves have been made in this direction. Like other Central Asian
militaries, the Uzbek army suffers from inexperience and corruption among its
officer class – a fact that the inept response to the August 2000 IMU incursion
made clear.Â
35.
NATO has a strategic interest in Central Asia. Because of their social weakness and because they do not have
the strong institutions and civil societies needed to manage the peaceful
transfer of power there is a real possibility that one or more of the Central Asian countries can become failed states and a source of
regional instability. Moreover, stability, democratization and prosperity of
the Central Asian countries would have a positive impact on the stabilization
of Afghanistan itself. Â
36.
Despite their different level of involvement,
all five Central Asian republics are participating in PfP programmes, primarily
in the field of military cooperation. Nonetheless, such a participation in the
EAPC/Pfp programmes also implies sharing the basic common values underpinning
the Partnership itself. The Istanbul Partnership policy document “Refocusing
and Renewal†clearly recalls the normative sources and indicates the
expectations regarding the compliance of such shared values. Indeed, all the
different EAPC Partnership programmes are value-based, aiming at enhancing
internal democratic reforms – including the difficult task of bringing security
services and military establishment under effective democratic control - as
well as international stability.
