


Optegnelser
fra



Conference of EU Defence Committee Chairmen

London den 7. - 8. November 2005.

Deltagere:

Formand for Forsvarsudvalget Allan Niebuhr (KF)

Fra sekretariatet: sekretær for Forsvarsudvalget KatinkaVillemoes

Program for besøget er vedlagt som **bilag 1**.

Den 7. november 2005 blev der afholdt en middag for alle de deltagende formænd for forsvarsudvalgene.

Her talte den britiske minister for de væbnede styrker Adam Ingram om udviklingen af den Europæiske Sikkerheds- og Forsvarspolitik, ESDP. ESDP har udviklet sig hastigt siden etableringen af den i 1998. For bare 10 år siden ville det ifølge ministeren have været svært at forestille sig, at EU i dag ville komme til at lede 9 militære og civile krisestyringsoperationer rundt om i verden – fra Bosnien til Afrika og Indonesien. For 10 år siden ville det også have været utænkeligt, at EU i 2005 ville komme til at operere side om side med NATO, FN, den Afrikanske Union og visse ASEAN-lande, men dette er ikke desto mindre blevet til virkelighed. Ministeren opfordrede dog til ikke at hvile på laurbærrene, for Europa står over for nye trusler, som de europæiske lande må forholde sig til: fejlslagne stater, miljøkatastrofer, humanitære kriser, organiseret kriminalitet og terrorisme. Disse nye trusler indebærer, at Europas sikkerhed i stigende grad afhænger af sikkerheden i andre dele af verden som f.eks. Afrika og Afghanistan.

Ingram understregede nødvendigheden af at samtænke EU's militære og civile indsats, og han brugte EU's engagement i Bosnien-Herzegovina som et godt eksempel på, at en samtænkning sagtens kan lade sig gøre. I december 2004 afløste en EU-militærstyrke (EUFOR) den tidligere NATO-ledede sikkerhedsstyrke (SFOR) i Bosnien-Hercegovina, men den 7000 mand store EU-styrke er kun ét af flere elementer i EU's samlede indsats i landet. EUFOR opererer bl.a. ved siden af EU's politimission, som blev etableret i 2003 med det formål at opbygge en lokal politistyrke gennem rådgivning, vejledning og overvågning. Samtidig brugte Ingram EUFOR som et godt eksempel på, at EU og NATO kan arbejde sammen om et fælles mål. EU og NATO samarbejder i Bosnien-Hercegovina under den såkaldte Berlin+ aftale, som giver EU mulighed for at trække på NATO's aktiver og planlægningskapacitet.

EU's ambition om hurtigt at kunne deployere styrker til krisestyring rundt om i verden er også en stor udfordring, fordi en hurtig udsendelse af tropper kræver hurtige beslutninger på det politiske niveau. Især de multinationale kampgrupper er en udfordring, fordi deployering af kampgrupper kræver hurtige beslutninger i flere forskellige nationale parlamenter, EU-institutioner og i den militære kommandostruktur.

Ingrams tale er vedlagt som **bilag 2**.

Tirsdag den 8. november deltog formændene for EU-parlamenternes forsvarsudvalg i en konference, som lagde op til debat om emner af fælles interesse. Oplæggene på konferencen tog udgangspunkt i det britiske formandskabs prioriteter: aktivitet, kapabilitet og sammenhæng (*activity, capability and coherence*).

Konferencen blev indledt af **Sir David Madden**, som fungerer som POLAD (*political advisor*) for EUFOR i Bosnien-Herzegovina. Madden tegnede et billede af, hvordan EUFOR i Bosnien-Herzegovina fungerer i praksis, og han beskrev EUFOR som en prøve for ESDP: Det er her, ESDP skal bevise sin værdi og effektivitet. EUFOR ledes ikke af én enkelt nation, og derfor er det en stor udfordring for EU-landene at bevise, at de kan løse en fredsbevarende opgave i fællesskab.

EU's militæroperation i Bosnien-Herzegovina (operation Althea) blev iværksat den 2. december 2004, og i dag bidrager 22 EU-lande og 11 tredjelande til operationen.

Hovedformålet med EUFOR's tilstedeværelse er at sikre en fortsat overholdelse af Dayton-freds aftalen og at bidrage til fredelige og sikre omgivelser for at gennemføre de civile aspekter af aftalen. Bl.a. hjælper EUFOR med at konfiskere og indsamle de mange slags våben, som stadig er en del hverdagen i Bosnien, og styrkerne hjælper også de lokale myndigheder med at overvåge grænseovergange til Serbien - med henblik på at begrænse den organiserede kriminalitet.

Althea afløser som nævnt NATO's SFOR-operation, og i store træk løser EUFOR mange af de opgaver, som SFOR tidligere var ansvarlig for. Ifølge Madden fungerer samarbejdet mellem EU og NATO gennem den såkaldte Berlin + aftale rigtig godt. Også selve processen, hvor ansvaret for de fredsbevarende opgaver i Bosnien blev overdraget til EU, forløb godt.

Ifølge Madden er der ikke behov for at sætte en dato for, hvornår EUFOR trækker sig ud af Bosnien-Herzegovina. Det giver mere mening at definere hvilke betingelser, der skal være til stede, før en tilbagetrækning bliver mulig. Der er stadig en række problemer i Bosnien-Herzegovina, som kræver EUFOR's tilstedeværelse, f.eks. de mange våben, som lokalbefolkningen ligger inde med, den organiserede kriminalitet, korruptionen, den skrøbelige økonomi, og en politik, som ikke i tilstrækkeligt omfang tager hensyn til landets etniske diversitet.

Et baggrundsnotat om EUFOR i Bosnien-Herzegovina er vedlagt som **bilag 3**.

Herefter leverede **Andrew Mathewson**, som er *Director of EU and UN issues* i det britiske forsvarsministerium, en briefing om multilateralisme - set i lyset af det internationale samfunds reaktion på den humanitære krise i Dafur.

Darfur har siden 2003 været plaget af væbnede konflikter mellem lokale oprørsgrupper og regeringsstøttede militser. Konflikterne har resulteret i massive overgreb mod civilbefolkningen i området, primært begået af de regeringsstøttede militser, som kaldes Janjaweed. Store områder af Darfur er lagt øde, og mindst 1,5 million mennesker er tvunget på flugt.

Parterne i Darfur har gennem 2004 og 2005 indgået en række våbenhviler og aftaler, som imidlertid har vist sig at være svære at overholde. Det internationale samfund, herunder FN og EU, har lagt stærkt pres på parterne for at stoppe volden og fremme en politisk løsning. Den Afrikanske Union (AU) leder fredsforhandlinger mellem parterne og har indsat en observatørmission i området med knap 7.000 personer.

Den Afrikanske Unions mission i Darfur (AMIS) modtager omfattende finansiell, logistisk og planlægningsmæssig støtte fra især EU, FN, NATO og USA. Mathewson betegnede det som en overraskelse, at NATO i sin tid valgte at engagere sig i Darfur, men både USA og andre NATO-lande viste sig at være indstillet på at yde et betydeligt bidrag til AU's mission - især med hensyn til *strategic air lift*. EU leverer ligesom NATO militær støtte, men bidrager også med støtte til civile opgaver som f.eks. at uddanne en politistyrke i landet.

Darfur er et af de første eksempler på samarbejde mellem EU, NATO, AU og FN, og ifølge Mathewson har der i samarbejdet været en effektiv kommunikation og koordination på alle niveauer. Men samtidig har konflikten i Darfur rejst nogle vigtige spørgsmål om det fremtidige samarbejde mellem de internationale organisationer, fordi Darfur også har tydeliggjort de områder, hvor samarbejdet skal koordineres bedre. AMIS har ifølge Mathewson været en vigtig mission for AU, fordi AU med AMIS har fået mulighed for at bevise sin evne til at varetage fredsbevarende opgaver.

Mathewsons talepapir er vedlagt som **bilag 4** og et baggrundsnotat om EU's rolle i Darfur er vedlagt som **bilag 5**.

Herefter talte vicedirektøren for Det Europæiske Forsvarsagentur **Hilmar Linnenkamp** om baggrunden for oprettelsen af Forsvarsagenturet og om de forskellige udfordringer, som agenturet står over for. Forsvarsagenturet blev oprettet af Det Europæiske Råd i 2004 og har til formål at støtte medlemslandene i deres indsats for at forbedre europæiske forsvarskapaciteter inden for krisestyring og som støtte til europæisk sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik. Linnenkamp betegnede Forsvarsagenturet som ” *en katalysator og en bevidsthed*”, dvs. at agenturet både har en opgave i at fremme materielsamarbejde mellem medlemslandene og i at opfordre landene til at bruge tilstrækkelige summer på deres forsvarsbudgetter. Samtidig bemærkede Linnenkamp, at man måske lige så godt kunne have kaldt Det Europæiske Forsvarsagentur for Det Europæiske Transformationsagentur, fordi agenturet skal hjælpe med til at transformere EU's militære kapaciteter.

Linnenkamp beskrev det som en stor udfordring at sikre, at EU ikke duplikerer NATO's militære kapaciteter, men i stedet bestræber sig på at supplere NATO, og Forsvarsagenturet kan her spille en vigtig rolle. Samtidig beskrev Linnenkamp det som en stor udfordring at få EU's medlemslande til at tænke og agere som én samlet aktør. EU's medlemslande bliver nødt til at indse, at de ikke kan opretholde det nødvendige militære niveau hver for sig.

2 baggrundsnotater om Det Europæiske Forsvarsagentur er vedlagt som **bilag 6** og **bilag 7**.



**Conference of Chairmen of EU Defence Committees
Palace of Westminster, London
Monday 7 – Tuesday 8 November 2005
Draft Programme**

Monday 7 November

- Afternoon *Marriott Hotel, County Hall, London SE1 7PB*
Arrival and registration
- 7.00 pm: Coaches depart for *Banqueting House, Whitehall*
- from *Banqueting House, Whitehall*
7.00 pm: Reception
- 8.00 pm: Dinner, welcoming remarks from James Arbuthnot, Chairman of the Defence Committee.
- 9.30 pm: Keynote speech – Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, Minister for the Armed Forces
- 9.50 pm: Closing remarks, Lord Bowness, Chairman of Lords Sub-Committee C
- 10.00 pm: Coaches depart Banqueting House for Marriott Hotel

Tuesday 8 November

- 8.45am Coaches leave *Marriott Hotel* for *Portcullis House, Palace of Westminster*
Attlee Suite, Portcullis House, Palace of Westminster
- 9.00 am *First Session:*
11 am: **Activity – EU Political-Military activities in Bosnia & Herzegovina**
Speaker: Sir David Madden, UK POLAD, EUFOR HQ
Chairman: James Arbuthnot MP
- 11.00 am *Coffee*
11.15 am:
- 11.15 Second Session:
1.15 pm: **Coherence and multilateralism – multi-agency response to Darfur**
Speaker: Andrew Mathewson
Chairman: Lord Bowness

- 1.15 pm: *Westminster Hall*
Group photograph:
- 1.15 pm *Churchill Dining Room, Palace of Westminster*
Lunch
- 2.45 pm:
- 2.45 pm Third Session:
4.15 pm: **Capability – European defence procurement co-operation and the European Defence Agency**
Speaker: Mr Hilmar Linnenkamp, Deputy Chief Executive, EDA
Chairman: David Crausby MP
- 4.30pm: Delegates depart

**Address by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces to the gala dinner,
Conference of EU Heads of National Parliamentary Defence Committees, 7
November, Banqueting House**

Introduction

Good evening Ladies and Gentlemen. I am honoured that I have been invited to speak to you this evening.

You have a full and wide-ranging agenda for tomorrow, and I hope you have a productive day. I would like to speak to you briefly this evening about the UK Presidency themes of making the European Security and Defence Policy more **capable**, more **active** and more **coherent**.

ESDP was created in 1998 to respond to a real need. In the Balkans in the 1990s, Europe faced a crisis on her own doorstep. And we were unable to act. Our Heads of State decided that this must not happen again.

That we must build an active Europe that would be capable of tackling the challenges of the future, and of genuinely sharing the burden of global peace and security.

Just ten years ago, it seemed inconceivable that the European Union would soon be running nine civilian and military missions around the world – from Bosnia to Africa to Indonesia. That we would be working alongside the UN, NATO, the African Union and ASEAN nations. Or that we would be undertaking tasks from peacekeeping to logistics support to police reform. But that is what we are now doing.

But while rightly celebrating our progress, we must not allow ourselves to become complacent. We must continue to ask ourselves what the challenges of the future will be, and how we can best ready ourselves for them. This is what I intend to speak to you about this evening.

We are now faced not only with conventional military threats, but also with failed states, environmental disasters, humanitarian crises, organised crime and the lingering threat of terrorism.

Security and defence are not just about defending our borders. Our security is directly linked to other parts of the world such as Afghanistan and Africa, and closer to home, such as the Balkans.

As the European Security Strategy says: “with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad”.

We had prepared ourselves for the Cold War. But the new crises we now face are different – more complex, more dynamic. They are self-sustaining, fuelled by networks of organised crime and corruption.

They take place in regions where governance is weak and instability is rife. If allowed to fester, these can quickly become failed states, which – as we are all so painfully aware – create ungoverned spaces in which threats such as terrorism can grow.

Globalisation has brought prosperity and democracy to many, but it has also brought frustration, alienation and a spread of violence. As a result our security interests are now less clearly defined. Our security in Europe is increasingly interdependent with that of Asia, Africa and elsewhere.

To give just one example, in Aceh, the EU is now engaged – by invitation – in a Muslim country on the other side of the world. Not long ago, this would have been seen as beyond our sphere of interest.

So what has changed?

And what have we gained by doing this?

Well, we have made a difference. We have acted as a force for good. The mission has supported the first tentative steps of the new peace process – the decommissioning of weapons and soon the withdrawal of military and police forces.

And in so doing it has been widely praised for its transparency and its neutrality. By acting as an honest broker, we have generated international goodwill and built stronger links between Europe and Asia.

The EU was the only international organisation that could accomplish this at the time.

All of this is welcome progress. And we will continue to launch more missions – like the police support mission to the Palestinian Territories agreed today. However, to do this properly, we must also ensure that we are fully equipped to meet the challenges we set ourselves. We must be sure that when we respond to a crisis we use the right tool for the job.

One of these tools is EU Battlegroups. These are small packages of highly effective, high-readiness forces. Their great advantage is that they can act quickly and effectively in a hostile environment. They might be used to stabilise a volatile region in a failing state – like Operation Artemis did in the Democratic Republic of Congo – before handing over to a longer-term peacekeeping force such as a UN mission.

Such cases are particularly common in Africa – Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and the DRC are just a few recent examples – and EU's focus on this troubled region of the world is right for just this reason.

But other regions of the world may be equally deserving of support.

Acting early – wherever it may be – is crucial to stop a crisis from deteriorating. And following this up with a longer-term mission can help to ensure the benefits are not lost.

But of course putting out the fire is no use if the flames simply reignite once the peacekeepers have departed.

A military force can deter violence and instability, but it cannot substitute for the genuine and deep-rooted confidence provided by a democratic, accountable government and by a well-functioning criminal justice system, within a stable economic framework.

To create long-term stability and security we must use different tools, drawing on our civilian and our military expertise. You cannot successfully demobilise an army until the economic conditions are in place to provide alternative employment. And you cannot hold elections until the security is in place to ensure that they are free and fair.

We have seen the consequences of our failures to ensure such basic conditions for peace many times in recent years. Examples are not hard to find. Rwanda, Angola and Cambodia are just a few. And negotiating a peace agreement second time round is more costly still, not only in terms of time and money but also in lives.

That is why the EU's work on Security Sector Reform – both conceptual and in the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo – is so important.

And it is why the innovative work on civil military co-ordination that the EU is now taking forward is so vital. A comprehensive approach to a crisis will help to sketch out the roles and interdependencies of all actors – military and civilian. This will help us to ensure the most effective allocation of our resources, and the greatest impact for our actions.

I have already alluded to Bosnia. But there really is no better example to illustrate my point. EUFOR is playing a vital role in the broader international efforts to build a stable, democratic and viable Bosnia. With our support, Bosnia will soon be capable of maintaining law and order on her own, and of taking her place in the international community.

But EUFOR is only one element of the EU's presence. It operates alongside the EU's police mission, under the coordination of the EU Special Representative Lord Ashdown – who is also responsible for coordinating the broader efforts of the international community.

EUFOR is also, of course, a good example of how the EU and NATO can work together. In theatre, each carries out separate but complementary tasks, working towards a shared goal. We have also seen this kind of cooperation in Darfur, where the EU and NATO are supporting the African Union's peacekeeping mission. And in Aceh we are cooperating with ASEAN nations. We must work to deepen these partnerships.

And turning to my second point we must ensure that we have the right capabilities to back us up, whichever tool it is appropriate to use.

As we know, national operations – whether military or civilian – are now the exception, not the rule. By harmonising our requirements - as we are doing through both the civilian and military Headline Goal processes and through the European Defence Agency - we can minimise duplication. By joining our efforts as Member States we can target limited resources more effectively and begin to fill the gaps.

Military capabilities are only part of the story. But they are particularly challenging.

At RAF Lyneham in October, EU Defence Ministers saw a potent example of the kind of expeditionary capabilities we need to deploy our forces overseas.

But this level of capability does not come cheaply, or easily.

Although we are now 25 Member States, we still face shortages in key areas such as strategic lift and air to air refuelling. Meanwhile, we have some 23 separate programmes ongoing to provide us with armoured fighting vehicles, only one of which is bilateral. If we do not work together, how do we hope to rectify this?

And of course it is not just about equipment. Capability is also about ensuring that we can get boots on the ground fast when the need is greatest – while the fire is still burning so to speak – and when we are called upon to do so.

But rapid deployment requires rapid decision-making at the political level. Multinational Battlegroups pose particular challenges since their deployment will involve the coordination of decision-making by several national parliaments as well as military command chains, and EU institutions.

You will have an important role to play in this, and I would encourage you to begin to think about it now.

Equally, in joint civil-military missions, Foreign and Defence Ministries will have to work closely together both in Brussels and in capitals.

Coherence – a key theme of the Presidency – is not just between the EU and its partners but must apply equally to ourselves. Civil military coordination must begin at home.

And of course our troops must be able to work together effectively once in theatre. At the end of the day there is only one pool – and a limited pool at that – of forces that we can draw upon.

So it is in all of our interests to ensure that our procedures and standards are as closely aligned as possible – so that we can work as part of, or alongside, an EU or a NATO operation, or a UN force.

As I have said, different challenges will require different solutions and different tools. We must be flexible and adapt to each, working with our allies both within the EU and without, to make a real contribution to international security.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I have talked enough. You will have time enough to discuss these issues tomorrow. But I would like to leave you with one thought.

It is often said that armies constantly prepare to fight their last war. It is also said that this is a sure way to lose the next one. We must not let that happen to us. As the international security environment changes we must change with it.

Activity: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

EUFOR's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina began in December 2004 – taking over NATO's stabilisation force. EUFOR is the largest EU deployment to date with 22 Member States, and 11 third-party countries participating. The deployment operates under the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements under which NATO assets are made available to the EU. EUFOR's mandate is aimed at providing deterrence and contributing to a safe and secure environment. Beyond security issues EUFOR supports efforts to strengthen the rule of law and enable economic and democratic reform.

The EU brings a range of resources to reform in Bosnia in addition to EUFOR. The EU is considered to have greater leverage than NATO in bringing about transformation, particularly as Bosnia aspires to membership of the Union. The EU has set out several areas where reform is required – principally relating to the economy and the rule of law. The EUFOR's mandate also encompasses the fight against organised crime, apprehension of war criminals and assisting NATO's defence sector reform mission.

Full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), defence sector reform and the establishment of a single military force will also be important. According to the International Crisis Group the main security challenges now are weapons smuggling, the apprehension of war criminals, extremist religious groups, and border security, rather than the separation of combatants which was the main achievement of the NATO mission.

EUFOR is the EU's first major military deployment, and is seen therefore as something of a test for the Union's capabilities and will. Delegates may wish to discuss both the challenges facing EUFOR and the lessons that can be learnt from the EU's work in Bosnia.

Within EUFOR, command and control arrangements in place are clear for all troops, whether they are from EU Member States or not. What lessons can be learnt from EUFOR for joint operations with other national or international armed forces?

While NATO and the EU have stressed that their respective responsibilities are clear and that there is close coordination between the institutions in Bosnia, there are areas of overlap between international organisations and between separate EU Missions. Can the internal structures within the EU be improved to allow for such missions, and how do EU structures incorporate Member States' national priorities and caveats?

How effective have the relationships between the military and civil or political agencies/institutions been?

What is the likely timescale for EU military involvement in Bosnia?

Conference of Defence Committees of National Parliaments

Coherence and multilateralism – multi-agency response to Darfur

Thank you for the privilege of the invitation to address your conference today.

I am especially pleased since the theme of this session - Coherence and multilateralism – multi-agency response to Darfur – closely aligns with two of the United Kingdom's objectives for ESDP during our Presidency.

Taking our themes from the European Security Strategy we have aimed to make ESDP more capable, more coherent and more active, all underpinned by effective multilateralism.

Sir David Madden has addressed the theme of a more active ESDP, with special reference to Bosnia. Nick Witney will this afternoon describe the vision for the EDA supporting nations in improving capability.

I think our experience in Darfur amply demonstrates the challenges around coherence and multilateralism.

My remarks fall into two major areas:

- First I should like simply to describe the evolution of the international community's response to the crisis in Darfur.
- Secondly, I should like to suggest some of the policy issues that emerge from this international engagement.

You will be aware that the humanitarian crisis in Darfur fuelled by inter-communal violence has been going on for almost three years now. It first broke out in early 2003. Talks brokered by Chad resulted in the first ceasefire agreement in September of that year.

More robust agreements the following year included provision for a Ceasefire Commission, which would be chaired by the African Union and include representatives of the international community. This became the first African Union mission in Darfur, launched in June 2004 and intended to monitor the ceasefire. It was small – just 60 observers.

As the security and humanitarian situation deteriorated dramatically it became clear that this was not enough. By now Darfur had also caught the attention of an international community concerned not to allow a repeat of Rwanda or Bosnia.

In October 2004, the African Union Peace and Security Council decided to expand the mission, approving the AMIS II mission plan. The number of personnel deployed was set to rise to over 3000 by May 2005 followed by a further expansion to over 7000 by September 2005. This was based on intensive work by a joint assessment mission including AU and UN planners.

The objective was to monitor and report on the ceasefire, and contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief, and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes. The objective was also to assist in the process of building confidence, with the understanding that the responsibility for the protection of the civilian population lies with the Government of Sudan.

Both the US and EU were already engaged in providing humanitarian relief and several countries had provided assistance to AMIS on a national basis. It was at this stage that the EU signalled its willingness to help with the expansion of AMIS, and the AU Chair, Konare, then made a formal request to both the EU and NATO to provide assistance.

- In May the EU put a comprehensive package of support on the table including support in: planning and logistics; equipment; strategic and tactical airlift; development of AU's observation capabilities; and training of police experts and in other civilian areas. This was premised upon the AU retaining primacy.
- NATO offered support mainly in coordinating offers of strategic lift, particularly the substantial US contribution. This also allowed non-EU member states such as Canada to make their contribution through the coordinating mechanism NATO offered.

I do not intend to pick over the sometimes difficult international politics that surrounded the AU requests and the EU and NATO responses. Different nations will have their own recollections of that period. But it is worth reflecting on why both chose to become involved.

- Firstly the EU had already been engaged in Darfur for over 2 years, and it made sense for them to continue to build on the relationship they had already established with the AU. The EU was quick to identify the support it could offer, and put together a consolidated package including police and civilian elements, which NATO does not possess.
- NATO's choice to be engaged was more of a surprise, given their lack of past engagement in Africa. However the US was keen to make a substantial contribution to the AU mission in strategic lift, as were other NATO members, and NATO therefore had a clear role to play.

In the event, whatever the political issues, cooperation on the ground and through the joint coordination centre in Addis Ababa has been excellent. There has been effective communication and coordination at all levels both in Brussels and in-theatre, with strong working links forged between the two organisations. Both the EU and NATO have supported the airlift of thousands of additional troops and donations of vehicles and other contributions, while supporting the building of AU capabilities.

The role of the UN has been no less important. The UN – through its various bodies, not least DPKO in planning and OCHA on the ground – has played a crucial role in supporting the AU.

There have been solid examples of the EU, UN and NATO all working together in support of the AU – for instance the UN and NATO ran the Map Exercise (MAPEX) at the El Fasher Force HQ, which included the EU-supported Joint Logistics Centre (JLOC).

The key driver has been – as it should be – the requirements of the AU, and making sure that their needs are carefully identified and that offers made are based on which organisation is best placed to help. Collaborative responses such as this will increasingly have to become the norm as the international community adapts itself to respond to today's strategic challenges.

AMIS has been an important mission for the AU, and in our view has been a success. The AU stood up the mission and has demonstrated concrete peacekeeping capabilities that it did not previously possess.

We are now urging the AU to consider the future, including the possibility of handing over a successful AMIS to the UN and being brought together with the UNMIS mission in southern Sudan. It is for the AU to make such a request.

It is evident that the recent history of Darfur is a real world illustration of multilateralism: the UN, AU, EU and NATO, as well as bilateral donors, have cooperated to provide real, practical assistance in a troubled part of the world.

But that cooperation does throw up important policy issues. I should like to use the next few minutes identifying some of these. We have an EU focus today, so I should like to look briefly at the following areas:

- The EU's relationship with NATO
- The EU's relationship with regional organisations like the AU
- The EU's relationship with the UN
- Intra EU relationships, between Pillars I and II

EU-NATO Relationships

For me the big issue emerging from this is what we can deduce about the roles of the EU and NATO in crisis management and peace support.

Two years ago the answer might have been straightforward: we saw NATO as the cornerstone of our collective defence and therefore the alliance of choice for higher intensity, probably more substantial operations. The EU, on the other hand, was best suited to missions that required coordinated use of a range of military and civil instruments.

Following NATO's assistance to the AU in Darfur and more recently assistance with disaster relief in Louisiana and Pakistan that distinction no longer seems to hold.

Until recently we tended not to think in terms of NATO involvement in Africa – that too seems to have changed.

So are there any guidelines that would indicate potential roles for NATO and the EU, or will it simply depend on which organisation seems to have the best capability in particular circumstances or best suits the politics of the situation?

And what about the Berlin Plus protocols that provide for assured EU access to NATO capabilities where the Alliance as a whole is not involved. This seems to imply no pre-existing pattern of international engagement. But this will rarely be the case. We certainly did not feel that NATO's decision to become involved in Darfur required the EU to stand aside, as Berlin Plus might suggest. And nor did NATO. Both organisations saw that the other had a valid role to play.

How then to manage this potential for very great variability in NATO or EU engagement? Four principles are key:

- No duplication of capability. It remains the case that we cannot afford to generate separate capability for the two organisations;
- Nations need to build in the intellectual, human and material capability to operate seamlessly with either NATO or the EU, at all levels; and to practice NATO and EU working together.
- Harmonisation of our military and political assessments so that the two bodies can develop their understandings of emerging situations and thinking on potential responses together, avoiding surprises. The liaison cells we have established will help, but we need more routine dialogue.
- Responsiveness – both organisations need to improve their ability to respond swiftly and relevantly to emerging situations, whether managing crises or responding to natural disasters.

Relationships between the EU and regional organisations.

Darfur is expressly not an ESDP mission but a package of support to the AU, aiming to build capacity, while the AU retained ownership. This is a new and different mode of working for the EU. And in Aceh we are at the next level, working with ASEAN nations in a joint mission and building an important strategic partnership as we do so.

We are likely to see this pattern of cooperation with other bodies continue. But it raises important issues.

How do we maintain the autonomy of decision making that will be vital to both the EU and its partner organisation, without introducing cumbersome arrangements that damage the agility, effectiveness and responsiveness of the mission?

How do we reconcile EU and the partner organisation's assessment of the operation, or potential threats, and develop strategies with which both agree.

What political or military liability is the EU taking on? Is it acceptable to the EU to be implicated in another organisations handling of a crisis? What are the implications for the EU if AU troops in Darfur act in ways which we find unacceptable? What implicit liability to come to the aid of the other organisation in the event of mission failure do we assume?

Who controls the exit strategy?

Are there particular challenges in working with a novice organisation like the AU? Can they be truly equal partners? Do they even have the understanding to identify where they want us to help, and do they have the means to learn from our involvement and develop their own capacity – or is this another role that the international community and donors must assume?

These are all difficult issues. Practice has got ahead of doctrine, and rightly since that has allowed us to make a difference in troubled areas of the world. But we need to reflect on the policy basis for operating in this way.

Relations between the EU and UN

As I said, the UN has been involved with the AU, EU and NATO in Darfur for some time now. And we suspect that its role in future will be even more substantial.

Such 4-way cooperation is certainly complex, more so than a bilateral relation, and there is currently no formal political framework through which this can take place. We might do well to take this forward.

And there are broader issues about the relationship between the EU and UN in peace support operations that are worth exploring.

In general the UN is right to see the EU as its most valued supporter. European nations may no longer provide large numbers of troops for peacekeeping operations, as the Secretary General has lamented. But the EU is a strong political supporter of the UN, including the Secretary General's efforts to reform the New York machinery.

And the EU can support in niche capabilities like comprehensive planning and security sector reform – where the EU has a wide range of civilian and military resources and expertise which can address not only military but judicial, police and economic reform.

And in Battlegroups the EU has developed a significant new capability which responds to a need – a gap in the international security architecture – identified by the UN. However acknowledging that this capability may be deployed in response to UN requirements is not the same as giving the UN a lien on the EU's forces. The decision to use Battlegroups will remain with the EU.

Nor does the possibility of the EU deploying the Battle group eliminate the need for the UN to generate forces. The Battlegroup is a quick response capability with limited endurance, size and utility. It may provide an ability to nip a crisis in the bud, but if any continuing engagement is contemplated, the UN needs to generate the forces to replace it.

EU-EU coherence

My final set of issues is about coherence within the EU.

We say that the great theoretical advantage that the EU can bring to crisis management and peace support is the ability to deploy a comprehensive response, bringing together both the military and civilian aspects of ESDP and the resources of Pillars I and II more rapidly than other International Organisations, as we recently saw in Aceh.

But if this is the EU's Unique Selling Point in theory, we do not yet see it realised in practice. There is room to improve this cross pillar, military civilian coordination almost everywhere the EU is involved in peace support. To my mind the clearest example is in Bosnia, but there are examples in Africa too.

That is why the UK, both before, during and (I assure you) after its Presidency has been committed to promoting a comprehensive approach within the EU. The establishment of the civ-mil cell is a start, we look forward to the Op Cen being available next year, we have promoted a framework for comprehensive planning, and gained agreement on an outline concept for security sector reform. We will continue to support the Austrian and Finnish presidencies in taking this agenda forward.

That concludes my remarks.

Darfur is one of the first examples of international organisations working closely together and has gone a long way in developing new forms of international engagement in crisis management.

But it is hardly a model. Along with its success on the ground it has thrown up many examples of where we need to improve multilateral coordination. I hope I have given you some food for thought in your debate.

[2371]

Coherence in EU defence actions: Darfur

The conflict in Darfur began early in 2003 after a rebel group began attacking government targets. The rebels accuse the government is oppressing black Africans in favour of Arabs. The government admits mobilising 'self-defence militias' but denies any links to the Janjaweed. Sudan's government and the pro-government Arab militias are accused of war crimes including ethnic cleansing of the regions non-Arab black Africans.

After international pressure the government promised to deploy thousands of extra policemen and to disarm the Janjaweed. But there is little evidence of this so far. Millions have fled their villages, with many heading for camps near Darfur's main towns but NGOs have warned that there is not enough food, water or medicine in the camps. Security is still a concern with attempts to persuade refugees to return home hampered by continuing attacks around refugee camps.

The government and the two rebel groups signed a ceasefire in April 2004 but this has not held. Subsequent African Union brokered peace talks in Nigeria have failed to make much progress, though agreement has been reached on banning military flights in Darfur and on humanitarian aid.

In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops to Darfur to protect ceasefire monitors, but they were not there to protect civilians and the killings continued. By July there were 3,000 African Union peacekeepers on the ground in Darfur with thousands more committed. In mid-march 2005 an AU-led joint assessment mission evaluated the impact of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which concluded that more troops were needed. On 28 April 2005 the AU's Peace and Security Council decided to expand the troop numbers to 7,700 by the end of September 2005. A total of 5,581 military and civilian personnel, and 908 civilian police have now been deployed.

The expansion of AMIS has required international assistance, provided by the EU, UN and NATO. NATO made a specific offer of strategic airlift, while the EU offer appeared to concentrate on the civilian side, policing advisors and training. The EU has also provided military assistance. This includes the provision of equipment and assets, provision of planning and technical assistance to all AMIS II levels of command, provision of additional military observers, and the training of African troops and observers forming part of AMIS II enhancement.

To ensure coherent, effective and timely EU support to AMIS II, the EU Joint Action which established the AMIS support mission made provision for an appropriate co-ordination mechanism. An EU co-ordination Cell in Addis Ababa (ACC) was established under the authority of the EUSR to Sudan. The Cell continues to be responsible for EU co-ordination with the Administrative Control and Management Centre within the AU chain of command in Addis Ababa. The EU also continues to maintain close and effective co-ordination with all institutional and bilateral donors engaged in supporting AMIS II. This includes close co-ordination with the United Nations, as well as with NATO regarding military support (particularly in the area of airlift).

Capability: The role of the European Defence Agency

The European Union's military capabilities are central to the success of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and in particular European capacity to undertake operational deployments. The European Defence Agency (EDA), established in July 2004, works to: "support the Member States in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future."

The Agency pursues this overarching aim by:

- encouraging Member States to harmonise their military requirements;
- proposing collaborative activities;
- appraising the financial priorities of Member States in capabilities development and acquisition;
- improving the European defence industrial and technological base;
- promoting collaborative defence research across the Union; and

To date, the EDA has identified four flagship programmes in which they consider a 'common approach' between all 24 Member States could be achieved in the near term. Those programmes are focused on Command, Control and Communication (C3); the European defence equipment market; unmanned aerial vehicles and armoured fighting vehicles.

The idea of a European armaments agency is not new. However, previous attempts to promote defence cooperation, and particularly collaborative armaments projects, have had only limited success. Governments face a major challenge in increasing the proportion of spending on defence investment rather than personnel. Progress towards reaching the research and development target of 3% of GDP by 2010 has been slow.

The Agency is also trying to create a consolidated single European market, which will require harmonisation of relevant rules and regulations in consultation with the European Commission and industry. Delegates may wish to discuss:

How Member States can best pool efforts and resources?

Whether a single European defence industrial base is desirable or achievable?

And how will the necessary development of specialisation across Member States be achieved?

What assumptions are used to determine a long term perspective of ESDP's future capability needs?

House of Lords
European Union Committee
9th Report of Session 2004-2005

European Defence Agency

Introduction

1. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established by a Council Joint Action on 12 July 2004. The Agency's purpose is:

'To support the Member States in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future.'

2. To this end the Brussels based Agency was tasked by the Council to help:

Develop European defence capabilities;

Promote armaments co-operation in the EU;

Improve the European defence industrial and technological base; and

Promote collaborative defence research across the Union.

Background to the establishment of the EDA

3. Since the inception of the ESDP in 1999, the EU has made headway in identifying what capabilities the Union needs in order to carry out crisis management. The United Kingdom proposal for an agency, the primary focus of which would be the improvement of defence capabilities rather than armaments collaboration, gained support in the 2002 Convention. The final text put forward by the Convention proposed a 'European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency'.

4. The Government chose to take the Defence Agency idea forward outside of the Constitutional Treaty framework by putting the idea on the agenda for the Franco-British defence summit at Lé Touquet in February 2003. At the summit France and the United Kingdom were able to agree that an EU capabilities agency to co-ordinate arms procurement should be established. The other Member States agreed with the Franco-British formulation. By December 2003 an Agency Establishment Team had begun work. In June 2004 the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) agreed the Joint Action which provides the legal base for the agency.

5. We recognise the instrumental role the Government has played in the establishment of the EDA. In order for the Agency to be successful, the Government must now ensure that all relevant parties understand its role.

How the Agency works: Steering Board and Council

6. 24 Member States have decided to participate in the work of the EDA. Denmark, which has an opt-out from the Treaties on defence related matters, will not participate.

7. The Agency is answerable to both the Council and a Steering Board. The Council gives guidelines on the Agency's work programme and sets a budgetary framework. The Steering Board, in turn, agrees the specific work programme and the annual budget allocations. It is

OCCAR and WEAG, in addition to NATO. We discuss NATO in more detail in the next chapter. The EDA will also need to liaise with Member States on activities undertaken under the Letter of Intent (LoI) Framework Agreement.

17. The EDA will take over WEAG's role in accordance with the EU's general decision to merge the WEU with EU structures. This is going to be one of the EDA's key tasks in 2005. Mr Witney is hopeful that the EDA can be more successful in improving European capabilities than the WEAG has been since the EDA can 'relate consideration of possible armaments collaborations to wider issues of capability need, which has been what has handicapped WEAG activities to date.'

18. However, the EDA will co-exist with OCCAR. Both the Ministry of Defence and Mr Witney were at pains to emphasize the complementary nature of these two bodies. Mr Fraser of the MoD explained that 'OCCAR is essentially an agency to manage co-operative programmes once they have gone beyond the R&T arena.' There may be a neat division on paper between the activities of the EDA and OCCAR but there is no denying the general point that over the years there have been a number of initiatives, coming from various constellations of European countries, to try to address the state of European military capabilities and the state of the European defence industrial and technological base. The next chapter deals with the question of whether the EDA can succeed where so many initiatives have failed before.

19. Consideration should be given to a rationalisation of the different bodies and, if the EDA is proving to be successful, the possibility for mergers should be encouraged.

Can The EDA Help Improve European Military Capabilities?

Does the EDA have a comparative advantage?

20. Mr Witney summarised why the time has come for yet another attempt to improve European capabilities.

The EU is becoming more ambitious on ESDP. There is an increasing realisation that as Europe's ambitions for external action are becoming more clearly articulated, particularly through the European Security Strategy, capabilities are needed to back up ambition.

Europe is underperforming. This is a familiar reflection in the transatlantic burden-sharing context. Europe has a shortage of capabilities and, according to Mr Witney, no-one can feel comfortable about the state and profitability of the European defence technological and industrial base.

Spending is fragmented across the Member States. Mr Witney is less concerned about the total European spend on defence, €160 billion per annum, than about its fragmentation.

21. Mr Witney's view is that previous efforts to co-operate and improve European capabilities have failed because they have been too fragmented. Previous 'efforts have tended to be conducted in small corners by people who are effectively invisible to their defence ministers and who lack the impulse of having their efforts tied to the requirement needs of the military staff working for future defence capabilities.' By contrast, Mr Witney is hopeful that the EDA can

27. The EDA has limited resources and very considerable goals to fulfil. We strongly believe that the EDA needs to concentrate, initially, on a few achievable tasks. The EDA will gain Member States' confidence by enabling an ESDP mission to operate more effectively. Once trust in the Agency's capacity to deliver has been built up, more strategic issues such as relative defence spending or specialisation of forces can be approached.