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## **REPORT**

### **FOR THE GENERAL COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY**

*“30 Years since Helsinki:  
Challenges ahead”*

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## **THE OSCE 30 YEARS SINCE HELSINKI: CHALLENGES AHEAD**

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In anticipation of the 2005 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) Annual Session in Washington D.C. (July 2005), themed '30 Years Since Helsinki: Challenges Ahead', we hereby would like to outline a number of developments that, in our opinion, belong to the major challenges for the OSCE region in the coming years.

During the last decade of the twentieth century, the Balkans were the OSCE's main area of operation. Now that other institutions – the UN, the EU and NATO – are increasingly involved in reconstruction, state building and security, we feel that the OSCE could increasingly shift its attention and resources towards areas where the OSCE space, the former Soviet Union and the Muslim cultural spheres meet and overlap each other: Central Asia and the Caucasus. For we feel that these regions witness the emergence of a number of challenges that will likely affect the OSCE in its relations with non-OSCE states and regions (most notably the Muslim world) and its internal security.

Although the points and proposed priorities treated in this paper are by no way exhaustive, we feel that the issues presented herewith could open possibilities for close cooperation and operational orientations within the OSCE, as they will be encouraged during the Belgian OSCE Chairmanship in 2006.

### **1. SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR THE OSCE MEMBER STATES IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THIRD STATES**

#### **1.1. The Golden Crescent and Eurasian Illicit Drug Traffic**

Trafficking in illicit drugs originating from the so-called Golden Crescent (especially heroin, to a lesser extent cannabis) continues to be a considerable security factor in the OSCE zone even three years after the US led intervention against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and International Security Assistance Force (ISFA) presence in Afghanistan. Increasing seizures in the EU-EFTA countries from 5,8 to almost in 1998 10 metric tons in 1994<sup>1</sup> do not only reflect an increasing supply. The existing trafficking routes and criminal networks provide fertile soil, and are likely also used, for other criminal activities like weapons smuggling, trafficking in human beings and illegal migration and money laundering.

### 1.1.1. Human and Geographic Setting

The Golden Crescent is the name for a crescent-shape area in Central Asia that now provides the bulk of the global opium- and heroin production and, as such, plays a pivotal role in the lucrative drug traffic along with the Golden Triangle in Myanmar, Northern Thailand and China. The Golden Crescent roughly parallels the crescent-shaped Afghan-Pakistani border and includes large swaths of Southeastern Afghanistan as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Peshawar region and parts of the province Baluchistan in Pakistan.


The production centre of the Golden Crescent are the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan (not to be confused with its neighboring namesake in Tajikistan), Nangarhar, Uruzgan and Helmand. Together, these areas deliver 67 percent of the Afghan poppy and opium production. In number of hectares of land used for the Afghan poppy cultivation, the trend over the last decade has been as follows:

Table 1: Land used for poppy cultivation in Golden Crescent core (in hectares)<sup>2</sup>

1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
71.000	54.000	57.000	58.000	64.000	91.000	82.000	8.000	74.000	80.000

In terms of poppy yields which can be transformed into opium, the trend looks as follows:

Graphic 1: Golden Crescent Opium Poppy Production from 1994 to 2004 (in metric tons)



According to surveys carried out by the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2003, some 264,000 Afghans households representing 1.7 million people or 7 percent of the population are involved in poppy cultivation in one way or another. The cultivation itself is mostly small-scale, on family fields averaging 0.3 hectares. If one adds the number of people staffing heroin laboratories as

well as those staffing the smugglers' networks, almost half of the active population of war-ravaged and drought-affected Afghanistan could receive some income from drug traffic in one way or another.

The annual income of heroin production and –traffic are estimated at US\$ 2.3 billion, almost half of Afghanistan's gross domestic product in 2002. According to the UNODC data, 44 percent of that amount goes to the mass of grass roots cultivators, the remaining part to a small group of ringleaders.

### 1.1.2. Evolution in trafficking routes

The majority of profits of narcotics from the Golden Crescent are made en route to its main markets: the EU<sup>3</sup> and EFTA countries, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and, more recently, also the province of Xinjiang in China.

UNODC and International Crisis Group data<sup>4</sup> suggest that a kilo of heroin with a value of US\$ 400 in Southeastern Afghanistan costs US\$ 800 to 1,000 once it arrives in Iran or Tajikistan. Depending on its destination, the number of intermediaries and market fluctuations, its value can increase up to one hundred times that at its final market destination.

Traditionally, the main smuggling routes from the Golden Crescent go via Iran, Turkey and then the Balkans. Since the late nineties, however, one observes a clear and increasing shift of routes towards the southern rim of the former Soviet Union, and hence the OSCE space, and recently also to Xinjiang<sup>5</sup> via the following routes<sup>6</sup>:

- ▶ the Panj-Amu Dar'ya valley on the Afghan-Tajik border to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and from there to Russia and Xinjiang
- ▶ Turkmenistan and the Caucasus or Western Kazakhstan and from there to Russia and Turkey;
- ▶ the Panj-Amu Dar'ya area in Northern Afghanistan and then Uzbekistan

This shift has been caused and accelerated by the following factors:

- ▶ since a number of years Iran, facing an increasing problem of drug use and addiction among its young population (according to the ICG over one million users in 2001) is increasing its efforts to stem the drug traffic through its territory and is, as such, becoming less somewhat interesting for smuggling rings. According to an 2002 ICG study on drugs and conflict in Central Asia, almost half of the global heroin seizures in 1997 and 1998 took place in Iran, while only in 2000, about 7.000 smugglers were arrested and 254 tons of narcotics confiscated, dealing a financial blow to several drug rings.
- ▶ the Taliban takeover in 1995 and its impact for the Golden Crescent production and drug traffic:
  - ⇒ by the end of 1995, the bulk of the Golden Crescent's production areas were under Taliban control; like the Jibha-i-Muttahid (i.e. the anti-Taliban coalition internationally better known as the Northern Alliance), the Taliban initially funded their military operations and regime with drug profits
  - ⇒ in mid-2000 the Taliban initiated a radical poppy-eradication campaign and destroyed thousands of hectares of poppy fields, which explains the plunge in production as outlined in table graphic 1.; the Taliban leadership explained its actions with religious argumentation, though it is more likely that it hoped to get international recognition,

massive financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states or merely carried out a price control strategy

- ⇒ the main consequence for the Golden Crescent drug trade was, that its centre shifted from Taliban-controlled areas to provinces then still under Northern Alliance control: 83 per cent of the 185 tonnes of opium produced between between mid-2000 and late 2001 for example, came from the Northern Alliance-controlled Badakhshan province
  - ⇒ the main Northern Alliance factions had, and still have, their power base among Northern Afghan communities that are linguistically and genealogically related to the titular ethnic groups of the Central Asian OSCE member states (especially Tajiks and Uzbeks); a number were also supplied via those states at the time the Taliban controlled the southern routes
- ▶ in facing and tackling the increasing drug traffic threat, the OSCE member states in the southern rim of the former Soviet Union face the triple problem of:
- ⇒ long borders in physical terrain that is often difficult to control (mountains, deserts, savannah)
  - ⇒ on-going post-Soviet institution building and ‘brain drain’ in as well as under-funding of existing institutions and law enforcement agencies, the latter providing fertile ground for institutionalized corruption
  - ⇒ high unemployment and rural poverty in the border areas and, as thus, a larger vulnerability for involvement in the drug trade at the grass-roots level

### 1.1.3. Trends since late 2001

Since the US-led and Northern Alliance-assisted intervention against Al-Qaeda and the subsequent removal of the Taliban regime in fall 2001, several changes occurred in the drug production and traffic from the Golden Crescent:

- ▶ with the fall of the Taliban regime, the Northern Alliance and affiliated faction leaders as well as turncoat warlords rapidly obtained control over poppy areas previously under control of the Taliban; the poppy cultivation ban was de facto cancelled, leading to a surge in poppy and opium production (see table and graphic 1.)
- ▶ the control over the drug trade splintered among numerous stakeholders, there were the bulk of it was previously controlled by a limited number of actors (i.e. the Taliban and the Northern Alliance); the present actors seek to capitalize a maximum on what is mostly their only source of income, leading to increasing supply and, on the mid-term, decreasing prices and increasing competition not only in production but also in market areas
- ▶ a concentration of drug labs in Northern Afghanistan: of the 300 to 400 Afghan heroin labs estimates by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, over half is situated in Northern Afghanistan not far from the southern OSCE area frontier; another concentration is in the eastern province on Nangarhar
- ▶ given the Northern Alliance-affiliated actors’ previous preference for and familiarity with smuggling routes via the southern ex-Soviet republics, these routes are being strengthened;

In the same vein, one can observe a trend whereby the affected southern OSCE member states' position is no longer limited to that of transit area, but also faces increasing:

- ▶ production: for example, ICG reports about small poppy plantations in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, while cannabis is grown in Kyrgyzstan, Southern Kazakhstan and Georgia; in most cases, poppy and cannabis were already grown in the Soviet and pre-Soviet period, but the production is now being internationalized
- ▶ drug use<sup>7</sup> and HIV-contamination among the younger part of their populations: in 1999, for example, there were 216 registered addicts in the Uzbek province of Andijan, and 428 in 2000; Turkmenistan, as another example, had some 13,000 registered addicts in 2001, a three-fold increase compared to 1996
- ▶ general criminalization risk of the economy: according to UNODC and ICG, about one third of Tajikistan's de facto domestic product is somehow related to illicit drug traffic
- ▶ destabilization risks:
  - ⇒ a number of conflict areas in the Caucasus (South Ossetia<sup>8</sup> and Chechnia for instance) have become contraband areas including for illicit drugs, making the frozen or on-going conflict there self-sustained
  - ⇒ the presence of growing narco-economies and lucrative narco-business on the southern edge of the OSCE area also lead to the availability of unregistered financial means, part of which is sooner or later recycled in the regular economy, but can also be used to extend illicit activities or finance or become a stake for armed (semi-) political groups and armed conflicts.

#### 1.1.4. Possible OSCE approach

Given the multi-dimensional nature of the problem, and the potential for destabilization by the transcontinental drug traffic, as well as the European Union's and the Russian Federation's common predicament of being main markets, we propose to look into the feasibility of the following measures or initiatives, some of which have been proposed in an ICG study on the OSCE in Central Asia<sup>9</sup>:

- ▶ by nature, the trafficking problem transcends the OSCE area; as such, the OSCE could offer affected non-OSCE members Afghanistan and Pakistan a Partnership Agreement that would provide a framework for information exchange and confidence building measures with the Central Asian OSCE states;
- ▶ initiate steps to upgrade the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) into a real security body for the OSCE; as such, the FSC could function as a permanent and coherent advisory and backup structure for the Permanent Council on policing issues, border monitoring issues and other first dimension areas;
- ▶ expand or develop OSCE assistance destined at expanding the capacity of border policing in the affected OSCE member states, in coordination with or/and as a supplement to existing and planned UNODC efforts and using best practices and lessons learned from efforts to curb similar traffic between North Africa and the Mediterranean OSCE states; certain OSCE Field Offices close to the Afghan border (eg. in Tajik Shahr-i-Tuz) could focus on such activities and issues, while other could be opened (eg. in Khorog in the Pamir and in Kushka close to the Turkmen-Afghan border)

## 2. INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR OSCE MEMBER STATES

### 2.1. Migration and Asylum

#### 2.1.1. Economic Migration

As the EU and Schengen areas expand and economic and demographic gaps between the EU and neighbouring regions grow wider, both legal and illegal economic migration will increasingly become an internal political factor to reckon with, especially if migration is being facilitated by illegal or semi-legal structures or tries to take advantage of the asylum systems in the EU and other OSCE member states.

Between 1999 and 2004, for example, 4,088 asylum requests were submitted in Belgium by citizens of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with a peak of 1,903 from Kazakhstan and 575 requests from Kyrgyzstan in 2000. The majority of those requests came from younger ethnic Slavs (mainly Russian, also Ukrainian and Belarussian) who claimed discrimination and persecution in their respective countries of origin. This temporary migration movement seemed specifically oriented towards Belgium. By comparison, in the peak year 2000, the number of asylum applications from Kazakhstan in Germany, for instance, amounted to 155, in France 75 and in Canada 127.

Research by the Belgian migration and asylum authorities and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees revealed that, although ethnic Slavs are also hit by impoverishment and are under-represented in the legislative and executive branches of authority, one can not speak of organized or systematic persecution in either Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan. Rather, most of the said applicants were economic migrants using asylum request as one of the conduits to enter Belgium and the EU, very often with the help of travel agencies and middlemen specialized in dodging visa regulations, forging documentary evidence and making other arrangements charging up to US\$ 2,000 per person for the trip and a further US\$ 1,000 for the documents<sup>10</sup>.

This is one example of a situation where the line between political asylum and economic migration become scrambled and that can repeat itself with other groups. Over two-thirds of the requests in the example discussed above were rejected. The return to the country of origin proved more difficult, and many of the applicants-migrants became illegals and, as such, vulnerable for exploitation by criminal networks.

Although economic migration is not necessarily negative for the receiving states in terms of skills import, it does cause a considerable 'brain drain' in the states of origin. Moreover, if it abuses the asylum system, it overburdens institutions not designed for economic migrants while the illegal or semi-legal networks used could serve as a base and conduit for planting other criminal activities in the receiving countries. Moreover, the legal void in which most illegal migrants find themselves and illegal migration's spin-offs in organised crime are particularly threatening for women, who are more vulnerable for economic and sexual exploitation and violence.

#### 2.1.2. Political Asylum

We would like to voice concern for an increasing number of applications for political asylum in Belgium and other EU states by members of ethnic groups who, so to say, fell between hammer and anvil in the ongoing war on terror. Two key examples are the Chechens (and, to a lesser extent, Ingush) and the Uighurs. Both are ethnic groups originally from areas within or adjacent to the OSCE region who have seen separatist conflict since well before the September 11 attacks.

Those conflicts and their actors, however, have gradually been presented or considered as a frontline and targets in the war on terror. Together with highly mediatized terror operations by fringe groups like the Beslan tragedy in late 2004, it contributed to increasing collective stigmatization and insecurity for members of those communities as a whole.

The numbers of asylum request by Chechens and other North Caucasian Muslim groups in several EU countries are sharply on the increase since the start of the second phase of military operations in Chechnia in 1999 and the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

**Table 2: Asylum Request from the Russian Federation in a Number of European Union and OSCE States<sup>11</sup>**

	<b>Austria</b>	<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>Slovakia</b>
2001	369	2,343	245	4,523	1,324	16
2002	n/a	1,140	629	n/a	2,943	634
2003	6,713	1,597	4,853	3,383	5,331	2,664
2004	5,665	1,361	n/a	2,513	5,315*	2,147*

\*Until October

Depending on the year, between 70 and 85 per cent of asylum seekers from the Russian Federation in Belgium, for example, come from people belonging to a North Caucasian Muslim group, i.e. mostly Chechens and to a lesser extent Ingush. In the Czech Republic, as another example, 4,587 of the 4,853 or 94 percent of requests by citizens of the Russian Federation in 2003 were Chechens.

This does not only apply for Chechens from the Russian Federation, but possibly also for Chechen refugees and asylum seekers in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan, which has an older Chechen community of 30,000 holding Kazakh citizenship, also has between 8,000 to 13,000 refugees. Kyrgyzstan has a historical Chechen community of about 2,500 and some 250 to 300 refugees and asylum seekers. The recently arrived refugees in both countries face uncertain status and part might show a tendency towards seeking asylum in the EU.

Many Chechen aylum seekers arrive via new EU members states like Poland and Slovakia, from where they often (i.e. in 70 to 90 percent of the cases, respectively) continue to 'older' EU member states in the Schengen area. Although it is often difficult to make a distinction between Chechens who fled war and instability in Chechnia and the Northern Caucasus, and Chechens who have been living for more than a decade in major Russian cities like Moscow and Stavropol, the overall acceptance rate of asylum requests is rather high given the situation in Chechnia.

Internal security concerns related to the increasing number of Chechen asylum seekers in OSCE countries include:

- ▶ fake Chechen asylum seekers
  - ⇒ we hereby refer to asylum candidates who are not Chechens and not even political refugees at all but who, often equipped with forged documentary evidence and stories, pose as Chechen refugees in order to increase their chances to obtain polical asylum.
  - ⇒ in turn, this creates a market for criminal groups able to provide travel services and documentation (similar to the case of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, cf. point 2.1.1.). In summer 2003, for example, an investigation was launched on an 8 man strong Slovak-Chechen criminal group in the Belgian province of Limburg. The said group did not only provided false Belgian and Slovak vehicle



license plates but also sold arrangement packages for asylum applications as so-called Chechen refugees to migrants from Belarus, amongst others<sup>12</sup>.

- ⇒ such groups and networks might also capitalize on the desire of genuine and accepted Chechen asylum seekers to bring over members of their extended families (given the strong clan culture in Chechen society)
- ▶ the grafting of criminal networks and conflicts in the receiving states
  - ⇒ we hereby refer to the possibility that certain parts of Chechen refugee communities engage in criminal or semi-legal activities, as has been observed with other refugee or asylum seeking groups (eg. Albanians from Kosovo, Roma from Slovakia). In Belgium, for example, there are indications that a fringe among Chechens are involved in extortion and racket practices targeting other migrants from the former Soviet Union and of Russians in particular. In carving out criminal niches, they have sometimes entered in violent collision with other criminal structures that were already present (especially Albanian).

A similar though much lesser-known plight is that of the Uighurs from the Chinese province of Xinjiang and former Soviet Central Asia, more specifically OSCE member states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan<sup>13</sup>. The Uighurs are originally from the western Chinese province of Xinjiang (aka East Turkestan), where they face increasing Chinese migration, social marginalization and curtailing of religious and recently also language rights since 1949, not unlike what is happening in Tibet. Since 1992, a number of Uighur groups reply with a separatist and Islamist agenda, even though it is not certain that both currents enjoy majority or even substantial support among the Uighur population.

The Uighurs in the former Soviet states can, for their part, be divided in two groups: the majority belong to historical communities, often descendants of Uighurs who fled unrest, persecution and social marginalization in Xinjiang as far back as the late nineteenth century; and more recent arrivals of political refugees and people involved in trade between Xinjiang and the mentioned OSCE member states. The latter group is more vulnerable than the former.

There are indications that China is using its economic importance in Central Asia as well as its increasing political-military influence through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to pressure the concerned states to closely watch its Uighur communities in order to prevent them from becoming safe havens for Uighur separatists. Since the start of the global war on terror, the Chinese authorities also stress the alleged links between Uighur separatists and Al-Qaeda, particularly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement or ETIM. According to an official communiqué, the ETIM had seven training camps in northern Afghanistan until late 2001 and received some US\$ 300,000 from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to carry out operations in Xinjiang.<sup>14</sup>

In turn, has led to increasing documented by bodies such as Human Rights Watch and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights<sup>15</sup>. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, Uighur radicals have been blamed for several high-profile crimes such as explosions on a public bus and in an exchange office in Osh in 1998, attacks on a Chinese trade bus on the Bishkek-Kashgar road killing 21, and the assassination of an Uighur businessman in Bishkek in 2001. Even though most of these acts were eventually believed to be linked to organized crime more than political motives, it reflects a trend whereby ethnic Uighur communities come under closer scrutiny and feel increasingly threatened. Another concern are extradition of Uighurs to China (eg. around 20 extraditions by Kazakhstan and 50 by Kyrgyzstan between 1996 and 2004<sup>16</sup>), where they almost certainly face serious human rights violations, including torture, unfair trial and even executions.

**Table 3: Asylum Request by Uighurs from Xinjiang, China in a number of European Union and OSCE States (2003 and 2004)**

Country	Number of asylum requests from China	Percentage of Uighurs*
Norway	180	60
Finland	65	25
Sweden	320	8
Germany	3,500	7.5
Belgium	500	2

Source: CEDOCA, CGVS-CGRA Belgium

\*Note: the share of Uighurs in the total population of the People's Republic of China is 0.6 per cent

In addition to this, of the 423 asylum seekers from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in Norway between 2002 and 2004, for instance, 25 to 33 percent were ethnic Uighurs. This is also a disproportional number compared to their respective share in the population the countries of origin (i.e. 1.5 in Kazakhstan and 1 per cent in Kyrgyzstan). Even though the number of Uighur asylum seekers in the EU does not match that of the Chechens yet, the potential for larger influxes does exist depending on political developments in both Xinjiang and the former Soviet Central Asia.

A number of EU and OSCE member states host Uighur diaspora organizations. Examples include the Munich-based East Turkestan Information Center and World Uighur Youth Congress. Despite attempt by the Ministry of Public Security of China to have those Uighur diaspora organisations outlawed as terrorist structures<sup>17</sup>, many operate legally as non-governmental organizations. The East Turkestan Information Center is linked to the East Turkestan National Congress, which is recognized by bodies like the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organisation (which has UN observer status).

### 2.1.3. Possible OSCE Approach

In order to avoid fighting terrorism and crime at the expense of legitimate human rights concerns among certain ethnic communities, it is essential to develop a sound policy towards this matter. One problem that asylum and migration offices of OSCE member states face in outlining a policy with asylum seekers under both 2.1.1. and 2.1.2. is the lack or incompleteness of information regarding the situation on site. We therefore propose to outline the possible role and function of OSCE Field Missions and their reporting standards as on site providers of information concerning the status of ethnic and other minorities. We also propose to carry out any OSCE approach in this regard in coordination and cooperation with similar initiatives by the European Union.

## 2.2. Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Management

The earthquake near the Iranian town of Bam in late 2003 and the recent South Asian earthquake and tsunami wave are only two tragic reminders that natural disasters and other emergency situations remain a permanent concern for a substantial number of OSCE member states. Special reference is hereby made to states situated in mountainous and seismic environment (Tien Shan-Pamir, Caucasus, parts of the Balkan). The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) environment as a security challenge as such: "Development, poverty alleviation and sustainable management of the environment ultimately depend on stability and peace. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, conflict is increasingly fought within, rather than between nations, and is killing and displacing civilians as never before. Likewise, the frequency and impacts of natural disasters are on the rise, driven in part by an

unpredictably changing climate. The poor are the most threatened by these catastrophes and the least equipped to recover. Moreover, development is set back by decades, resource management systems are disrupted and investors are reluctant to return.”<sup>18</sup>

According to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the European Commission Humanitarian Office, disasters – especially drought, landslides and earthquakes – killed about 2,500 and affected more than 5.5 million people in Central Asia over the past decade. Likewise, estimates by the UN Development Programme state that over 2 million people were affected by natural hazards in the Caucasus in the same period. In June 2002, more than 300,000 were affected by floods in the Northern Caucasus, while landslides killed 150 in North Ossetia in September 2002.

Although disasters like earthquakes can not be prevented or can hardly be forecasted, measures can be taken to limit the human and material damage and protect the vulnerable population in the affected areas. For example, if a major earthquake were to happen in the east of Tajikistan close to lake Sarez, it would affect millions of people throughout the whole region. Lake Sarez was created in 1911 when an enormous landslide caused by an earthquake in the Eastern Pamir range in Tajikistan blocked the Murgab river canyon. The river soon formed a lake approximately 60 km in length, containing close to 17 cubic km of water. The natural dam which retains the lake, named 'Usoi', is located at an altitude of 3,200 metres. With a height of over 550 metres, it is the tallest dam, natural or man-made, in the world.

Another example is the Kazakh economic capital Almaty, in whose area serious seismic tends to occur every 80 to 100 years. The last period of seismological activity happened between 1885 and 1911, leaving a high probability on another major earthquake in the next ten to fifteen years. According to the Almaty Institute of Seismology and OCHA, with an earthquake with a magnitude of 5.5 at least 5 percent of the population could be killed or injured and around 40 percent made homeless.

A thick layer of winter ice on the Syr Dar'ya river and a failure to observe regional water use agreements regarding the Chardara reservoir triggered floods in southern Kazakhstan in fall 2004, affecting more than 2,000 people over 600 square kilometres. A last category of preventable disasters are the technical disasters, coming from situations like the radioactive waste deposits in the northern Tajik settlement of Chaklovsk, for instance, or the Soviet bacteriological warfare test facilities on the soon to be mainland-connected island of Vozrozhdeniye in the almost dried up Aral Sea.

Similar situations and risks exist in the Caucasus. Most risk countries have economies that have been heavily affected by post-Soviet transition or conflict. Although several show encouraging recovery, they can afford no further setbacks. In late 2004, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance organised a regional meeting to raise regional disaster awareness in Central Asia, as part of an increasing attention to emergencies as an operational issue.

The OSCE, for its part, is addressing environmental security in Southeastern Europe and Central Asia through its Economic and Environmental Office and partnerships like the ENVSEC Initiative between the OSCE, the International Institute for Sustainable Development and the UN. We propose that the OSCE increasingly uses the existing ENVSEC Initiative as a framework to support initiatives aimed at:

- ▶ stressing the transnational nature of emergencies, disaster preparedness and -contingency and, hence, advocating common interest in closer regional cooperation with disaster preparedness and -contingency as a priority test case
- ▶ strengthen the capacity of local communities and Ministries of Emergency and Civil Defense to adequately foresee and cope with the consequences of natural disasters

### **3. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE OSCE**

#### **3.1. Enhance Dialogue between the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly**

In general one could recognize that in the process of the meetings of the OSCE PA (especially at the winter meetings in Vienna) mainly the administrative aspects of the activities of the OSCE are being discussed rather than the political scope of the activities of the OSCE, which are being underexposed. To change this, we not only need the willingness of the executive branch of the OSCE to accept that the PA, like any parliamentary assembly, asks the OSCE-chairmanship and the OSCE-agencies to justify its actions on a number of policy issues, but also to give the PA the appropriate instruments to do so.

In that respect, we advance the following proposals:

- ▶ Explanation by the executive branch of the OSCE about the follow-up of the recommendations adopted by the OSCE PA.
  - ⇒ this proposal has already been made a few years ago but has been rejected by the Standing Committee. The budget proposal is sent to the PA OSCE which can table recommendations. The OSCE has to motivate his possible refusal.
  - ⇒ In other words, the executive branch of the OSCE should mention on an annual base, at the explanation of the budget, to what extent and how the OSCE has taken into consideration the resolutions adopted by the PA OSCE (including the implications of these recommendations).
  - ⇒ These items could be examined at the winter sessions in Vienna. They contribute to the aim of the OSCE to pursue a transparent budgetary policy (cf. item 25 Rotterdam declaration that calls upon the OSCE to ensure a transparent and balanced budget).
  - ⇒ The representative of the PA OSCE in Vienna can issue a monthly report on the implementation of these proposals.
- ▶ More efficient organization of the winter sessions
  - ⇒ The parliamentary delegations arrive at the winter session in Vienna with no or very few preparatory documents, neither of the executive branch of the OSCE nor of the rapporteurs who should comment on their draft report and resolution.
- ▶ The implementation of “written questions”

In addition to the central theme of the Summer Session the Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly contains resolutions dealing with various other topics. Next to the resolutions of the Committee on Political Affairs, the Committee on Economic Affairs and the Committee on Democracy and Human Rights there are annually some ten resolutions about ‘supplementary items’. These items stand one-off, during the plenary meeting, in the spotlight without the PA OSCE having performed any preceding preparatory work.

Solving this issue an article into the Rules of Procedure of the PA OSCE could be introduced which enables members of the PA OSCE to put questions for written answers.

Article 19 of the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE PA only provides in a procedure of questions for oral answer during the annual debates. By using questions for written answers the possibility is conceived to address the OSCE-chairmanship on a permanent basis about various aspects that now are taken into consideration in the 'supplementary items'.

In this regulation, yet to be designed, following aspects have to be provided:

- questions shall be submitted in writing to the President of the PA OSCE who shall forward them to the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE;
- the question should be answered within a certain time limit;
- questions which require an immediate answer shall be answered within three weeks and forwarded to the Chairman-in-office. Other questions shall be answered within six weeks of being forwarded to the Chairman-in-office;
- questions and answers shall be published on the website of the PA OSCE;
- when a written question stays unanswered, the permanent representative of the PA OSCE could be asked to focus the attention of the OSCE-chairmanship upon this aspect;
- if the question still is unanswered, the question will automatically be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Assembly (or in the committee responsible);
- to anticipate that the OSCE-chairmanship will be showered with written questions, one can stipulate that the questions are being asked by means of the delegation leaders with quota according to the scope of the delegations. The content of questions shall be the sole responsibility of their authors.

► Auditing on Efficiency and Effectiveness

Proposed innovation that contributes to more transparency and can be taken in consideration are the following:

- ⇒ periodical reviews of sound administration of public resources is very important. Those resources must be used in compliance with the principles of economy, effectiveness and efficiency.
- ⇒ the Office of the PA OSCE or the committee ad hoc concerning "transparency" may, after this being accepted by the executive branch of the OSCE, entrust an audit office with carrying out management controls on the efficiency and effectiveness in the departments and bodies falling under the OSCE's remit. This must, however, happen with sense for proportionality and only after a pertinent assessment has been made for that purpose.
- ⇒ the Declaration of Rotterdam expressed the wish for a more rational approach of the OSCE, taking in consideration the specific character of the tasks of the other institutions such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and NATO. This recommendation can be implemented by examining how these different international organizations (and their assemblies) could cooperate more efficiently.
  - to what extent is there a double use between these institutions?
  - to what extent the aims are or are not being reached by another organization than the OSCE?
  - to what extent the use of resources and staff of certain OSCE-agencies is adequate?

A study on the efficiency and effectiveness of certain OSCE-agencies based on a recommendation of the OSCE PA could thus contribute to more transparency in the policy of the OSCE. This could also bring about a shift of staff and resources towards the 'field

missions', as the OSCE PA welcomes the effort to give the field missions greater responsibility and budgetary independence (cf. point 27 of the declaration of Rotterdam).

► Follow-up in the parliaments

- ⇒ Mr. Kimmo Kiljunen, Vice-President of the OSCE PA, tabled a resolution to encourage the examination of PA OSCE documents in the national parliaments: "National Parliaments are encouraged to introduce practices whereby annual reports on the activities of the OSCE PA by national OSCE PA delegations are regularly debated in an appropriate manner in the national parliaments."
- ⇒ National delegations to the OSCE PA should propose concrete measures in order to implement this recommendation.
- ⇒ Questions by national Members of Parliament to their Governments on OSCE affairs could be published in the relevant chapters of the OSCE website

### 3.2. OSCE Staff Policy

The mentioned International Crisis Group study on the work en effectiveness of the OSCE in Central Asia voiced concern over the common practice to issue six-month standard contracts for seconded, international OSCE personnel even in contexts that are politically stable (again). Although in reality these contracts are automatically extended, it is felt by both the ICG and OSCE personnel that we interviewed that the concept does not offer much employment security.

In order to keep the better seconded staff members, we therefore support the recommendation to modify the rule of six month' contracts for seconded personnel to standard contracts of one year. Likewise, given the importance of gender activities in the OSCE's mandate, maximal gender balance among international as well as national staff in the OSCE field missions should be ensured in the OSCE's recruitment policy.

### 3.3. Others

We would like to conclude with an invitation to debate on the question whether the name Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will remain adequate in the mid- or long-term. Given the Cold War background of the Helsinki initiative and the CSCE's initial quality of meeting platform for NATO and Warsaw Pact states, and as long as the OSCE's operational focus was on the Balkans and Southeastern Europe, the emphasis on Europe in the OSCE's name made sense. Almost one and a half decade after the demise of the Soviet Union, the OSCE groups eighth member states that are technically situated in Asia and one key player, the Russian Federation, that is genuinely Eurasian. Moreover, the southern ex-Soviet republics border the Middle East and face situations that are increasingly influenced by developments in the latter region. Therefore, we could consider whether after 30 years, 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok' reflects a Atlantic-Eurasian more than a strictly European cooperation.

## MAP ANNEX


Origin of the maps:

- ▶ Le Monde Diplomatique, [www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cartes/](http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cartes/)
- ▶ UN Environment Programme, [www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/CEO-for-Internet/CEO/](http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/CEO-for-Internet/CEO/)


**MAP 1: THE GOLDEN CRESCENT AND ITS MAJOR TRAFFICKING ROUTES**



**MAP 2: CONFLICT MAP OF THE CAUCASUS**



**MAP 3: ETHNIC AND ECONOMIC MAP OF XINJIANG-UIGHUR AND ADJACENT AREAS**




**MAP 4: ENVIRONMENTAL MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA**





**MAP 5: SEISMICITY MAP OF THE CAUCASUS**



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## NOTES AND REMARKS

<sup>1</sup> UN Office for Drugs and Crime: 'Drugs and Crime Trends in Europe and Beyond', UNODC, Vienna, April 29, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> UN Office for Drugs and Crime: 'Afganistan: obzor opii v 2003 god' and 'Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004', UNODC, Vienna and Islamabad, October 2003 and October 2004

<sup>3</sup>For example, according to the French *Association pour études géopolitiques des drogues* close to 90 per cent of heroin consumed in the United Kingdom and in Russia originates in the Golden Crescent.

<sup>4</sup>UNODC *op.cit.*, and International Crisis Group, 'Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict', ICG Asia Report № 25, November 26, 2001.

<sup>5</sup>Although China's main traditional supplier of heroin is the Golden Triangle, recent official estimates suggest that around 20 per cent of the country's opiate supply and consumption or an annual 16 tonnes of opiates comes from the Golden Crescent via Xinjiang, compared to less than ten per cent before. See also 'All quiet on the Western Front? Xinjiang and Afghan opiates', *Central Asian-Caucasus Institute Analyst Journal*, December 15, 2004. Link: [http://www.cacianalyst.org/view\\_article.php?articleid=2909](http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2909)

<sup>6</sup>See Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, "Opiate Smuggling Routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 1, 2003, as well as "Les territoires de l'opium: conflits et trafics du Triangle d'or et du Croissant d'or", Olizane, Geneva, October 2002, from the same author.

<sup>7</sup>Figures taken from International Crisis Group, 'Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict', ICG Asia Report № 25, page 10.

<sup>8</sup>For South Ossetia, see the thorough field study by Alexander Kukhianidze, Alexander Kupatadze and Roman Gotsiridze, "Smuggling Through Abkhazia and the Tskinali Region of Georgia", Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre, American University of Tbilisi, 2004, esp. pp. 34-36.

<sup>9</sup>International Crisis Group, 'The OSCE in Central Asia: a New Strategy', ICG Asia Report № 38, September 11, 2002.

<sup>10</sup>The existence of such travel agencies, in this case for labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan to the United Kingdom, has recently also been documented by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Report RCA №. 339, January 5, 2004. Link: [http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca2/rca2\\_339\\_2\\_rus.txt](http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca2/rca2_339_2_rus.txt)

<sup>11</sup>Various sources, including the Belgian CGVS-CGRA refugee and asylum administration and UNHCR.

<sup>12</sup>See coverage in the Russian daily *Vremya Novostei* (Russia) № 147, August 12, 2003 and the Belgian *De Morgen*, August 8, 2003

<sup>13</sup>In 2000, the autonomous province of Xinjiang-Uighur in Western China had a population of 19.25 million, of which officially 45.3 per cent or 8.7 million are Turkic speaking and Muslim Uighurs. Officially, there are 220,000 ethnic Uighurs living in Kazakhstan (mainly in the Almaty, Taldykurgan and the Zharkent-Panfilov areas), 50,000 in Kyrgyzstan (primarily Bishkek and surroundings, as well as Uzgen and Jalalabad) and 37,000 in Uzbekistan (mostly Tashkent and surroundings), although non-official sources put those numbers substantially higher.

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<sup>14</sup>Communiqué of the Permanent Representation of China to the UN, ‘Terrorist activities perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ organisations and their links with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban’, November 29, 2001.

<sup>15</sup>Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Page: [http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=central\\_asia](http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=central_asia) ; UNOHCHR Paper ‘Minorities and Participation in Public Life in Kazakhstan’, Minority Rights: Cultural Diversity and Development in Central Asia-Seminar, October 2004.

<sup>16</sup>Amnesty International, ‘Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: The Plight of Uighur Asylum Seekers and Refugees’, in *Europe and Central Asia: Summary of Amnesty International’s Concerns in the Region* (January-June 2004, Doc. № EUR:01/005/2004), pp. 47-49

<sup>17</sup>The East Turkestan Information Center and World Uighur Youth Congress are listed among four alleged terrorist organizations in a document titled ‘List of the first batch of identified ‘Eastern Turkistan’ terrorist organizations and terrorists’, issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China on December 15, 2003. This document is being circulated among foreign diplomatic representations and law enforcement structures (uncluding those of EU and OSCE members) for lobbying purposes. The two other organisations listed in the brochure are: the East Turkestan Islamic Movement; and the East Turkestan Liberation Organizations. So far, only the East Turkestan Islamic Movement is listed by both the US and the UN as a terrorist outfit.

The Federal Republic of Germany has so far refused to follow up China's demand that it ban the East Turkestan Information Center and World Uighur Youth Congress on its territory and ban its leaders, on the grounds that it lacks enough evidence. According to a report in the German magazine *Der Spiegel* of December 13, 2004, investigators of the Bundesnachrichtendienst were expected to leave for China to examine the evidence collected by the Chinese authorities.

<sup>18</sup>Source: <http://www.iisd.org/natres/security/> . The IISD is a partner of the OSCE’s ENVSEC Initiative.