Europarådet 2004-05 (2. samling)
ERD Alm.del Bilag 98
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2596993_0001.png
Parliamentary Assembly
Assemble parlementaire
Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblee parlementaire
COUNCIL
OF EUROPE
CONSEIL
DE L'EUROPE
Doc. 10572
3 June 2005
Europarådet (2. samling)
ERD alm. del - Bilag 98
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Current situation in
Kosovo
Report
Political Affairs Committee
p
Rapporteur: Mrs Marianne Tritz, Germany, Socialist Grou
Summary
ty over the further political stabilisation of the entire
The present undecided status of Kosovo casts uncertain
n and economic recovery. On the status issue,
region, including its perspectives of European integratio
no indication of a compromise is in sight.
the positions of the parties concerned are polarised and
however,
is necessary with a view to reaching a peaceful
establishment of a genuine dialogue between the parties
The
ns from both sides.
and mutually acceptable solution which requires concessio
in strengthening democracy and the rule of law and
Bearing in mind the role played by the Council of Europe
amentary Assembly believes that the Council
g human rights standards in "new democracies", the Parli
raisin
in the search for a durable stabilisation of Kosovo. Its
of Europe should endeavour to play a similar role
blishment of a political dialogue and on the other,
action should aim, on the one hand, at facilitating the esta
ards in the fields of democracy, rule of law, good
at ensuring that in Kosovo, Council of Europe stand
s are achieved and irreversibly secured, as well
governance, protection of national minorities and human right
ethnic groups.
as mutual trust between individuals belonging to different
+33 3 88 41
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, F — 67075 Strasbourg Cedex, tel.:
20 00, fax +33 3 88 41 27 76, http://assembly.coeint, assembly@coeint
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I.
Draft resolution
1.
For the last six years, Kosovo has been subjected to an
interim United Nations administration,
pending a final settlement. The Parliamentary Assembly believes
that the undecided status of Kosovo casts
uncertainty over the further political stabilisation of the entire
region, including its perspective of European
integration, affects its economic recovery and prevents a num
ber of displaced persons and refugees from
Kosovo from reaching a decision whether to return to their hom
es.
2.
Recalling its Resolutions 1375 (2004) on the situation in Koso
vo and 1417 (2005) on the protection
of human rights in Kosovo, the Assembly reiterates its aspiratio
n for Kosovo to be, irrespective of its status,
an area which is safe for all those who live in it, where Council
of Europe standards of democracy, rule of
law, protection of human rights and rights of national mino
rities and good governance are fully enforced,
where recourse to the European Convention on Human Rights
is available to everyone and where the values
of democracy, tolerance and multiculturalism are shared by
its people and institutions.
3.
The progress achieved in the implementation of the Standard
s for Kosovo, as indicated by the
Technical Assessment presented by the Secretary General'
s Special Representative (SRSG) to the UN
Security Council on 27 May 2005, shows that important step
s are being made in the right direction. The
establishment of a climate of trust between people belongin
g to different ethnic groups, however, is a long-
term objective which will require further attention by those
having governmental authority over Kosovo as
well as by the international community, in particular the Cou
ncil of Europe. This process of consolidation is
likely to last for years, even after the determination of a final
status for Kosovo.
4.
The Assembly is conscious that on the status issue, the posi
tions of the Government of Serbia and
Montenegro and Kosovo Serbs on the one hand, and of
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
(PISG) and Kosovo Albanians on the other, are polarised
and regrettably no indication of a compromise is in
sight. The preparedness of these actors to engage in a polit
ical dialogue is essential to reach a peaceful and
mutually acceptable determination of the final status if Koso
vo. It should, therefore, be encouraged and
rewarded.
5.
Dialogue is also necessary for the implementation of fund
amental reforms. In this respect, the
Assembly considers as a positive development the rece
nt decision of Kosovo Serbs' political representatives
to participate in the working groups on decentralisatio
n. Similarly, the proposal by the SRSG to create a
Political Forum should be seen as an important contribut
ion to preparing the ground for the momentous
political discussions, by including opposition parties in
the political process, provided that the role of such a
Forum is only consultative and that representatives of ethn
ic minorities are invited to participate.
6.
The recent indictment of former Prime Minister Ram
ush Haradinaj by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) raised fears
for renewed violence in Kosovo. Even if reality proved
different, the Assembly warns against underestimati
ng the volatility of the security situation in Kosovo:
whereas no serious ethnically-motivated crime against
ethnic minorities has been reported in the last year,
minor incidents are continuous, especially in some parts
of Kosovo, which contributes to nurturing a feeling
of insecurity among these minorities.
7.
This climate of tension cannot but be exacerbated by polit
ically-motivated attacks as well as by
accusations of corruption and involvement in organised crim
e against members of the PISG. Besides, a
disastrous economic situation with unemployment affecting
more than half of the population, widespread
poverty and lack of basic social welfare has obvious potential
ly destabilising effects.
8.
In consideration of the fragile socio-economic environment
of Kosovo, the volatility of the security
situation and the risk of tension flare-ups as status talks
approach, the Assembly is concerned at the
intention manifested by some Council of Europe member
states to increase the number of forced returns of
failed asylum seekers and other people from Kosovo in the
months to come. By putting additional strain on
the limited resources of the Kosovo administration, this polic
y could concur in having destabilising effects
and appears in contradiction with the considerable financial
and military commitment by a number of such
countries aiming at restoring sustainable living conditions and
security in Kosovo.
2
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9.
In light of the foregoing, the Assembly:
final status, asks the Government of Serbia and
as regards the determination of Kosovo's
i.
minorities, the PISG and Kosovo Albanian
political forces of Kosovo Serbs and other
Montenegro, the
to reaching a peaceful and mutually acceptable
a
to engage in a genuine dialogue with view
political parties
solution which requires concessions from both sides;
ii.
as regards the creation of an inclusive political envi
ronment in Kosovo, calls on:
ideration to the SRSG's proposal of
legal political parties in Kosovo to give positive cons
all
a.
;
blishment of a Political Forum with consultative functions
the esta
cipate in the PISG and in the political
Kosovo Serbs' political representatives to fully parti
b.
process in general;
ons from Kosovo, calls on Council of
rds the return of failed asylum seekers and other pers
as rega
iii.
Europe member states which are host countries to:
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
comply with the positions of the United Nations High
a.
iduals from Kosovo;
on the continued international protection needs of indiv
of potential returnees on a case-by-
give attentive consideration to humanitarian concerns
b.
host country and their access to dignified and
case basis, including their level of integration in the
humane housing and social conditions upon return;
rb returns by financing housing,
endeavour to increase the capacity of Kosovo to abso
c.
returnees and by ensuring support to long-
reception structures and other basic services needed by
ture, including adequate facilities for
term integration in terms of accommodation and infrastruc
medical care;
Kosovo, if appropriate in co-
implement programmes for voluntary assisted return to
d.
(IOM);
operation with the International Organization for Migration
instruments in the territory of Kosovo, calls
as regards the full implementation of Council of Europe
iv.
s to the full implementation of the European
on UNMIK and KFOR to remove all remaining obstacle
for the Protection of National Minorities and the
Convention on Human Rights, the Framework Convention
ding the effective functioning of their monitoring
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, inclu
mechanisms;
to the solution of the status issue and
as regards the role of the Council of Europe in contributing
v.
s, asks the Secretary General of the Council of
ensuring that Kosovo attains Council of Europe standard
Europe to:
ncil of Europe in assisting the
offer the UN Secretary-General the expertise of the Cou
a.
the Comprehensive Assessment of the
Special Envoy who will be responsible for conducting
relating to the mandate and expertise of
implementation of the Standards for Kosovo, in the fields
the Council of Europe;
ent of Serbia and Montenegro to
establish contacts with UNMIK, the PISG and the Governm
b.
facilitator of dialogue between the parties
explore the possibility of the Council of Europe acting as a
l;
concerned in preparation of status talks, at formal or informal leve
nical advice of the European
propose to the UN Secretary-General to rely on the tech
c.
g the stage of status talks, with
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) durin
e status of Kosovo;
a view to identifying viable legal/constitutional arrangements for the futur
and the PISG with Council
continue to provide the international civil administration in Kosovo
d.
l self-government and offer to
of Europe expertise in the field of decentralisation and reform of loca
extend it to the following fields:
A.
B.
C.
protection of national minorities;
use of minority languages;
inter-cultural dialogue;
3
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D.
fight against corruption, organised crime, money-laundering and trafficking in human
beings;
E.
democratisation and financing of political parties;
F.
independence and efficiency of the judiciary;
vi.
finally, in consideration of the developments which can be expected to take place during the next
months, asks its Political Affairs Committee to continue to be concerned with the situation in Kosovo
and
report to the Assembly when necessary.
4
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II.
Draft recommendation
improving good governance, strengthening
ncil of Europe has played a major role in
The Cou
1.
dards in "new democracies", in this way
the rule of law and raising human rights stan
democracy and
r European political integration.
contributing to laying down solid foundations for close
iamentary
(2005) on the current situation in Kosovo, the Parl
Resolution
Referring to its
2.
avour to play a similar role in the search for a
Assembly believes that the Council of Europe should ende
dination with other international actors.
durable stabilisation of Kosovo, in co-operation and coor
g the establishment of a fruitful dialogue between
Its action should aim, on the one hand, at facilitatin
3.
ensuring that in Kosovo Council of
erned by the status issue and; on the other hand, at
the parties conc
protection of national minorities and human rights
Europe standards in the fields of democracy, rule of law,
are achieved and irreversibly secured.
to the promotion of better socio-economic
Besides, the Council of Europe should contribute
4.
nally displaced persons and returnees.
conditions on behalf of ethnic minorities, in particular inter
5.
The Assembly, therefore, asks the Committee of Ministers
to:
of political dialogue between the parties
ort the role of the Council of Europe as a facilitator
supp
i.
concerned, in preparation of status talks;
ase the visibility and the impact of the
appropriate financial and administrative measures to incre
take
ii.
its mandate and expertise;
Council of Europe in Kosovo, in the fields pertaining to
ase the sustainability of returns to Kosovo;
promote the organisation of a donors' conference to incre
iii.
with the assistance of the Group of Specialists
ask the Co-ordinator on Roma activities, if necessary
iv.
a fact-finding mission to Kosovo to collect first-
Roma, Gypsies and Travellers (MGS—ROM), to conduct
on
a internally displaced population as well as of
information on the socio-economic conditions of the Rom
hand
e of Ministers.
Roma returnees, with a view to reporting back to the Committe
5
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Explanatory memorandum by Mrs Tritz
1.
Introduction
1.
2005 could be the year of Kosovo. This frequently heard statement
rests on the acknowledgement
that the status quo in Kosovo in untenable and that a solution shou
ld be found as soon as possible: the
present undecided status casts uncertainty over further political
stability of the entire region, including its
perspectives of European integration, affecting its economic recovery
, and preventing a number of displaced
persons and refugees from Kosovo from reaching a decision whether
to return to their homes.
2.
Once acknowledged that the situation is untenable, however, it shou
ld be kept in mind that on the
status issue the positions of the government of Serbia and Mon
tenegro and Kosovo Serbs on the one hand,
and of Kosovo Albanians and their political forces on the other are
polarised, and regrettably no indication of
a compromise is in sight.
3.
In my capacity as Rapporteur on Current situation in Kosovo
on behalf of the Political Affairs
Committee I visited Pristina and Mitrovica from 22 to 25 May
2005. My visit took place in a period of intensive
diplomatic and political activity: on 23 May 2005 the Contact Grou
p meeting in London agreed that the status
issue should be addressed at the earliest opportunity, following
a positive assessment of the implementation
of standards; a few days earlier the Secretary General's
Special Representative (SRSG), Mr Jessen-
Petersen, launched a proposal for a Political Forum, which would
allow the inclusion of opposition parties in
the political discussion; besides, it seemed that meetings at
the highest level may soon take place between
the government of Serbia and Montenegro and the Provision
al Institutions of Self-Government.
4.
Next months promise to continue to be as intense: following
the Technical Assessment presented by
the SRSG to the UN Security Council on 27 May, the UN Secr
etary General may appoint a Special Envoy to
conduct a Comprehensive Assessment. Should this be
positive, status talks may start as early as next
autumn. I believe, therefore, that the Political Affairs Com
mittee should continue to be concerned with the
situation in Kosovo, and report to the Assembly when nece
ssary.
2.
A volatile situation
5.
Since the outbreaks of violence of March 2004, the
security situation in Kosovo has gradually
improved, even if 'the already limited trust between
communities was gravely shaken''. In March this year
,
the indictment of former Prime Minister Ramush Hara
dinaj byrthe International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) raised fears for renewed viole
nce in Kosovo. Even if reality proved different, the
volatility of the security situation in Kosovo should not
be underestimated: whereas no serious ethnically-
motivated crime has been reported in the last year, mino
r incidents such as shootings and stoning continue.
It is difficult to make an assessment of the security situa
tion in Kosovo as a whole, as it varies according to
geographical areas. All my interlocutors, however,
recognised that members of minorities still nurtu
re a
sense of insecurity and that trust between different com
munities is very low. Besides, full reconstruction
,
apologies and compensation from the Kosovo Alba
nian side for the events of March 2004 are still
outstanding, and likewise full investigation and prosecut
ion of the offences committed.
6.
This climate of tension cannot but be exacerbated
by politically-motivated attacks, such as those
recently made against Ibrahim Rugova, Veton Surr
oi and Oliver lvanovic, as well as by accusations
of
corruption and involvement in organised crime against
members of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government (PISG) and rumours on the existence of para
llel security and intelligence structures within legal
political parties.
7.
Finally, a disastrous economic situation with unem
ployment affecting more than half of the
population, widespread poverty and lack of basic soci
al welfare has obvious potentially destabilising effects.
Unemployment is high and growing (60 to 70%). In the
under-30 age group, 50% of the population in Kosovo
is unemployed. Average income is in the region of 200
euros and the average age is about 22 years. The
prospects for economic development are limited. Ther
e is little domestic investment and foreign investme
nt
is virtually nonexistent. The process of privatisation
of property has been ruptured on several occasion
s.
There is evident discontent with the socio-economic
situation, which affects all communities living in Koso
vo.
It is an obvious consideration that the unresolved
status of Kosovo is an obstacle to its economic reco
very,
as it has been confirmed by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.2 On the other hand, I am
2
UN Secretary General, Report to the UN Security Coun
cil, 30 July 2004.
World Bank, Kosovo Economic Memorandum, 17 May
2004.
6
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s who will have governmental authority
the solution of the status issue, the authoritie
afraid that even after
reforms to create the premises for
introduce fundamental legislative and economic
over Kosovo will have to
l 'political stability' nor an environment
lopment. 'Final status' does not necessarily equa
stable economic deve
ical forces should make additional effort to
gn investment, and I believe that Kosovo polit
conducive to forei
acknowledge this.
3.
Standards: progress and durable implementat
ion
outbreak of violence of March 2004, describe a
The 'Standards for Kosovo', introduced after the
8.
re
and democratic, the rule of law is effective, whe
Kosovo where public institutions are representative
ic
ut fear, where all individuals, regardless of their ethn
displaced persons who wish to return can do so witho
s
t for Kosovo. Progress towards this target is the basi
background, can live in safety. They remain the targe
s.
from which to begin consideration of Kosovo's final statu
G on the implementation of the Standards
According to the latest technical report of the SRS
9.
gh
ementation of all the eight priority standards. Thou
(27 May 2005), progress can be seen in the impl
to recall that `progress in the implementation' does
recognising that this is a remarkable achievement, I wish
ble standards of democracy, rule of law, protection
not mean that Kosovo has attained satisfactory and dura
to Council of Europe standards. Similarly, the
of human rights and national minorities comparable
belonging to different ethnic groups is a long-term
establishment of a climate of trust between people
ng government authority over Kosovo as well as by
objective which will require further attention by those havi
of Europe. This process of consolidation, effective
the international community, in particular the Council
uilding is likely to last for years, even after the
legislative implementation, institution and confidence-b
determination of Kosovo's final status.
4.
Decentralisation
nt for the implementation of a number
ntralisation is not a Standard in itself but is a key instrume
Dece
10.
tion of minorities in the administration and
s and for providing institutional scope for the participa
of standard
of the Council of Europe3, the Kosovo
process. In February 2005, with the expert advice
the political
would be launched to assess the viability of
ent approved a decentralisation plan: five pilot-projects
Governm
t the majority of the population (Gracanica
; in two of the municipalities concerned, Serbs represen
the plan
and Partesh).
reform: the main ethnic Albanian opposition
Regrettably, there is no political consensus on the
11.
ter autonomy carries the risk of encouraging
oppose it on the grounds that any step towards grea
parties
the other hand, Kosovo Serbs criticize the
s to seek the division of Kosovo along ethnic lines. On
Serb
n plan approved by Belgrade in 20044; 2) it
nt plan for two reasons: 1) it ignores the decentralisatio
governme
are still displaced in Serbia proper, the
ature; because of the large number of Kosovo Serbs who
is prem
n would not reflect the real ethnic composition
ographic picture of Kosovo is skewed and decentralisatio
dem
of some districts.
the system of local self-government is a
In my opinion, reaching consensus over the reform of
12.
ce and empowering minorities and an important
fundamental step towards guaranteeing good governan
rding to Lutfi Haziri, Minister of Local Authorities,
indication of the maturity of the political forces. Acco
m could be finalised by mid-2006 or 2007. It is
provided that the pilot-projects are successful, the refor
advice and assistance in this field.
important that the Council of Europe continues to provide
5.
The situation of minorities
, especially Kosovo Serbs in predominantly
Freedom of movement still poses challenges: minorities
13.
icipalities, do not feel safe travelling through
Albanian areas, but also Kosovo Albanians in northern mun
north Pristina and Obilic travel to school under
areas inhabited by the majority. Kosovo Serb children in rural
o-ethnic enclaves especially, people are
military escort and would otherwise be unlikely to attend.5 In the mon
missible for Europe.
even afraid to venture beyond their immediate surroundings. This is inad
3
ed an expert report on the reform of local self-government and
In 2003 the Secretary General of the Council of Europe commission
public administration in Kosovo (`the Civiletti report', SG/inf (2003) 40).
2004.
in Kosovo and Methoija (`Kosmer) adopted by the Serbian Parliament in April
4
Plan for the political solution of the situation
Special Representative of the
mentation of the standards for Kosovo, prepared by the
5
Technical assessment of progress in the imple
Secretary General for Kosovo, 24 January 2005.
7
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14.
The events of March 2004 have had an impact on the behaviour of
many displaced persons: Since
then, the decline in the return of displaced persons to their homes has
been around 40%: 1,864 people
remain displaced and do not seem to be willing to return.6 To this num
ber, should be added individuåls and
families from Kosovo who fled to other European countries and live there
, legally or illegally.
15.
Former Prime Minister Haradinaj made forceful efforts to press ahea
d with the implementation of
standards concerning minorities, by calling upon municipal represent
atives to apply the standards speedily at
local level and allow the return of refugees; urging Kosovo Serb
refugees to return; setting up the above-
mentioned pilot-projects for decentralisation; and virtually com
pleting the reconstruction of dwellings
destroyed in March 2004.
16.
One year after March 2004, in the absence of similar outbreaks of viole
nce, there is a clear intention
by some host countries to increase the number of forced returns
of failed asylum seekers and other people
from Kosovo in the months to come.
17.
I believe that, in addition to complying strictly with the principle
of non-refoulement and the position
of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), any decision
to return ethnic minorities to Kosovo should
be taken with special cautiousness, both on security and hum
anitarian grounds. Considering the fragile
socio-economic environment of Kosovo, the volatility of the
security situation, and the risk that political and
ethnic tension flares up as status talks approach, an increased
number of returns may contribute to having
destabilising effects. In addition, it would put additional strai
n on the limited resources of the Kosovo
administration. In a sense, a policy of forced return is also
in contradiction with the considerable financial
and military commitment by a number of European countries
aimed at restoring sustainable living conditions
and security in Kosovo.
18.
Once ascertained that return would not be in contravention
of the principle of non-refoulement, host
countries should give attentive consideration to humanitarian
concerns of potential returnees on a case-by-
case basis, including their level of integration in the host
country and their access to dignified and humane
housing and social conditions upon return. UNMIK, the civil
administration in Kosovo, faces increasing
pressures to accept forced returns, at a time where it
is reducing its personnel. I was even told that
sometimes host countries fail to notify the return of some
individuals to UNMIK, including vulnerable cases
who are then sent back despite a lack of basic services to
meet their needs.
19.
Finally, given the economic situation in Kosovo and lack
of social welfare, concerned Council of
Europe member states should support reintegration sche
mes for those who are forcibly returned, especially
vulnerable cases.
6.
The PIS and Kosovo Albanian political parties
20.
Following the resignation of Ramush Haradinaj, a new
government was formed by the same ruling
coalition LDK — AAK, with Bajaram Kosumi as Prim
e Minister. Amongst others, PDK — the second large
st
party in the Kosovo Assembly - is in the opposition.
Reportedly, the EU and the US administration would
have favoured an enlargement of the government coal
ition to include some opposition parties and political
forces of Kosovo Serbs. Recently, the SRSG proposed
the creation of a Political Forum, which would
prepare grounds for future momentous political discussion
s. This proposal, however, is still under discussion
and has been received with mixed feelings: the issue of
whether it should have consultative or decision-
making powers is a bone of contention.
21.
On the status issue, no Kosovo Albanian political party is
ready to accept less than independence.
Despite this uniform approach, the political climate is tens
e and stained by accusations of corruption and
involvement in organised crime. In this respect, my
attention has been drawn to the lack of internal
democracy of political parties and to the fact that political alleg
iance is strongly linked with clan affiliation.
7.
Participation of Kosovo Serbs in the political process
22.
During the last elections to the Kosovo Assembly (October
2004), 99% of Kosovo Serbs abstained:
out of 96,000 Serbs living in Kosovo only 300 voted, plus
another 523 Kosovo Serbs residing outside Kosovo
(out of 108,000). This was a very meaningful sign
: in the three previous elections in the province (200
0,
6
ibid.
8
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Doc. 10572
Serbs was also in doubt, although in the end the decision
2001 and 2002), the full participation of the Kosovo
proved positive'.
with the absence of a positive response
reasons for non-participation were dissatisfaction
Among the
23.
g would condone institutions which had
s for decentralisation, a perception that votin
to Belgrade's proposal
n by the Serb community as a sign
security, and the impact of the March riots, take
failed to guarantee Serb
ent and the international community to protect
of the incapacity of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Governm
minorities.
of Oliver Ivanovic, called for a boycott of the
Kosovo Serb leaders, with the notable exception
24.
s
an ambivalent attitude, with some prominent politician
election process. Belgrade, on the other hand, had
a) while others were against it (President Tadic).
supporting the boycott strategy (Prime Minister Kostunic
tions undermines the representativeness of the
The poor participation of Kosovo Serbs in the elec
25.
for the Serb community. As to participation in the
Kosovo Assembly, where 10 seats are set aside
Initiative, has accepted the office of
ever, Mr Slavisa Petkovic, leader of the Serbian Civic
government, how
Minister for Return and Communities.
Serbs to engage in dialogue and support the
Needless to say, the continued unwillingness of Kosovo
26.
ty to move forward.9 Besides, the absence of
implementation of the standards has hampered the abili
vo Assembly means that Belgrade is
elected representatives of the Kosovo Serbs in the Koso
democratically
the only interlocutor of the international
actor with a "mandate" to represent their interests and
now the only
s that will be decided starting from this
and the Kosovo institutions on all the important issue
community
10
year.
ge occurred: Oliver lvanovic informed me of
ng my visit to Kosovo, however, an important chan
Duri
27.
ntralisation. I hope that this decision is a
of Kosovo Serbs to attend the working groups on dece
the decision
a genuine dialogue. As far as I was told, the
the Kosovo Serbs of their readiness to be involved in
sign from
autonomy'. Independence of Kosovo is for
of Kosovo Serbs is 'less than independence, more than
position
them unacceptable.
8.
Dialogue with Belgrade
in the settlement of Kosovo's status will
There is no question that Belgrade's legitimate interests
28.
the readiness of the Serbia and Montenegro
to be considered. An essential precondition, however, is
have
government to engage in a dialogue.
g dialogue with Belgrade at various levels.
UNMIK has repeatedly stressed the need for improvin
29.
ss substantive issues such as decentralisation
n the SRSG went to Belgrade in January 2005 to discu
Whe
his interlocutors chose to talk about power cuts
and the reactivation of dialogue concerning missing persons,
any other issue. The nature of this exchange raised
in Kosovo affecting Serb households, to the exclusion of
blish a dialogue on crucial questions. Some
the question of Belgrade's apparent unwillingness to esta
" in Belgrade, as the political elites are no longer
observers have even spoken of a "process of regression
willing to address the issue of Kosovo".
where specific aspects are concerned:
Recent positive developments, however, should be noted
30.
e of missing persons, energy and transport. Its
Belgrade has agreed to engage in a dialogue on the issu
than autonomy'. No political force in Serbia
position on the status issue is `less than independence, more
else would be acceptable.
and Montenegro is prepared to declare publicly that anything
of the population in Kosovo while other minorities were 5%
The overall turnout was 53%. In 2000 Kosovo Serbs represented 7%
(source: Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK)).
Rapporteur: Guenther Krug (Germany, R, SOC), Congress of
Report on the Elections of the Kosovo Assembly, 23 October 2004,
ted by the Bureau of the Congress on 10 December 2004).
Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (document adop
rity Council on UNMIK, February 2005.
g
Report of the UN Secretary General to the Secu
western Balkans, 2004-2005, paragraph 109.
t0 House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Third Report on
les (CERI) in Paris, at the hearing on 'Kosovo: five
11 Professor Jacques Rupnik, of the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationa
ment (26 January 2005).
years on' organised by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parlia
9
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2596993_0010.png
Doc. 10572
9.
The international community
31.
After 6 years of presence in Kosovo UNMIK's public approval rating
is not at its highest.12 The riots
of March 2004 raised serious doubts about UNMIK's administrative
effectiveness and ability to provide
security.
32.
As the International Crisis Group has put it, "the international com
munity entered Kosovo in June
1999 without an exit strategy and has taken only a few uncertain
steps towards defining one".13 With the
future status question looming ever closer, UNMIK has already
started to reduce its presence, possibly to be
paralleled by an increased role for other international organisations
such as the European Union14. I was told
that a detailed proposal on the future role of the European Union
in Kosovo may be put forward by Javier
Solana in mid-June.
33.
I believe that the political process to resolve the issue of
Kosovo's status is necessarily closely
bound to the European outlook for the region as a whole. The pros
pect of drawing closer to the EU provides
a basis in Kosovo for consolidating political stability and economic
development. It should also be the chief
incentive for Belgrade to participate constructively in seeking a solu
tion for Kosovo.
34.
The transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to the Kosovo Polic
e (KPS) is progressing and by mid-
2005 all 33 UNMIK police stations should be handed over to the
KPS. This transfer, however, is problematic.
The KPS still lacks experience and doubts have been expresse
d as to its capability of being completely self-
reliant without international support and supervision. In this resp
ect, I believe that — in case of an increased
involvement of the European Union — Europol should play an impo
rtant role.
10.
The role of the Council of Europe
35.
Democracy, rule of law, human rights and rights of national
minorities, good governance: these are
the subjects of expertise and competence of the Council of
Europe; these are also the main targets that
Kosovo should achieve. I was surprised, therefore, to see
that the Council of Europe office in Pristina counts
only 3 international staff in addition to an expert consultant on
decentralisation.
36.
I believe that the Council of Europe should do more, to incre
ase its visibility and its impact in Kosovo.
The aim should be that Kosovo, irrespective of its statu
s, reaches standards comparable to those of the
Council of Europe and that this achievement is durable.
The Secretary General should, therefore, offer the
current and future civil administration in Kosovo Council of
Europe expertise also in the fields of: protection
of national minorities; use of minority languages; inter
-cultural dialogue; fight against corruption, organised
crime, money-laundering and trafficking in human bein
gs; democratisation and financing of political parties;
and independence and efficiency of the judiciary.
37.
Besides, as far as the status issue is concerned, the
Council of Europe could act as a facilitator of
dialogue between the parties, at a formal or informal
level; and could make available the expertise of the
European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) during the stage of status talks
,
with a view to identifying viable legal/constitutional
arrangements for the future status of Kosovo.
11.
Conclusions
38.
'2005 will be the year of Kosovo'; 'Standards befo
re Status'; 'Less than independence, more than
autonomy'... A lot of slogans have been invented
for Kosovo. In reality, none of them can capture
such a
complex situation, nor provide a ready-made solu
tion. I believe that the issue of status has become
urgent
and that it should be addressed by all the parties
concerned with a realistic approach and readiness
to
compromise. Both sides have to make additional effor
ts in this respect. The Council of Europe should play
a
role in helping them establish a fruitful political dialogue.
39.
The current situation in Kosovo is improving, but moti
ves for concern remain: effective protection of
minorities and human rights, decentralisation, corru
ption, organised crime and inter-ethnic dialogue
are
issues which will have to be addressed with a
long-term strategy which goes beyond the status
issue. The
Council of Europe should support the elaborati
on and implementation of this strategy, with
the aim of
rendering Kosovo an area where Council of Euro
pe standards and values are fully applicable.
ICG, Kosovo: Towards Final Status, 2005, page
4. This statement is based on regular quarterly
opinion polling sponsored by
UNDP/Riinvest.
13
Idem, page 2.
14
This opinion is shared by
UNMIK and by Kai Eide.
12
10
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Doc. 10572
Appendix
Propramme
Sunday, 22 May 2005
14:30
17:30
Arrival at the airport and transport to Hotel PRISHTINA
Meeting with Zurab Katchkatchishvili, Head of the Council of Europe Office, Pristina
Monday 23 May 2005
09:30
11:00
12:00
Lutfi H4ziri, Minister of Local Authorities, building of the Ombudsperson, 2'd floor
Adem Salihaj, Deputy Prime Minister, Government Building, second floor
Fatmir Sejdiu, Member of the Assembly Leadership, Government building, 15t floor North
Wing
President Ibrahim Rugova, (President's residence)-Velania street
Ambassador Werner Wnendt, Head of OSCE Mission, OSCE HQ
Meeting with EU country mission representatives, EAR building 8th floor
Hashim Thaqi, President of PDK Party, building of Economic chamber, 3rd floor
Slavisa Petkovic, Minister for Return and Communities, Ex-private business Bank
Bujar Bukoshi, President of the New Party, meeting at the CoE Office
13:00
14:00
15:00
16:00
17:00
18:00
Tuesday, 24 May 2005
08:00
09:00
10:00
11:00
12:30
Craig Jenness, Senior Adviser to SRSG on Minority Issues, UNMIK HQ, 4th floor, room 406
Pascale Moreau, Head of UNHCR Mission in Kosovo, UNHCR building 2"d floor
Briefing with Roman Flevak, Political Adviser, KFOR Film City
Veton Surroi, President of "ORA" Party, Government Building, 2'd floor, M 210
Major Wolf Wewers, Chief of Section Support & Service, Directorate of Organized Crime,
UNMIK-CIVPOL
departure for Mitrovica
NGO Nansen Dialogue
Oliver Ivanovic
16:00
17:00
18.00
WedneSday, 24 May 2005
09:00
15.15
Kilian Kleinschmidt, Deputy Director, Office of Returns and Communities, UNMIK
beparture for Berlin
11
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Doc. 10572
Reporting Committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Reference to Committee: Ref. 2907, 29.09.03
Draft Resolution unanimously adopted by the Committee on 31.05.05
Draft Recommendation unanimously adopted by the Committee on 31.05.05
Members of the Committee : Mr AbdUlkadir Ate§ (Chairperson), Mr Latchezar Toshev (Vice-Chairperson),
Mr.
Mr Dick Marty (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Konstantin Kosachev (Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Manuela Aguiar,
u,
Giuseppe Arzilli, Mr David Atkinson, Mr Claudio Azzolini, Mr Miroslav Benes, Mr Radu-Mircea Bercean
Doros
Mr Gerardo Bianco, r Haakon Blankenborg, Mr Giorgi Bokeria, Mrs Beåta Brestenkå, Mr
Christodoulides, Mrs Anna Curdovå, Mr Noel Davern, Mr Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr Adri Duivesteijn, Mrs
Mr
Josette Durrieu, Mr Mikko Elo, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Daniel Goulet,
Mr
Andreas Grbss, Mr Klaus-Jurgen Hedrich, Mr Jean-Pol Henry, Mr Joachim H0rster, Mr Tadeusz 'whisk',
Elmir Jahi0 (alternate: Mr Sead Avdi6), Mr Ljubrea Jova§evit, Lord Frank Judd (alternate: Lord John
Tomlinson), Mr Ivan Kalezi6, Mr Oleksandr Karpov, Mr Oskars Kastens, Mr Petro Ko9i, Mr Yuriy Kostenko,
Mrs Darja Lavti2ar-Bebler, Mr Wren Lindblad, Mr Tony Lloyd (alternate: Ms Jane Griffiths), Mr Younal
Loutfi, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Frano Matu'eid, Mr Jose Medeiros Ferreira, Mr Evagelos Meimarakis
(alternate: Mrs Elsa Papadimitriou), Mr Murat Mercan, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Mr Marko Mihkelson, Mrs
Natalia Narochnitskaya (alternate: Mr Ilyas Umakhanov), Mr Zsolt Nemeth, Mrs Carina Ohlsson, Mr Boris
Oliynyk, Mr Algirdas Paleckis (alternate: Mr Jonas Cekuolis), Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mrs Eleonora
Petrova-Mitevska, Mrs S0lveig Petursd0ttir, Mrs Clara Pintat Rossell, Mr Gordon Prentice (alternate: Sir
Sydney Chapman), Mr Dumitru Prijmireanu, Mr Gabino Puche, Mr Lluis Maria de Puig, Mr Jeffrey Pullicino
Orlando (alternate: Mr Leo Brincat), Mr Umberto Ranieri, Mr Michael Roth (alternate: Mr Rudolf Bindig ), Mr
Jan Rzymetka, Mr Peter Schieder, Mrs Juana Serna (alternate: Mr Julio Padilla), Mr Adrian Severin, Mrs
Hanne Severinsen, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid Slutsky, Mr Michael Spindelegger, Mr Zoltån Szab6, Mr
Mehmet Tekelioglu, Mr Tigran Torosyan, Mrs Marianne Tritz, Mr Vagif Vakilov (alternate: Mr Azim
Mollazade), Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Varujan Vosganian, Mr Andrzej Wielowieyski, Mr Bart van
Winsen, Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mr Marco Zacchera
Ex-officio: MM. Måtyås Ehrsi, Mats Einarsson,
N.B.
: The names-of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold
Head of the Secretariat : Mr Perin
Secretaries to the Committee: Mrs Nachilo, Mr Chevtchenko, Mrs Sirtori-Milner
12