Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn 2005-06
Bilag 44
Offentligt
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
F.
NATO
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF
OTAN
ETAT-MAJOR MILITAIRE INTERNATIONAL
December 2005
IMSM-091 2-2005
SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
RELEASE OF UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)The Military Committee agreed today to the release of an UNCLASSIFIEDversion of SACEUR's OPLAN 10302 to facilitate talks with the United Nations, theAfghan authorities and other international bodies. The sanitised OPLAN is enclosed.1.
2.
This document clears IMSWM-0548-2005.
FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:
F. DEL POZOVice Admiral, SPNADirectorInternational Military StaffEnclosure1.J5PLANS/7340-093/05 - 106409, SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (Revise 1)(Unclassified), Dec 05
Copy To SDL T, IS/OPSAction Officer Gp Capt J. A. Hill, OPS (5554)
G:\OPS 2005\DOCS\IMSM\05-091 2 (Release of UNCLASVersionof OPLAN10302(Rev 1 )).doc
NATO UNCLASSIFIEDIMS Control Nr: O05008333
Enclosure I toIMSM-091 2-2005
UNCLASSIFIED
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERSEUROPEBELGIUMJ5PLANS/7340-093/05 - 106409DECEMBER 2005
SACEUR OPLAN 10302(REVISE 1)
ISAFUNCLASSIFIED
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THIS PAGE IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PAGE COUNT.
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OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)SACEUR OPERATION PLAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCEFORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTANREFERENCES:
A.B.
C.
Bonn Agreement, dated 5 Dec 01.United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386(2001)and subsequent UNSCRs for Afghanistan.Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between ISAF and the Interim
Administration of Afghanistan, dated 4 Jan 02, and subsequentamendments.
SITUATION.a.
Strategic Conditions.
NATO assumed the lead for ISAF on 11 Aug 03,
drawing its authority from References A-C. The original operations plan foresaw fivephases. Phase I was assessment and preparation and ISAF operations in Kabul. InPhase 2, ISAF is expanding its presence from Kabul into the northern, western, easternand southern regions of the country. Coincident with the final stage of ISAF expansionin Phase 2, command and control structures will be adjusted to ensure greater synergybetween ISAF and coalition forces, while respecting the two distinct missions/mandates.Phase 3 is "stabilisation".Phases 4 and 5 are "transition" and "redeployment"respectively. Coalition forces will continue to operate in Afghanistan, adjusting as ISAFexpands.
Strategic Environment. In the fields of security and development, there are aconsiderable number of international actors assisting the Afghan government. Anintegrated and strategic approach is crucial to overall success. In the anticipated post-Bonn environment, primary responsibility for this coordination rests with the Afghangovernment, though in the mid-term it will require assistance from the UN and others.The NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul is responsible for carrying forwardb.
political aspects of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan.
Alliance Political Objective. Full support for implementation of the Bonn andKabul (ie post-Bonn) processes, as endorsed by UNSCR 1386 and subsequentUNSCRs for Afghanistan, in co-operation and coordination with key internationalorganisations and the coalition, by assisting the Afghan government to meet itsc.
responsibilities to provide security, order, stability and reconstruction.
A self-sustaining, moderate and democraticAfghan government able to exercise its sovereign authority, independently, throughoutd.
Alliance Political End-State.
Afghanistan.
e. - f. Reserved.g.
Political Limitations.
ISAF military elements will engage in mine clearing and explosive(1)ordnance disposal when essential for mission accomplishment.Counter terrorism operations will not be conducted by ISAF forces, or(2)under ISAF command.I
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Strategic Planning Assumptions.(1)
Reserved.
G8 lead nations will retain leadership for the designated pillars of security(2)sector reform, the success of which will be of critical importance to the fulfilmentof ISAF's objectives.Reserved.
(3)(4)
To support ISAF operations in Afghanistan, political arrangements will be
made to facilitate effective NATO engagement and military liaison withneighbouring states.
When authorized by the NAC, SACEUR will direct the Joint ForceCommander (JFC) to conduct military operations across Afghanistan, as appropriate and2.
MISSION.
within the mandate, in cooperation and coordination with Afghan national security forces and incoordination with coalition forces, in order to assist the Afghan government in the maintenanceof security; facilitate the development of government structures and extension of its control;
and assist reconstruction/humanitarian efforts, through the implementation of the mandateprovided by the relevant UNSCRs.3.
EXECUTION.a.
Conduct of Operations.
After completing Phases 1 ("assessment and
preparation") and 2 ("geographic expansion") of the five, partially overlapping, phases ofOperations Plan 10302, the focus of the third ("stabilisation") phase (and of this revise ofthe operations plan), will be to assist the Afghan government to extend and exercise itsauthority and influence. This phase will end, most likely at different intervals for each
province (or groups of provinces), as a level of stability is achieved to allow thehandover of ISAF military tasks to Afghan authorities. This incremental transition ofsecurity responsibilities will take place in Phase 4. Phase 4 ends when SACEURconfirms that the mission from the NAC extant at that time is accomplished. The fifthphase is redeployment.b.
Strategic Commander's Intent.
strategic transition plan at Annex A, we will continue to assist the Afghangovernment in establishing and maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, andcreating the conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction in its country. At the
(1)
Main Effort. Coincident with the expansion of ISAF, as described in the
strategic level, our Main Effort is to achieve our goals in Afghanistan byconducting stability and security operations in order to allow the Afghangovernment to assume control in the regions and provinces; and by helping theAfghan government to develop its security forces, in cooperation with the G8lead nations and other international organisations as they intensify their efforts inthe south and the east, to the extent that they can be effective without outsideassistance.(2)
Creating Effect — Expanding Afghan Authority.(a)
Context.
As directed by the NAC, I will empower COMJFC2UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Brunssum, as the JFC, to conduct NATO-led operations acrossAfghanistan, and provide strategic guidance, derived from political
direction from the NAC, and the necessary forces and resources for thistask. The JFC will, as the overall operational commander, determine the
effects required to achieve the military strategic objectives, providecampaign guidance and continuity and codify and maintain thoseagreements necessary with US CENTCOM (on behalf of the coalition) tomaximise operational synergy. In turn, the JFC will direct COMISAF, asthe in-theatre operational commander, to achieve the effects sought andthe key military and supporting tasks mandated by the NAC. This will take
place in an environment where ISAF has become the principalinternational military force in Afghanistan. The stability and securitycomponents of this ISAF operation are mutually supporting and linkedelements that must be driven centrally through coherent and consistentcommand and control. Moreover, they must be taken forward with thecognisance of the Afghan government. While political direction for this
mission comes from the NAC, there must be full consultation withappropriate Afghan political and military authorities over the prosecution of
operations by ISAF. Enduring change can only be sustained with clearAfghan support for, and ownership of, initiatives and programmes, leadingto the development of self-reliant partners. Although final decisions overISAF rest with NATO authorities, a collaborative approach will engender
indigenous involvement in shaping Afghanistan's destiny and create ashared view of ISAF's execution of its stability and security operations insupport of Afghan authorities and forces.
(b)Stability.Expanding the government's authority and the rule oflaw countrywide, and building the indigenous capacity required to sustain
them effectively, are critical to success in Afghanistan. Provincialreconstruction teams (PRT5) will be at the leading edge of NATO's effort.
Military support to them is one of NATO's major contributions to thesuccess of ISAF in Afghanistan. Stability operations will be used to create
an environment that generates the confidence and ambient securityrequired to enable reconstruction and nation-building activities. They will
also facilitate the continued physical and moral extension of Afghangovernment authority. Results will be achieved through presence andengagement. PRTs act as catalysts for change, while remaining sensitiveto Afghan sovereignty and political primacy. Teams will have significantinfluence and a disproportionately positive impact on authorities within aprovince. Broadening the range of capabilities within a PRT will increaseits ability to assist with the expansion of provincial authority and achieve
local success.
Similarly, while recognizing the different national
characters of PRTs, increasing convergence between the activities of allPRTs, with synchronised movement towards a set of common objectives,
will have the desired strategic impact. Stimulating economic growth,increasing the level of security, improving governance and public servicesand enhancing living conditions will satisfy basic human security needs,reduce the need for farmers to acquire income through poppy cultivation
and create greater loyalty to legitimate authorities. Lacking a commoncause, and without the likelihood of support, extremists will be less able tooperate. In this setting, ISAF will work alongside others, supporting the
Afghan government (and its forces and agencies) and overalldevelopment efforts, sharing information and harmonising its own3
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activities with those of others to the fullest extent practical to createcoherent effects. ISAF elements will operate with subtlety and a lighttouch, striking a careful balance between the traditionally active approachof military organisations and the requirement for other actors to conductreconstruction operations.
Security.Security operations will be required to allow PRTs toperform their tasks. Such security operations will range from local forceprotection in a permissive environment to decisive, pro-active militaryground and air manoeuvre, thereby creating the environment for PRTs toflourish.ISAF will support the Afghan government by deterring anddisrupting those who challenge the extension of government authority orprevent ISAF from operating freely. A robust approach will be necessaryto maintain the initiative.In-place forces can be supported by the(c)
deployment of out of theatre reserves from those elements of theStrategic Reserve Force earmarked by providing nations for operations inAfghanistan. Operational activity will be closely coordinated with coalition
forces, to secure the synergies available and manage the operatingspace.
Increasing involvement of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
Afghan National Police (ANP) will be developed as the missionprogresses.
Building Afghan National Capacity. Development of effective Afghannational security forces, responsive to central authorities, is a particularlyimportant step in extending government influence. Progress in this area alsoaids movement towards the NAC desired end state. Manning, training and(3)
equipping of the ANA and ANP remains the responsibility of respective G8 leadnations.ISAF's focus will be on the coherent employment of indigenous
capability. ISAF will mentor, support and aid the training and operationalemployment of ANA units in order to increase their capability and reach. This will
include the coordination of ANA operations with those of ISAF to achievesynergy, primarily through ISAF operational mentor and liaison teams that cansupport ANA operations and manage joint operating space and ISAF missionmutualtrust,unit-to-unit,and commander-to-commanderpartnerships at every level, with a clear understanding of respective operatingparameters. Accordingly, the operational mentor and liaison teams will operatein support of kandak1 activities: in barracks; on collective training; and closelymentoring kandak operational deployments where such activities are consistentwith the ISAF mandate. Operational effect will be further enhanced through ISAFcoordination,
enabling or battle-winning support.
It will be critical to establish close
focusing on practical steps to involve the ANP in the overall security effort, inaccordance with Appendix 2 to Annex B. ISAF will assist provincial securitycommittees and help coordinate the various police elements internally and whenworking in the same operating space with the ANA and/or ISAF. Advice andpractical support will also be offered to border police and supporting ANA units to
enhance their capacity through the adoption of an integrated border securitystrategy that reduces illegitimate movement and increases central governmentrevenues. Niche and professional development training will also be conductedfor Afghan national security forces on an opportunity basis. In coordination withother forces, ISAF will support Afghan government efforts to disarm illegallyarmed groups. Given the threats to stability arising from the drugs trade, ISAF1 An operational Afghan National Army unit of battalion size.
4UNCLASSIFIED
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will also support Afghan government counter narcotics efforts, within agreedguidelines. Throughout, all ISAF support to security sector reform will be in fullcoordination with the Afghan government and the G8 lead nations and withinmeans and capabilities.
While it is clear that ISAF has noComprehensive Awareness.responsibility for the delivery of effects by nations and other international(4)organisations supporting the Afghan government, or for the coordination of those
effects, ISAF could help. Analysing PRTs' work across the breadth of theirengagement provides ISAF with an almost unique ability to observe a range ofprovincial development activities. Similarly, ISAF, operating countrywide, has acomprehensive view of progress in security sector reform. COMISAF, working inconcert with the NATO Senior Civilian Representative and with both supportedby appropriately skilled staff, can gauge the breadth and depth of stabilisation,reconstruction and reform, spotting gaps or duplication of effort for the benefit ofthe wider community. Through politically agreed and accepted coordinatingmechanisms, considering civil and military effort, such assessments will assistthe Afghan government, who have primacy in this area, in coordinating the widerange of international community activities in the country. It should also prove
useful to those nations, organisations and agencies supporting Afghangovernment development efforts, helping them judge the effects of theirprogrammes.
External Influences. Under overall Afghan lead, developing relations(5)with Afghanistan's neighbours2 will buttress NATO's efforts, thereby enhancingregional and border security. In accordance with NAC guidance, ISAF shouldpromote regular Afghan/NATO military to military contact with key neighbours,supported by a responsive military liaison structure, to provide the primary toolfor liaison on the military side and support ISAF's tactical efforts in support of an
indigenous border security strategy to reduce illegitimate movement andincrease revenue collection.(6)-(7) Reserved.
(8)
Military Strategic Campaign Objectives.(a)The extension of Afghan government authority across the country.
Development of the structures necessary to maintain security in(b)Afghanistan, without the assistance of international forces.(c)
Development and maintenance of a countrywide stable and secure
environment by Afghan authorities, in which sustainable reconstructionand developmental efforts have taken hold.
Desired Strategic Military End-State. Afghan national security forces(9)provide security and sustain stability in Afghanistan without NATO support.c.
Reserved.
2 China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
5
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d.MissionReviewand Exit. Progress towards mission accomplishment will bekept under review. Recommendations will be made through the medium of the periodicmission review process. NATO's exit from Afghanistan is dependent on the successfuldevelopment of credible, professional and legitimate Afghan security structures able tomaintain a safe and secure environment in their own country, and on the desires of theAfghan government. Once Afghan national security forces are trained and effective,ISAF should be able to reduce its profile, as decided by the NAC. The first reductionsare likely to be in combat forces, leading to PRTs providing the longer-term ISAFmilitary presence. Once these are no longer required, on a province-by-province basis,the capabilities provided by a PRT should be taken on by Afghan structures and theteam dissolved.e.
Key Military and Key Supporting Tasks. Annex C.
f. - h. Reserved.
Co-ordinating Instructions.Timings. When the JFC and CENTCOM are satisfied that the necessary(1)conditions are met, transfer of authority for the southern region will take place onSACEUR's orders, following NAC approval. The same arrangements will apply
for subsequent expansion. Annex A to this operations plan is ineffective ontransfer of authority of coalition assets in the eastern region to ISAF.
(2)-(5) Reserved.
Markings. Generally, all ISAF personnel, vehicles and facilities will be(6)identified with the ISAF symbol and/or "ISAF".(7)
CombinedOperations.The JFC is authorised to conduct combined operations with Afghannational security forces. In such operations, ISAF will retain primacy forits own operational decision-making and ROE.(a)
The JFC is not authorised to conduct combined operations withcoalition forces. However, the JFC is authorised to provide in extremissupport to coalition operations conducted under separate mandate in(b)
support of the Afghan government. This may include operations toprevent the death, wounding or capture of coalition forces or anyANA/ANP supporting them; or to facilitate their extraction from danger.ISAF elements are to use their authorised ROE.(8)-(1O) Reserved.
(11) Arms Control. Annex M.(12)-(14) Reserved.
(15) Guidance on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. Annex LL.
6
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4.
SERVICE SUPPORT.
Strategic Logistic Priority. The priority is to deliver the best possible supportto ISAF by rationalising functions, increasing multi-nationality and utilising host nationsupport as the operation matures in order to reduce manning, equipment and costs.Establishing combined joint logistics and technical reach back capabilities shouldreduce the size of national support elements. These actions will contribute to reducingthe logistic footprint in Afghanistan and increasing logistic efficiency. Readily availablein-country resources should be used as much as possible. This practice increasesrevenue opportunities in the region and may lead to beneficial training for locala.
personnel, thus developing national human capital.
Logistics. Troop contributing nations and NATO authorities have a collectiveresponsibility for logistic support, which may be provided by national logistics assets,through multinational agreements, by using commercial contracts and with host nationsupport.Nations may take advantage of NATO pre-arranged contracts or basicThe JFC will facilitate bi and multilateral supportingordering agreements.arrangements between nations. Co-ordination of logistic support between NATO andnations should be carried out at the appropriate levels. Similarly, competition betweennations should be avoided and, wherever possible, contracting is to be co-ordinated.Accordingly, nations should give NATO commanders visibility of logistic resources andany mutual support arrangements established. Nations should also be prepared tob.
support other nations' forces, subject to mutual support arrangements and/orappropriate bilateral agreements.
c. - d. Reserved.e.
Engineering.
Nations provide engineer support to their contingents. Force
level engineers will support freedom of movement, construction and explosive ordnance
disposal, which must be coordinated with the host nation, the United Nations MineAction Co-ordination Centre and coalition authorities as appropriate. NATO and nationshave a collective responsibility for environmental protection.5.
COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
Command, Control and Liaison. The military chain of command runs fromSACEUR to COMJFC Brunssum, as the JFC, to COMISAF. The JFC, as the overalla.
operational commander, provides campaign direction and continuity. COMISAF will be
the in-theatre level operational commander, responsible for the synchronisation ofNATO's military activities with the Afghan government and with relevant representativesof the international community in Afghanistan. The focus for military to military relationswith neighbouring states, under politically approved arrangements, is split. The JFC will
lead on longer-term issues. COMISAF may deal with shorter-term practical bordersecurity concerns and the modalities of ISAF's operations near borders.b.
Reserved.
c.Areas.Afghanistan.
The ISAF Area of Operations is the territory and airspace of
7
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ANNEXES:A.
B.C.
D. - L.M.LL.
Concept of Operations for Transitional Operations.Reserved.Key Military Tasks and Key Supporting Tasks.App 1.PRT Operations.Afghan National Security Forces.App 2.Counter Narcotics.App 3.Reserved.Arms Control.Guidance on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.
0. - KK. Reserved.MM. -ZZ.Reserved.
8
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ANNEX A TOOPLAN 10302 (REV 1)OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)SACEUR OPERATION PLAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCEFORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTANANNEX A — SUPPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR TRANSITIONALOPERATIONS
SITUATION. This annex provides the necessary strategic guidance to allow theconduct of transitional operations for the assimilation into ISAF's area of operations of thesouthern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, in accordance with the original SACEUROPLAN 103021. This annex can be deleted once expansion is complete.2.3.
Reserved.
EXECUTION.a.
Strategic Commander's Intent.Under the strategic guidance in the main body and this annex, the JFC(1)will plan and conduct transitional operations for the assimilation of the southernand eastern regions into ISAF's area of operations. This will involve detailedplanning and coordination at the operational and tactical levels, including withproviding nations and the coalition, represented by USCENTCOM and its in-theatre HQs.(2)Transitional operations, complex in nature, will see the gradual build-up
of forces in the south, before transfer of authority to NATO. Dependent oncircumstances, the build up of ISAF forces may continue after transfer ofauthority. Assimilation of the eastern region will be more a re-flagging ofexisting coalition forces, though some new contributions may be offered byother nations during the force generation process.
Through expansion, NATO aims to build on the success of ISAF(3)operations in the north and west, and coalition operations elsewhere to date,and to further reinforce the dual messages of good governance and stability.Assimilation of the southern provinces marks a commitment for NATO inAfghanistan that is more than just geographic expansion. Given the morechallenging security environment into which ISAF is moving, there will be aneed to take the necessary and appropriate security measures. There will alsobe a requirement to establish clear arrangements for operational coordinationbetween an expanding ISAF, Afghan national security forces and any enduringcoalition presence.(4)Reserved.
The desired end state of transitional operations is for ISAF to be(5)operating nationwide to a coherent mission focused on stability and security1 This will be the completion of Phase 2 of the original plan, which had 4 stages: Stage I, the northernprovinces; Stage II, the western provinces; Stage Ill, the southern provinces; and Stage IV, the easternprovinces. While the original 10302 talked about distinct "central" and "eastern" provinces, subsequent analysisshowed the best approach was to wrap the central provinces, less Kabul, into the eastern region.
A-iUNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
through five regional commands (Capital, North, South, East and West). The
force will also include appropriate theatre level forces, including an aircomponent, and exercise full operational coordination with the remainingcoalition forces and Afghan national security forces. This end state will bereached when NATO-led forces have performed a full relief in place in thesouthern region (under coalition command until the moment of transfer ofauthority) and assumed responsibility for the southern provinces; assumedcommand of re-flagged coalition forces in the eastern region and adjustedtheatre-level command and control.b.
Assimilation of the Southern Region. The strategic intent of the southern
expansion is twofold. First, it is to expand the beneficial ISAF effect in Afghanistan bydeploying NATO-led PRTs and units into the southern provinces.Secondly,
expansion to the south will establish the conditions for the assimilation of theremaining provinces into the NATO-led mission, and provide for adjustments toexisting command and control arrangements. Over winter 2005/spring 2006, undercoordination between CENTCOM, the JFC and contributing nations, forces will flowinto the southern provinces, carrying out a relief in place of CFC-A forces. When the
JFC and CENTCOM are satisfied the necessary conditions are met, transfer ofauthority for the southern region will take place on SACEUR's orders, following NACapproval. CFC-A retains responsibility for the southern region, and control of forcestherein, until transfer of authority has been achieved. Full operating capability will bedeclared once determined by the operational commander.c.
Assimilation of the Eastern Region. Once transfer of authority has been
conducted in the southern region, NATO will move towards assuming command ofthe eastern region. When the JFC and CENTCOM are satisfied that the necessaryconditions have been met, transfer of authority of coalition forces in the eastern regionto COMISAF under the ISAF mandate will take place on SACEUR's orders, followingNAC approval. The coalition retains responsibility for the eastern region until transferof authority has been achieved.
The creation of the Capital regional command (KabulCapital Region.Province) may happen at any stage during the transition process, as recommendedby the JFC and providing nations and on SACEUR's orders following NAC approval.d.e.f.
Reserved.
Afghan National Security Forces. As assimilation takes place, so ISAF'srole in coordination with Afghan national security forces will increase. The desiredendstate is set out at Appendix 2 to Annex C. In broad terms, as ISAF assimilates aregion, it will establish clear coordinating arrangements and emplace operationalmentor and liaison teams at the Afghan National Army (ANA) corps, brigade and unit(kandak) level in order to provide advice and guidance on the operational employmentof the ANA and coordinate ISAF and ANA operations in the same operating space.
Simultaneously, ISAF will support the Afghan National Police (ANP), whenappropriate, in coordination with the G8 lead nations and in accordance withAppendix 2 to Annex C, in their coordination with ISAF and ANA operations.
A-2UNCLASSIFIED
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Coordinating Instructions.Policies, Guidance and Direction.Unless specified, all aspects of(1)the main body and other annexes of SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (Revise 1) applyto the transitional operations set out herein.Timings. Transfer of authority of the forces in the southern and theneastern regions will take place when the operational conditions are met.SACEUR will recommend detailed timings, for MC endorsement and NAC(2)
approval.4.5.
Reserved.
COMMAND AND CONTROL.a.
Regional Commanders. All regions will have regional commanders. The
regional coordinators in the northern and western regions should be empowered asregional commanders, with the appropriate staffs and resources to exercise effectivemilitary command and control upon execution of this OPLAN.b.c.
Reserved.
HQ ISAF.The structure of HQ ISAF has been reviewed to ensure it isorganised in the most efficient way to conduct operations in an expanded ISAF.Double-hatting arrangements at the HQ ISAF level, to maximise synergy betweenISAF and the coalition, will be in place before full assimilation is complete in thesouthern region.d.
Operational Coordination.
Very close coordination of activities and
extended liaison with US CENTCOM and CFC-A will be required to support seamlessexpansion.
A-3
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UNCLASSIFIEDANNEX C TOOPLAN 10302 (REV1)
OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)SACEUR OPERATION PLAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCEFORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN
ANNEX C - KEY MILITARY TASKS AND KEY SUPPORTING TASKS
Key Military Tasks. Fulfilling the mandate of ISAF based on Reference B of theOP LA N
Assist the Afghan government in extending its authority, across the country,including stimulation of the security sector reform process, thus contributing to themaintenance of a secure environment to allow International Organizations (lOs) tocarry out their responsibilities and activities. Appendix 1.a.
In coordination with Afghan national security forces, conduct stability andsecurity1 operations, to create the operational environment in which governmentauthority may be extended, ISAF may operate unhindered and other internationalb.
organizations can carry out their responsibilities freely.c.
Mentor and support the Afghan National Army (ANA) to increase theirSupport Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups.Coordinate and deconflict ISAF and enduring coalition operations.
capability and reach. Coordinate ISAF and ANA operations. Appendix 2.d.e.
f.Operate, and maintain security for, Kabul International Airport (KAIA),transferring responsibility for specific functions to Afghan authorities2 when practical.2.
Key Supporting Tasks. Within means and capabilities and, where applicable, inProvide the NAC, the Afghan government, and those nations, organisationsand agencies supporting development efforts, a coherent overview of the progress ofa.
line with relevant Afghan government agreed national or provincial project lists:
development efforts and security sector reform.
Support the Afghan National Police (ANP) to integrate its different componentsand to help it to coordinate its activities with the ANA and ISAF. Appendix 2.b.
c.
Advise and support the Afghan government in the development and
maintenance of border security through an integrated border security strategy.Appendix 2.d.e.
Support Afghan government counter narcotics efforts. Appendix 3.
On request, provide assistance to humanitarian assistance operations
conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.1 See Strategic Commander's intent in main body for a description of stability andsecurity operations.2 Any transition plan must consider the 'human capital' issue to enable theAfghan government to takeover therunning of the airport.
C-IUNCLASSIFIED
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f.
Support UNAMA, United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees(UNHCR) and other appropriate agencies for the return of refugees and displacedpersons.g.h.
Support responsible authorities, and supporting agencies, combatingOn request, provide assistance to disaster relief operations of the Afghan
trafficking in human beings. Annex D.
government, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.
Co-ordinate with nations' non-combatant evacuation operations and, ifrequested, provide assistance.
On request, provide in-extremis support to coalition counter-terrorist operationsj.conducted in support of the Afghan government.k.
ISAF military elements will only engage in mine clearing and explosive
ordnance disposal when essential for mission accomplishment. However, on request,remove/neutralize threats from explosive remnants of war when there is an immediaterisk to the community.APPENDICES:PRTs.Afghan National Security Forces.Counter Narcotics.
2.3.
C-2UNCLASSIFIED
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APPENDIX 1 TOANNEX C TOOPLAN 10302 (REV 1)APPENDIX 1— PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) OPERATIONS
PRTs are one of the important tools available toPRT Concept of Operations.COMISAF for stability operations. Their role is to assist the Afghan government extend itsauthority across the country. This is achieved through promoting the policies and prioritiesof central government and by stimulating the security sector reform process. While PRTsare not an end in themselves, their military capability provides a security effect andenables the work of other agencies. Military PRT elements, working in close co-operationand concert with a broadly based and multi-disciplined civilian element, will seek to1.
influence local authorities within a province.
"Development without security isunachievable and security without development is meaningless1". Where the militaryelement facilitates building security sector capacity, the civilian element facilitates buildinggovernance capacity and assisting community development. PRTs, while not surrogateprovincial governments, thus act as catalysts for change, sensitive to Afghan sovereignty
and political primacy. PRT activities are to be fully integrated into developing Afghansystems in order to encourage and support their own nascent abilities. The desired endstate for the PRT network2 will be achieved when international military forces are no longerrequired and the Afghan government and provincial government institutions are soundlyestablished and fully functioning, with PRTs in turn becoming unnecessary.2.
PRT Structures.
Due to the widely differing regional circumstances in
Afghanistan, as well as the different capabilities and approaches of PRT lead nations, a
"one size fits all" PRT concept is neither appropriate nor possible. The core militaryelements of a PRT could be complemented by a civil-military co-ordination element and a
civilian element. The former facilitates the consultative group mechanism, throughbringing together stakeholders to consult and deconflict on pertinent issues within thePRT's province. Through facilitating wider consultation, the civil-military coordinationelement is supporting a wider collective strategy. The civilian element can be expected tolead on the political, economic, humanitarian and social aspects of a PRT's work. It canalso be expected to support the process of reconstruction in accordance with the Afghangovernment's national development priorities and, in particular, to support G8-lead nationsin specific aspects of the security sector reform process. Harmonising the military securityobjectives of the PRTs with the governance and development objectives of the civiliancomponent will deliver a more secure environment that achieves food security and buildshuman security for the future. The basic premise of any national civilian contribution within
the context of a PRT must always be unity of effort with the work of other PRTs, the
Afghan government, UNAMA and other organisations and agencies supportingredevelopment.
PRT Effects. Effects should be achieved through presence and engagement.Progress should have an Afghan face; improvements can only be sustained with local3.
ownership and the development of self-reliant partners. Military PRT elements, working inclose co-operation and synchronisation with a broadly based and multi-disciplined civilian
PRT element, have significant influence and a disproportionately positive impact onauthorities within a province. Increasing convergence between the activities of all PRTs,with coherent and coordinated activity to a set of common objectives, would create1 Afghanistan's 2020 Vision: Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.2 PRT Executive Steering Committee's chosen end state.
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beneficial effects across a number of provinces and achieve strategic impact. ISAF shouldwork alongside others, supporting the Afghan Government (and its forces and agencies)
and overall development efforts, sharing information and harmonising activities to thefullest extent practical to create coherent effects. In this context, ISAF elements shouldoperate with subtlety and a light touch, striking a careful balance between the traditionallyactive approach of military organisations and the requirement for other actors to conductreconstruction operations.4.
PRT Tasks. The following list, whilst not exhaustive, provides strategic guidanceon suitable PRT tasks:
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Improve the security environment for the Afghan people through dialogue withprovincial leaders and confidence building activities and mitigating likely areas ofconflict.Monitor, assess, advise on and support security sector reform activities, particularly
Afghan National Army and police training, in close co-ordination with UNAMA,security sector reform lead-nations and bilateral programmes.Facilitate the development of effective provincial governance, building capacity toplan, prioritise and manage programmes and major events.Encourage and facilitate the work of provincial development committees, and othercommittees that may emerge, for example on security, and provincial bodies, suchas joint coordination centres.Advise on the coordination of Afghan security forces/agencies in a province.
Provide a visible presence in assigned areas of operation, monitoring andassessing the military and civil situations within those areas.Act as the development reconnaissance force for the reconstruction effort, offeringa coherent picture of needs to the ISAF chain of command, provincial authoritiesand those assisting redevelopment.Assist the international community with the process of reform and strengthening ofcivil administration.
Help to facilitate information sharing between the Afghan government and civilagencies, on their request.
Support humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities when requested,within means and capabilities.
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APPENDIX 2 TOANNEX C TOOPLAN 10302 (REV 1)APPENDIX 2- AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES11.
Introduction. Responsibility for the development of Afghan national security forces
rests with the Afghan government, supported by G8 lead nations. GE leads theprogramme for the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP), with some supportfrom a US-run programme for patrolmen at the regional level. The US is the lead nation forthe development of the Afghan National Army (ANA), with some bilateral assistance. Itruns an initial individual and collective training programme at a central location, after whichunits ("kandaks") are deployed to the provinces. NATO's exit from Afghanistan is, interalia, dependent on the successful establishment of an integrated security structure that is
owned by the Afghans, capable of maintaining security within its own borders and ofdeterring foreign adversaries.2.
security forces. First, that the G8 security sector reform lead nations will continue with theirefforts to increase the capability of Afghan national security forces. Secondly, that NATOwill not be responsible for logistic sustainment of the ANA or ANP or fund their operatingand maintenance costs and, thirdly, that any ISAF activity with Afghan national security
Assumptions. Three assumptions underpin NATO support to Afghan national
forces will support the goals of the G8 security sector reform lead nations to deliverenhanced operational capability underpinned by a robust and effective sustaining structure,adding value.
ANP ISAF will focus on practical steps to harness the ANP into the overall securityeffort, leaving manning, training, equipping and fielding to the G8 lead nation. As such,3.
ISAF will assist provincial security committees and provincial security coordinatingmechanisms and help to coordinate the various police elements, with the ANA and otherAfghan national security forces, and with ISAF when operating in the same space. Indirectsupport can also be offered within means and capabilities, such as information sharing,local technical advice and indirect mentoring/role modelling through local partnershiparrangements. Low cost high value training can also be given at the local level in fieldssuch as site security and event management, thus building management capacity. Supportto counter narcotics police is encompassed in Appendix 3 to Annex B. Under G8 nationlead, ISAF units may also conduct niche training for the ANP2, on an opportunity basis andwithin means and capabilities.4.
Border Security. To enhance border security (and legitimate revenue collection),technical advice and practical mission support should be offered to Afghan border policeand supporting ANA units, within the framework of an integrated border security strategy.5.
Strategic Concept for NATO Support to the ANA.a.Focus.NATO's involvement with the ANA will focus on employment,leaving manning, initial training, sustainment and fielding to the G8 lead nation.
1 Afghan national security forces refers to all security forces under the authority andresponsibility of theAfghan government, all of which are in varying stages of development. These comprise the Afghan NationalArmy (ANA), including a small Air Corps; the Afghan National Police (ANP); Highway Police; Border Police;Criminal Investigation Police; and Counter Narcotics Police.2 Common skills, such as search procedures, vehicle checkpoints, personalself-protection and weaponhandling.
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ISAF will assist the Afghan government and G8 lead nation to bring the ANA to full
self sufficiency by operational mentoring, facilitating continuation training andsupporting ANA units to increase their capability and reach. This will include thecoordination of ANA operations with those of ISAF to achieve s/nergy, primarilythrough embedded ISAF operational mentor and liaison teams .Such teams,emplaced in all manoeuvre and combat support and combat service supportkandaks, brigade and corps HQs and in the ANA operational HQ, will be able tosupport ANA operations and manage joint operating space and ANA and ISAFmission and service support. When not deployed, teams will also facilitatecontinuation training for the kandak or HQ with which they are aligned, against ANAcentral training objectives. Liaison will be established with the MOD and General
Staff. The JFC may direct the conduct of niche and professional developmenttraining for the ANA on an opportunity basis, calling on temporary externalassistance as required.In addition to the framework of operational mentor andliaison teams, clear arrangements between ISAF units/commanders and local ANAunits/commanders will be developed, thereby enhancing integration in the sameoperating space.
Employment of Teams.ISAF teams will replace coalition embeddedtraining teams4 at around the 20-week point in the life of a kandak, providingmentoring and support until self-sufficiency is achieved.It is critical to establishclear arrangements, partnerships at every level and mutual trust, with a clearb.
understanding of respective operating parameters. Thus, operational mentor andliaison teams will operate in support of kandak activities: in barracks; on collectivetraining; and closely mentoring kandak operational deployments.
Mission Support to the ANA.To facilitate success, ISAF, in addition toc.assistance provided by the G8 lead nation, will provide practical support for ANAsecurity and stability operations within means and capabilities. ISAF can provideimmediate aid to ANA casualties resulting from operations. The provision of militaryequipment (and its maintenance) ammunition, logistic support, sustainment, pay androutine medical care remains in the hands of the ANA, strongly supported by the G8lead nation.d.Direction. Clear in-theatre arrangements are necessary to ensure coherentand coordinated direction is provided to the respective G8 lead nation and ISAFcomponents supporting the ANA. The lead nation will discern its way forward fordevelopmental work, funding, equipping, sustainment support and basic training.ISAF will address operational employment. There is distinct complementarity.Training and equipping must match operational needs, while any continuationtraining conducted by kandaks when not deployed, which will be overseen andfacilitated by associated ISAF operational mentor and liaison teams, must fit into anoverarching developmental strategy with identified training objectives.Whiledirection for ANA operations and training should come through its own chain ofcommand, suitably supported by advisers at every level, ISAF and G8 lead nationelements must closely coordinate all of their activity in relation to the ANA. Duringoperations, clear command and control arrangements have to be established.
A different name to that used by the coalition (embedded training teams), reflecting the emphasis onoperational employment.Some elements of the coalition team may remain to handle lead nation issues, such as pay and equipment.
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Command and Control. ANA operations remain under national command,with close coordination with ISAF. However, effective integration and an increase inoperational capability will be achieved through the development of "partnering"e.
arrangements between ISAF units and formations and corresponding ANAstructures.
Hand-Off. As the capability of an ANA unit or HQ grows, the role and thesize of its operational mentor and liaison teams will decrease. When full operationalcapability has been achieved, the team can be withdrawn.Ordinary liaisonf.
arrangements can then apply.
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APPENDIX 3 TOANNEX C TOOPLAN 10302 (REV 1)
APPENDIX 3- GUIDANCE ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS
Background. The extension of Afghan government authority, the maintenance oflong-term stability and the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan are inextricably linkedto the successful tackling by the Afghan government of the illicit opium trade.1.
2.
The Afghan government's integrated approach to counter narcoticsincorporates interdiction, eradication, law enforcement, the judiciary, alternative livelihoodprogrammes, regional cooperation, improved border controls and domestic demandreduction. Specialised Afghan interdiction and eradication units and the Counter NarcoticsPolice Force, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, carry out counter narcoticsdirect action tasks. However, experience shows that success of the overall campaign
Situation.
relies just as much on the creation of good governance at the local level, a secureenvironment with effective law and order and demonstrable commitment by theinternational community.3.
NATO Support. Supporting Afghan government counter narcotics programmes isan ISAF Key Supporting Task. The Afghan government, supported by the internationalcommunity, is making a significant effort to tackle the illicit opium trade. NATO, as theprimary military force, can contribute. Facilitating Afghan institutions and security forces ina long-term national counter-narcotics strategy is consistent with ISAF's role to support theAfghan government extend its authority across the country.
Parameters.COMISAF will develop all plans in close co-ordination with theresponsible Afghan government authorities and the G8 lead nation and other supporting4.
agencies. Poppy eradication is not a task for ISAF. Any support must be withinauthorised rules of engagement and the varying roles and capabilities of the forces in anyparticular area.
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ANNEX M TOOPLAN 10302 (REV 1)OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)SACEUR OPERATION PLAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCEFORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN
ANNEX M - ARMS CONTROLREFERENCES:A.B.
Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (VD 99), 16 Nov 99.Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on theirDestruction (Ottawa Convention), 18 Sep 97.
Vienna Document 99.Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan andTajikistanaresignatories to the Vienna Document 99 (Reference A). It entails an annual exchange ofmilitary information, a requirement to give notification of certain military activities above1.
specific thresholds and the requirement to submit to possible area inspections, allspecified in the Treaty. This could include military forces from ISAF contributing nationswithin these states.
Ottawa Convention. Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are parties to theOttawa Convention (Reference B). It completely prohibits use, development, production,acquisition, stockpiling, retaining or transfer of anti-personnel mines, as well as theassistance, encouragement or inducement of any activity prohibited under the Convention,2.
under any circumstances. Each signatory also undertakes to destroy or ensure thedestruction of all anti-personnel mines. Mine awareness and related action such ascollecting them is permitted, as it supports the spirit of the Convention.3.
Other Treaties. Afghanistan is not a signatory to the Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty or the Vienna Document 99. There is, therefore, norequirement for notification or inspection, under the above agreements, of military forceswithin Afghanistan.4.
Additional Remarks. NATO, as an organisation, is not a signatory to any of these
agreements and, therefore, cannot be held accountable under the terms of them.However, the provisions do bind Member States who are parties to the agreements.National forces assigned for collective military activity by member states remain subject to
the arms control commitments of their individual governments. NATO and its memberstates should be sensitive to any arms control activities or obligations that may arise as aresult of the deployment of NATO forces to this region.
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ANNEX LL TOOPLAN 10302 (REV 1)
OPLAN 10302 (REVISE 1)SACEUR OPERATION PLAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCEFORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN
ANNEX LL - COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS IN AFGHANISTAN1.
Situation. NATO policy1 on combating trafficking in human beings takes into
account the universal condemnation of the crime, reiterating that it constitutes a seriousabuse of human rights. In the context of the policy, "trafficking" means the recruitment,transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat of use offorce or other forms of coercion, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position ofvulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of
a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation."Exploitation" shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others, orother forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar toslavery, servitude or the removal of organs.2.
Strategic Concept. The approach has a twin-track: to enforce the basic standards
of conduct to which NATO-led forces must adhere; and provide support, withincompetence and respective mandates, to responsible authorities in the host country intheir efforts to combat trafficking in human beings:
Forces2 conducting operations under NATO command and control areprohibited from engaging in trafficking in human beings or facilitating it.Thedetailed standards of individual behaviour, reflecting the definition of trafficking atPara 1, should be developed in theatre and made clear to contingents througha.
COMISAF's OPLAN. Whenever evidence suggests any involvement in traffickingby ISAF personnel, even in the broadest term, the JFC will take swift action, in fullconsultation with national authorities, to prevent re-occurrence and ensure thatappropriate disciplinary action is taken and records maintained. The JFC will also
maintain oversight of any related national investigations and prosecutionsconcerned with misconduct by members of their forces or civilian elements,including contractors.
Set against a background of all ISAF personnel applying the appropriatelevel of personal conduct, ISAF support to responsible authorities in Afghanistan tocombat trafficking in human beings will be provided, within means and capabilities,within the framework of NATO support to security sector reform and the Afghanb.
government. Such measures will include, but not be limited to:
Identification within the area of operation of local and internationalorganisations with the capacity for protecting and housing adult and child(1)
victims of trafficking and the establishment of appropriate liaisonarrangements with them.
1 National training for all personnel taking part in ISAF operations will make them aware of the problem oftrafficking; how it affects human rights and stability and security; and to set out their own responsibilities andduties in this area.2 The prohibition also applies to any civilian element accompanying such forces, including contractors.
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(2)
Sharing of information related to human trafficking gathered during the
course of routine operations with government authorities and responsibleagencies.(3)(4)Support to Afghan national security forces' operations3.
In a similar vein to the support being provided to other initiatives,
production of information products to support anti-human traffickingprogrammes being run by the Afghan government or responsible agencies.
The conformity of contributing forces to the required standards and thec.implementation of supporting efforts will be evaluated as part of the periodic missionreview process, in accordance with agreed policy.
See Annex C, Appendix 2, Para 3.
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