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Human Rights Watch
October 2005 Volume 17, No. 9(E)
A Face and a NameCivilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in IraqI. Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 1The Victims................................................................................................................................ 4Insurgent Groups...................................................................................................................... 6Arguments of Insurgent Groups............................................................................................ 9Violations by U.S. and Iraqi Government Forces ............................................................. 10Methodology............................................................................................................................ 11II. Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 11III. Insurgent Groups in Iraq .................................................................................................... 13Attacks on Civilians ................................................................................................................ 19Purpose of Attacks on Civilians ........................................................................................... 20Justifications for Attacks on Civilians.................................................................................. 23Statements by Insurgent Groups.......................................................................................... 30Statements by Sunni Religious Groups ............................................................................... 32IV. Attacks on Ethnic and Religious Groups ......................................................................... 35Attacks on Shi`a Muslims ...................................................................................................... 36Attacks on Kurds .................................................................................................................... 40Attacks on Christians ............................................................................................................. 46V. Attacks on Civilians Working for Foreign Governments................................................ 52VI. Attacks on Government Officials and Politicians........................................................... 62VII. Attacks on Civilians Applying for the Iraqi Security Forces........................................ 70VIII. Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations and the U.N................................................ 73IX. Attacks on Media.................................................................................................................. 83X. Attacks on Intellectuals and Professionals......................................................................... 90XI. Attacks on Women .............................................................................................................. 93XII. Abduction and Execution of Non-Iraqi Civilians ......................................................... 98XIII. Unlawful Attacks on Government Security Forces...................................................102Summary Executions of Government Forces..................................................................104Perfidious Attacks.................................................................................................................107Attacks on Security Forces Causing Disproportionate Civilian Harm .........................109XIV. Violations by U.S. Forces...............................................................................................111XV. Violations by the Iraqi Government..............................................................................114XVI. Legal Standards and the Conflict in Iraq .....................................................................118
International Humanitarian Law in Iraq............................................................................118International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Civilians .................................122Designation of Military Objectives ....................................................................................126Prohibition on Attacks Causing Disproportionate Civilian Harm................................127and Indiscriminate Attacks..................................................................................................127Suicide Attacks and International Law ..............................................................................129Criminal Responsibility ........................................................................................................130Crimes Against Humanity....................................................................................................131Appendix A ................................................................................................................................134Major Attacks with Civilian Deaths by Insurgent Groups in Iraq ................................134Acknowledgments.....................................................................................................................140
I. SummaryIraqi families were shopping and preparing for evening prayers at the People ofMusayyib Husainiyya Mosque in the town of Musayyib on July 16, 2005, when the bombblew up. A suicide bomber from an unknown armed group detonated his explosivesnext to a tanker truck filled with cooking gas, igniting a massive fire-ball that sweptthrough the market and surrounding streets.“I saw how the flames swallowed the panicked people as they ran away,” a local teachersaid. “The fire chased the people down and ate them alive.”1More than ninety civilians died in the mostly Shi`a Muslim town just south of Baghdad,including women and children. Hundreds more were badly burned or pierced byshrapnel.The Musayyib bombing is but one example of an insurgent attack in Iraq targetingcivilians. Since the U.S.-led invasion of the country in March 2003, armed oppositiongroups have purposely killed thousands of civilians—men, women and children. Acrossthe country, insurgents have used car bombs and suicide bombers, like the one inMusayyib, to maximize the number of civilian injuries and deaths. They haveassassinated government officials, politicians, judges, journalists, humanitarian aidworkers and those deemed to be collaborating with the foreign forces in Iraq. They havetortured and summarily executed, sometimes by beheading, persons in their custody.And attacks against legitimate military targets, such as army convoys, have been carriedout in such a manner that the foreseeable loss of civilian life was far disproportionate tothe military gain. All of these attacks are serious violations of international humanitarianlaw—war crimes—and in some cases they are crimes against humanity.This report aims to give the civilian victims of these attacks a face and a name. Throughvictim and witness testimony, it documents some of the crimes committed againstcivilians by insurgent groups, and addresses the arguments these groups and theirsupporters use to justify unlawful attacks.It also places insurgent abuses in context; namely, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and theensuing military occupation that resulted in tens of thousands of civilian deaths and1
Borzou Daragahi and Saad Fakhrildeen, “Iraqi Town Left Devastated by Attack,”Los Angeles Times,July 18,2005.
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sparked the emergence of these insurgent groups. Chief among the justificationsinsurgent groups use is that the United States illegally invaded Iraq and has killed untoldthousands of Iraqi civilians over the past two-and-a-half years.Previous Human Rights Watch reports have documented the use of indiscriminate andexcessive force by U.S. forces during raids on residential areas and at checkpoints.Thousands of suspected insurgents in U.S. and Iraqi government custody have beendetained without regard to the protections afforded by international law. U.S. forceshave committed torture and humiliation of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison and otherdetention centers, and mistreatment of detainees by Iraqi authorities has been systematic.Few persons responsible for abuses—and none at higher levels—have been criminallyprosecuted.These abuses have enraged many Iraqis, as well as people outside Iraq, and are onemotivating factor behind the insurgency’s steady growth over the past two years. Butthey in no way justify attacks on civilians by insurgent groups, who are legally bound torespect international humanitarian law, regardless of their adversary’s behavior, andwhether or not they recognize the law. It is to promote the principle that civilians maynever be the object of attack that Human Rights Watch has published this report.The laws of war, binding on government armed forces and non-state armed groups,prohibit direct attacks on civilians, attacks made with no effort to distinguish betweencivilians and combatants, and attacks that cause civilian loss disproportionate to theexpected military gain. Also prohibited are attacks intended primarily to spread terroramong the civilian population. Crimes committed as part of a widespread or systematicattack against a civilian population are considered crimes against humanity. Anyoneresponsible for serious violations is subject to prosecution, including those commanderswho ordered or knew or should have known of the unlawful attacks and did nothing.The report divides the civilian victims into nine categories to explain how they have beenattacked, why they were attacked and the justifications the attackers used. Thecommonality is that the insurgents considered their target in some way associated withthe U.S.-led Multi-National Force in Iraq or the country’s current government, whichthey view as an agent of the United States. For the insurgents, most of whom are SunniArabs, the Iraqi government is an illegitimate institution that serves the United States oris unfairly dominated by Shi`a Muslims and Kurds.The report also documents attacks against Iraqi, U.S. and other coalition military forcesthat violate the laws of war. Some insurgent groups have committed war crimes by
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executing, torturing or otherwise mistreating combatants in their custody. They haveviolated the laws of war by committing perfidious attacks on military targets, that is,attacks in which the attacker feigns being a civilian. And some insurgent attacks onmilitary targets have unlawfully failed to discriminate between combatants and civiliansor have caused disproportionate civilian casualties. While international law does notprohibit insurgents from attacking military targets, such attacks are violations of Iraqicriminal law for which the perpetrators may be prosecuted. Likewise, Iraqi governmentforces are liable under domestic law for torturing detainees and other misuses of force.This report assesses the conduct of the insurgents solely under the applicable provisionsof the international laws of war.A chapter on the insurgent groups describes the various groups active in Iraq, most ofthem composed of Sunni Arabs, who are fighting the multinational and Iraqigovernment forces. This is complex because “the insurgency” is a general term used todescribe an array of groups with different structures, allegiances and aims, as well asseemingly different views on the acceptable objects and methods of attack. Some groupshave at times condemned attacks on civilians, while others like Ansar al-Sunna, al-Qaedain Iraq and the Islamic Army in Iraq have publicly extolled their responsibility for seriouscrimes through videos and statements on bomb attacks, abductions and executions ofcivilians.The report presents the arguments some insurgent groups and their supporters use tojustify attacks on civilians. Most of these stem from the view that all means are legitimateto liberate Iraq from foreign forces; thus, anyone perceived as associated with theoccupation is open to attack. But none of the arguments justify the attacks documentedin this report, which are in clear violation of international humanitarian law. Not onlyshould all insurgent groups in Iraq cease such attacks, but the political and religiousleaders in Iraq and other countries who have expressed support for the insurgencyshould condemn the targeting of civilians, all acts that put civilians unnecessarily at riskand the mistreatment of those in custody.By documenting these abuses, Human Rights Watch is challenging the disregard forinternational law endorsed by some insurgent groups in Iraq. Regardless of the violationscommitted by U.S. and Iraqi forces, almost daily attacks on civilians have had adevastating impact on the people of Iraq and further undermine respect for the rule oflaw.
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The VictimsThe exact number of civilians killed by unlawful insurgent attacks since the fall ofBaghdad in April 2003 is unknown. The chaos of the conflict, the partial functioning ofIraqi institutions and the unwillingness of the United States to keep statistics on civiliandeaths make accurate statistics very difficult to obtain. Still, all evidence suggests thatinsurgent attacks in Iraq have killed many more civilians than combatants.The report divides the civilian victims of insurgent attacks into nine categories, althoughthese often overlap. First are attacks on members of Iraq’s various religious and ethnicgroups. Some insurgent groups have struck Shi`a Muslim shrines in Karbala and Najafwith massive bombs, killing hundreds, as well as Shi`a mosques and funeral services incities like Mosul and Baghdad. Insurgents have attacked Kurdish civilians, most severelyin February 2004, when twin suicide bombers killed ninety-nine people in Arbil. Andsome groups have victimized Iraq’s small Christian community through churchbombings, abductions and murders, forcing tens of thousands of Christians to fleeabroad or to the relative security of the Kurdish-controlled north.In the eyes of some insurgent groups, Shi`a Muslims, Kurds and Christians are legitimatetargets because they believe them to have sided with theoccupying forces in Iraq, or to be supporting the current Iraqigovernment. To the extreme Islamist groups like al-Qaeda inIraq, the Shi`a are apostates who have betrayed Islam. Kurdishfighters fought alongside U.S. forces in 2003, and the Kurdishpershmerga remain close to the Multi-National Force. Andsome attacks may be motivated by long-standing tensionbetween the religious and ethnic groups, and the struggle forA mother hugs her sonoutside a morgue in al-Najaf.power in post-Saddam Iraq. None of these arguments orTwo car bombs exploded onexplanations justifies attacks on civilians within these groups.August 29, 2003, killing upA second targeted category is Iraqis who work for foreign� 2003 Zohra Bensemra/governments or their armed forces as reconstructionREUTERScontractors, translators, cleaners, and drivers or in other non-combatant jobs. Some insurgent groups consider Iraqis inthese positions to be collaborators, and attacks against them are apparently meant aspunishment and as a warning to others. In one case documented in this report, gunmenkilled three women as they left a U.S. military base in Mosul where they worked ascleaners, and attacks like this have been frequent across Iraq.to eighty-seven people,including AyatollahMuhammad Baqir al-Hakim.
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Third is Iraqis holding government or political posts. The list of assassinations is long,with victims from most of the major parties that have formally entered politics since2003. Included in this group are members of the Iraqi Interim Government and electionworkers who were murdered while trying to organize the January 2005 election.A fourth category is civilians who are waiting to sign up for the Iraqi police or armedforces, which have frequently been the target of car bomb and suicide bomb attacksoutside recruitment centers. As they are not yet members of the security forces norcivilians actively participating in hostilities, they are not legitimate military targets underinternational humanitarian law.A fifth category is staff of international and nongovernmental organizations, some ofwhich have been active in Iraq since before the war. The most deadly attacks were thetruck bombs that exploded at the United Nations (U.N.) headquarters in August 2003and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Baghdad headquarters inOctober that same year. Insurgent groups have threatened and sometimes killedhumanitarian aid workers, most of them Iraqis. Almost all international humanitarianorganizations have left Iraq for security reasons, severely limiting the aid they canprovide a population in need.A sixth category is journalists and media workers. Some insurgent groups have bombedmedia offices and targeted journalists with abductions and executions. The vast majorityof victims are Iraqis who worked as local journalists or as reporters, drivers, cameramenand translators for international media, but foreign journalists have also lost their lives.The seventh category is Iraq’s intellectuals and professionals, including doctors, lawyersand academics. Armed groups have abducted between 160 and 300 Iraqi doctors sinceApril 2003, and killed more than twenty-five, the Iraqi Ministry of Health concluded inApril 2005. They have murdered at least forty-eight professors since mid-2003, a UnitedNations study said. Some of the abductions and killings may be criminally motivatedbecause the victims were considered to have more money to pay in ransom. But somekillings appear politically motivated, either because the victim had expressed sympathyfor the U.S.-led intervention or had criticized the insurgency, or because the person wasbelieved to hold such views. According to some Iraqis, the attacks are an attempt todestroy the country’s intellectual elite.The eighth category is women. Many women have been attacked because of theirparticipation in the categories mentioned above—in their roles as politicians, civilservants, journalists and humanitarian aid workers, as well as for their work as cleaners
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or translators for foreign governments or militaries. But some insurgent groups haveattacked women’s rights activists and Iraqi women for what they consider “immoral” or“un-Islamic” behavior, like promoting women’s rights, socializing with men or notcovering their heads in public. The violence and lack of security has had a major impacton Iraqi women, who once enjoyed a public role in the country’s social and political life.The ninth and final category is non-Iraqi nationals, including drivers, businesspeople,contractors, journalists, diplomats, humanitarian workers and others in civilian jobs.Since April 2003, insurgent groups have abducted more than 200 non-Iraqis from atleast twenty-two countries, killing at least fifty-two. An estimated forty-three people aremissing. The goal is often to pressure the victim’s government or company intowithdrawing from Iraq, or obtaining other concessions, such as the release of prisoners.A common motivation is money; non-Iraqis are targeted because of the ransom that theinsurgents, or a criminal group, hope to extract.Victims of insurgent attacks may be from overlapping categories, and the precise reasonfor their being targeted is not always clear. Some Christians and Kurds, for example,might have been killed because of their religion or ethnicity, or because they worked forthe U.S. military. Insurgent groups might have targeted Shi`a Muslim leaders because oftheir religious or political importance, or because they were participating in the Iraqigoverning structures. Certain women may have been targeted for their occupation asmuch as for their gender. Lastly, many Iraqis have lost their lives in attacks targetedagainst others because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time.Finally, Iraqi insurgents are not just committing war crimes against civilians, but alsoagainst the Multi-National and Iraqi forces. One chapter of the report documentsmistreatment and executions, sometimes by beheading, of multinational and Iraqi forcestaken into custody by insurgent groups. In addition, many insurgent attacks on legitimatemilitary targets have been carried out using perfidy, usually by pretending to be civiliansin order to carry out a suicide attack.
Insurgent GroupsThe term “insurgency” is used to describe a spectrum of armed opposition groups inIraq with different structures and strategies, although they are united by commonimmediate goals: to expel the U.S.-led military coalition from Iraq and to overthrow thecurrent Iraqi government. Determining who is who is difficult, if not impossible, withdozens if not hundreds of groups engaged in military activity, and many unverifiableclaims of responsibility. As such, this report presents a general overview of theinsurgency without details on the specific groups.
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The insurgent groups covered in this report are comprised predominantly of SunniArabs, who make up approximately 20 percent of Iraq’s population, and their activitiesare focused in the country’s center, northwest and west. Individuals apparently join theinsurgency for a variety of reasons: a desire to expel foreign forces from Iraq, fear ofmarginalization by a Shi`a-dominated government after decades of Sunni control and astruggle over strategic areas like Kirkuk. Some view the insurgency as part of a globalIslamic fight against the United States. Others may join as a way to survive during a timeof high unemployment. At the same time, many Sunni support the insurgents or theiraims without joining their ranks. And untold other Sunni oppose the insurgents or theirmeans, even publicly condemning attacks on civilians, and have themselves beenattacked.The insurgency can be divided very broadly into three general categories: extremeIslamist, Ba`thist and Sunni nationalist. As with the victims, the categories of armedgroups overlap. The groups in the extreme Islamist category have generated the mostattention due to prominent operations that have intentionally killed many civilians. Thebest known of these groups are Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam), a Kurdish groupthat existed before the war, Ansar al-Sunna (Supporters of the Sunni) and al-Qaeda inMesopotamia, apparently run by Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian. These groupshave claimed responsibility for detonating car bombs and suicide bombs in crowdedcivilian areas, abducting businessmen, contractors and journalists, and executing captiveIraqi police and soldiers, sometimes by distributing grisly videos of their deaths. Ingeneral, these groups say they seek a pure Islamic state, with legal and institutionalstructures based on strict interpretation of the Qur’an. For them, the armed conflict inIraq is part of a global war they termjihadagainst the imperialism and military aggressionof the United States and corrupt, un-Islamic dictatorships in the Arab world. Foreignfighters from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Kuwait and Jordan have joined the fight,although their numbers in Iraq are unclear. Less than 5 percent of the killed or capturedinsurgents have been non-Iraqi, a coalition official said in spring 2005.The second general category is linked to Saddam Hussein’s ousted Ba`th Party.Apparently led and funded by former members of the Iraqi security structures, groupslike Saddam’s Fedayin (Saddam’s Martyrs), al-`Awda (The Return) and Wahaj al-`Iraq(Flame of Iraq) have staged attacks against multinational and Iraqi government forces.They are also responsible for targeted killings and attacks on military targets, such aswith roadside bombs, that failed to distinguish between combatants and civilians, orcaused disproportionate civilian casualties. Available evidence suggests they have notbeen responsible for many of the suicide bomb attacks on civilians and the summaryexecutions of captured members of the security forces, although they may cooperatewith or fund groups responsible for such crimes. Some of the groups in this category
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have a desire to see their old leader return, but others apparently have no currentconnection with Saddam Hussein.The third general category is what some analysts call nationalist, or Sunni nationalist,comprised mostly of Sunni Arabs who wish to expel foreign forces from Iraq, but arenot as driven by religion or ties to the Ba`th Party. Some of these groups say they wantan Iraq guided by Islamic principles, but they do not share the vision of the extremeIslamist groups. Compared to groups like Ansar al-Sunna and al-Qaeda in Iraq, thesegroups apparently limit their attacks more to military targets, and some, like the al-Jabhaal-Islamiyya al-`Iraqiyya al-Muqawima (Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance) have attimes condemned attacks on civilians. However, some of these groups are also believedto have abducted civilians or targeted them for attack.These three categories are not strictly defined, as religious and nationalist groups blend,and they are not meant to neatly classify insurgent groups as better or worse with respectto their compliance with the laws of war. The al-Jaysh al-Islami fi al-`Iraq (Islamic Armyin Iraq), for instance, is a predominantly Sunni nationalist group with a strong Islamicbent. It has apparently not carried out car bomb or suicide bomb attacks on civilians, butit has repeatedly claimed responsibility for abductions and summary executions ofcivilians. Some Ba`th-affiliated groups, although stemming from a secular party, areapparently cooperating with and funding some of the Islamist groups.The vast majority of insurgents are Sunni Arabs, but other armed groups operate in Iraq,including Shi`a Muslim groups. Among these groups is the al-Mahdi Army, led by theShi`a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Badr Organization of the Supreme Council of theIslamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Credible information received by Human RightsWatch indicates that these groups are responsible for kidnappings, torture andassassinations, including revenge attacks against persons associated with the formergovernment or Ba`th Party. However, their actions are not considered in this reportbecause they are currently not engaged in hostilities against multinational or Iraqigovernment forces, and as such do not form part of the insurgency.Lastly, not all abductions and killings of civilians in Iraq that appear linked to insurgentgroups are their doing. Common crime is rampant throughout Iraq. Criminals masked asinsurgents have abducted people for ransom or for sale to insurgent groups. Likewise,some insurgent groups apparently engage in common crimes, such as kidnapping androbbery, to obtain funds for their military operations. In the lawlessness of today’s Iraq,the line between the political and criminal is often blurred.
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Arguments of Insurgent GroupsThe insurgent groups in Iraq that target civilians use two broad arguments to justify theiracts. First, they contend that persons in any way supporting the Multi-National Force inIraq—which they believe remains a foreign occupation—are not civilians entitled toprotection because of their collaboration with the United States and its coalition. Thisincludes Iraqis employed as translators, drivers and construction contractors for foreigngovernments and Shi`a Muslims, Kurds and Christians, because these groups have ingeneral supported the military invasion that overthrew the Saddam Hussein government.Because many insurgent groups believe the current Iraqi government is serving theforeign occupation, politicians, government officials and bureaucrats are also targeted.Westerners by definition are considered part of the foreign presence, thus variousinsurgent groups target foreign officials, including diplomats, western journalists and aidworkers.Second, insurgent groups contend that the nature of the armed conflict in Iraq, ratherthan the identity of the victims, permits attacks on civilians. The arguments of insurgentgroups include:••in a war to drive foreign occupiers out of Iraq, the ends justify the means;in a war against the military superpower of the world, an insurgency with smallarms and explosives is obliged to go after non-military, or so-called “soft”targets;insurgent groups are bound only by Islamic law, and not internationalhumanitarian law;Islamic law allows the killing of civilians in a war of self-defense;the illegality of the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, as well as violations of the laws ofwar by the Multi-National Force, remove any obligation on insurgent groups toabide by the laws of war.
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None of these justifications are defensible under international law. The armed conflict inIraq is regulated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary internationalhumanitarian law. This law applies to both government armed forces and oppositionarmed groups, regardless of whether the forces to the conflict recognize the law. Thelaws of war are applicable whether the war is lawful or not, and regardless of violationsby the other side. Reprisals are banned.
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As described in the chapter on legal standards, international humanitarian law prohibitsdirect attacks against civilians at any time and for whatever reason. It also bans attacksthat do not discriminate between civilians and combatants and attacks that causedisproportionate harm to civilians in light of the expected military gain. So long as acivilian is not taking a “direct part in hostilities,” a concept discussed in the report, he orshe is immune from attack. Although there are gray areas regarding whether certainconduct constitutes direct participation in hostilities, the conduct of the victims whosecases are documented in this report were unambiguously civilian in nature.Serious violations of international humanitarian law are war crimes. All those taking partin unlawful attacks or are liable as a matter of command responsibility are subject toprosecution. Crimes committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against acivilian population are considered crimes against humanity under international law, andthose responsible are subject to prosecution anywhere in the world.
Violations by U.S. and Iraqi Government ForcesResponsibility for the abuses documented in this report rests with the perpetrators.However, the U.S. and Iraqi governments have committed violations of the laws of warthat raise serious doubts about their stated commitment to promoting the rule of law inIraq. The torture and humiliation of detainees by U.S. forces at Abu Ghraib and otherdetention centers, the unjustified killing of civilians at U.S. military checkpoints andduring U.S. military operations, and the long-term detention without charge of personsapprehended, contribute to widespread disdain for the foreign military presence amongordinary Iraqis, whatever their views about an invasion that left tens of thousands ofIraqis dead but toppled the abusive government of Saddam Hussein.The U.S.-backed Iraqi government has committed arbitrary arrests and systematictorture against persons in detention, while militias linked to political parties in thegovernment have been implicated in abductions, torture and assassinations. The fact thatthe Iraqi police and armed forces are under regular attack from insurgent groups doesnot absolve the government of its obligation to respect international law in its lawenforcement and counter-insurgency operations.Such abuses contribute to the general lawlessness in Iraq and provide a handy ifillegitimate rationale for the insurgents to commit abuses of their own. If the U.S. andIraqi governments are sincere about establishing the rule of law in Iraq, ensuring respectfor that law among their own forces is an important place to start.
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MethodologyThis report is based on research in January-February 2005 in Kurdish-controllednorthern Iraq, where Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed twenty-nine victimsand witnesses of insurgent attacks. The researchers interviewed three more victims andinternational humanitarian organizations during a subsequent week in Amman, Jordan.Security conditions prohibited travel to Iraq’s center or south and, as such, the report’svictim testimony is weighted towards people in the north, although some of thoseinterviewed had fled from Baghdad. The full names of some interviewees are not usedfor their protection. Reports from established Iraqi and international media arefrequently used, but only when two or more sources exist.II. RecommendationsAll armed forces in Iraq—insurgent groups, Iraqi forces and the U.S.-led Multi-NationalForce—are bound to respect international humanitarian law, or the laws of war. The lawimposes on these warring parties legal obligations to reduce unnecessary suffering and toprotect civilians and other non-combatants.Previous Human Rights Watch reports have documented abuses by the U.S. and Iraqigovernments, and made recommendations to address those abuses.2
In this report, Human Rights Watch calls on insurgent groups active in Iraqto:•Cease all attacks against civilians, the civilian population and civilian objects,both Iraqi and non-Iraqi. Civil servants, politicians, religious leaders,humanitarian aid workers, journalists and civilian employees of foreigngovernments are immune from attack;Cease all attacks that do not discriminate between combatants and civilians, andattacks that cause harm to civilians or civilian objects that is excessive in relationto the anticipated military advantage;
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Other relevant Human Rights Watch reports on Iraq are:Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture ofIraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division,September 2005;Getting Away with Torture:Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of Detainees,April 2005;The New Iraq: Torture and Ill-treatment ofDetainees in Iraqi Custody,January 2005;Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq,August 2004;The Road To Abu Ghraib,June 2004;Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualtiesin Iraq,December 2003;Hearts and Minds: Post-war Civilian Casualties in Baghdad by U.S. Forces,October2003;Climate of Fear: Sexual Violence and Abduction of Women and Girls in Baghdad,July 2003;ViolentResponse: the U.S. Army in al-Falluja,June 2003; andBasra: Crime and Insecurity Under British Occupation,June 2003.
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Take all feasible precautionary measures during military operations to verify thatobjectives to be attacked are not civilian but military, and take all feasibleprecautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid or minimizeharm to civilians and civilian objects;Take all necessary steps to ensure that insurgent group members understand andrespect the obligation to protect civilians and captured combatants;Refrain from an attack when it becomes apparent the objective or target is not amilitary one or where civilian loss would be disproportionate;Give special attention to the potential of civilian harm when operating inresidential areas;Cease any and all abductions and hostage taking of civilians. All civilianscurrently in detention should be released;Treat all detainees from the multinational and Iraqi forces humanely. Prohibitand prevent the execution, torture and other ill-treatment of detainees; andDiscipline or expel fighters or commanders who unlawfully detain or mistreatany person in custody, or who target civilians or use indiscriminate ordisproportionate force that unnecessarily harms civilians.
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Human Rights Watch calls on political, cultural and religious leaders inIraq and other countries who have expressed support for the insurgencyto:••••Publicly condemn the abduction and hostage-taking of Iraqi and non-Iraqicivilians by any insurgent group;Publicly condemn any insurgent group for targeted attacks against civilians andcivilian objects;Publicly condemn any insurgent group for indiscriminate attacks or attackscausing disproportionate civilian casualties; andPublicly condemn any insurgent group for the mistreatment of those in itscustody.
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III. Insurgent Groups in IraqThe word “insurgency” is used to describe the many groups that have taken up armsagainst foreign forces in Iraq and the new Iraqi security forces since April 2003. Butthese groups—it is unclear how many exist—are varied and diverse, with shiftingallegiances, configurations, funding sources, strategies and aims. They share a commongoal of ending the foreign military presence in Iraq. Many would like to replace thecurrent Iraqi government, considered illegitimate because it is backed by the UnitedStates or because it is dominated by Shi`a Muslims and Kurds. Most importantly for thisreport, the insurgent groups appear to have different views on the conduct of hostilitiesand the legitimate targets of military attack.Certain insurgent groups have repeatedly admitted, even boasted, about their role inabductions, summary executions, attacks on religious or ethnic groups, and suicidebombings in populated areas. Videos they produce of beheadings leave no doubt as totheir responsibility for the most serious crimes of war. Other groups have concentratedtheir attacks more on military targets, though they still may be responsible for unlawfulattacks against civilians. Some insurgent groups have at times condemned attacks oncivilians, both Iraqi and foreign. This is not to suggest that insurgent groups can bedivided neatly according to their respect for international humanitarian law. The fluidalliances, apparent sub-contracting and generally clandestine nature of the insurgencymake these distinctions difficult, if not impossible, to make.The insurgent groups covered in this report are comprised predominantly of SunniArabs, who make up approximately 20 percent of Iraq’s population, and their activitiesare focused in the country’s center, northwest and west. Different members of thecommunity, of course, have different views of the insurgency. Some oppose theinsurgency generally, or the way it is being conducted, while others have not joined theinsurgency but support its aims. Sunni who criticize the insurgency or are seen as alliedwith the new government risk themselves becoming a target of insurgent groups.3
On July 19, 2005, for example, unknown gunmen in Baghdad killed Mijbil Shaikh al-`Issa, a Sunnirepresentative on the Constitution Drafting Committee of the Transitional National Assembly, Dahmen al-Jabouri, an adviser to the Committee, and their driver. (Alissa J. Rubin, “Sunni Arabs Halt Work on ConstitutionAfter Killings,”Los Angeles Times,July 21, 2005.) On August 19, 2005, insurgents in Mosul abducted andexecuted three members of the largest Sunni Arab political party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, as they were puttingup posters that urged Sunnis to vote in a referendum for a new constitution planned for October 2005. (“IraqiSunni Party Workers Killed”,BBC,August 19, 2005, available athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4167304.stm, as of August 19, 2005.)
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Those who join insurgent groups apparently do so for a variety of reasons: a desire toexpel foreign forces from Iraq, fear of marginalization by a Shi`a-dominated governmentafter decades of Sunni control and a struggle over strategic areas like Kirkuk. Some viewthe insurgency as part of a global Islamic fight against the United States. The membersinclude former officials of the government and security forces who lost their jobs afterthe Saddam Hussein government fell in 2003, as well as Ba`th Party members. Othersjoined out of anger over war crimes committed by U.S. forces or the Multi-NationalForce’s perceived disrespect for Iraqi culture and institutions. And some appear to havejoined or participated in specific attacks as a way to earn money.4As head of Iraqiintelligence Maj. Gen. Muhammad `Abdullah al-Shahwani said in January 2005, “peopleare fed up with no security, no electricity, people feel they have to do something.”5In general, the insurgent groups operating in Iraq can be divided into three basiccategories, although these categories overlap. First are the groups dedicated to a pureIslamist philosophy. The three major groups in this category are a Kurdish group Ansaral-Islam (Supporters of Islam), Ansar al-Sunna (Supporters of the Sunna) and al-Qaedain Iraq, apparently led by the Jordanian Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, and also known asJama`at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War) or al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafidain (al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia). Ansar al-Islam existed before the war6and hasapparently merged with Ansar al-Sunna which, like the other extreme Islamist groups,was formed after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.7The groups’ immediate goal is to end theforeign military presence in Iraq and to topple the U.S.-backed Iraqi government. Drivenby a puritanical interpretation of Islam, they wish to establish an Islamic state governedby a literal interpretation of shari`a (Islamic law).8They see the armed conflict in Iraq aspart of a global war against imperialism and military aggression by the United States andcorrupt, un-Islamic dictatorships in the Arab world. An undetermined number offoreign fighters from countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan and Yemen haveSee James Glanz, “Rings That Kidnap Iraqis Thrive on Big Threats and Bigger Profits,”New York Times,March 28, 2005, Monte Morin, “Crime as Lethal as Warfare in Iraq,”Los Angeles Times,March 20, 2005, AliRifaat and Hala Jaber, “Kidnap Gangs Force Doctors to Flee Iraq,”The Times,June 5, 2005, and HishamMohammed, “Insurgency Provides Financial Lure,”IWPR,June 21, 2005.564
“Iraq Battling More Than 200,000 Insurgents: Intelligence Chief,”Agence France-Presse,January 3, 2005.
Ansar al-Islam began fighting the two principal secular Kurdish parties in 2001. U.S. forces destroyed thegroup’s bases during the 2003 air war on Iraq, killing some members and forcing others to disperse. Forbackground on the group, see Human Rights Watch Backgrounder,Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan,availableat www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/ansarbk020503.htm.According to one press account, Ansar al-Sunna was established five months after the U.S. entered Iraq. In itsfirst statement to the press on September 20, 2003, the group said, “It is known that jihad in Iraq has becomean individual duty of every Muslim after the atheist enemy assailed the territory of Islam.” (Dr. Hani al-Siba’i,“Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunnah Army, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, and Abu-Hafs Brigades,” posted March 14,2004, on al-Basra Net, translated byFBISReport in Arabic, March 14, 2004.See the website of Jama`at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, in Arabic, available at http://www.tawhed.ws/, as ofSeptember 26, 2005.87
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14
entered Iraq to join the fight, and some sources say these foreign fighters are responsiblefor the most deadly suicide bomb attacks.9These groups are responsible for many of the war crimes and crimes against humanitydocumented in this report. All three groups mentioned above have repeatedly claimedresponsibility for targeted attacks on civilians and the executions of civilians andcaptured security force personnel. They have broadcast videos of kidnap victims andexecutions. In one example from August 2004, photos and a video appeared on awebsite associated with Ansar al-Sunna that showed the execution of twelve Nepalesecleaners and cooks, including one beheading. The group, which had previously claimedresponsibility for the abduction, executed the workers because they “came from theircountry to fight the Muslims and to serve the Jews and the Christians,” a statementsaid.10Al-Qaeda in Iraq has also broadcast the beheadings of captured Iraqi soldiers andpolice, as well as foreigners.The second general category comprises insurgent groups connected in some way to theformer government under Saddam Hussein or his Ba`th Party. According to Iraqi andforeign analysts, the leaders are mostly former members of the Iraqi security orintelligence structures who have organizational and military skills, and some of them mayhave prepared for the insurgency before the 2003 invasion began.11Despite comingfrom a secular party, some groups apparently cooperate with Islamist groups, either byproviding funding or participating in joint operations.12Some of these groups have anapparent allegiance to Saddam Hussein, like al-`Awda (The Return), Wahaj al-`Iraq(Flame of Iraq), Jaysh Mujahidi al-`Iraq (Mujahadin of Iraq Army) and Saddam’s Fedayin
See Ahmed Hashim, “Foreign Involvement in the Iraqi Insurgency,”Jamestown Foundation,Terrorism Monitor,Volume 2, Issue 16, August 12, 2004, available athttp://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?search=1&volume_id=400&issue_id=3047&article_id=2368398, as of September 23, 2005, and Patrick Quinn and Katherine Shrader, “Foreigners Blamed for Iraq SuicideAttacks,”Associated Press,July 1, 2005.“Nepalese Hostages Killed in Iraq,”BBC,August 31, 2004, available athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3614866.stm, as of June 22, 2004, and “Militants Kill 12 Nepal Hostages,”CNN,August 31, 2004, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/08/31/iraq.main/, as of June 22,2005, and Stephen Farrell and Charles Bremner, “Hostage Fears After Mass Killing,”The Times,September 1,2004, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1240841,00.html, as of June 22, 2005.See Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “Who Kills Hostages in Iraq,”al-Zawra,September 19, 2004, and“What is Driving the Iraqi Insurgency,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 20, 2005, available athttp://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=8117, as of June 19, 2005. In one example, a January 2005 statementannouncing the existence of the Mujahadin of Iraq Army said the group had veteran officers and soldiers.(“Saddam Hussain Loyalists Said to Have Formed ‘Mujahadin of Iraq Army,’”BBC Monitoring Middle East,excerpt from report by `Usamah Mahdi, “International Information Centre to Guide Iraqi Voters Abroad. SaddamLoyalists Establish ‘Mujahidin of Iraq Army,’” published byElaphwebsite on January 7, 2005.)12See, Rod Nordland, Tom Masland and Christopher Dickey, “Unmasking the Insurgents,”Newsweek,February7, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6885867/site/newsweek/, as of August 19, 2005.1110
9
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(Saddam’s Martyrs), but others seem to have distanced themselves from their formerleader.13Some of these groups have targeted civilians for abductions and executions.The third category is what some analysts call nationalist, or Sunni nationalist, comprisedmostly of Sunni Arabs who for a variety of reasons are fighting to expel foreign forcesfrom Iraq, but are not as driven by religious doctrine or former government ties. Theinsurgents in this category are often local, regional or tribally based, who have taken uparms in a specific area to, in their view, defend the population from aggression byforeign troops. Others conduct actions in larger areas across Iraq’s center and north inorder to end the presence of foreign military troops in Iraq. These include members ofthe former government and military who were dismissed after the fall of the governmentin 2003 or people who fear a Shi`a and Kurdish dominated government in Iraq. Othersjoined out of anger at violations by the U.S. and other coalition forces that resulted inIraqi civilian deaths and property destruction. Some of these groups say they want anIraq guided by Islamic principles, but they do not share the vision of the Islamist groups.Compared to the extreme Islamist groups, these groups generally appear to limit theirattacks to military targets, and some have condemned attacks on civilians.These three categories are not strictly defined, as religious and nationalist goals blend,and some groups are not easily categorized. The al-Jaysh al-Islami fi al-`Iraq (IslamicArmy in Iraq), for instance, is a predominantly Sunni nationalist group with a strongIslamic bent, but not along extreme puritanical lines.14It has apparently avoided directattacks on civilians with car bombs and suicide bombs, but it has repeatedly claimedresponsibility for abducting and executing civilians.15Groups like Jaysh Muhammad(Muhammad’s Army) and al-Rayat al-Bayda (White Flags) apparently want an Iraqguided by Islamic law, but claim they are less willing to target Iraqi civilians to achievethat goal.16Some Ba`th-affiliated groups, although stemming from a secular party, havecooperated with some of the extreme Islamist groups.
13
One Iraqi newspaper report said Saddam’s Fedayin might have abandoned its support of the former leader.(Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “Who Kills Hostages in Iraq,”al-Zawra,September 19, 2004.)
See “Hostage Takers Widen Demands Beyond Iraqi Affairs,”Agence France-Presse,August 29, 2004, andMahan Abedin, “Post-Election Terrorist Trends in Iraq,”Jamestown Foundation,Terrorism Monitor, Volume 3,Issue 5, March 11, 2005.A video broadcast by the Islamic Army in Iraq in April 2005 showed the execution of a Bulgarian pilot from acivilian helicopter the group had shot down. (“US Military Probes Iraq Chopper Crash,”Agence France-Presse,April 22, 2005, and Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Robert F. Worth, “A Private Copter Crashes in Iraq,”New YorkTimes,April 22, 2005.)1615
14
For an interview with a Muhammad’s Army spokesman, see Ali Kais al-Rubai, “Islamists Pledge ContinuedWar on Coalition,”IWPR,May 14, 2004, available at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_63_1_eng.txt,as of June 22, 2005.
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As noted, most insurgent groups are comprised of Sunni Arabs, who held most of theimportant political, economic and social positions in Iraq during and before the SaddamHussein government. But some Shi`a Muslims have also joined these groups. Shi`amilitias exist as well, most notably the al-Mahdi Army run by the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr,which fought U.S. forces in Najaf in August 2004, and the Badr Organization of theSCIRI political party. Both groups have been implicated in threats and violence againstcivilians, particularly revenge attacks against officials from the previous Iraqi governmentor Ba`th Party. Because they are not currently engaged in hostilities against multinationalor Iraqi forces, and are therefore not insurgent groups, they are not covered in thisreport.17Accurate information on the three general insurgent categories outlined above is difficultto obtain. New insurgent groups claim responsibility for armed attacks on a regularbasis, and it is impossible to verify if they are coordinated organizations or groups ofneighborhood friends. Some statements turn out to be false.18According to senior Kurdish intelligence and security officials interviewed by HumanRights Watch, the groups are often organized in small cells with one leader, known astheemir(prince), who orders operations. The groups’ over-all leaders sometimes learnonly later about an attack after the fact. New groups form and dissolve with regularity,establishing new structures and alliances. And some groups change their name to givethe impression that more groups exist.19One English-language article on the insurgencyand mass media concluded that the confusing names “may reveal a tactic designed togive the impression that the Islamist elements are more numerous than the otherfactions.”20Similarly, it is not possible to determine accurately the number of insurgents in Iraq. OnNovember 13, 2003, head of U.S. Central Command Gen. John Abizaid said the number17
For a detailed description of abuses by Iraqi government-affiliated militias, see Anthony Shadid and SteveFainaru, “Militias on the Rise Across Iraq,”Washington Post,August 21, 2005.
In the August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters, for example, three groups claimedresponsibility for the attack (see chapter VIII of this report, “Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations and theU.N.”). In the case of the two Italian humanitarian aid workers, Simona Pari and Simona Toretta, abducted inBaghdad on September 7, 2004, a group calling itself the Islamic Jihad Organization in Iraq said on September22 that it had killed the two women. The next day, another group, the Supporters of al-Zawahri, said it hadbeheaded the Italians. The women’s captors eventually released them both unharmed. (See Nadia Abou el-Magd, “Militants Claim to Have Killed Italians,”Associated Press,September 23, 2004.)19
18
Human Rights Watch interviews with Kurdish intelligence and security officials in Arbil and Sulaimaniyya,January 2005.
20
See Ibrahim al-Marashi, “Iraq’s Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media and the Iraqi Insurgency,”MiddleEast Review of International Affairs,Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2004.
17
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of “actively armed” people operating against U.S. and coalition forces did not exceed5,000 people.21Eleven months later, American officials said the “hard-core resistance”numbered between 8,000 and 12,000 people, and this number grew to more than 20,000with active sympathizers and covert accomplices.22In January 2005, head of Iraqiintelligence Major General Muhammad `Abdullah al-Shahwani claimed “the resistance isbigger than the U.S. military in Iraq.” He put the number at 200,000, but that includedsympathizers as well as active fighters.23The number of foreign insurgents in Iraq is also impossible to obtain, with men comingand going on a regular basis through Iraq’s porous border, mostly with Syria.24According to a May 2005 estimate by the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C.,Iraq had 1,000 foreign fighters (as part of an insurgency with 16,000 members).25Inspring 2005, a coalition official in Baghdad told the press that fewer than 5 percent ofthe killed or captured insurgents have been non-Iraqi.26More recently, Gen. Abizaid saidthe number of foreign fighters was going up: “I believe there are more foreign fighterscoming into Iraq than there were six months ago,” he told the U.S. Congress on June 23,although the overall strength of the insurgency was “about the same.”27Lastly, criminal elements play an important role. The absence of law and order,particularly in Baghdad and other cities, has created a fertile environment for criminalgangs, some of which use Islamist or political cover to mask their illegal intent. A largepercentage of abductions, for example, appear to be committed by criminal gangslooking for ransom cash.28Their targets are sometimes foreigners, but the majority ofvictims are wealthy Iraqis or those who work with foreign organizations or companies.According to a study by the Iraqi Ministry of Health concluded in April 2005, criminalgangs have abducted between 160 and 300 Iraqi doctors since April 2003, and killed
2122
Will Dunham, “U.S. Estimates Iraqi Resistance Forces at 5,000,”Reuters,November 13, 2003.
Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,”New York Times,October 22, 2004.“Iraq Battling More Than 200,000 Insurgents: Intelligence Chief,”Agence France-Presse,January 3, 2005.
2324
For a detailed account of fighter smuggling from Syria, see Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Outside Iraq but Deep in theFight; A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria’s Influential, Changing Role,”Washington Post,June 8, 2005.Michael E. O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, “The State of Iraq: an Update,”New York Times,June 3, 2005. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom made a similar estimate inOctober 2004, but with a total insurgency figure of 18,000. (The Military Balance 2004/05, International Institutefor Strategic Studies, October 19, 2004.)Carol J. Williams, “Suicide Attacks Emerge as Weapon of Choice,”Los Angeles Times,June 1, 2005.Liz Sidoti, “Top Commander Says Insurgency Still Strong,”Associated Press,June 23, 2005.
25
262728
See James Glanz, “Rings That Kidnap Iraqis Thrive on Big Threats and Bigger Profits,”New York Times,March 28, 2005, Monte Morin, “Crime as Lethal as Warfare in Iraq,”Los Angeles Times,March 20, 2005, and“Filipino Returns Home After Hostage Ordeal in Iraq,” Reuters, June 23, 2005.
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more than twenty-five. Nearly 1,000 doctors have fled the country, with an average ofthirty more following each month.29According to some reports, insurgent groups exploit Iraq’s poverty and highunemployment rates by paying Iraqis to stage attacks.30Detonating an improvisedexplosive device pays up to $200, one U.S. security expert said, and killing an Americanpays up to $1,000.31In some cases, criminal groups have reportedly sold kidnap victimsto insurgent groups.
Attacks on CiviliansThe number of civilians killed in Iraq is unknown. The chaos of the conflict, the partialfunctioning of Iraqi institutions and the unwillingness of the Multi-National Force tokeep statistics on civilians casualties make accurate numbers very difficult to obtain.32Inaddition, not all civilian deaths resulted from a violation of international humanitarianlaw.According to the U.K.-based Iraq Body Count, the media reported 24,865 civilian deathsattributed to the fighting between March 2003 and March 2005.33In November 2004, agroup of public health experts reported in the British medical journalThe Lancetthat themortality rate in Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion was 1.5 times higher than the rate priorto the invasion (and 2.5 times higher when they included statistics from al-Falluja, whichincurred heavy fighting in April and November 2004). Based on a door-to-door surveyof 988 Iraqi households, the report estimated there were 98,000 “excess deaths” after the
2930
Ali Rifaat and Hala Jaber, “Kidnap Gangs Force Doctors to Flee Iraq,”The Times,June 5, 2005.
Hisham Mohammed, “Insurgency Provides Financial Lure,”IWPR,June 21, 2005, available athttp://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_129_1_eng.txt, as of June 22, 2005.
31
“What is Driving the Iraqi Insurgency,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 20, 2005, availablehttp://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=8117, as of June 19, 2005.In response to a Human Rights Watch request in 2003 for information about civilian casualties, the Multi-National Force’s press office replied:It is tragic that civilians have died as a result of our operations and we are fully aware that everytime a civilian is caught in the line of coalition fire, we potentially lose allies among the Iraqipopulation. In terms of statistics, we have no definitive estimates of civilian casualties for the overallcampaign. It would be irresponsible to give firm estimates given the wide range of variables. Forexample, we have had cases where during a conflict, we believed civilians had been wounded andperhaps killed, but by the time our forces have a chance to fully assess the outcomes of thecontact, the wounded or dead civilians have been removed from the scene. Factors such as thismake it impossible for us to maintain an accurate account.(E-mail sent to Human Rights Watch from Multi-National Force press office on September 29, 2003.)
32
33
Iraq Body Count,A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003-2005,July 19, 2005. See www.iraqbodycount.net. Thelist of media sources is on the report’s methodology page.
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war began (again without counting al-Falluja). From those “excess deaths,” 24 percentresulted from violence (51 percent including al-Falluja). The survey did not distinguishbetween military and civilian deaths, and it did not address whether the deaths resultedfrom violations of international humanitarian law.34The Iraqi government has made a number of pronouncements on civilian casualtiesattributed to insurgent attacks, but the accuracy of their claims is impossible to confirm.In April 2005, Iraq’s Minister of Human Rights said insurgents had killed 6,000 civiliansand wounded 16,000 over the previous two years.35Two months later, Iraq’s InteriorMinister said insurgents had killed 12,000 civilians in 2004 and the first half of 2005,although government officials later said this figure was an estimate.36The Iraqi InteriorMinistry later gave more precise figures, claiming that insurgents had killed 8,175 Iraqicivilians and police officers between August 2004 and May 2005. The ministry did notprovide a breakdown of civilians versus police.37The Iraqi government released updated figures in July 2005, based on information fromthe ministries of health, interior and defense. In the first six months of 2005, thegovernment said, civilian deaths from bombings, assassinations and armed clashes withinsurgents totaled 1,594. During this time insurgents killed 895 members of the Iraqisecurity forces (275 soldiers and 620 police).38Again, not all civilian deaths reflectviolations of the laws of war.
Purpose of Attacks on CiviliansInsurgent groups in Iraq claim they attack civilians to achieve various aims, includingpressuring foreign governments, discouraging Iraqis from supporting the currentgovernment and avenging perceived wrongs. Based on statements attributed to the
Les Roberts, Riyadh Lafta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khudhairi and Gilbert Burnham, “Mortality Before andAfter the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey,”The Lancet,Volume 364, Number 9448, November 20,2004.3536
34
Luke Baker, “Iraq Insurgency Has Killed 6,000 Civilians—Govt,”Reuters,April 5, 2005.
Hamza Hendawi, “Iraqi Interior Minister Jabr Interviewed,” Associated Press, June 2, 2005, Ellen Knickmeyer,“Iraq Puts Civilian Toll at 12,000,” Washington Post, June 3, 2005, and Bassem Mroue, “Civilian Deaths in IraqExceed Military,”Associated Press,July 14, 2005.Sabrina Tavernise, “Data Shows Rising Toll of Iraqis from Insurgency,”New York Times,July 14, 2005. Forother Iraqi government figures, see Bushra Juhi, “Casualties From Iraq Insurgency Up in May,”AssociatedPress,June 1, 2005. According to a cited health ministry official, insurgents killed 434 civilians and wounded775 in May 2005, up from 299 and 598, respectively, the previous month.
37
“Civilian Deaths in Iraq Violence Far Exceed Those of Military and Police, Government Says,”AssociatedPress,July 14, 2005. The number of insurgents killed during the first six months of 2005 was 781, the Iraqigovernment said.
38
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groups, as well as media reports and the views of insurgency experts in Iraq and abroad,their attacks seem intended to accomplish the following goals:39•
Punish individuals for collaboration.Attacks on Iraqi translators, drivers,contractors and others who work with foreign governments often are aimed atpunishing them for their collaboration and warning others to avoid such work.Some insurgent groups have broadcast videos of executions, sometimes bybeheading, on the Internet or on CDs that are sold in markets, preceded by a“confession” and statement from the person in custody. “I am telling anybodywho wants to work with Americans to not work with them,” said Saif `AdnanKan`an, who worked as a vehicle mechanic for the U.S. military in Mosul,before being beheaded by militants from Ansar al-Sunna.40
•
Punish groups for collaboration or claims to political power.Attacks onIraq’s religious and ethnic communities—Shi`a Muslims, Kurds andChristians—are collective punishment for perceived cooperation with foreignforces and, in the case of Shi`a Muslims and Kurds, their assertions of nationalpower. On September 19, 2004, Ansar al-Sunna announced that it had capturedand killed three members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and a video on thegroup’s website showed three men getting beheaded. “The puppet Kurdishgroups... have pledged allegiance to the crusaders and continue to fight Islamand its people,” a statement said.41
•
Pressure foreign governments to leave Iraq.The abductions and killings offoreign civilians often are accompanied by a demand for the removal of aspecific country’s military from Iraq. In July 2004, for example, the IslamicArmy in Iraq abducted the Filipino truck driver Angelo de la Cruz, and thendistributed a video of him kneeling in front of three militants, who threatened tokill him if the Philippine military did not withdraw from Iraq. The Philippinegovernment consented on July 12, and the insurgents released de la Cruz.42
•
Undermine the Iraqi government.Attacks on Iraqi politicians andgovernment officials send the message that Iraqis who participate in the newgovernment risk death and the lives of their families. Before the January 30,
39
See, for example, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies,Iraq’s EvolvingInsurgency,Updated as of May 19, 2005, Jeffrey White, “Assessing the Iraqi Insurgency (Parts I and II),”Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #978, March 24, 2005, andIraq: Insurgency Goals,Council on Foreign Relations, May 20, 2005.“Iraqi Militants Behead Man Who Worked With U.S. Forces in Mosul,”Associated Press,October 23, 2004.“Iraqi Groups Shows Tape of Beheading of Three Kurds,”Reuters,September 19, 2004.
404142
Alistair Lyon, “Philippines Announces Pullout to Save Iraq Hostage,”Reuters,July 12, 2004, and “HostageTakers Widen Demands Beyond Iraqi Affairs,”Agence France-Presse,August 29, 2004. The governmentclaimed that it was already planning to withdraw its fifty-one-person contingent at the end of the month.
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2005, elections, various groups warned Iraqis not to vote. Ansar al-Sunna, theIslamic Army in Iraq and al-Qaeda in Iraq warned Iraqis not to participate in theJanuary 30, 2005, Iraqi elections. “Voters should know that even if they do nottake part in the poll (but attend the voting stations) they will not escape thehands of the mujahedeen, including after the elections,” an Ansar al-Sunnastatement said.43•
Instill fear in the civilian population.Attacks also may aim to induce Iraqiswho support the new government to lose faith in the ability of the governmentand the Multi-National Force to provide security.
•
Divert resources from military tasks.Attacks on civilians and civilian objectsforce the Iraqi government and Multi-National Force to divert resources toprotect reconstruction projects, infrastructure facilities, humanitarianorganizations and other so-called “soft targets.”
•
Impede reconstruction.Attacks on Iraqi and foreign reconstructioncontractors, as well as on oil pipelines, electrical grids and water stations, impedethe country’s reconstruction and send a message that the new Iraqi authoritiescannot provide for the public’s needs. According to the U.S military, up to 25percent of the $18.4 billion it allocated for reconstruction projects has gone tosecurity.44
•
Provoke a heavy-handed response.Attacks on civilians and civilian objectsmay goad multinational and Iraqi forces into a heavy-handed response in whichcivilians are killed or civilian infrastructure is destroyed. Such attacks mightalienate the population and help win insurgent groups sympathizers and recruits.
•
Gain the release of detainees.Insurgent groups have used abducted civiliansto demand the release of persons from detention facilities in Iraq. On September16, 2004, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad abducted three civil engineers in Baghdad, EugeneArmstrong and Jack Hensley from the U.S. and Kenneth Bigley from the U.K.Videos and statements on the Internet threatened them with execution unlessthe U.S. government released the Iraqi women it held in detention. Subsequentdeadlines passed and the group beheaded all three men. A video posted to awebsite before the final execution showed Bigley pleading to British PrimeMinister Tony Blair to: “Please, please release the female prisoners that are heldin Iraqi prisons.”45
434445
“Islamist Group Threatens Attacks After Iraqi Vote: Website,”Agence France-Presse,January 27, 2005.Andrew Hammond, “Insurgency Soaks Up Money Set for Reconstruction,”Reuters,August 10, 2005.
“British Hostage Pleads For His Life Amid Claim Italians Killed in Iraq,”Agence France-Presse,September23, 2004.
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Justifications for Attacks on CiviliansInsurgent groups in Iraq that target civilians seek to justify their attacks by variousarguments. Most of the arguments fall into one of two categories: First, arguments thatthe victims in some way were supporting the foreign military presence, and as such, werepart of that military force. Second, arguments that specific aspects of the armed conflictin Iraq justified an attack on civilians.As discussed, international humanitarian law prohibits at all times attacks directedagainst civilians. The applicability of international humanitarian law is unrelated to thenature of the armed conflict; that is, whether the war is just or unjust, lawful or unlawful,international humanitarian law still applies.46Among the justifications insurgent groups and their supporters use to explain attacks oncivilians are:•
Employees of foreign governments or the Multi-National Force haveeffectively joined the enemy.Any Iraqi or foreigner who works with the U. S.or the Multi-National Force, whether as a contractor, translator, driver, orcleaner, is considered a collaborator because of the assistance he or she providesthe foreign forces, and therefore loses immunity as a civilian. According to aformer Iraqi general who joined the insurgency: “Every Iraqi or foreigner whoworks with the coalition is a target. Ministries, mercenaries, translators,businessmen, cooks or maids, it doesn’t matter the degree of collaboration. Tosign a contract with the occupier is to sign your death certificate.”47
•
Officials of the Iraqi government serve as agents of the foreignoccupation.The various post-Saddam Hussein governments—Iraq’s InterimGoverning Council, the Iraqi Interim Government and the Iraqi Transitional
46
Some Iraqis and insurgent groups in Iraq claim that attacks on civilians are the work of foreign forces,particularly from Israel and the U.S., in an attempt to cause chaos and to rally the Shi`a and Kurdish populationsaround the new government. In March 2005, for example, the influential Sunni group, the Association of MuslimScholars, condemned an attack on a Shi`a mosque and said that foreign elements must have been involved.“The Iraqis are not programmed to kill. Even the extremist Islamists, we know them and we know how theythink,” an association spokesman said. “They have no such ideology which makes them sanction the killing ofinnocent people without any religious or moral scruples.” (BBCMonitoring Middle East,“Iraqi Sunni ClericsSpokesman Rejects Iraqi Involvement in Shi’i Mosque Blast,”al-Jazeera Television,March 10, 2005.) Anotherexample was an article in Quds Press that argued, citing “special sources,” that the U.S. had sent a special unitto commit assassination, sabotage and random bombings attributed to the insurgency in order to “smear itsreputation.” (“U.S. ‘Special Unit’ Said in Iraq for ‘Dirty Operations,’”Quds Press,August 3, 2005.)
Alix de la Grange, “‘The Liberation of Baghdad is not Far Away,’”Asia Times Online,June 25, 2004, availableat http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FF25Ak07.html, as of August 19, 2005.
47
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Government—are considered subservient to the U.S.-led coalition. Viewed asagents of the foreign forces, they are deemed to have lost their immunity ascivilians. When asked about his organization’s view of the Iraqi GoverningCouncil, for example, the Jaysh Muhammad spokesman said: “Our position isclear—they are all spies, traitors, and agents for the Americans.”48To the headof the pro-Saddam Hussein group Wahaj al-`Iraq, the Iraqi parliament andgovernment are “the institutions of the aggressor.”49•
By supporting the foreign forces occupying Iraq, Shi`a Muslims, Kurdsand Christians are traitors and spies.Insurgent groups that attack Shi`a,Kurdish or Christian civilians say these groups are legitimate targets because theycollaborated with the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein and tooccupy Iraq. “The American forces and their intelligence systems have found asafe haven and refuge amongst their brethren the grandchildren of monkeys andswine in Iraq,” one group said when claiming responsibility for the August 2003attacks on five churches in Mosul and Baghdad.50Because the Kurdishpeshmerga fought alongside U.S. forces in 2003 and some Shi`a militias, like theIran-trained Badr Brigade (now Badr Organization), are powerful in the currentIraqi security force, all Kurds and Shi`a are considered fair targets. According togroups like Ansar al-Sunna and al-Qaeda in Iraq, Kurds and the Shi`a are“helping the Crusaders and Jews.”51
•
All westerners in Iraq are part of the foreign occupation.Regardless of theirrole in Iraq, be it as construction contractors, journalists or humanitarian aidworkers, all foreigners are considered elements or potential elements of a foreignoccupation. According to a statement by a group called the Assadullah Brigades(Lion of God Brigades), for example, “themujahid[holy fighter] is entitled tocapture any infidel that enters Iraq, whether he works for a constructioncompany or in any other job, because he could be a warrior, and themujahidhas
Ali Kais al-Rubai, “Islamists Pledge Continued War on Coalition,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting,IraqiCrisis Report 63,May 14, 2004, available at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_63_1_eng.txt, as ofMarch 31, 2005.49
48
“Head of Pro-Saddam Militants in Iraq Sets Peace Terms, Doesn’t Know al-Zarqawi,”BBC Monitoring MiddleEast,published in La Repubblica, June 3, 2005.
50
Translation from the website www.assyrianchristians.com (accessed February 22, 2005). See also, SalahNasrawi, “Unknown Group Claims Responsibility for Assaults on Iraqi Churches,”Associated Press,August 2,2004.“Al-Qaeda Linked Group Claims Attack Targeting Kurdish Official,”Agence France-Presse,May 24, 2005.
51
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the right to kill him or take him as a prisoner.”52According to the group, “anyforeigner working here should be killed or abducted.”53•
The ends justify the means.Attacks against all targets, military and civilian, arenecessary and permitted to achieve the ultimate end: driving foreign occupiersfrom Iraq. “The killing of infidels by any method including martyrdom [suicide]operations has been sanctified by many scholars even if it means killing innocentMuslims. This legality has been agreed upon ... so as not to disrupt jihad,” AbuMus`ab al-Zarqawi purportedly said on an audio tape posted to the Internet. Hecontinued: “The shedding of Muslim blood ... is allowed in order to avoid thegreater evil of disrupting jihad.”54
A sign in al-Falluja from May 2003 reveals anger at the United States.� 2005 Fred Abrahams/Human Rights Watch
•
A more powerful enemy.The United States and its coalition partners are betterfinanced and equipped than insurgent groups, with overpowering technologyand firepower. Against such an adversary, all means of attack are necessary,including attacks on civilians and other “soft targets.”
•
Double standards on the applicability of international law.Some insurgentsargue that armed opposition groups should not be expected to respect legalstandards when the other side brazenly disregards the law. They assert that theU.S.-led invasion of Iraq was a violation of international law, and that excessive
525354
Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “Who Kills Hostages in Iraq,”al-Zawra,September 19, 2004.Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “Who Resists and Who Kidnaps,” IslamOnline.net, September 14, 2004.“Iraq Qaeda Leader Defends Slaying of Muslims-Web,”Reuters,May 18, 2005.
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and indiscriminate force during and after the invasion has killed tens ofthousands of Iraqi civilians.•
Reprisals.Some attacks against civilians are justified as reprisals for allegedabuses or unlawful attacks by Iraqi or multinational forces. This was ajustification given for the May 2004 beheading of American businessmanNicholas Berg, as recorded in a video entitled “Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi ShownSlaughtering an American.” “For the mothers and wives of American soldiers,we tell you that we offered the U.S. administration to exchange this hostage withsome of the detainees in Abu Ghraib and they refused,” one of five menwearing headscarves and black masks read from a statement. “So we tell you thatthe dignity of the Muslim men and women in Abu Ghraib and others is notredeemed except by blood and souls.”55
•
International humanitarian law does not apply to insurgent groups inIraq.Some who defend the conduct of insurgent groups in Iraq claim thegroups are not bound by the laws of war because they did not sign the GenevaConventions or otherwise make legal commitments to abide by internationallaw. They say that insurgent groups cannot be bound by international normsthey did not help shape or pledge to respect.
•
Insurgents only recognize Islamic law, which permits all attacks againstan occupying force.Some groups cite the Qu’ran or Islamic scholars to justifythe killing of Muslim and non-Muslim civilians in a war against occupyingmilitaries. “Killing Muslims who are serving as human shields [for U.S. forces] isallowed by the sharia,” Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi said in a tape posted to theInternet on May 18, 2005, backing the argument with statements from severalMuslim clergymen. He also said that “it is legitimate to shoot all infidels with allkinds of arms that we have.”56
•
Executions are carried out according to law.At least one insurgent grouphas justified an execution because it was carried out after a legal review. On July21, 2005, al-Qaeda in Iraq abducted two Algerian diplomats, `Ali Belaroussi andAzzedine Belkadi, and executed them six days later. “The judicial court of the
55
Niko Price, “Video on Islamic Militant Web Site Shows Beheading of American,”Associated Press,May 11,2004.“Zarqawi Tries to Justify Killings of Civilians in Iraq: Tape,”Agence France-Presse,May 18, 2005.
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Organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq has sentenced to death the diplomatic envoysof the apostate Algerian government,” a statement posted to the Internet said.57None of the justifications given above is defensible under international law. Thejustifications for attacking specific groups of people misread or misapply the definitionof a civilian as it applies under the laws of war. The arguments that international lawdoes not apply are contrary to long-accepted understandings of the applicability of thelaws of war.International humanitarian law provides that in all armed conflicts, whether duringarmed conflicts between states, occupations or civil wars, the parties must at all timesdistinguish between civilians and combatants. According to the principle of civilianimmunity, attacks may only be directed against combatants, and never civilians.58Civilians are defined as persons who are not members of the armed forces.59A civilian isprotected against attack unless and for such time as he or she takes a direct part inhostilities.60In practice a civilian would temporarily lose immunity by, for instance,picking up a weapon and engaging in fighting, loading ammunition during a battle orspotting targets for artillery. Civilians involved in the planning of military operations orwho are giving orders to military forces likewise may be subject to attack. As describedin the ICRC Commentary to Protocol I, direct participation in hostilities “implies adirect causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to theenemy at the time and the place where the activity takes place.”61Thus, while a worker ina munitions factory may be assisting the war effort, the absence ofdirectparticipation inhostilities means the person cannot be subject to attack (the munitions factory is alegitimate target, however, and the worker bears the risks of being present there).
5758
“Iraq’s al Qaeda Says Will Kill Algerian Envoys—Web,”Reuters,July 26, 2005.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),Customary International Humanitarian Law,(Cambridge:Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, eds.), volume 1, rule 1, citing Protocol Additional tothe Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International ArmedConflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, articles 48, 51(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8June 1977, article 13(2).
59
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 5, citing Protocol I, article 50, citing Protocol I, article50.ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 6, citing Protocol I, article 51(3), citing Protocol I,article 51(3).
60
See ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 516. The Commentary also explains that underProtocol II “direct part in hostilities” implies “that there is a sufficient causal relationship between the act ofparticipation and its immediate consequences.” Ibid. p. 1453.
61
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Although there are gray areas regarding whether certain conduct constitutes “directparticipation in hostilities,” the immunity of the civilians whose cases are documented inthis report is clear. Ordinary civilians regardless of ethnic group or sect, governmentofficials not directly involved in the war effort, Iraqi and foreign staff performing non-combat jobs for foreign governments, humanitarian aid workers and journalists are allprotected from direct attack by the laws of war.The prohibition on intentional attacks against civilians is absolute. Where there is doubtas to whether a person is a civilian or a member of the military, that person must beconsidered a civilian.62Reprisal attacks against civilians and captured combatants areprohibited.63It is also unlawful to carry out sentences, including executions, of anyperson except by a regularly constituted court meeting international fair trial standards.64It is no justification to claim that the attacked civilian was part of a larger group that hasmembers involved in the hostilities. Thus Kurdish civilians are not lawful targets becausethe peshmerga is made up of Kurdish fighters. Likewise, foreign civilians do not becomelawful targets because of the presence of foreign soldiers in Iraq.The broader justifications for attacks on civilians based on the perceived irrelevance orunfairness of international humanitarian law are a blanket disavowal of international law.Under international humanitarian law, the fighting that has persisted in Iraq since theU.S.-led invasion in March 2003 meets the requirements for an armed conflict. Theclassification of that armed conflict, whether as an international armed conflict or as anon-international (internal) armed conflict, is of limited importance for issues pertainingto direct attacks on civilians: such attacks are illegal during an international armedconflict or occupation as per the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or during an internalconflict as a matter of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 andcustomary international humanitarian law.While armed opposition groups such as insurgents in Iraq are not parties to the GenevaConventions, it has long been recognized that such groups are bound by common article
62
See Protocol I, art. 50(1); ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 16 (“Each party to theconflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives”), citing Protocol I, article57(2)(a); 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, article 7.
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 146, citing, e.g. First Geneva Convention, art. 46;Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 33.64
63
Common article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
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3 and customary international humanitarian law.65Recourse to competing principlessuch as “the ends justifies the means” or other bodies of law, such as interpretations ofIslamic law, have no legal bearing on whether or not international humanitarian law hasbeen violated. As the preamble to Protocol I states, the provisions of the GenevaConventions “must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protectedby those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin ofthe armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to theconflicts.”66Moreover, a failure by one party to a conflict to respect the laws of war doesnot relieve the other of its obligation to respect those laws. That obligation is absolute,not premised on reciprocity.67The rejection of international humanitarian law has moral, political and legalconsequences. Most importantly, the unwillingness to adequately distinguish betweencivilians and combatants is having a devastating impact on the civilians of Iraq. Seriousviolations of the laws of war are considered war crimes; under international law, personswho commit, order, or condone war crimes or crimes against humanity are criminallyresponsible individually for their actions. In certain circumstances, internationalhumanitarian law also holds commanders criminally liable for war crimes committed bytheir subordinates. There are two forms of command responsibility: direct responsibilityfor orders that are unlawful, such as when a military commander authorizes or ordersintentional attacks on civilians; and imputed responsibility, when a superior failed toprevent or punish crimes committed by a subordinate acting on his own initiative whenthe superior knew or should have known of the subordinate’s plans.War crimes that are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes againsthumanity are crimes of universal jurisdiction, meaning that they can be prosecutedanywhere in the world. Moreover, international crimes committed since July 2002 maybe prosecuted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague if the state involved isunwilling or unable to prosecute the offense. Because there is no statute of limitation forwar crimes, those responsible may be arrested and tried at any time and in any place.68
65
See generally the discussion of the applicability of international humanitarian law to non-state armed groupsin ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,pp. 497-98.Protocol I, preamble.
6667
The issue of reciprocity is addressed in the ICRC’s Commentary to Protocol I, para. 51: “The prohibitionagainst invoking reciprocity in order to shirk the obligations of humanitarian law is absolute. This appliesirrespective of the violation allegedly committed by the adversary. It does not allow the suspension of theapplication of the law either in part or as a whole, even if this is aimed at obtaining reparations from theadversary or a return to a respect for the law from him.”68
Neither Iraq nor the United States are party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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Statements by Insurgent GroupsVarious armed groups, notably Ansar al-Sunna, al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic Army inIraq, have repeatedly claimed credit in videos and written statement for assassinations,executions and bomb attacks that unlawfully killed civilians.69Only on rare occasions hasan armed group condemned such attacks. When such condemnations occur, they arelikely to express disapproval with attacks on “innocent Muslims” or Iraqi citizens,including soldiers and police, rather than a condemnation based on the legal obligationto distinguish between civilians and combatants. The implied message often is to redirectattacks from Iraqis to foreigners, whether soldiers or civilians, rather than a desire toprotect all civilians from attack.A statement from Jaysh Muhammad, for example, a Sunni group with a strong Islamistbent, was as much an affirmation of certain unlawful attacks as it was a condemnation ofothers. “A Muslim must not kill a Muslim, no matter what,” a spokesman said in aninterview, as he denounced the bombings at Shi`a shrines and attacks on police. At thesame time, he accepted kidnapping those who “cooperate with the occupation.”“Kidnapping is an obligation,” he said. “It is not prohibited by religion, if it is done toforeigners who cooperate with the occupation.”70In a statement by the Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades, one of three groups that claimedresponsibility for the U.N. bombing of August 19, 2003, the group said it was against“any action that harms the interest of the Iraqi people, such as targeting the Abu GhraibPrison and blowing up the principal water main in Baghdad because it is not allowable toharm Muslims.”71The statement did not mention that eight of the twenty-two peoplewho died in the U.N. bombing were Iraqis (see chapter VIII of this report, “Attacks onHumanitarian Organizations and the U.N.”).In one of the very few cases that al-Qaeda in Iraq condemned an attack on civilians, itcommented only on the need to protect innocent Muslims. “We changed the plans for anumber of decisive operations against the enemy because of the presence of a Muslim
69
Such statements could help demonstrate that particular criminal acts were knowingly part of an attack on apopulation, as necessary for showing a crime against humanity. See e.g. Kayishema and Ruzindana,International Criminal Court for Rwanda, Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999, para. 133-34.Ali Kais al-Rubai, “Islamists Pledge Continued War on Coalition,”IWPR,May 14, 2004.
7071
“Statement Said From al-Qa’idah Claims Responsibility for UN HQ Attack in Iraq,”BBC Monitoring MiddleEast,Muhammad Salah, “Al-Qi’diah Claims Responsibility for Blowing Up UN Headquarters in Baghdad,”al-Yat,August 25, 2003.
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who would have been killed by the explosions, and we canceled martyrdom [suicide]operations out of concern for the blood of Muslim passers-by,” it said.72On January 27, 2005, three days before Iraq’s elections, an apparent umbrellaorganization of Sunni nationalist groups called the Political Bureau of the Islamic Frontof the Iraqi Resistance,73announced that it condemned the elections but had ordered itsfighters not to attack polling stations or Iraqi citizens. “It is not our policy to provokesedition that will allow the blood of our citizens to be shed by attacking the pollingstations and shedding the blood of innocent Iraqis, especially as many of ourcompatriots have failed to understand the reality of this issue,” the statement reportedlysaid. “Our wish to spare the lives of our Iraqi people extends to all our citizens of allreligious persuasions and ethnic affiliations.”74A month later the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance issued another statement thatextended its condemnation to attacks on all civilians. “We prohibit targeting civilians,slaying hostages and spilling the blood of Iraqis whether civilians or members of policeand national guard forces, under any pretext,” the statement said, adding that its fightersshould not undertake actions in cities, where civilians could be hurt. Regarding non-Iraqis, the Front said its members were not allowed to target civilian foreigners, such asreporters, drivers and relief workers, or Iraqi infrastructure facilities, like oil pipelines andelectrical grids. It called on its members not to cooperate with any insurgent group thatattacked Iraqis or civilians in general.75Likewise, in a statement posted on its website in June 2005, the Iraqi Patriotic Alliance,an alliance of Iraqi political parties and groups based abroad, denounced the targeting ofcivilian objects and foreign civilians:Schools, churches, mosques and other civilian places have never beenthe target of the Iraqi resistance. Besides, we have to be very critical andcareful about any kidnapping or killing process of a foreigner [sic]worker in Iraq. The resistance has no benefit in attacking people like7273
Nadia Abou el-Magd, “Iraq Insurgents Call for Hassan’s Release,”Associated Press,November 5, 2004.
According to one Iraqi press report, the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance is a Sunni group that announcedits existence on May 30, 2004. It concentrates in Ninewa and Diyala provinces and has at least two militarywings: Salah al-Din al-Ayubi Brigades and Sayf-Allah al-Maslul Brigades. (Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi,“Who Kills Hostages in Iraq,”al-Zawra,September 19, 2004.)“Iraq’s ‘Islamic Resistance Front’ Says Elections ‘US Conspiracy,’”BBC Monitoring Middle East,Statement bythe Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance, carried by Quds Press web news agency, January 30, 2005.Samir Haddad, “Iraqi Resistance Distances Itself From Civilian Blood,” IslamOnline.net, March 7, 2005,available at http://www.islamonline.org/English/News/2005-03/07/article05.shtml, as of August 15, 2005.
74
75
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Margaret Hassan,76two Simonas77or others. These actions are meant todiscredit the legal resistance of our people.78In an interview published in June 2005, the head of a pro-Saddam group claimed hisforce did not target civilians, and he did not distinguish between Iraqis and foreigners.“We strike only at military targets,” said Shaikh Majid al-Qa’ud, secretary general ofWahaj al-`Iraq. “It is others who slaughter women, old people and children.”79
Statements by Sunni Religious GroupsMost Sunni institutions and religious bodies view the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq as anoccupation, and they support the insurgents’ military actions as a legitimate response.Some have condemned attacks on civilians, particularly the large-scale attacks on Shi`ashrines and Christian churches, but their condemnations are sometimes limited andsuggest that attacks on civilians are warranted in certain circumstances.The most influential Sunni religious authority in Iraq is the Hayat ‘Ulama al-Muslimin(Association of Muslim Scholars), which was created in April 2003, after the fall of theSaddam Hussein government. Directed by Shaikh Harith al-Dhari, the Associationundertakes religious, political, social and economic activities, from organizing theprotection of mosques and the work of imams to caring for the families of Iraqis killedby U.S. forces. It has been an outspoken critic of the U.S.-led military presence andcalled on the Sunni to boycott the January 30, 2005, elections.At the same time, the Association has condemned the Jordanian Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawiand some of the attacks for which he claimed responsibility. “We have nothing to dowith the terrorist al-Zarqawi,” an Association spokesman said in February 2005. “He is aforeigner and an enemy of Iraq. Our liberation struggle against the occupation is acompletely different matter from his barbarous terrorism.”8076
Margaret Hassan, the head of CARE in Iraq, was abducted in October 2004 and killed the next month. SeeChapter VIII of this report, “Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations and the U.N.”The “two Simonas” are the Italians Simona Pari and Simona Torretta from the organization Un Ponte perBaghdad (“Bridge to Baghdad”), who were kidnapped in September 2004 with two Iraqi staff and released afterthree weeks.“Letter From Iraqi Patriotic Alliance Addressed to Our Brothers All Around the World,” Iraqi Patriotic Alliancewebsite, http://www.iraq-ipa.com/, as of June 6, 2005.“Head of Pro-Saddam Militants in Iraq Sets Peace Terms, Doesn’t Know al-Zarqawi,”BBC Monitoring MiddleEast,published inLa Repubblica,June 3, 2005.
77
78
79
“Iraqi Sunni Body Reiterates Refusal to Join Government Before US Withdrawal,”BBC Monitoring MiddleEast,February 4, 2005, translation of interview with Association of Muslim Scholars spokesman Bashar al-Faydi, published in Corriere della Sera on February 3, 2005.
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The Association has condemned some hostage-taking and attacks on civilians, but it hasbeen accepting of other practices that violate the laws of war. For example, at least onespokesman said it was acceptable to kidnap—but not kill—“collaborators.” “Iraq is anoccupied country and Iraqis are entitled to resist this ugly occupation no matter what themeans…It makes sense then to target collaborators,” Association spokesman MuthanaHarith al-Dhari said in September 2004. He added, “Kidnapping the collaborators islawful when it comes to warfare. They are deemed as troops fighting alongside theoccupation forces.”As an example, al-Dhari mentioned the case of twelve Nepalese workers, abducted andexecuted by Ansar al-Sunna in August 2004. “There was nothing wrong in kidnappingthe twelve Nepalese as they used to work for the occupation forces as bodyguards orsupply drivers in return for mind-boggling salaries,” he said. “But we are totally againstkilling them. They are prisoners of war and shouldn’t be killed.”81The Association had condemned the killing when it took place. “We are against killinghostages, particularly if it has been a group execution,” Shaikh al-Dhari said. “Thosetwelve Nepalese hostages are simple people. They might have been deceived to serve theoccupation forces.”82That same month, when insurgents bombed five Christianchurches in Baghdad and Mosul, the Association said the attacks were “totally remotefrom any religious or humanitarian norms.”83On September 12, 2004, the Association called for the release of two Italianhumanitarian workers, Simona Pari and Simona Torretta, who had been abducted oneweek before. “The two Italians were doing a humanitarian job and don’t have any linksto the occupation,” a spokesman said.84The two women were eventually released.In January 2005, the Association called upon all armed groups to release any hostagesthey held on the Eid al-Adha feast (Feast of Sacrifice)—a major Islamic holiday. “On theoccasion of `Eid al-Adha, the Association of Muslim Scholars appeals on parties who
81
“Targeting ‘Collaborators’ Lawful: Iraqi Scholar,” Islamonline.net, September 27, 2004,http://www.islamonline.net/English/news/2004-09/27/article01.shtml, accessed August 15, 2005.“AMS Slams Nepalese Captives’ Execution,” al-Jazeera.net, August 31, 2004, available athttp://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/67833A12-87BE-467D-8E7E-9D173D9A9915.htm, as of June 23, 2005.Alissa J. Rubin, “Muslims and Their Leaders Denounce Church Attacks,”Los Angeles Times,August 3, 2004.“Muslim Scholars Call for Release of Italian Hostages,”Associated Press,September 13, 2004.
82
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hold hostages to free them as an expression of goodwill,” a spokesman said. “Ourreligion does not accept such acts that lead to killings and humiliation.”85In February 2005, the Association called for the release of the abducted Italian journalistGiuliana Sgrena, saying “she was doing a humanitarian job in Iraq and has nothing to dowith the occupation forces.”86A group called the Islamic Jihad Organization respondedthat it would kill the woman if Italian forces did not leave Iraq. “We call upon ourbrothers in the Association of Muslim Scholars to be careful in their call to release theItalian POW,” a statement posted on the Internet said. “We are still investigating thePOW and the judicial committee in the organization will take its decision on thatsoon.”87Sgrena’s captors released her on March 4 (see chapter IX of this report,“Attacks on Media”).In contrast to these statements, another large Sunni group has condoned certain attacks.Fakhri al-Qaisi, a prominent Sunni cleric who heads a Salafi group in Iraq88and is part ofthe Higher Council for al-Da`wa, Guidance and Fatwa, told a French journalist that thekilling of CARE director Margaret Hassan in November 2004 (see chapter VIII of thisreport, “Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations and the U.N.”) was justified because aU.S. Marine had recently killed a wounded and unarmed insurgent in an al-Fallujamosque.89“As the Americans wage a war of extermination against us, the resistance alsowill kill everyone, women, old men and infants,” he reportedly said. “The Americans leftus no other choice but violence.”90
85
“Influential Sunni Muslim Group in Iraq Appeals to Insurgents to Release Hostages During Holiday,”Associated Press,January 19, 2005.
86
“Purported Kidnappers of Italian Journalist Issue Final Warning to Rome to Withdraw Troops From Iraq,”Associated Press,February 6, 2005.Ibid.Al-Salafiyya (derived from the word al-Salaf, denoting the companions of the Prophet Muhammad) as adoctrine or philosophy emerged during the latter half of the 19th Century. Salafism urged believers to return tothe pure form of Islam as practiced by Muhammad and it rejected any practice not directly supported by theQur’an. At the same time, Salafism encouraged Muslims to interpret religious texts for themselves through thepractice ofijtihad(independent reasoning), rather than blindly accept the interpretations by theologians ofreligious texts. (See Denoeux, G., “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,”Middle East Policy,Vol.IX (2), June 2002.) Denoeux also discusses a “second generation” of Islamist movements witnessed during the1980s and 1990s, termed “Jihadist Salafi.” These movements “embrace a strict, literal interpretation of Islam,but combine it with an emphasis on jihad, understood here as holy war. To them, jihad becomes the primeinstrument through which the “Salafi” desire to “return” to the original message of Islam will be turned intoreality…. Some concentrate their attacks on the “infidel regimes” at the helm of the country in which theyoperate. Such regimes are denounced as Muslim in name only and for having become completely subservientto the West.” Ibid.See Andrew Marshall, “Reporter Recounts Killing of Wounded Iraqi by Marine,”Reuters,November 22, 2004.Jean-Pierre Perrin, “La résistance va tuer tout le monde,”Libération,November 18, 2004.
8788
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A leading Sunni cleric in al-Falluja has sought to differentiate between “honest” and“dishonest” insurgents. “Honest resistance is a legitimate right against the occupation allover the world. It is not governed by the ideas of small groups of people,” Shaikh`Abdullah al-Janabi explained. “If they think beheading civilians is a means of pressureover the occupation, then they don’t understand the concept of honest and trueresistance, which targets the American and British occupation.” He added, “If there issomeone called Zarqawi, I am not grateful for his attack on our policemen.”91
IV. Attacks on Ethnic and Religious GroupsA primary target of some insurgent groups has been the Shi`a Muslim, Kurdish andChristian communities in Iraq. They have attacked civilians from these communitieswith suicide bombs, car bombs and roadside bombs and have committed murders andsummary executions. Massive bombs have killed hundreds of civilians in mosques andchurches, at funerals and in markets.Some armed groups have justified their attacks with the argument that thesecommunities collaborated with the U.S.-led coalition to overthrow the Saddam Husseingovernment, to occupy Iraq and to dominate the new Iraqi government. The Kurdishforce in particular, the peshmerga, fought alongside U.S. forces in Iraq’s north in 2003,and has remained a close ally of the United States. Shi`a are dominating the current Iraqigovernment—a position of power previously held by the minority Sunni populationduring and before Saddam Hussein—and the militia of a principal Shi`a political party,the Iran-trained Badr Organization, is powerful in Iraq’s new police force.Christians have repeatedly come under attack because they are viewed as supportive ofthe U.S. invasion, and many have taken jobs with the occupation authorities and variousU.S. government entities. Insurgents may also have attacked Iraqi Christians assurrogates for the Christian West.The attacks may also be motivated by the historical animosities between these ethnic andreligious groups, and their struggle for power in post-Saddam Iraq.
91
“‘We Pray the Insurgents Will Achieve Victory,’”Newsweek,August 7, 2004, available athttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5634250/site/newsweek/, as of August 15, 2005.
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Attacks on Shi`a MuslimsIn terms of casualties, the religious or ethnic group most targeted by insurgents in Iraq isShi`a Muslims, who comprise roughly 60 percent of Iraq’s population. Since 2003, someinsurgent groups have repeatedly targeted Shi`a religious sites packed with civilians,senior clerics and political leaders, as well as neighborhoods where Shi`a Muslims live.As stated above, the attacks are primarily motivated by a belief that Shi`a political andreligious groups welcomed and cooperated with the U.S. invasion to overthrow the Iraqigovernment, long dominated by Sunni Arabs. In addition, the Shi`a are dominating thecurrent Iraqi government and security forces, provoking concerns that Sunnis will bemarginalized in the new Iraq. To the extreme Islamist groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq,which has claimed responsibility for some of the most deadly attacks, Shi`a Muslims areapostates and heretics who have betrayed Islam.On September 14, 2005, for example, al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for a stringof car bombs and suicide bomb attacks across Shi`a areas of Baghdad that killed nearly150 people. In one case, a bomber lured men around his car with promises of workbefore blowing himself up and killing at least 112.92In an audiotape posted to the Internet that day, a voice believed to belong to AbuMus`ab al-Zarqawi declared “all-out war” on Iraq’s Shi`a population. “The al-QaedaOrganization in the Land of Two Rivers is declaring all-out war on the Rafidha [apejorative term for Shi`a], wherever they are in Iraq,” the voice said. He continued: “Anyreligious group that wants to be safe from the blows of the mujahedeen must (disavow)the government of Ja`fari and its crimes. Otherwise it will suffer the same fate as that ofthe crusaders.”93Iraqi and U.S. officials have blamed many other attacks on al-Qaeda in Iraq. By attackingShi`a leaders and religious sites, these officials and many analysts believe, al-Zarqawihopes to spark a civil war between Shi`a and Sunni Muslims.9492
Robert F. Worth and Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Multiple Attacks Kill Nearly 150 in Iraqi Capital,”New York Times,September 15, 2005.“Zarqawi Declares War on Iraq Shiites, Threatens Other Groups,”Agence France-Presse,September 14,2004.
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In February 2004, the U.S. government released a letter it claims to have intercepted from Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Ladan, in which al-Zarqawi talks of provoking Shi`a Muslims into attacking Sunnis, andthereby starting a civil war. Shi`a Muslims are “the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spyingenemy and the penetrating venom,” al-Zarqawi wrote, according to the U.S. translation. He added, “If wesucceed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentiveSunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at the hands of these Sabeans.” See February
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The first major attack on a Shi`a site occurred on August 29, 2003, when two massivecar bombs exploded outside the Shrine of Imam `Ali Mosque in al-Najaf, the most holyShi`a Muslim site. More than eighty-five people died, including the influential AyatollahMuhammad Baqir al-Hakim, head of SCIRI, who was being driven from the mosqueafter Friday prayers. “There was a huge blast, and I was flung to the ground,” onewitness said. “I saw parts of bodies all around me. There was dust everywhere.”95According to the Iraqi police, the attackers planted 1,550 pounds of explosives in twocars.96The police arrested four men, two Iraqis and two Saudis, all four withconnections to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, an Iraqi police official said.97It remains unclear who staged the attack. Sayyid `Abd al-`Aziz al-Hakim, the brother ofAyatollah Baqir al-Hakim and his successor as head of SCIRI, blamed elements loyal toSaddam Hussein.98The CPA and U.S. military said it had intelligence and other evidencelinking al-Zarqawi to the bombing, but they did not provide details.99On January 15,2005, Iraqi authorities arrested Sami Muhammad `Ali Sa`id al-Jaaf, also known as Abu`Umar al-Kurdi, who they claimed was a top lieutenant in al-Qaeda. According to anIraqi government statement, al-Jaaf confessed to preparing thirty-two car bombs,including the bomb in al-Najaf that killed Ayatollah al-Hakim.100For the past two years, deadly attacks have marred the Shi`a holy day of `Ashura’, whichmarks the seventh century death in battle of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandsonHussain. On March 2, 2004, bombs at Shi`a shrines in Karbala and Baghdad killed more
2004 Coalition Provisional Authority English translation of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi letter obtained by UnitedStates Government in Iraq, available at www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm, as of June 12, 2005. According toAnthony H. Cordesman, an insurgency expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies inWashington D.C., car bombings and suicide bombings by radical Islamist groups are “deliberately designed toprovoke something approaching civil war.” See “Cordesman: Crucial to Bring Sunnis Into Government and GiveIraqis More Control Over Aid Money,” Interview with Council on Foreign Relations, June 30, 2005, available atwww.cfr.org/publication.php?id=8233, as of July 20, 2005.95
Vivienne Walt and Thanassis Cambanis, “Car Bomb Kills 85 at Shrine in Iraq Top Shi’ite Cleric Dies; NoClaim of Responsibility,”Boston Globe,August 30, 2003.
Tarek al-Issawi, “Iraqi Police Make Arrests in Najaf Bombing, Claim Two are Saudis, Four Have al-QaedaTies,”Associated Press,August 30, 2003.97
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Tarek al-Issawi, “Police Investigator Says Four Arrested in Najaf Bombing, All Have Ties to al-Qaeda,”Associated Press,August 30, 2003.
BBC Monitoring Middle East,“Iraqi Shi`a Leader Al-Hakim Says Iraqis Responsible for Iraq’s Security,”al-Zaman,September 23, 2003.99
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Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing With Daniel Senor and Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, Baghdad,Iraq, February 12, 2004.Bassem Mroue, “Iraq Forces Arrest Top al-Qaida Lieutenant,”Associated Press,January 24, 2005.
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than 181 people and wounded 573. On February 18 and 19, 2005, despite heightenedsecurity, attacks during the holy day in Baghdad killed more than seventy people.In the 2004 attacks, coordinated blasts with suicide bombers and planted explosives hitshrines in Karbala and Baghdad as pilgrims from Iraq and abroad converged for the holyday. In Karbala, five bombs detonated after 10 a.m. near two important shrines. “Wewere standing there when we heard an explosion,” one witness said. “We saw flesh,arms, legs, more flesh. Then the ambulance came.”101Around the same time, threesuicide bombers detonated their explosives in and around the al-Kadhimiyya shrine inBaghdad killing fifty-eight. A fourth bomber was captured after his explosives failed todetonate.102No one claimed responsibility for these attacks. U.S. officials and Iraqi leaders blamedal-Zarqawi, but they did not provide evidence to support the claim.103One year later, in Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonated explosives inside the al-Kadhimiyya shrine as worshippers knelt in prayer, killing seventeen people. Shortlythereafter, two suicide bombers exploded at the `Ali al-Bayya’ Mosque in westernBaghdad as people were leaving the Friday prayers. In a third incident, a suicide bomberkilled at least two more Shi`a Muslims.104Some Sunni Arab leaders condemned the attacks, including the Sunni Association ofMuslim Scholars. “The shedding of the blood of any Iraqi citizen during this delicatestage will contribute to achieving the occupation’s goals,” an Association spokesman saidat a press conference called to condemn the attacks. “Namely, igniting sectarian seditionamong the components of the Iraqi people to facilitate or guarantee their stay in Iraq.”105Three weeks later, on March 10, 2005, an explosion ripped through the funeral of arespected Shi`a professor in Mosul, killing more than forty-seven people, some of themKurds and Turkomans. According to witnesses, a suicide bomber detonated himself in ahall next to the al-Sadrin Mosque in the al-Ta’mim neighborhood where the funeral
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Tarek al-Issawi, “Explosions Rock Shrines in Iraqi Cities,”Associated Press,March 2, 2004.
Hamza Hendawi, “Suicide Bombers Kill at Least 143 People in Attacks on Shiite Shrines in Iraq; U.S.Blames Militant Seeking to Spark Civil War,”Associated Press,March 2, 2004.103104
“US Says Jordanian Militant Prime Suspect In Iraqi Blasts,”Associated Press,March 2, 2004.
“Blasts Outside Baghdad Mosques Kill at Least 27,”Associated Press,February 18, 2005, and “Forty Deadin Iraq Violence,”Agence France-Presse,February 18, 2005.Al-Sharqiyah Television,February 20, 2005.
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service was being held. “As we were inside the mosque, we saw a ball of fire and heard ahuge explosion,” one witness said. “After that blood and pieces of flesh were scatteredaround the place.”106Insurgent groups also have targeted individuals active in Shi`a parties and organizations.On February 9, 2005, gunmen shot and killed `Abd al-Hussain Khaz`al, aged forty, whowas an official of the al-Da`wa political party, a spokesman of the Basra city council,director of a local newspaper and a journalist for the U.S.-funded al-Hurra Television.Witnesses told the press that gunmen converged on Khaz`al as he sat in his pickup withhis three-year-old son Muhammad outside their Basra home, shooting at them at leastthirteen times.107Al-Hurra (“The Free”) began operations in early 2004 with U.S.government funds in an attempt to counter the Arabic-language television stations al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya.According to Agence France-Presse, a group called the Imam al-Hassan al-BasriBrigades108claimed responsibility for the killing in a statement on an Islamic website.The previously unknown group said it had “liquidated the apostate agent.” They accusedKhaz`al of being a member of the “criminal traitor Badr Brigade,” the militia of SCIRI.“The slain agent will not be the last, but this is one of the filthy heads of agents to be cutby themujahedeen,”the statement reportedly said.109In May 2005, unknown armed men shot and killed at least three Shi`a clerics in andaround Baghdad. On May 15, gunmen killed Qassim al-Gharawi, an aide to GrandAyatollah `Ali al-Sistani, and his nephew in a drive-by shooting in Baghdad. Two dayslater, gunmen killed the cleric Muwaffaq al-Hussaini. On May 18, gunmen killed thecleric Muhammad Tahir al-`Allaq while he drove to the city of Kut.110
“Many Killed in Mosul Funeral Blast,” al-Jazeera.net, March 11, 2005,http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/40D1CE62-54B3-4846-A2E2-4BAA17A61478.htm, accessed March 28,2005, and Robert F. Worth and Edward Wong, “Bombing at Shiite Mosque in Mosul Leaves 40 Dead,”NewYork Times,March 11, 2005.Steve Fainaru, “Reporter, Son Among 6 Iraqis Slain; 4 U.S. Soldiers Killed,”Washington Post,February 10,2005, and Rory McCarthy, “Iraqi Journalist and Son, 3, Shot Dead in Basra,”The Guardian,February 10, 2005,and Alhurra press release, “Alhurra Establishes Memorial Fund for Slain Correspondent,” February 11, 2005.Imam al-Hassan al-Basri is known from the early days of Islam for his strict observance of the ProphetMohammad’s teachings.109110108107
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“Militant Group Claims Killing of Iraq Journalist,”Agence France-Presse,February 9, 2005.
“Killings of Iraqi Officials Since Elected Government Was Announced April 28,”Associated Press,May 23,2005 andAlexandra Zavis, “Iraqi Police Find 38 Bodies Dumped in Three Parts of Iraq in Less Than 24 Hours,”AssociatedPress, May 15, 2005.
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Attacks on Shi`a neighborhoods have continued unabated since the current Iraqigovernment was named on April 28, 2005. On May 23, for example, unknowninsurgents carried out three major car bomb attacks in Shi`a areas, killing at least thirty-three people and wounding 120. According to press reports, the deadliest attack camefrom a pair of suicide car bombers who tried to kill a local Shi`a leader in the northerncity of Tal Afar, fifty miles west of Mosul, but instead killed at least fifteen people andwounded twenty. Other bombs exploded that day at a popular Baghdad restaurant nearthe predominantly Shi`a Sadr City in Baghdad and outside a Shi`a mosque inMahmudiyya.111On the evening of June 10, a car bomb exploded near the Nur marketplace in the al-Shula district of Baghdad, a predominantly Shi`a area, killing ten people and woundingtwenty-eight. Seven men, three women and a child reportedly died in the blast. No oneclaimed responsibility for the attack.112
Attacks on KurdsSince April 2003, various insurgent groups have attacked Kurdish civilians and civiliansites in the north, and sometimes in Baghdad. Some insurgent groups have usedimprovised explosive devices (roadside bombs), car bombs and gunmen to kill Kurdishpoliticians and journalists. On February 1, 2004, twin suicide bombs exploded at theArbil offices of the two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party(KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), killing ninety-nine people who hadgathered to mark the first day of Eid al-Adha.Iraqi governments in Baghdad have long persecuted the Kurds with discriminatory laws,forced displacement and the genocidal Anfal campaign in 1988, which resulted in anestimated 100,000 Kurdish deaths.113Comprising 15-20 percent of the population, IraqiKurds are mostly pushing for an autonomous federal state in the three northernprovinces they control, if not independence outright. The main political forceswelcomed the U.S.-led invasion, and have cooperated closely with the U.S. governmentin the hope they will achieve their goals.
Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Sabrina Tavernise, “Car Bombing in Iraq Kill 33, With Shiites as Targets,”NewYork Times,May 24, 2005, and Patrick Quinn, “Car Bombings Across Iraq Kill Dozens,”Associated Press,May23, 2005.“10 Killed, 28 Wounded in Baghdad Bombing,”Agence France-Presse,June 10, 2005, and “Eighteen Killedin Baghdad Attacks,”Sunday Telegraph,June 12, 2005.See Human Rights Watch reports:Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds,July 1993;Iraq’s Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds,May 1994;Iraq: Forcible Expulsions ofEthnic Minorities,March 2003; andClaims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Iraq,August 2004.113112
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Various armed groups make no secret of their desire to attack Kurds, whom theyconsider collaborators with the United States and the “allies of Jews and Christians.”114Most prominent among them is Ansar al-Islam fi Kurdistan (Supporters of Islam inKurdistan), a Sunni Kurdish group espousing an ultra-orthodox Islamic ideology thatbegan fighting the two principal secular Kurdish parties in 2001.115U.S. forces destroyedthe group’s bases in the villages of Biyara and Tawila near the Iranian border during the2003 air war on Iraq, killing some members and forcing others to disperse. But seniorKurdish police and intelligence officials told Human Rights Watch that Ansar al-Islamsubsequently either merged, or is cooperating closely, with Ansar al-Sunna, which hasalso claimed responsibility for many attacks on Kurdish civilians, as well as theexecutions of captured security forces. Most attacks on Kurds in the past two years havebeen attributed to Ansar al-Sunna rather than Ansar al-Islam.In the eyes of these groups, the secular Kurdish parties are allies of the enemy forcesthat occupied Iraq, and they are now trying to secede from Iraq. The Kurdish peshmergafought alongside the U.S. from northern positions in 2003, and the two main Kurdishpolitical parties are close allies of the United States. While peshmerga fighters are part ofan armed force and are therefore legitimate military targets, attacks against Kurdishcivilians, including politicians, are illegal under international humanitarian law. Civiliansmay not be attacked because their ethnic group or leadership is considered allied withthe enemy force.The most deadly attack came on February 1, 2004, when two suicide bombers detonatedtheir explosives almost simultaneously at the Arbil offices of the two main Kurdishpolitical parties—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan DemocraticParty (KDP). Although both of the parties have security forces, neither of the officestargeted served a military function. In addition, the attacks were timed to inflict the mostpossible damage on civilians.The bombs exploded during celebrations of the Muslim festival Eid al-Adha, when localpoliticians and party members traditionally receive the citizens of Arbil to wish eachother “Eid Mubarak”—Happy Eid. A video of the PUK event viewed by Human RightsWatch showed civilian party officials shaking hands with local citizens in a crowdedauditorium until a bomb exploded and chaos ensued. In total, the two bombs killedninety-nine people and wounded 246.Jennie Matthew, “Arbil Bombings Claimed by Group Linked to Al-Qaeda,”Agence France-Presse,February5, 2004.See Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan, available atwww.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/ansarbk020503.htm.115114
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One of the wounded was Zanyar Muhammad Qadir, a KDP member and civilianemployee in the party’s Organizations Unit, whose left leg was broken (see photos). Hetold Human Rights Watch what happened that day:So many people came because the party members cannot go to see allthe people, so they come here. Politicians and party members were alsoin the hall. They were standing to receive people. They made a plan tosee people, for example, the lawyers at 10:00 a.m., the engineers at 10:30,and so on. This was a little different from theother Eids. Everyone was happy that day. Itwasn’t like previous Eids. We received manypeople. At the last moment, a friend asked mewhat time it was. I said 10:30 a.m. HarrySchute, the former head of U.S. forces in thenorth, came. He was standing near SamiAbdul Rahman, the deputy prime minister,who was killed with his son. I gave Schute myplace. When he left, Sami Abdul Rahman wasstill standing. I was talking to him. At thatmoment, a sergeant in the security called tome. I heard a very loud sound, and I saw ahuge fire around the hall. I fell to the ground.I felt something hit my shoulder, and whenAn employee of the KurdistanI looked I saw Sami Abdul Rahman. He wasDemocratic Party, ZanyarMuhammad Qadir, broke his legalive but breathing his last breaths. Thewhen a suicide bomb exploded inceiling collapsed on our heads. I saw threethe party offices in Arbil on February1, 2004, killing fifty-one. A secondbodies in front of me burning. Sami Abdulbomb at the same time at the officesRahman’s bodyguards carried him out. Iof the Patriotic Union of Kurdistankilled forty-eight.tried to stand but I couldn’t. I tried to walk� 2005 Human Rights Watchbut I saw pieces of flesh on the floor. I sawthat and cried, but I couldn’t hear my voice.I couldn’t hear anything for four or five minutes. The bodies were stillburning. I looked at the people. One of them was Shawkat ShaikhYazdin, a minister for cabinet affairs. Next to him was the chiefMamosta Sa`ad `Abdullah, who had been minister of agriculture, but atthe time was head of the KDP’s Second Branch in Arbil. On the otherside was Akram Mantiq, who was the governor of Arbil. One of theirheads was blown apart. I looked around and I saw all of my friends who
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had died, and I couldn’t believe it—as if it was play. I cried and cried,but after a while a friend came and carried me out.116Qadir was taken to the hospital, which was filling with the wounded and dead. Fifty-onepeople died in the KDP attack, the party said, and 121 were wounded. The doctors wereoverwhelmed. He was forced to bandage his leg by himself, using a rifle piece as a splint.Doctors eventually found two pieces of shrapnel in his leg and eight more in other partsof his body. After five operations, the leg is slowly healing, although he is awaiting abone graft.The PUK office suffered similar devastation and death, with forty-eight people killedand 125 wounded. `Adnan Mufti, a Politburo member of the PUK and the party’s headin Arbil, suffered a broken leg and took shrapnel to the face and neck. He told HumanRights Watch how the bomb exploded, killing four of his bodyguards, twelve membersof the PUK leadership in Arbil and dozens of civilians:Nobody thought something like that could happen. We feared only a carbomb outside, and we took precautions for that. But the technical skillof those terrorists was high. It was the first time, I think, that there was asuicide bombing in Iraq…Just before 11:00 a.m., I heard a hugeexplosion and I saw fire. It was like thunder. I lost my mind for a fewseconds and then I found myself on the ground. I couldn’t turn back tolook. My leg was broken. I tried to straighten my leg but I didn’t knowwhat had happened to my head. I saw bodies on the ground, but I didn’tknow if they were dead or alive. Friends took me to the hospital. I wasbleeding from the mouth. I thought I had internal bleeding, but I foundout later that it was from shrapnel in my mouth and neck. One piecenear my mouth went through and broke two teeth. One tooth broke andthe piece embedded itself in my tongue. The shrapnel in my neck, onemillimeter from my vocal cords, went in one side and out the other. Forabout two months, I could barely speak. In my right leg were five or sixpieces of shrapnel. Three of them are still there. I’ve had two operationson my leg. I also lost my hearing in the right ear but I’m okay now afteran operation.117
116117
Human Rights Watch interview with Zanyar Muhammad Qadir, Arbil, Iraq, January 26, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with `Adnan Mufti, Arbil, Iraq, January 26, 2005.
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In a statement posted to a website on February 4, Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibilityfor the twin attacks. “Two of our martyrs, may God accept them, raided two dens of thedevils in the city of Arbil in north Iraq,” the statement said. “And with this, ourhappiness over Eid al-Adha merged with our happiness in striking the allies of Jews andChristians.”118Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for other attacks in Arbil in 2004 and 2005, usuallyagainst Kurdish political figures and police. On June 26, 2004, a car bomb targeted theKurdish Minister of Culture, Mahmud Muhammad, lightly wounding the minister, killingthe owner of a garage across the street, and wounding seventeen others.119In aninterview with Kurdistan TV that same day, Muhammad said the bomb exploded as hewas outside his home on the way to work. “Regrettably some of the bodyguards wereinjured,” he said. “I am fine.”120Human Rights Watch interviewed two witnesses to the attack.According to Sulaiman Siddiq, who owns a metal shop next tothe garage across the street, the bomb detonated around 8:10a.m. “It was a very big explosion,” he said. “All the glass in myshop broke. I saw a fire and an old man, a mechanic, near myshop was killed.121The victim was Sayyid `Ali Nuri, aged fifty and a father of five,who owned the small garage across from the college,approximately sixty meters from where the bomb went off(see photo). According to the metal shop owner Siddiq, Nuriwas taken to the hospital but he died on the way.
Another witness, Muhammad Wirya Baha’ al-Din, wasmeeting the director of Ishlik College when the bomb exploded. He took two men tothe hospital with head wounds, he said:
Sayyid `Ali Nuri, a father offive, was killed when a carbomb intended for a Kurdishofficial exploded across thestreet from his garage in Arbilon June 26, 2004.� 2005 Human Rights Watch
“Police Say No Yememi Arrested in Iraqi Bomb Probe,”Reuters,February 5, 2004, and Jennie Matthew,“Arbil Bombings Claimed by Group Linked to Al-Qaeda,”Agence France-Presse,February 5, 2004.“Car Bomb Kills One, Wounds 18 in Iraqi Kurdistan,”Agence France-Presse,June 26, 2004, and AndrewMarshall, “Militants Threaten to Kill 3 Turkish Hostages in Iraq,”Reuters,June 26, 2004.120119
118
“Iraq: Injured Kurdish minister says attacks make Kurds more determined,”BBC Monitoring Middle East,Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party Satellite TV, June 26, 2004.Human Rights Watch interview with Sulaiman Siddiq, Arbil, Iraq, February 7, 2005.
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My back was to the windows, and the explosion blew open the windowsand shattered the glass on my back. The force threw me across theroom. I took two people to the hospital, two workers. Both of themwere outside and had head injuries.122Ansar al-Sunna did not claim responsibility for the attack, but Kurdish security officialstold Human Rights Watch that they had arrested a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish manfrom the group for taking part in the attack.123On September 19, 2004, Ansar al-Sunna announced that it had captured and killed threemembers of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and a video on the group’s websiteshowed three men getting beheaded. “The puppet Kurdish groups... have pledgedallegiance to the crusaders and continue to fight Islam and its people,” a statement withthe video said.124The group also said the killings were “for us to revenge our women,children and elderly who die daily from American raids.”125On December 12, 2004, a car bomb exploded at 1:00 p.m. near the al-Khadija Mosquein Arbil as KDP official Amin Najjar was driving by. Najjar was unhurt but the bombwounded two others.126“The mujahideen managed to blow up a rigged car in Arbilagainst one of the officials of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by MasudBarzani, but the man was not killed,” a statement posted on the Ansar al-Sunna websitesaid.127Kurdish officials arrested a twenty-one-year-old Kurdish man who they claimedhad driven the explosives-laden car.128On April 28, 2005, unknown gunmen in Mosul shot and killed Sayyid Talib SayyidWahhab, a KDP official. Three days later, a bomb-laden car rammed into his funeral in
122123124125126
Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Wirya Baha’ al-Din, Arbil, Iraq, February 7, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with Kurdish security official, Arbil, February 7, 2005.“Iraqi Groups Shows Tape of Beheading of Three Kurds,”Reuters,September 19, 2004.“Video Shows Beheading of Three Iraq Hostages,”Associated Press,September 19, 2004.
“Iraqi ‘Ansar al-Sunna’ Group Claims Arbil Attack,”Reuters,December 13, 2004, “Iraq Car Bomb WoundsTwo in Kurdish City,”Agence France-Presse,December 12, 2004, and “Iraq: Car Bomb in Arbil Results in NoCasualties,”BBC Monitoring Middle East,“Failed Terrorist Attempt in the Regional Capital,”Khabat,December13, 2004.127128
“Iraqi ‘Ansar al-Sunna’ Group Claims Arbil Attack,”Reuters,December 13, 2004.Human Rights Watch interview with Kurdish security official, Arbil, February 7, 2005.
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Tal Afar, killing at least twenty-five people and wounding more than fifty.129It is notknown who staged the attack.On May 4, a suicide bomber slipped into a line of young men waiting to sign up for thepolice in Arbil and detonated his explosives, killing forty-six people and wounding anestimated 150.130“The scene was like a slaughterhouse, with body parts everywhere,heads, hands, eyes. It was terrible,” one survivor told the press.131Ansar al-Sunna soonposted a statement on the Internet. “This operation is in response to our brothers whoare being tortured in your prisons... and in response to the infidel peshmerga forceswhich surrendered themselves to the Crusaders and became a thorn in the side ofMuslims,” it said.132
Attacks on ChristiansIraq’s ancient Christian community, comprised of Chaldean Catholics, Assyrians, Romanand Syriac Catholics, Greek, Syriac and Armenian Orthodox, Anglicans and others,comprises roughly 3 percent of the country’s population, or about 800,000 people.Mostly concentrated in and around Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Arbil, Christians aregenerally in the professional class and are considered wealthier than the average Iraqi. Inthe eyes of some insurgent groups, Christians supported the U.S.-led invasion, and manymembers of the community subsequently took jobs with the CPA or U.S. government.Especially in 2004, violence against Christians by insurgent groups was consistent andintense. As of March 2005, tens of thousands of Iraqi Christians had fled the country,mostly for Syria and Jordan. And thousands left their homes for the relative safety of theKurdish-controlled north. Human Rights Watch interviewed eight of these families inJanuary and February 2005, most of them from Mosul and Baghdad. They had left theirhomes, they said, after threats, abductions and attacks. In some cases, family membershad been killed. In addition, religious extremists have threatened and attacked Christiansfor not living by strict Islamic codes. Armed groups have threatened Christian womenwho did not cover their heads and killed Christian vendors who sell alcohol.133129
“Car Bomb Targets Funeral in Iraq, Killing Many Mourners,”Associated Press,May 1, 2005, Lutfi Abu Oun,“Bomb Kills 20 at Iraq Funeral—Australian Abducted,”Reuters,May 1, 2005, and Ashraf Khalil, “Bomb AttacksPersist in Iraq,”Los Angeles Times,May 2, 2005.“Suicide Bomber Killers 45 in Northern Iraq City,”Agence France-Presse,May 4, 2005.
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Rory Carroll and Michael Howard, “They Were Lining Up To Join Iraq’s Police—But in the Queue Was aSuicide Bomber,”The Guardian,May 5, 2005.132133
“Iraq’s Ansar al-Sunna Claims Arbil Bombing—Web,”Reuters,May 4, 2005.
According to one Assyrian Christian group, some Christian families got letters from the Islamic Troops ofBadr in Najaf that threatened kidnappings and death if female family members did not wear veils. For Englishand Arabic versions of the letter, see www.assyrianchristians.com/news.htm, accessed June 7, 2005.
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One of the first reported attacks against Christians occurred in Baghdad in March 2004,when gunmen shot and killed `Aziz and Ranin Ra`d Azzu, aged five and fourteenrespectively, apparently because their father sold alcohol. The family reportedly hadreceived a death threat before the murders. “We are warning you, the enemies of Godand Islam, from selling alcohol again, and unless you stop we will kill you and send youto hell where a worse fate awaits you,” the warning reportedly said, signed by HarakatAnsar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam Movement.)134The most public and coordinated attacks took place on Sunday, August 1, 2004, wheninsurgents detonated car bombs at five churches, four in Baghdad and one in Mosul,killing eleven people and wounding more than forty. The attacks sparked an exodus ofChristians to Syria, Jordan and the Kurdish-controlled north.
A Christian woman from Baghdad living near Arbil displays her crucifixtattoo. Like hundreds of Christians from the capital, she and her familyfled to northern Iraq for safety from threats and attacks.� 2005 Human Rights Watch
The first bomb exploded around 6:00 p.m. as mass was starting at an ArmenianOrthodox church Our Lady of the Flowers in Baghdad’s al-Karrada neighborhood. Lessthan half an hour later, a second bomb exploded at the nearby Assyrian church OurLady of Salvation, followed by blasts at a church in the al-Dora neighborhood andanother in Bagdhad al-Jadida.134
Annia Ciezadlo, “Iraq’s Christians Consider Fleeing as Attacks on Them Rise,”Christian Science Monitor,July 13, 2004. See also Yochi J. Dreazen, “Iraq Sees Christian Exodus,”Wall Street Journal,September 27,2004.
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A woman named Payman was leaving the church in al-Dura, Church of the TwoMessengers, when a bomb exploded. In Kurdish-controlled Iraq, where she had fledwith her family after the attack, she told Human Rights Watch that the church wascrowded, with between 100 and 200 worshippers, when the bomb went off:The church itself was not damaged because the explosion was from theparking lot in the back. Only some windows broke. There was one ofthe poor people who gets donations. He died. We had given him moneyand we later saw him lying on the ground. An engaged couple was theregiving out their wedding invitations in the church, and both of themdied.135Human Rights Watch spoke separately with another woman who was present at thechurch during the attack. She said:I was just leaving the church going outside when I heard a big explosion.I didn’t know what happened; I just saw a lot of smoke… There was alot of confusion and chaos and people didn’t know what had happened.But people were running around and some of them were wounded. Thepeople in the back died. And then the ambulances arrived.136The day after the attacks, a previously unknown group calling itself the “Committee ofPlanning and Follow-up in Iraq” reportedly claimed responsibility on a website, saying“you wanted a crusade, and these are its results.” Human Rights Watch did not see theoriginal statement in Arabic but, based on a translation into English by an AssyrianChristian group, the statement read:A Declaration from the Committee of Planning and Follow-Up in IraqIn the name of God the most merciful,Thanks be to God the supporter of his faithful, prayers and peace beupon him, who was sent with the sword at these times as a mercy forhuman beings. He who believes in him and upholds his methods will135
Human Rights Watch interview with Payman, ‘Ain Kawa, Iraq, January 29, 2005. The interviewee did notwish to provide her family name.Human Rights Watch interview with anonymous witness, ‘Ain Kawa, January 29, 2005.
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gain paradise and he who denies him and sways away from his methodswill be lost forever.O! Muslims wherever you live...The war today in Iraq and Afghanistan is undoubtedly something thattwo Muslims wouldn’t argue about, that it’s a hateful Crusades wartargeting Islam and Muslims and that the United States and its allies137didn’t ever delay or spare an effort to fight God’s religion with all thepower that they have and with the blessing of the (Pope) before whomthe leaders of America stand like slaves.O! Believers in one God...America didn’t only occupy and invade militarily the Islamic lands butthey also founded hundreds of Christianizing establishments, printingfalse deviated books and distributing them amongst the Muslims in aneffort to strip them away of their religion and Christianize them. TheCrusaders are one nation even if they differed in their ideas.The American forces and their intelligence systems have found a safehaven and refuge amongst their brethren the grandchildren of monkeysand swine in Iraq.The graceful God has enabled us on Sunday, August 1, 2004, to aimseveral painful blows at their dens, the dens of wickedness, corruptionand Christianizing. Your striving brethren were able to blow up fourcars aimed at the churches in Karrada, Baghdad Jadida and Dora whileanother group of mujahedeen hit the churches in Mosul.As we announce our responsibility for the bombings we tell you, thepeople of the crosses: return to your senses and be aware that God’ssoldiers are ready for you. You wanted a Crusade and these are itsresults. God is great and glory be to God and his messenger. He whohas warned is excused.137
According to the translators, the Arabic version has the word “tails” instead of “allies,” which connotessubservience and humiliation.
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Prayers and peace be upon our prophet Muhammad, his kin andcompanions.The Committee of Planning and Follow-Up in Iraq14/Jamadi I/1425—August 1, 2004International Islamic Information Center138Three days later, another group used the Internet to deny that Islamic militants hadcommitted the attacks. A statement signed by the “Media Center for Mujahedeen” saidthat “if the mujahedeen had wanted to target those churches, they would have madethem disappear from the face of earth and nobody would have come out alive.”Christians in Iraq would not be harmed, the statement said, so long as they respectedthree rules: do not “collaborate with the occupation,” do not “betray Muslims,” and donot attack Islam or try to convert Muslims. At the top of the statement were the namesof three previously unknown groups, identified in English as: the Jihad Battalions, theIslamic Army Brigades and the Shura Council of Jihad. The statement did not present adefinition of collaboration or betrayal.139Muslim political and religious leaders, as well as the Iraqi Interim Government, roundlycondemned the attacks. Iraq’s most senior Shi`a Muslim cleric, Grand Ayatollah `Ali al-Hussaini al-Sistani, called the attacks “criminal acts” that targeted Iraq’s “unity, stabilityand independence.”140The Association of Muslim Scholars said the bombings were“totally remote from any religious or humanitarian norms.”141Insurgent groups bombed two more churches on November 9, 2004, the day U.S.Marines began their second major offensive on the city of al-Falluja. Around 6:30 p.m., acar bomb exploded near St. George’s Church in southern Baghdad, causing nocasualties. About five minutes later, another car bomb detonated less than one mile awayat St. Matthew’s Church, killing three people and wounding more than twenty-five. A
Translation from the website www.assyrianchristians.com (accessed February 22, 2005). See also, SalahNasrawi, “Unknown Group Claims Responsibility for Assaults on Iraqi Churches,”Associated Press,August 2,2004.“Islamists Deny Responsibility for Iraqi Church Bombings in Internet Message,”Associated Press,August 5,2004.Statement by Grand Ayatollah `Ali al-Hussaini al-Sistani, August 2, 2004. (Seehttp://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/bay9.htm, accessed February 24, 2005.)Alissa J. Rubin, “Muslims and Their Leaders Denounce Church Attacks,”Los Angeles Times,August 3,2004.141140139
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Christian man who lived near the two churches explained to Human Rights Watch howhe was wounded in the second attack:We were home, and I heard an explosion from a distance. We went upto the roof to see what it was when something exploded nearby. Theexplosion came, and rubble fell on our heads. Something cut my leftarm, and I started bleeding. All our windows broke, and the front doortoo… My neighbor cut his head, and another person got glass in hisneck.142Four or five days later, the man said, he and his wife blocked their front door withstones—because the explosions had destroyed the metal door—and set out for theKurdish-controlled north. “We came out of fear,” he said. “I don’t want to give anypersonal details because one day I will hopefully go back. I don’t want any problems.”This man joined a growing Christian community in the Kurdish zone. Although totalnumbers are not known, hundreds of Christians have settled temporarily in and aroundArbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk. According to themukhtar(local communityrepresentative) of `Ain Kawa, a largely Christian village near Arbil, approximately onehundred Christian families have come to `Ain Kawa in the past year, mostly fromMosul.143A priest in Sulaimaniyya who did not wish to be named said thirty-one familieshad come to Sulaimaniyya, Koisanjaq and a nearby Christian village called Armouta.144He showed Human Rights Watch a pile of requests from other Christian families inplaces like Baghdad, Basra and al-Falluja, asking the church for help to relocate in theKurdish region (see photo).145“I came because of fear for my daughter, who got sick from being scared,” said Payman,a mother of three who was in the Church of the Two Messengers when the bombexploded. “She was afraid to sleep alone at night. Then she got herpes.” She continued:“My two nieces worked as cleaners at the Convention Center [in Baghdad]. They werethreatened and quit. Three other girls, also Christians, worked there too. They werekilled and my nieces saw it. They came home hysterical.”146
142143144145
Human Rights Watch interview, ‘Ain Kawa, Iraq, January 29, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with Salim Mansur, ‘Ain Kawa, Iraq, January 29, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with priest in Sulaimaniyya, Iraq, January 30, 2005.
The Kurdish administrations in Arbil and Sulaimaniyya are providing basic aid to some Christian families whofled to these governorates.146
Human Rights Watch interview with Payman, ‘Ain Kawa, Iraq, January 29, 2005.
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A priest in Sulaimaniya reviews letters from Christians all over Iraqseeking help in relocating to the Kurdish-controlled north to escapethreats and attacks.� 2005 Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch interviewed three other Christian families who had lost a familymember to violence by an insurgent group. One victim was Ra`d Nisam, a twenty-three-year-old father of three, who was killed by unknown gunmen on September 26, 2004,near his home in the al-Dora neighborhood of Baghdad, although it is not certain thathe was attacked because of his religion. According to a family member, Nisam worked atthe Hunting Club in Baghdad, where he had been a manual laborer for more than sixyears. He and his co-workers, all of them Christians, were driving home from work justafter midnight when gunmen sprayed their car with bullets, wounding two and killingthree, including the Muslim driver. The family member told Human Rights Watch:I ran towards the car and I saw them there. The driver was a Muslimand he was also killed… After I saw the scene before me I don’tremember anything else. You can imagine the state I was in. All Ilearned afterwards is that the shooters wore masks but it was dark andwe don’t know who is responsible.147
V. Attacks on Civilians Working for Foreign GovernmentsWhile most insurgent attacks in 2003 targeted Iraqi or multinational forces, by early 2004insurgents began to attack so-called “soft targets” affiliated with the foreign forces in147
Human Rights Watch interview with family member, Zakho, Iraq, February 7, 2005.
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Iraq; namely, Iraqi and foreign civilians working for, or suspected of working for, theMulti-National Force or foreign governments. By far the largest number of victims hasbeen Iraqis who worked as translators, cleaners, drivers and barbers for the CPA, theU.S. government or other governments in the coalition, as well as those suspected ofgiving information to foreign governments. The total number of victims is unknown,but press reports and anecdotal evidence reveal a pattern of threats and attacks,including the murder of civilians who work with foreign governments in any capacity.According to those claiming responsibility for attacks on these civilians, the victims werevalid targets because they were collaborating with the foreign powers in Iraq. Eventhough they were not directly engaged in hostilities, they were viewed as aiding andabetting foreign forces by providing services to a government or military. As a matter ofinternational humanitarian law, any attack against civilians who are not directlyparticipating in hostilities is prohibited.The attacks are intended as punishment for perceived collaboration and as a warning toothers who might consider such work. On October 23, 2004, for example, Ansar al-Sunna posted a video on its website that showed the “confession” and execution of Saif`Adnan Kan`an, who said he was a vehicle mechanic at the U.S. base in Mosul. “I amtelling anybody who wants to work with Americans to not work with them,” he said. “Ifound out that the mujahadeen have very accurate information [and] strong intelligenceabout everything. They are stronger than I thought.” He was then beheaded.148A well documented target among this category of victims is Iraqi and foreign civiliansworking on U.S.-government-funded reconstruction contracts. According to a report bythe U.S. government’s Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, insurgentgroups killed 276 civilians working on such contracts up to March 31, 2005.149Approximately 100 of these civilians were U.S. citizens. The attacks have continuedapace since the report, with armed groups killing seven contractors, injuring eleven andkidnapping up to sixteen in August, according to the U.S. Project and ContractingOffice in Baghdad. Of the thirty-four contractors who were killed, wounded or wentmissing that month, thirty-two of them were Iraqi and none was American.150
“Iraqi Militants Behead Man Who Worked With U.S. Forces in Mosul,”Associated Press,October 23, 2004,and “Al-Qaeda-linked Group Beheads Alleged ‘Spy’ in Iraq: Website,”Agence France-Presse,October 23,2004.149150
148
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,Report to Congress,April 30, 2005.Rick Jervis, “Intimidation, Attacks Take Toll on Contractors in Iraq,”USA Today,September 7, 2005.
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Another targeted group is translators who worked for the U.S. government, the militaryor the CPA. According to one press report, insurgent groups killed fifty-two translatorsin Baghdad, al-Falluja and al-Ramadi between January and September 2004, although thereport did not specify how they were killed. Forty-five of the deaths were in Baghdad.151In one case documented by Human Rights Watch, armed men gunned down four youngwomen, all of them Christians, as they drove home from work as cleaners on the U.S.military base at Mosul airport. According to family members of the victims, the threewomen in the back seat were killed, while the driver and woman in the front survived.Tara Majid Boutros, aged nineteen, was one of those killed (see photo). A literaturestudent at the university in Mosul, she was working at the base for the summer to earnextra money for the family. Her father suffered from kidney stones and was unable towork. According to family members, the four women commuted every day from theirhomes in Bartala, just outside Mosul, to the airport base. One of them told HumanRights Watch what happened on August 31, 2004:Usually she [Tara] came home at 4:45 p.m. and we would wait for herbecause the situation in Mosul was bad. On that day she didn’t come at4:45 or 5:00. By 5:10, I was waiting in the street, and I thought to call thefamily of the driver. When I called, I heard crying, and someone saidthey had been attacked. You can imagine how I felt. I dropped thephone. I was in bare feet but I ran to the family of the driver, which wasone kilometer away.152At that point, another family member went to Mosul with a friend to look for Tara andthe other girls. They found her in al-Razi Hospital, badly wounded from bullet woundsto the lower back, hip and buttock and in need of blood. She died just after theyarrived.153The death certificate stated the cause of death as “rupture of the heart andtwo lungs as a result of gunfire.”154
Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqis Working for Americans Are in Insurgents’ Cross Hairs,”New York Times,September 18, 2004. For another article about attacks on translators, see “Iraqi Translator Defiant in Face ofDeath Threats Longs for Peace,”Agence France-Presse,June 25, 2004.152153154
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Human Rights Watch interview with family member A, Bartala, Iraq, January 31, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with family member B, Bartala, Iraq, January 31, 2005.Death Certificate, Iraqi Ministry of Health, #669266, August 31, 2004.
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The two other victims were the sisters Taghrid and Hala `Ishaq. According to thewoman in the front seat, who received a minor shrapnel wound in the back:We were driving along, and we had just passed the light near the al-Karama police station when a car came from behind and hit us on thedriver’s side. I don’t remember the kind of car, but it was milk colored. Ithink they were three, a driver and two men in the back. Our driverstopped to see who had crashed into us. Then he saw they had weaponsso, although he had slowed down, he said “Put your heads down!” andhe sped up. He sped up and the other car followed us but they had abetter car and they caught up to us and cornered us on the side of thestreet. They were shooting the whole time.I ducked and stayed down until the shootingstopped. I got a piece of metal from the car inmy back. When I lifted my head, I saw thedriver move, and he was asking the girls if theywere hit. He was holding his side because hewas hit. I didn’t feel the fragment yet, but weturned around and I saw the three girls werecovered in blood. Only Tara said “Oh!” fromthe pain. We got out of the car and opened theback door to see if we could help them. Tarawas right behind me so I asked where she washurt. She only said, “Get me to the hospital.”We tried to stop some cars to help us and finallya car stopped… Before they drove away, whenthey pulled Tara from the car, Hala slumpedover. Half of her was in the car and half outside.It was clear she was dead because she was hit inthe head and half her brain was out. Sopassersby lay her on the street and covered herwith a scarf. I called Taghrid and she moved herhand so people said she was still alive.155
Armed men gunned down fouryoung women as they drovehome from work as cleaners onthe U.S. military base at Mosulairport on August 31, 2004. Threeof them died, including Tara MajidBoutros, aged nineteen, aliterature student at the universityin Mosul.� 2005 Human Rights Watch
The woman and driver helped get Taghrid and Tara to the hospital. Taghrid was dead onarrival but Tara was still alive, the woman explained:
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Human Rights Watch interview with victim, Bartala, Iraq, January 31, 2005.
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While there, they brought Tara for x-rays. Two of the nurses were calledaway, there was only one left, so he asked me to help him put Tara inthe right position for x-rays. At that point, Tara was still able to speak.She said, “Help me.” I said, “Hold on, the doctors are coming.” Butthen, all of a sudden, she stopped speaking… They had been giving herblood. After the fourth pint, the x-rays returned. There was a bullet inher urinary tract. There was internal bleeding. They said, “We can’t helpher.”Tara’s family tried to speak with the police in Mosul but they were repeatedly rebuffed,they said. “When I tried to speak to the police, I said ‘they [the attackers] are terrorists,’but they told me, ‘no, they are mujahadin,’” one of the family members said.156Thefamily filed a complaint with the police ten days after the attack. The police took witnesstestimonies, and then one of the officers asked the family bluntly: “What got [her] intothis mess? You know the mujahadin don’t accept [working for the U.S.].” The U.S.military called the family to the airport base, where they were asked if the familysuspected anyone in the girls’ death, and whether the family had any enemies. The familysaid no. An officer said they would contact the family again in fifteen days, but thefamily has not heard from them since.In a case involving Christians, gunmen shot and killed a man named Isho NissanMarkus, aged twenty-three, and his niece Ramziyya, aged twenty-one, while they went towork at the laundry in the Presidential Palace in Baghdad, which was occupied by U.S.forces. According to a family member who wanted to remain anonymous, his tworelatives, together with three others named Ramiz, Rami and Duraid, traveled every dayby taxi to work in Baghdad’s Green Zone. On June 7, 2004, unknown assailants attackedthem on the way to the family home. The family member said:We were at home at the time and we heard the commotion outside,because the killing took place near our house, just at the end of the road.When I got there I saw Ramziyya. We took her to the Al-YarmukHospital. She had seven bullets in her back, her waist and her left hand.Isho had received three bullets to the head and he died instantly. Therewere also two other bullet wounds to his chest. Ramziyya was still alivewhen I found her but she died around 12:30 p.m. after we had arrived atthe hospital.157
156157
Human Rights Watch interview with family member A, Bartala, Iraq, January 31, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with family member, Zakho, Iraq, February 7, 2005.
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According to the family member, the other passenger Duraid also died, while Ramiz andRami were wounded. According to the Assyrian Democratic Movement, Iraq’s largestChristian political organization, three men died in the attack: Isho Nissan Markus,Duraid Sabri Hanna and Hisham `Umar.158It is possible that Hisham `Umar was killedon the street as a bystander rather than in the car.In a separate incident on the same day, the Assyrian Democratic Movement saidgunmen shot and killed a driver and three Assyrian Christian women returning fromwork at the CPA, Alice Aramayis, Ayda Petros Bakus and Muna Jalal Karim, but HumanRights Watch did not confirm this report.159In a third case involving Christians, insurgents killed two brothers whom they suspectedof working for the United States military, Khalid and Hani Boulos Tu’ma Sliwa, agedthirty and thirty-three, respectively. Gunmen shot and killed both men in their car inMosul on September 2, 2004 (see photos).According to family members, the problems began in mid-2004 when insurgentscaptured a Christian from Mosul, who they believed was giving information to the U.S.military about insurgent activity. An armed group called Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi soondistributed a video around Mosul called “The Spies,” in which the captured man“confessed” to being an informer for the United States. In the video, viewed by HumanRights Watch, the man names others as informers, including the five brothers of theSliwa family, before being beheaded with a large knife.On June 1, 2004, one of the Sliwa brothers who wished not to be named was walkinghome from a café with four friends, two Christians and two Muslims, when masked menopened fire on them with pistols. The brother said he was hit in the left arm andstomach.160Human Rights Watch saw scars in both places as well as medical recordsfrom the al-Zahrawi Teaching Hospital in Mosul attesting to the injuries.The injured brother said that acquaintances from his al-Sa`a neighborhood in Mosul,where the family had lived for five generations, had threatened him before, wronglyasserting that he was working for the U.S. military, but this was the first physical attack.Graffiti in the neighborhood called for Christians to be killed, he said, and the beheading“Terrorist Attacks on Assyrians Intensify,”www.assyrianchristians.com/news_terroristattacks_june_24_04.htm (accessed February 23, 2005).159160158
Ibid.Human Rights Watch interview with a Sliwa brother, ‘Ain Kawa, Iraq, January 25, 2005.
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video by Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, mentioned above, was widely available in Mosulmarkets. According to the brother, neither he nor anyone in his family worked for theU.S. government, but Human Rights Watch did not confirm this claim.Six weeks after the first shooting, gunmen again shot and wounded the brother.Unknown men had entered his neighborhood, he said, and when he went out to look,they opened fire with Kalashnikov assault rifles, hitting him in the right thigh and leftshin. Three other men nearby were also hit.
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Unknown gunmen in Mosul shot and killed these two brothers, Khalid and Hani Boulos Tu’ma Sliwa, aged thirtyand thirty-three, respectively, on September 2, 2004, apparently because they were thought to be givinginformation to the U.S. military about insurgent activity.� 2005 Human Rights Watch
The injured brother interviewed by Human Rights Watch left Mosul, but the other Sliwabrothers stayed behind. On September 2, relatives said, Khalid and Hani were pullingtheir red BMW out of a garage when approximately fifteen armed men blocked their
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path and opened fire with automatic rifles, killing them both. The family went to thepolice station in Mosul’s Khazraj district and gave the names of the people who hadthreatened them in the past, but said the police told them to go home. As of February2005, the family had no information on whether the attackers had been arrested. “Wewent to the police but it was no use,” the brother said.The entire family moved to `Ain Kawa after the murders, where they lived in smallrented house. “We are threatened. We cannot go back,” one of the family members said.“I would never allow my [family] to go back. We had to leave.”161In a case with a Kurdish victim, unknown insurgents abducted and beheaded KhalidAnwar Ibrahim Mustafa Khoshnaw, a father of five, in Mosul on September 9, 2004.
A son of Khalid Khoshnaw sits by his father’s grave outside Arbil. Unknowninsurgents abducted and beheaded Khalid, a Kurdish father of five, in Mosul onSeptember 9, 2004.� 2005 Human Rights Watch
Although he was not formally working for the U.S. government or military, he didoccasionally visit the U.S. base at the Mosul airport, his family said, and he hadpreviously worked with the CPA in Arbil.162His precise relationship to the U.S.government remains unclear but, by all accounts, he was not engaged in hostilities andwas a civilian under the law.
161162
Human Rights Watch interview with Sliwa family member, ‘Ain Kaws, Iraq, January 25, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with family member, Arbil, Iraq, January 26,2005
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Armed men previously had threatened Khoshnaw, a taxi driver in Mosul who wasmarried to an Arab woman for thirteen years, two family members said. About onemonth before his murder, an unknown group had abducted him for ten days, but theyreleased him unharmed.On September 9, Khoshnaw went out to buy breakfast with his young son in the al-Karama neighborhood. Some minutes later, the son returned alone. Two days later,Khoshnaw’s decapitated body appeared on a street with the left hand also severed. Arelative explained the circumstances of the murder:He went out to get breakfast. A bit later, about fifteen minutes, his soncame home and said, “my father has been killed.” I went to the placewhere the car was and I saw it burning. It was near our house. The carwas on fire but the fire engine was there and the police too, trying to putout the fire. I asked the police, and they told me Khalid had been takenaway.They told me nothing else. I went home, but the next day people toldme his head had been found near where the car was. I didn’t go myselfbut neighbors went to the hospital to identify the head. The next day,his father went to the hospital and identified his son. The body wasfound two days later. I learned from the hospital that they haddiscovered the body. We have a relative who works there. Khalid’sfather identified the body because of the tattoos with his children’snames [on the severed hand].163Three-and-a-half months after his murder, Khoshnaw’s wife gave birth to a baby boy,Ghaffur.One case reported in the press happened on January 21, 2004, when gunmen attacked aminibus carrying workers from Baghdad to the U.S. military base in al-Habbaniyya nearal-Falluja. Five Christian women were killed.164U.S. Brigadier General Mark Kimmittbelieved the purpose of the attack was “to send a message of terror to those people thatif you work for the coalition... we can reach out and touch you.”165163164
Human Rights Watch interview with family member, Arbil, Iraq, January 27, 2005.
Cecile Feuillatre, “Families Mourn Iraqi Women Slain for Doing Washing of US Troops,”Agence France-Presse,January 23, 2004.165
Alissa J. Rubin, “Four Iraqi Women Slain on Way to Work at Base,”Los Angeles Times,January 23, 2004.
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Some employees of foreign governments received threats that caused them to leave theirjobs, and subsequently moved to the relative safety of the Kurdish-controlled north orfled Iraq. One such man who spoke with Human Rights Watch in northern Iraq was acar mechanic in Mosul. In the summer of 2004, he said, U.S. soldiers asked if he wouldwork on their vehicles. He repaired two Humvee military vehicles and, one week later,was visited by Iraqi men he did not know. He explained:One week later, two men came indishdasha[white robes] and redscarves. I don’t know if they were armed. “Why are you working for theAmericans?” they said. “If you don’t stop that, we will kill you.” I said“I’m just earning a living.” They said, “If you don’t stop, we’ll kill you.”Out of fear, I never went back to my work again. And one week later weleft.166
VI. Attacks on Government Officials and PoliticiansSince mid-2003, insurgent groups have repeatedly attacked Iraqi government officialsand politicians. Various armed groups have killed dozens, if not hundreds, of local andnational government officials and political party officials, as well as judges, by means ofassassination squads, roadside bombs and suicide attacks. A total figure is not knowndue to the magnitude of the attacks and the absence of a comprehensive reportingscheme. Political figures have also been the target of criminally motivated attacks.Insurgent groups like the Islamic Army in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna and al-Tawhid wal-Jihadhave repeatedly claimed responsibility for attacks on government officials. In the run-upto the January 30, 2005, elections for the Transitional National Assembly, various groupswarned Iraqis not to take part, with leaflets in neighborhoods addressed, for example, to“everyone who wants to stand in the queues of elections, the queues of doom anddeath.”167Some insurgent groups viewed Iraq’s Interim Governing Council as a bodythat served the interests of the United States. “Our position is clear—they are all spies,traitors, and agents for the Americans,” said a spokesman for Jaysh Muhammad, one ofthe larger Sunni groups.168
166167
Human Rights Watch with victim, ’Ain Kawa, January 29, 2005.
“Election Eve Lock-Downs Begin in Iraq,” CNN.com, January 28, 2005. (Seehttp://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/28/iraq.main/, accessed March 12, 2005.)168
Ali Kais al-Rubai, “Islamists Pledge Continued War on Coalition,” IWPR, May 14, 2004.
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One of the most prominent political killings was on August 29, 2003, when a car bomboutside the Imam Ali Mosque in al-Nafaj, killed Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim,head of SCIRI, and more than eighty-two other people (see chapter IV of this report,“Attacks on Ethnic and Religious Groups”).Shi`a politicians have since been a regular target of insurgent attacks. On September 20,2003, unknown gunmen in west Baghdad shot `Aqila al-Hashimi, one of three femalemembers of the U.S.-appointed Interim Governing Council, and she died five days later.A Shi`a Muslim and former diplomat, `Aqila al-Hashimi was preparing to leave for NewYork as part of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. Oneeyewitness told the press: “I saw a pick-up truck and a Mercedes pull up just as she wasleaving in her Land Cruiser with her bodyguards following in a second car.” Hecontinued:There were men hiding in the back of the pick-up with guns whojumped up and started firing. As her car tried to escape, someone threwa grenade. I saw her brother, who was one of her bodyguards, comerunning with blood on his face, shouting ‘My sister, my sister!’169According to members of al-Hashimi’s security detail, the assailants first fired a rocket-propelled grenade, missing her car, and then opened fire with Kalashnikov assaultrifles.170`Aqila al-Hashimi arrived at the al-Yarmuk hospital around 10:30 a.m. withserious abdominal wounds, and was taken to a U.S. military hospital.171She underwenttwo surgeries and died on September 25.172`Aqila al-Hashimi’s replacement on the governing council was another Shi`a woman, adentistry professor named Salama al-Khafaji, who was active in the dentists’ union afterthe fall of Saddam Hussein’s government (see photo in Chapter XI of this report,“Attacks on Women”). On January 16, 2004, gunmen in Iraqi police uniforms attackedSalama al-Khafaji’s convoy in Baghdad, but her bodyguards returned fire, and no onewas hurt. Four months later, on May 27, unidentified assailants ambushed her convoyagain, this time near al-Yusufiyya, south of Baghdad, killing her bodyguard and her eldestson Ahmad.
Peter Beaumont, “Senior Iraqi Official Gunned Down—Assassination Attempt Leaves Council MemberFighting for Her Life,”The Observer,September 21, 2003.170171172
169
“Shot Iraqi Council Member Reportedly Stable,”Associated Press,September 20, 2003.“Iraq Council Member Shot, Critically Wounded,”Associated Press,September 20, 2003.Rory McCarthy, “US Appointee Dies From Bullet Wounds,”The Guardian,September 26, 2003.
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Salama al-Khafaji was driving from al-Najaf to Baghdad in the early evening when fourmen in a red Opel overtook her three-car convoy. The Opel turned around and spedback in the opposite direction, al-Khafaji told a journalist who profiled her life. “Theylooked at us and knew who we were. They went away to get their weapons and cameback,” she explained. “I saw Ahmad’s car veering off the road into a canal, but there wasso much dust that I couldn’t really see what happened.” To save her life, al-Khafaji’sdriver sped away.That night al-Khafaji learned that her bodyguard had been killed, and her son’s body wasfound the following day. “When I was in Najaf, I met many women who had lost theirsons, husbands, brothers and I was very moved by their desire for peace,” she said in theprofile. “It’s the women who have suffered the most under this occupation. And that’swhy it’s women who want peace the most.”173Insurgent groups have targeted individual Kurdish politicians as well. On March 28,2004, armed men in the al-Karama neighborhood of Mosul tried to assassinate NasrineBerwari, Minister of Municipalities and Public Works, and one of five Kurdish ministersand the only woman in the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Interim Government. She escaped, buta driver and bodyguard were killed.174Human Rights Watch interviewed one Kurdishpolitician, Sadi Ahmad Pire, a PUK political representative in Mosul, who said he hadsurvived three assassination attempts. In March 2004, insurgents attacked his Mosuloffice with mortars, killing two guards and wounding eight, he said. In July 2004,insurgents attacked his convoy in Mosul with a roadside bomb. And in August 2004,insurgents attacked his convoy with an explosives-laden car. “I had switched cars, andthey attacked the old car with a suicide bomb,” he said.175According to a press report,the attack killed two bystanders and a bodyguard.176The February 1, 2004, suicide bomber attacks at the Arbil offices of the main Kurdishpolitical parties killed ninety-nine people and wounded 246 (see chapter IV of thisreport, “Attacks on Ethnic and Religious Groups”). While most of the casualties wereKurdish civilians who were visiting the party offices on the holiday of Eid al-Adha, manyparty officials were also killed, including Sami Abdul-Rahman, deputy prime minister of
Mohamad Bazzi, “Female Iraqi Poised to Take, Power, “Newsday,January 24, 2005. See also MichaelGeorgy, “Iraqi Politician Tells Harrowing Ambush Tale,”Reuters,May 28, 2004.174
173
Colin McMahon, “Iraqi Ministry Chief OK After Gunmen Attack Convoy,”Chicago Tribune,March 29, 2004,and Christopher Torchia, “Iraqi Minister Escapes Assassination,”Associated Press,March 28, 2004.Human Rights Watch interview with Sadi Pire, Arbil, Iraq, January 29, 2005.“Iraqi Kurdish Leader Survives Car Bomb,”Reuters,August 26, 2004.
175176
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the KDP government, Akram Mantiq, governor of Arbil province, Mantiq’s deputyMahdi Khoshnaw and twelve members of the PUK leadership in Arbil.Below is a list of the leading Iraqi political figures attacked between March 2003 and July2005, each based on two or more media sources.177•January 28, 2004—A car bomb exploded outside the Baghdad hotel inhabited byMinister of LaborSami Azara al-Majun.He was not hurt, but three peoplewere killed.May 17, 2004—A car bomb in Baghdad killed acting president of the InterimGoverning Council,`Abd al-Zahra `Usman Muhammad,known as ‘IzzedinSalim. Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad later claimed credit for the attack.May 22, 2004—A car bomb at the house of`Abd al-Jabbar Yusuf,DeputyInterior Minister, kills Yusuf and five others. Thirteen people were wounded.July 14, 2004—A group reportedly run by al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility formurdering the governor of Nineveh province,`Usama Kachmula,and two ofhis bodyguards in Mosul.July 17, 2004—Justice MinisterMalik Duhan al-Hassanescaped a suicide carbomb attack in Baghdad, but five others were killed.August 24, 2004—A suicide bomber attacks Environment MinisterMiskatMu’minand Education MinisterSami al-Muzaffar.They both survived, butfive other people were killed.September 1, 2004—The Islamic Army in Iraq claimed responsibility for anattack on the convoy ofAhmad Chalabi,head of the Iraqi National Congress,in al-Latifiyya, south of Baghdad. Chalabi survived but two of his bodyguardswere killed.September 7, 2004—Baghdad governor`Ali Radi al-Haidariescaped anassassination attempt, but two civilians were killed.November 1, 2004—Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for killing the deputygovernor of Baghdad,Hassan Kamil `Abd al-Fattah,in the city’s al-Doradistrict.
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The two primary sources are “Attacks Against Leading Iraqi Figures Since May 2003,”Agence France-Presse,January 4, 2005, and “Killings of Iraqi Officials Since Elected Government Was Announced April 28,”Associated Press,May 23, 2005.
177
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January 4, 2005—Baghdad Governor`Ali Radi al-Haidariand one of hisbodyguards were killed by unidentified assailants in a roadside ambush in thecapital.April 27, 2005—Gunmen shot and killed a Shi`a member of parliament,Lamia`Abid Khaduri al-Sagri,as she opened the door of her Baghdad home. Al-Sagri, who had reportedly escaped two previous assassination attempts, hadrecently been elected to the Iraqi parliament on then-Prime Minister Ayad`Allawi’s Iraqi List.May 8, 2005—Unknown gunmen shoot and killZoba Yass,a senior official inthe Transportation Ministry, along with his driver in Baghdad.May 14, 2005—Unknown gunmen shoot and killJassim Muhammad Ghani,director-general of the Foreign Ministry, outside his home in Baghdad.May 18, 2005—Unknown gunmen in Baghdad shoot and killSalah Niyazi,anofficial from the Youth and Sport Ministry.June 28, 2005—A suicide car bomber killed the influential Shi`a member ofparliamentDhari `Ali al-Fayadh,his son and two bodyguards as they drove toBaghdad. Al-Fayadh was parliament’s eldest member and was serving as interimspeaker. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attack.July 19, 2005—Unknown gunmen in Baghdad killedMijbil Shaikh al-`Issa,aSunni representative on the Constitution Drafting Committee of theTransitional National Assembly,Dahman al-Jaburi,an adviser to theCommittee, and their driver.
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Judges are not included in the above list but they have also been the target of attack. OnJanuary 25, 2005, for example, armed men in a car shot and killed Qais Hashim al-Shamari, the secretary of Iraq’s Council of Judges, together with his son. Ansar al-Sunnaclaimed responsibility for the attack, saying, “the heroes laid a carefully planned trap toone of the symbols of infidelity and apostasy in the new Iraqi government, theadministrator of Iraq’s judges.”178On March 1, 2005, unknown gunmen shot and killedJudge Barawiz Mahmud, who worked for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, and his son as theyleft their home in Baghdad.179
178
Dexter Filkins, “Insurgents Vowing to Kill Iraqis Who Brave the Polls on Sunday,”New York Times,January26, 2005.
179
Patrick Quinn, “Iraqi Judge on Saddam Case Killed,”Associated Press,March 1, 2005, and “Gunmen KillIraqi Judge and Son Working for Tribunal Trying Saddam,”Agence France-Presse,March 2, 2005.
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In addition to these documented cases, insurgents have threatened, assaulted, abductedand killed hundreds of local officials, including employees at national ministries,provincial governments and municipalities. Typically the persons responsible areunknown. Human Rights Watch interviewed one man who worked in the al-Fallujamunicipality and fled Iraq after insurgents detained him for two days. The man, whowished to remain anonymous, had previously received warnings to leave his job andthen, on May 7, 2004, unknown men abducted him on his way to work. He explained:On the first day, they asked me for my name and other personalquestions. Then they said, “Didn’t we tell you not to work with theAmericans? We are following everything, and we have people in thepolice and other places.” They took down my name and address and leftthe room.The next day a group of them came. One of them was senior. They addressed him as“shaikh.” He also said, “we told you not to work with the Americans.” I said I wasworking with the [municipality]. He said “the emir has issued a fatwa ordering yourkilling. You ate, drank and shook the hands of the infidels, so that makes you an infidel.You are a pig and a monkey just like them.” I was too scared to ask who the emir was. Ijust said I repent. They told me, “after we kill you, if God wants to forgive you he can.”I said I have a family, and they told me to shut up. They left and then came back fiveminutes later. They said, “the emir wants to execute the sentence of Islam, but webegged him to give you another chance. But you must leave Iraq, not just Falluja. If youstay, the blood of your wife and children will also be spilled.” One of them held his rifleto my head and cocked the trigger.180After his release, insurgents threw hand grenades at his home and burned it down, hesaid. His wife and children moved out of al-Falluja to live with family elsewhere, and theman fled Iraq, to a country he did not want to identify. Other municipal workers in al-Falluja had been killed, he said. He had found one such person’s body around thetown—a first lieutenant who had worked with the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (which wassubsequently incorporated into the Iraqi armed forces).181The period before the January 30, 2005, Iraqi elections was particularly violent, withalmost daily attacks against candidates and election commission officials. Due to threatsHuman Rights Watch interview with former al-Falluja municipal employee, location outside Iraq undisclosed,June 6, 2004.181180
The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps was set up by the Coalition Provisional Authority, and then incorporated intothe Iraqi National Guard in June 2004.
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and attacks, very few political groups had public meetings or campaigns. Most did notrelease the names of their candidates until days before the vote.In a survey of election-related incidents, the U.S.-based International Foundation ofElectoral Systems (IFES) documented 141 cases in the forty-five days prior to theelections, ranging from “vandalism of campaign material to intimidation, death threats,kidnapping, assassination, small arms fire, suicide bombings, and executions.”182In theseventy cases for which a perpetrator could be determined, “insurgent-initiated violencefar outnumbered participant-initiated violence.”183For example, on December 26, 2004, gunmen shot and killed Communist Party leaderSa`di `Abd al-Jabbar al-Bayati south of Baghdad.184Ten days later, on January 5, 2005,gunmen killed Hadi Salih, another Communist Party leader.185On January 12, gunmenkilled two aides to Ayatollah `Ali al-Sistani in Salman Pak and Najaf—Ansar al-Islamclaimed responsibility for the killing in Salman Pak.186On January 17, gunmen killedShakir Jabir Sahla, a candidate for the Constitutional Monarchy Movement.187The nextday, gunmen in Basra shot and killed two candidates from the Iraqi National Accord,Riad Radi and `Ala’ Hamid.Election commission workers were the regular target of threats, harassment and violenceby insurgents, which severely impeded their ability to work. In one incident that receivedIraqi and international media attention, gunmen pulled five election workers from a caron Baghdad’s Haifa Street on December 19, 2004, and shot three of them to death.188
182
IFES defined election-related violence as “violence that is aimed at hindering or disrupting any part of theelectoral process.”
International Federation of Electoral Systems, “Iraq Election Violence, Education and Resolution Report onthe January 30 Elections,” February 23, 2005.On November 13, 2004, unknown gunmen shot and killed Iraqi Communist Party Politburo member anddelegate in the interim National Assembly, Wadhah Hassan Abdul Amir, along with two colleagues, whiledriving from Baghdad to Kirkuk. (See http://www.iraqcp.org/members2/0041115icpengl.htm, accessed January5, 2005).185186184
183
“Iraqi Communist Killed in Baghdad,”Agence France-Presse,January 5, 2005.
The victim in Salman Pak was Mahmoud Madaeni, who was shot to death with his son and four bodyguards.Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Iraq Poll Fears Deepen as Sistani Aides Killed,”Reuters,January 13, 2005, andAnthony Shadid, “Sunni Group Says It Killed Shiite Cleric,”Washington Post,January 15, 2005.187188
Bassem Mroue, “Gunmen Kill Three Iraq Candidates,”Associated Press,January 18, 2005.
John F. Burns, “At Least 64 Dead as Rebels Strike in 3 Iraqi Cities,”New York Times,December 20, 2004,“Total of Eight Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission Members Killed,”Agence France-Presse,December 20,2004.
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As election day approached, election workers increasingly quit their jobs due to threats.In one reported example that typified the threats, a Baghdad resident was distributingvoter registration papers in his al-Bayya` neighborhood until he received a threateningletter in the mail. “The sword has become very near to your neck,” the letter said.“Leave any work that relates to the elections and stay safe.”189Election day was quieter than many had predicted, largely due to well-coordinatedsecurity measures and a country-wide ban on car travel. At least one insurgent groupstated that it would not attack voters or polling places. The Islamic Front of the IraqiResistance, apparently an umbrella organization of various Sunni armed groups,announced on January 27 that, while it condemned the elections as “a farce” that will“serve U.S. interests,” it had ordered its fighters not to attack polling stations or toinvolve themselves in any way “in shedding one drop of the blood of our honorableIraqi people.”190Insurgent groups have also targeted the family members of politicians. On November10, 2004, armed men in Baghdad abducted three relatives of then-Iraqi Prime MinisterAyad `Allawi, two of them women. A group called Ansar al-Jihad claimed responsibilityand demanded that male and female detainees in Iraq be released and that the U.S.military halt its offensive in al-Falluja. They released the two women four days later and,one week later, they released the man, `Allawi’s seventy-five-year-old cousin.191Aftertheir release, al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility, and said it had releasedthe three `Allawi relatives because they were not involved in the government.192
189190
“Iraqi Elections Officials Quit After Death Threats,”Sunday Telegraph,January 2, 2005.
“Iraq’s ‘Islamic Resistance Front’ Says Elections ‘US Conspiracy,’”BBC Monitoring Middle East,Statementby the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance, carried by Quds Press web news agency, January 30, 2005, andSamir Haddad, “Iraqi Resistance Group Says Not to Target Elections,”IslamOnline.net,January 27, 2005.Maggie Michael, “Two or Allawi’s Kidnapped Relatives Freed,”Associated Press,November 15, 2004, and“Iraq PM’s Two Female Relatives Released: Party Source,”Agence France-Presse,November 15, 2004.192191
Maamoun Youssef, “Zarqawi Group Claims Allawi Kidnappings,”Associated Press,November 22, 2004.
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VII. Attacks on Civilians Applying for the Iraqi Security ForcesInsurgent groups have frequently targeted groups of men waiting to sign up for the Iraqipolice or armed forces, which they consider “collaborating with the infidel crusaders.”193Typically, a large car bomb explodes outside a police station or other building where theregistration process is taking place.Iraqi soldiers and policemen engaged in military operations are legitimate targets underinternational humanitarian law. These attacks, however, are unlawful because the targetswere not combatants. The applicants were not yet members of the security forces—theywere still civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities. The intention to join a securityforce does not revoke the immunity a civilian enjoys.Even if such attacks were targeting a police station used for military purposes or amilitary recruiting center, the nature of the attacks likely makes them unlawful asindiscriminate or as causing disproportionate civilian harm. In any case, the bombingscases documented in this chapter suggest that the intended target was the applicantsoutside the building—all of them still civilians—rather than the building, whether or nota military target, they were waiting to enter. Moreover, many of the attackers employedperfidious means, feigning civilian status to get close to their target, which is likewiseunlawful under international law.On February 10, 2004, for example, a suicide bomber detonated a truck bomb outside apolice station in al-Iskandariyya, killing some fifty applicants and other civilians and nopolice. The bomb ripped the front off the police station, blasted a large crater in theconcrete and threw body parts across the street.According to witnesses, the bomb detonated around 8:30 a.m. in an area that held thepolice station, the local court and the mayor’s office. The compound was crowded withpeople applying for jobs at the police, some of whom were killed. The local police said ared pick-up truck with 500 pounds of explosives detonated as it drove by the station.
On April 9, 2005, men passed out leaflets from al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia at mosques in Mosul thatthreatened Sunnis who joined the Iraqi armed forces. “Sunnis must ban their sons from collaborating with theinfidel crusaders,” the leaflet reportedly said. “Allowing Sunnis to join the tyrannical army would make jihad loseits meaning.” (Dexter Filkins, “Demonstrators in Iraq Demand That U.S. Leave,”New York Times,April 10,2005.)
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“We found the bodies burnt and broken into pieces. We found pieces of flesh on theroof,” a witness told the press. “We found body parts that we couldn’t tell who theybelonged to. There were pieces of women.”194According to one press report, no Iraqi police died.195According to the Iraqi InteriorMinistry, between forty and fifty people died and up to 100 people were injured,including four members of the police.196The next day, February 11, a suicide bomber in a car detonated his explosives amidst alarge group of Iraqis waiting outside an army recruitment center in southeasternBaghdad, killing between thirty-six and forty-seven applicants.197“I saw a whiteOldsmobile slowly approaching. It ran over some people and exploded,” one injuredIraqi army officer said from his hospital bed. “I was blown up in the air and saw fire andbody parts all around me.”198On July 28, 2004, a suicide car bomb exploded outside a police station in Ba`quba andkilled sixty-eight people. The target was the hundreds of men waiting to sign up for thepolice outside the station, but the bomb had a devastating impact on nearby shops,apartments and a minibus. “I saw all those volunteers standing in line and I had a feelingsomething was about to happen, so I locked my shop and started to walk away,” agrocery store owner next to the station told the press. “That’s when the explosionhappened. I saw smoke, people running everywhere, shrapnel falling and pieces of flesh.I don’t know whom to blame, because no Muslim and no Iraqi could do such athing.”199
Justin Huggler, “Terrorists Spark Fear of Civil War in Iraq as 50 Die in Car Bomb,”Independent,February11, 2004.Hannah Allam, “Truck Bomb Kills at Least 50 Outside Police Station South of Baghdad, Iraq,”Knight Ridder,February 11, 2004.Mariam Fam, “Truck Bomb Outside Police Station South of Baghdad Kills Dozens; Crowd BlamesAmericans,”Associated Press,February 10, 2004.“36 Killed in Baghdad Suicide Car Bombing,” Agence France-Presse, February 11, 2004, and Mariam Fam,“Vehicle Bomb at Iraqi Army Recruiting Station Kills Dozens of Iraqis in Second Deadly Attack in Two Days,”Associated Press,February 11, 2004.Mariam Fam, “Vehicle Bomb at Iraqi Army Recruiting Station Kills Dozens of Iraqis in Second Deadly Attackin Two Days,”Associated Press,February 11, 2004.Pamela Constable and Bassam Sebti, “Suicide Bomber Kills 68 In Iraq; Attack in Baqubah Aimed at Line ofPolice Applicants,”Washington Post,July 29, 2004.199
198197196195
194
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According to one press report, “the blast strewed corpses, tangled wreckage and puddlesof blood over a busy, sun-baked street of shops and government offices.”200Onewitness said he saw burnt-up bodies inside the bus. “There were several bodies insidethe shops and on the rooftops,” he said.201On February 28, 2005, at about 8:30 am in the city of al-Hilla, sixty miles south ofBaghdad, a car bomb exploded and killed at least 125 people and wounded about 130.The apparent target was a group of several hundred people who were lined up outside ahealth center to take medical exams for acceptance into the police and armed forces.Among the dead were people in the market across the street from the health center. Inaddition to directly targeting civilians, the attack was unlawfully directed at a healthcenter, which is a protected object.202“I was standing inside the door when I saw a carcoming fast down the road opposite the clinic,” a security guard at the health clinic said.“All of a sudden the glass and shrapnel started coming down all around my head. WhenI got outside I couldn’t believe it: there were dead bodies everywhere, and blood on thewalls and the street.”203The day after the attack, the al-Qaeda Organization for Holy War in Iraq claimedresponsibility, according to a statement posted on the Internet. “A lion from ourmartyrdom brigade plunged into a gathering of apostates in front of a police andNational Guard registration center, blowing up his loaded car and killing 125 apostates,”the statement said. “The blood of the apostates was helping the Americans. They hadsold their religion and their honor.” Human Rights Watch could not verify the claim, butit appeared on a website most often used by Iraqi insurgents and was in the name of theperson who usually disseminates statements by al-Qaeda in Iraq.204In the most recent large-scale attack, on May 4, a suicide bomber detonated hisexplosives amidst a group of Kurdish men waiting to sign up for the police in Arbil,
200201202
Megan K. Stack, “Vehicle Bombing Kills 68 in Iraq,”Los Angeles Times,July 29, 2004.“Iraqi Police Recruits Caught in Morning Carnage,”Agence France-Presse,July 28, 2004.
See, e.g. Protocol I, art. 52(3) on the general protection of civilian objects: “In case of doubt whether anobject which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling ora school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be soused.”Warzer Jaff and Robert F. Worth, “Blast Kills 122 at Iraqi Clinic in Attack on Security Recruits,New YorkTimes,March 2, 1005. See also Haider Abbas and Mussab al-Khairalla, ”Suicide Car Bomb Kills 110 in Iraq,”Reuters,February 28, 2005.204203
“Web Site: Al Qaeda in Iraq Claims Hilla Bombing,”Reuters,March 1, 2005.
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killing forty-six people and wounding an estimated 150.205Ansar al-Sunna claimedresponsibility for the attack.206(See “Attacks on Kurds” in chapter IV of this report,“Attacks on Ethnic and Religious Groups”.)
VIII. Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations and the U.N.Since the summer of 2003, some insurgent groups in Iraq have targeted foreign and Iraqistaff of humanitarian organizations and U.N. agencies that provide health care, food andother assistance to Iraq. They have used suicide bombers against offices and committedabductions and summary executions.The insurgent groups responsible consider foreign aid organizations and the U.N. to bepart and parcel of the foreign forces in Iraq and therefore legitimate targets for attack.The broad-based and apparently indiscriminate nature of the attacks has resulted in thedeparture of most foreign humanitarian workers in Iraq.According to international humanitarian law, aid workers, whether foreign nationals orcitizens, are civilians who are protected from attack. Moreover, international lawimposes additional obligations on governments and armed groups to facilitate the workof impartial humanitarian organizations that aid the victims of the conflict.207The threats and violence have forced countless Iraqis working for foreign aidorganizations to abandon their jobs, and sometimes the country. Especially after thespate of abductions of foreigners in 2004, international humanitarian organizationssharply scaled down operations or stopped their operations in Iraq altogether. Many ofthese groups were providing desperately needed services and aid to the population in thefields of sanitation, health care and education.One of the first large-scale attacks was on August 19, 2003, when insurgents detonated amassive truck bomb outside the U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad,killing twenty-two people and wounding more than 150. U.N. Special Representative tothe Secretary-General Sergio Vieira de Mello was among the dead.
205
“Suicide Bomber Killers 45 in Northern Iraq City,”Agence France-Presse,May 4, 2005, and Rory Carroll andMichael Howard, “They Were Lining Up To Join Iraq’s Police—But in the Queue Was a Suicide Bomber,”TheGuardian,May 5, 2005.“Iraq’s Ansar al-Sunna Claims Arbil Bombing—Web,”Reuters,May 4, 2005.ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,vol. I, rules 55 & 56; see also Protocol I, Article 81(4).
206207
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While the United Nations is not a humanitarian organization per se, agencies likeUNICEF, the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP) were providing essential services for the population,such as education, health and nutrition, water and environmental sanitation, and childprotection.208From June 1 to mid-July 2003, there were fifteen security incidents that affected theUnited Nations, including rocket-propelled grenade attacks on the World Food Program(WFP) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) offices in Mosul and gunfireat the UNDP office in Baghdad.209At 4:30 p.m. on August 19, a suicide bomber drivinga flatbed truck drove unhindered up the service road next to U.N. headquarters anddetonated an estimated 1,000 kilograms of high explosives under de Mello’s office onthe third floor.Rasha al-Kaisy, a personal assistant at the United Nations in Iraq since 1998, was sittingin her office when the bomb went off. She told Human Rights Watch:I did not hear the sound of the bomb. All of a sudden it happened thatall the glass shattered. At first I thought it was something small, butwhen I came out and saw the destruction, I realized it was big. At firstpeople didn’t know what it was. Later we were told it was a car bomb.Of course the building was without security. I saw a lot of injuredpeople, people screaming, people on the ground. You didn’t know ifthey were alive or dead. So many injured people were on the ground.210Another U.N. staff member, Layla al-Mulla, was an administrative assistant to de Mello’schief of staff, Nadia Yunis, who was also killed. Al-Mulla was sitting in her office acrossthe hall from de Mello’s office when the bomb exploded:It was exactly 4:30 because I looked at my computer. I felt nothing atthat moment; I just heard something. We were used to heavy bombs andexplosions, and this sounded far away—like a thump. I was near theThe United Nations had been present in Iraq for more than forty years, with an enlarged presence in the mid-1990s to administer the Oil-for-Food Program. In anticipation of hostilities between Iraq and the United States,the United Nations evacuated its 387 international staff members on March 18, 2003. They stayed out of Iraq208during the U.S.-led invasion and returned to Baghdad on May 1, 2003. De Mello arrived with his staff andsecurity detail one month and one day after that.209210208
Ibid.Human Rights Watch interview with Rasha al-Kaisy, Amman, Jordan, February 13, 2005.
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window, actually the whole wall was window, and I felt something comedown on me from behind. I just lowered my head instinctively andeverything came crashing down on me. The whole place was upsidedown. My mind didn’t register, so I left my desk and stood next to acolumn. I looked down and saw a black cloud growing up towards me. Itried to leave the room, but I made it a few steps, and it was completelydark. I waited for it to clear, but it was dusty, and debris was everywhere,filling my lungs. I saw a crack in the concrete ceiling, and the buildingwas tilting. It was clear that the door to Sergio’s office was crushed. Itried to get out.I didn’t know what to do. I went down and saw the injured people, theblood, the dust all over the place. People were stuck under rubble. Themore I moved out of the building, the more destruction I saw. It waschaos. There were people dead all around, people screaming out inpain.211Twenty-two people died in all. Fifteen of the victims worked for the United Nations—five Iraqis and ten international staff. Of the non-U.N. employees, three were Iraqis andfour were foreigners.212Responsibility for the bombing of the U.N. headquarters remains unclear because threearmed groups have claimed to have committed the attack; the CPA and Iraqigovernment alleged a fourth. On August 21, a previously unknown group called theArmed Vanguards of Muhammad’s Second Army, al-Ramadi branch, claimedresponsibility in a statement sent to the al-`Arabiya television station, where it wasviewed by other news agencies.213“Where was the United Nations when the UnitedStates and Britain waged war on Iraq and killed Iraqi children, elderly men and women?”the statement said. “As to its work in helping Iraq, all it is doing is paying monthlysalaries to its employees from our oil.” Two days later, Lebanese LBC Televisionreported that Jaysh Muhammad, which may be the same group, had claimedresponsibility. In an audio taped statement the station received, members of the group’s
211212
Human Rights Watch interview with Layla al-Mulla, Amman, Jordan, February 13, 2005.
“Colleagues Killed in Baghdad Example of UN Family ‘At Its Most Committed and Most Courageous’, SaysSecretary-General to Memorial Service,” U.N. Press Release, September 19, 2003.“Shadowy Group Claims Baghdad UN Bombing, Vows More Attacks,”Agence France-Presse,August 21,2004, and Dexter Filkins, “Inquiry in U.N. Bombing Focuses On Possible Ties to Iraqi Guards,”New YorkTimes,August 22, 2004.213
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`Abdullah Bin-Iyad Brigade said they had bombed the United Nations as well as shelledthe Presidential Palace, occupied by the Multi-National Force, numerous times.214In May 2004, a reporter for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR)interviewed a man “credibly claiming” to be a spokesman for Jaysh Muhammad. Whenasked about his position regarding the bombing of the United Nations, the man replied,“There is no real United Nations…. It is an organization completely controlled by theUnited States and its resolutions always serve U.S. interests.”215On August 25, 2004, theLondon-basedal-Hayatnewspaper reported a statement by the Abu-Hafs al-MasriBrigades, a group affiliated with al-Qaeda that claimed responsibility for the bombing as“a lesson to the United States.” The U.N. headquarters was working “in collaborationwith the criminal Saddam Hussein, the main U.N. center for starving the Iraqi people fortwelve years,” the statement said.216In February 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority officials and the U.S. military said theyhad obtained intelligence and evidence that linked al-Qaeda and Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawito the U.N. bombing, but they did not provide information to support their claim.217The U.S. State Department later accused al-Zarqawi’s Jama`at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad forthe attack, again without providing evidence.218Finally, on January 15, 2005, the Iraqiauthorities arrested Sami Muhammad Ali Said al-Jaaf, also known as Abu Omar al-Kurdi, who they claimed was a top lieutenant in al-Qaeda. According to an Iraqigovernment statement, al-Jaaf confessed to preparing thirty-two car bombs, includingthe car used in the U.N. attack.219One month after the U.N. bombing, on September 22, 2003, another bomb exploded ina parking lot approximately fifty meters from the Canal Hotel gate, killing a U.N.security guard and two Iraqi policemen. By November, the U.N.’s international staff hadwithdrawn from Baghdad.
“Iraq: ‘Muhammad Army’ Group Says It Bombed UN Headquarters,”BBC Monitoring Middle East,Report byLebanese LBC Sat TV, August 23, 2003.215216
214
Ali Kais al-Rubai, “Islamists Pledge Continued War on Coalition,”IWPR,May 14, 2004.
“Statement Said From al-Qa’idah Claims Responsibility for UN HQ Attack in Iraq,”BBC Monitoring MiddleEast,Muhammad Salah, “Al-Qi’diah Claims Responsibility for Blowing Up UN Headquarters in Baghdad,”al-Yat,August 25, 2003.Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing With Daniel Senor and Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, Baghdad,Iraq, February 12, 2004.Foreign Terrorist Organization: Designation of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad and Aliases,” U.S. Departmentof State press statement, October 15, 2004. (See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/37130.htm, accessedMarch 9, 2005.)219218217
Bassem Mroue, “Iraq Forces Arrest Top al-Qaida Lieutenant,”Associated Press,January 24, 2005.
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The attacks have greatly limited the United Nation’s ability to work. The U.N. AssistanceMission for Iraq (UNAMI), established by Security Council Resolution 1500 in August2003, moved to neighboring Jordan. The international staff that returned to Baghdadwas restricted to the U.S.-protected Green Zone. And the Baghdad office was burdenedby the exorbitant costs of security and logistics. Of 256 staff in Baghdad in February2005, more than 200 were security.Insurgents have also targeted the International Committee of the Red Cross, which hasbeen in Iraq since the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. Around 11:00 a.m. on July 22,2003, gunmen shot and killed ICRC communications technician Nadisha YasassriRunmuthu just north of al-Hilla and seriously wounded his Iraqi driver, Mazin HamidRashid.220On January 13, 2005, an ICRC driver went missing near Abu Ghraib, and hisbody was found the following day. The unnamed victim was an Iraqi national in hisforties who had four children, the ICRC said.221On the morning of October 27, 2003, a vehicle with explosives detonated at the ICRCheadquarters in Baghdad, killing twelve, including two local ICRC staff, Zuhair`Abdullah Ahmad al-Shaikhli and Dekran Gregor Dekran Hagopian.222An ICRC driverwas present at the headquarters during the attack. He told Human Rights Watch what hesaw:We were sitting in the ICRC building and were outside the reception. Isaw how the car bomb entered. You know what happens. I wassurprised that a big vehicle could get so close. One guy named Omarwas at the reception. He shot at the car. Then it exploded. I saw all thebody parts on the wall. I was outside the building. Eight guys in thereception were killed… The bodies were all over. It was terrible, veryawful. You can imagine if you see a body covered in blood and someparts are stuck on the wall and the ground is covered in blood.223
220
“Iraq: One ICRC Staff Member Killed and One Wounded,” ICRC press release, July 22, 2003, and “Nadisha:“Not a Victim of War—a Victim of Murder,” ICRC press release, July 30, 2003.“Iraq: ICRC Staff Member Killed,” ICRC press release, July 15, 2005.
221222
Baltasar Staehelin, “Iraq: Indiscriminate Violence Increases Civilian Distress,” ICRC press article, October27, 2004. (See www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/927D51C2698B002AC1256F390047EB87,accessed June 9, 2005.) The article was first published inAl-Hayatnewspaper on October 27, 2004.223
Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmad, full name withheld, Sulaimaniyya, Iraq, February 3, 2005.
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The bombing severely affected the ICRC’s work, forcing it to reduce its internationalstaff, which made up about thirty of the organization’s 600 employees in Iraq.224“Inview of the direct attacks on the ICRC in 2003 and of the general security situation inIraq, the organization was forced to adapt to an exceptionalmodus operandithere,” theICRC said. The organization maintained a presence of only Iraqi staff, supported by ateam of foreign staffers operating out of Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq and Jordan.225The attack against an established independent organization like the ICRC, which hadprovided services in Iraq for the past twenty-three years, forced other humanitarianorganizations to question whether they could operate safely in Iraq. Many took thebombing as a message, even though no one claimed responsibility for the attack, that allorganizations providing assistance were susceptible to attack.“This and earlier attacks seriously put in doubt the very possibility of providingindependent humanitarian aid in Iraq,” said the organization Doctors WithoutBorders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). The statement continued, “deliberatelytargeting civilians and independent aid agencies is a war crime. The perpetrators of thisattack on the ICRC, an organization with a long history of providing humanitarianassistance to Iraqis, confront us with the question whether all aid organizations could betargets. The attack was an assault on the very heart of humanitarianism.”226Since the ICRC attack, insurgent groups have threatened, attacked, abducted and killedstaff members of various humanitarian organizations. While the most publicized casesare of foreigners, most notably the CARE country director Margaret Hassan (see below),the vast majority of victims have been Iraqi employees.Human Rights Watch spoke with three Iraqi staff of international organizations who fledto other countries after receiving threats from armed groups, either in writing or inperson. Each of these people knew colleagues and friends who had also fled afterreceiving a threat. In some cases, the threats were criminal rather than political, becausegangs apparently believe that Iraqis working for foreign organizations can afford to pay a
“Red Cross to Cut Iraq Staff,”BBC News,October 29, 2003. (Seehttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3224723.stm, accessed March 4, 2005.)Iraq: ICRC Operations in 2004, ICRC operational update, December 31, 2004. Available athttp://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/693L9H?OpenDocument, as of June 9, 2005.“Iraq: Independent Humanitarian Aid Under Attack” Médicins Sans Frontiers statement, November 10, 2003.Available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/other/iraq_11-10-2003.shtml, as of March 4,2005.226225
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ransom. The family of one United Nations employee, for example, received a note thatsaid, “give us $5,000 or we will kill all your sons and [your] daughter.”227But in some cases, the threats were clearly political and, when unheeded, resulted in themurder of a humanitarian worker. Muhammad Hushyar Salim Ahmad Dizayi, agedthirty-four and single, for example, was Mosul head of the humanitarian aidorganization, World Vision, a U.S.-based Christian relief and development organizationthat was working on school rehabilitation.Unknown individuals in the city warned him to quit his job,his family told Human Rights Watch, but Dizayi decided tocontinue working with the organization. On September 29,2004, unknown gunmen shot and killed him while he sat ina Mosul café.According to Dizayi’s father, who was in Arbil at the time ofthe murder, a witness told him that two cars drove up andshot his only son in a café near the university. He went tothe Mosul hospital and police the next day, but found noofficials willing to help. “No one was at the hospital. Ieven went to the police,” he said. “They said we cannotcome with you because we are afraid of the terrorists.They said they will attack you again if you come to talkwith us about this.” At the hospital there was only onecleaner, who said, “Don’t cry or shout because theterrorists will come again.”228
On September 29, 2004,unknown gunmen shot andkilled Muhammad HushyarDizayi, Mosul head of the aidorganization World Vision,while he sat in a Mosul café.� 2005 Human Rights Watch
Another targeted killing occurred on November 3, 2004, when gunmen shot and killedan employee of Caritas Iraq, a Roman Catholic church-based organization that helpedunderprivileged families with medicine, social counseling and food.229The victim was
227228229
Human Rights Watch interview with U.N. employee, Amman, Jordan, February 13, 2005.Human Rights Watch interview with Hushyar Salim Ahmad Pasha Dizayee, Arbil, Iraq, February 6, 2005.
The killing of ‘Ala’ Andraous was not the first violence Caritas had directly experienced in Iraq. One yearbefore, on November 12, 2003, a suicide bomb struck Italian police headquarters in al-Nasiriyya, killingeighteen Italians and nine Iraqis, and wounding more than 105. The bomb damaged the Caritas Iraq office,which lay a few hundred meters away, and seriously wounded the director of its Well Baby Center. According toCaritas, “the force of the blast blew out windows,” and twelve staff members were injured. “This attackhappened in a quiet residential area, and it has caused utter devastation,” the director of Caritas Iraq said.(John F. Burns, “At Least 26 Killed in a Bombing of an Italian Compound in Iraq,”New York Times,February 13,2003, “Death Toll Rises to 27 at Italian Base Bombing in Southern Iraq,”Agence France-Presse,November 13,
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`Ala’ Andraus, director of the organization’s Baby Well Center in Baghdad’s al-Duraneighborhood. A pupil at the al-Batul secondary school for girls in the Mekanik sectionof al-Dora, who knew Andraus because he had given food to a poor family in herbuilding, told Human Rights Watch:We were studying in the courtyard when we heard the screeching oftires, the crashing of the fence and the confusion of shooting. We wereabout to go inside because we thought the school was under attack—theschool had been threatened before. We had received messages thatChristian girls must wear veils. One of the cars came into the schoolyard, knocking down part of the wall. The other car just shot and spedaway. The police guarding the school shot back.The first car had a driver and a guy named `Ala’. His wife and child werein the back. The driver died. `Ala’ was injured, and he died that night.From upstairs through the window I saw them taking the bodies out ofthe car. The driver was dead, and ‘Ala’ had been hit in the jaw, and itwas blown apart. His wife had fainted from the shock.230Caritas was forced to close the Baby Well Center in al-Dora, which had treatedmalnourished children. “There was an immediate impact. There was tension—fearamong the staff. They were all shocked,” Sebastian Deschamps, the Caritas Desk Officerfor the Middle East, told Human Rights Watch. “When one of your colleagues is shotdead, it’s traumatic.”231By April 2004, insurgents launched a spate of abductions of foreigners working in Iraq,including some humanitarian workers. On September 7, armed men abducted SimonaPari and Simona Torretta from the Italian organization Un Ponte per Baghdad (“Bridgeto Baghdad”), as well as two Iraqi staff, Dr. Ra`d al-`Ali and Mahnaz Bassam. Theyreleased them unharmed three weeks later in circumstances that remain unclear, and it ispossible their abduction was criminally motivated rather than political.232
2003, and “Caritas Iraq Workers Injured in Nasiriya Suicide Bombing, Caritas press release, November 13,2003.)230231232
Human Rights Watch interview, ‘Ain Kawa, Iraq, January 29, 2005.Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Sebastian Deschamps, February 10, 2005.
Richard Owen, “Once They Knew We Weren’t Spies They Treat Us Well, Say Italian Aid Workers,” TheTimes, September 30, 2004, and “Italian Hostages Freed in Iraq: Al-Jazeera,”Agence France-Presse,September 28, 2004.
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The case that generated the most international attention was the abduction and killing ofCARE country director Margaret Hassan, who had married an Iraqi man, become anIraqi citizen and lived in Iraq providing humanitarian assistance for twenty-five years.CARE had been active in Iraq for the previous fourteen years, with Hassan as theorganization’s local director since 1996. She was among the very few expatriatehumanitarian workers who stayed in Baghdad throughout the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.According to CARE, armed men abducted Hassan in Baghdad at 7:30 a.m. on October19, 2004, as she was being driven to work. A video later broadcast on al-Jazeera showeda terrified Hassan calling for the withdrawal of British troops and the release of femaleprisoners in Iraq. “Please help me. Please, the British people, ask Tony Blair to take thetroops out of Iraq, and not to bring them to Baghdad. That’s why people like Mr. Bigleyand myself are being caught, and maybe we will die like Mr. Bigley. Please, please, I begyou,” she said, referring toKenneth Bigley, a British engineerwho had been beheaded onOctober 8.233
Unknown assailants in Baghdad abductedand killed Margaret Hassan, the Iraqcountry director for CARE, in October-November 2004. Hassan had lived in Iraqproviding humanitarian assistance fortwenty-five years and was among the fewexpatriate humanitarian workers who stayedin Baghdad throughout the 2003 U.S.-ledinvasion. Photo courtesy of CARE
On November 5, al-Qaeda in Iraq issued a statement calling for Hassan’s release, “unlessthere is proof of her being an agent.” If her captors “hand over this hostage to us wewould release her immediately unless it is proven that she plotted against Muslims,” thestatement said.234On November 16, CARE announced that they believed Hassan was dead, although nobody had been found. “It is with profound sadness that we have learnt of the existence
Kim Sengupta, “Harrowing Footage Shows Hassan Pleading for Her Life,”The Independent,October 23,2004.234
233
Kim Sengupta, “Al-Zarqawi Groups Calls for Irish Hostage to Be Set Free,”Irish Independent,November 6,2004, and Adam Nathan and Tom Coghlan, “Terror Group ‘Urges Release’ of British Hostage,”Sunday Times,November 7, 2004.
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of a video in which it appears that our colleague Margaret Hassan has been killed,” ashort statement said.235In May 2005, Iraqi and U.S. forces said they had arrested eleven men suspected ofinvolvement in Hassan’s death. Five of the men admitted complicity in the murder, theIraqi police said.236Hassan’s killing sent further shockwaves through the humanitarian community. Despiteregular attacks on humanitarian workers since summer 2003, humanitarian organizationsactive in Iraq had assumed Hassan was safe due to her long-standing family andprofessional ties to the country. The murder showed that no one, even a woman withdeep ties to Iraq, was beyond reach.CARE announced the closure of its Iraqi operations on October 28, 2003.237“It’s sad toclose such an operation that had been there for so long and had helped so manypeople,” said `Alia Khalifa, the program support coordinator for CARE Iraq, now basedin Amman. “All our activities had to be stopped, and it was going directly to thepeople.”238Other international humanitarian organizations followed suit. On November 9, theInternational Rescue Committee (IRC), which had been in Iraq for eighteen monthsworking on water systems, sanitation and health facilities, vaccinations and rebuildingschools, announced it was phasing its Iraq programs out by the end of the year.“Regretfully, we had to recognize the reality that due to security constraints, we are lessand less able to address Iraq’s needs,” said IRC’s director for the Middle East and Asia,Mark Bartolini. “The deteriorating security conditions reveal a trend toward attacksagainst Iraqi civilians who associate themselves with international agencies, as well asagainst the international staff of those organizations.”239That same month, World Vision, which had lost its director in Mosul six weeks before,announced it too was ending operations in Iraq. In Iraq for eighteen months improving“CARE Profoundly Saddened by the Apparent Death of Mrs. Margaret Hassan,” CARE press release,November 16, 2004.236235
“Iraq Raids Seize Men Linked to British Woman’s Death,”Reuters,May 1, 2005, and Anne Penketh, “Five‘Confess’ to Murder of Aid Worker,”The Independent,May 2, 2005.“CARE Closes Operations in Iraq,” CARE press release, October 28, 2004.Human Rights Watch interview with Alia Khalifa, Amman, Jordan, February 14, 2005.
237238239
“IRC Programs in Iraq to Conclude at Year’s End,” International Rescue Committee press release,November 9, 2004.
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schools, hospitals, clinics and water supplies, World Vision said it was too difficult tomaintain security. “We have realized that you can’t have twenty-four hour securityguards, and even now humanitarian agencies like ours, like CARE—even the Red Crosswith its studied neutrality for 150 years—are being targeted,” said Tim Costello, chiefexecutive of World Vision Australia.240
IX. Attacks on MediaInsurgent groups have attacked journalists with bombs, abductions, executions andtargeted killings. The vast majority of victims are Iraqis working as local journalists or asreporters, drivers, cameramen and translators for international media. Foreign journalistshave also lost their lives. Insurgents have sought to justify some of these attacks on thegrounds that the journalists were collaborating with foreign forces as informants orspies, or that all foreigners in Iraq are legitimate targets.According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in 2004 and the first five months of2005, insurgent groups had abducted thirty journalists.241As of June 12, 2005, thegroups had released twenty-eight of these journalists and killed two (Enzo Baldoni andRa’ida Wazzan).242According to Reporters Sans Frontières, as of May 2005, twenty-nine journalists andmedia assistants (twenty-three men and six women) had been kidnapped since the warbegan, six of them Iraqis. As of August 2005, insurgents had released twenty-five ofthese people unharmed and executed four others (Enzo Baldoni, Ra’ida Wazzan,Hussam Hilal Sarsam and Ahmad Jabbar Hashim)243Insurgent groups killed additionaljournalists in armed attacks.The precarious situation faced by journalists kidnapped by insurgents is evident from anincident in al-Falluja on October 24, 2004, when unidentified armed men detained anIraqi translator and French freelance photographer. According to the translator, whospoke with Human Rights Watch but wished to remain anonymous, five armed men“Major Aid Organization Quits Iraq,”BBC News,November 19, 2004.(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4025171.stm, accessed March 5, 2005.)“Journalists in Danger: Facts on Iraq,” Committee to Protect Journalists, available athttp://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/gulf03/iraq_stats.html, as of August 17, 2005.“Abductions of Journalists in Iraq in 2004 and 2005,” Committee to Protect Journalists, available athttp://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/gulf03/iraq_abducted.html, as of August 17, 2005.The War in Iraq: The Mostly Deadly One for the Media Since Vietnam, Reporters Sans Frontières, May 3,2005, available at www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Etude_Irak_Eng_PDF.pdf, as of August 17, 2005.243242241240
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held them for five to six hours at a cement factory in the town’s industrial zone. “Wedon’t usually kill people who haven’t done anything,” he said his captors told him. “Weonly deal with people who work with the Americans or the Iraqi National Guard.” Thearmed men, who did not identify themselves, said they would hand the two journalistsover to the “Consultative Council of the Mujahadin,” headed by Abu Ahmad, who alsoran Muhammad’s Army. Instead they released them unharmed.244Other abducted journalists were not so lucky. On May 29, 2004, gunmen in Baghdadabducted and killed two staff members of the Iraqi dailyal-Sabah al-Jadid(“The NewMorning”). According to the paper’s editor, Isma’il Zayir, a group of men arrived at hishome in a police car and two civilian cars, asking him to come to the police station forquestioning about a crime. He went inside to change his clothes and, when he returned,his driver and bodyguard, Samia `Abd al-Jabbar and Mahmud Da’wud, were gone. Policefound the bodies of both men later that day in another part of Baghdad. Zayir hadpreviously been editor ofal-Sabah(“The Morning”), a newspaper established with U.S.government funds.245On August 20, 2004, the Italian Enzo Baldoni, a freelance writer working forDiarionews magazine, went missing as he was driving to the southern city of al-Najaf, whereU.S. forces were battling Mahdi Army forces. In a video broadcast August 24 onal-Jazeera,the Islamic Army in Iraq said they could not guarantee Baldoni’s safety if Italydid not withdraw its 3,000 troops from Iraq within forty-eight hours.246Two days later,al-Jazeerareported that it had received two photographs that showed Baldoni dead,saying it did not air the images out of respect for his family.247On February 20, 2005, masked gunmen in Mosul abducted Ra’ida Muhammad Wazzan,aged thirty-five, a news presenter for the Iraqi state television al-`Iraqiya, together withher ten-year-old son. The abductors released her son on February 23 but, two days afterthat, Wazzan’s body was found on a Mosul street with multiple gunshot wounds to the244245
Human Rights Watch interview with anonymous translator, Arbil, Iraq, January 26, 2005.
“Iraqi Editor Says Driver, Guard Killed,”Associated Press,May 30, 2004, and “Media Workers Killed in2004,” Committee to Protect Journalists (http://www.cpj.org/killed/killed_media_wrkrs_04.html, accessed March5, 2005).“Italian Journalist Seized in Iraq,”al-Jazeera.net,August 26, 2004,http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ECA5FF8D-E659-4586-9BCD-6C492EECEB23.htm, accessed March 6.2005.247246
“Group Kills Italian Journalist in Iraq,”al-Jazzera.net,August 28, 2004,http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/BEED6CD4-AE97-400F-8B34-40A225A88B81.htm, accessed March 6,2005. According to an article in Iraq’s al-Zawra newspaper, two brigades are believed responsible for Baldoni’sdeath: Khalid bin al-Walid Brigades and the Iraq’s Martyrs Brigade. (See Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “WhoKills Hostages in Iraq,”al-Zawra,September 19, 2004.)
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head. According to her husband, insurgents had threatened Wazzan with death severaltimes, demanding that she quit her job. The week before her abduction, the al-`Iraqiyastation was struck by mortars, wounding three technicians. According to press reports,al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the mortar attack, but it is not clear whokilled Wazzan.248In some cases, insurgent groups have killed Iraqi journalists on the street. On October14, 2004, gunmen in a car shot and killed Dina Muhammad Hassan, aged thirty-eight, areporter foral-HurriyaTelevision. According to a colleague who was with her at the time,three men in a blue Oldsmobile drove by and opened fire as Hassan and he waited to bepicked up for work outside Hassan’s Baghdad home. “Collaborator! Collaborator!” theyyelled as they shot.Al-Hurriyais the station of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one ofthe two main Kurdish political parties, and the party of Iraq’s current president JalalTalabani. According to colleagues, Hassan had received three letters warning her to quither job.249The next day, October 15, gunmen in Mosul killed a twenty-two-year-old Iraqiphotographer named Karam Hussain, who worked for the European Press Agency andthe Italian ANSA. According to Reporters Sans Frontières, four masked gunmen shothim outside his home.250On October 30, 2004, a car bomb exploded at the Baghdad bureau ofal-`Arabiya,aDubai-based twenty-four-hour television news channel, killing seven persons, includingfive staff members: `Ali `Adnan, a security guard, Hassan Alwan, an engineer, RamziyyaMushi and Alahin Hussain, kitchen staff, and Nabil Hussein, a gardener. According toal-`Arabiya,fourteen other employees, including five journalists, were hurt. Two otherSaudi-owned news stations also used the office, the satellite channelal-Akhbariyaandal-`Arabiya’ssister channel, Middle East Broadcasting (MBC).In a statement on the Internet, the group Thawrat al-`Ishrin Brigades (1920 RevolutionBrigades) at first claimed responsibility. However, in a video later broadcast byal-248
Patrick Quinn, “Insurgents Blow Up Oil Pipeline in Iraq,”Associated Press,February 26, 2005, “Iraqi FemaleTV Reporter Abducted in Mosul,”Reuters,February 21, 2005, and “Iraq Journalist Found Dead Five Days AfterShe Was Kidnapped,” Reporters Without Borders, February 26, 2004.(http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12680, accessed March 5, 2005).Normitsu Onishi, “How Many Iraqis Are Dying? By One Count 208 in a Week,”New York Times,October 19,2004, and “Gunmen Killed Iraqi Woman Journalist in Baghdad,”Reuters,October 14, 2004.
249
“Iraqi Photographer Shot Dead in Iraq,”Agence France-Presse,October 16, 2004, and “ANSA PhotographerKilled in Iraq,” ANSA, October 15, 2004, “Two Iraqi Journalists Gunned Down Outside Their Homes in SeparateShootings,”Reporters Without Borders,October 15, 2004.
250
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Arabiya,four masked gunmen from the group denied they were behind the attack.251OnOctober 31, a previously unknown group called Sarayya al-Shuhada’ al-Jihadiyya fi al-`Iraq (Jihadist Martyrs Brigade in Iraq) said in an Internet statement that it hadconducted the attack for the station’s “cooperation with the Americans and their allies.”The group said it would “punish those who work with these news agencies and channelsone after the other or we will kidnap them and slaughter them like sheep if they sidewith the infidel American occupiers.”252Al-`Arabiya’s general manager, the prominent Saudi journalist `Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid, has spoken publicly against insurgent attacks on civilians. “We cannot tolerate inour midst those who abduct journalists, murder civilians, explode buses,” he wrote in theLondon-based newspaperAl-Sharq Al-Awsat.“We cannot accept them as related to us,whatever the sufferings they claim to justify their criminal deeds. These are the peoplewho have smeared Islam and stained its image.”253On June 18, 2005, gunmen shot and seriously woundedal-`Arabiya’sBaghdadcorrespondent, Jawad Kazim, aged thirty-seven. Gunmen tried to abduct Kazim as heleft a restaurant in Baghdad, his colleagues said.254According to the station, a groupcalling itself Jund al-Sahabah fi al-`Iraq (Prophet’s Companions Army in Iraq) claimedresponsibility for the attack because ofal-`Arabiya’seditorial policy and Kazim’s allegedanti-Sunni bent.255According to Reuters, the group that claimed responsibility calleditself Jama`at Jund al-Sahaba (Soldiers of the Prophet’s Companions). “We claimresponsibility for the assassination attempt of the evil Shi'ite Jawad Kadhim,” astatement posted on a website often used by militants reportedly said. “Al-`Arabiyachannel has harmed Sunnis in Iraq and is the tongue of Americans and dirty Shi'ites in[Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim] Ja`fari’s government.”256Many of the Iraqi journalists and support staff who have died in attacks were workingfor international media as drivers and translators, but also as reporters and fact-finders
Charles Clover, Steve Negus, and Dhiya Rasan, “Arab Media Under Pressure After Iraq Bomb,”FinancialTimes,November 1, 2004, and “Arabiya TV Denies Militant Accusation of U.S. Bias,”Reuters,October 31,2004.Maamoun Youssef, “New Militant Group Claims Responsibility For Deadly Al-Arabiya Car Bombing inBaghdad,”Associated Press,October 31, 2004.253254255252
251
Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, “A Wake Up Call: Almost All Terrorists are Muslims,”“Wounded al-Arabiya Reporter Moved From Iraq to Jordan,”Agence France-Presse,June 21, 2005.
Al-ArabiyaTelevision, June 20, 2005, as translated by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Arabicand Regional Media Review, June 21, 2005, andal-Zaman,June 19, 2005, as translated by theBBC,IraqiPress Highlights 19 June 2005, June 20, 2005.256
“Iraqi Militants Say They Tried to Kill Journalist,”Reuters,June 20, 2005.
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who could more easily navigate Iraq’s dangerous terrain. On January 27, 2004, forexample, gunmen opened fire on a two-car convoy of CNN, killing an Iraqi driver and atranslator/producer. According to CNN, the vehicles were headed north towardBaghdad from al-Hilla when a rust-colored Opel approached from behind. A singlegunman opened fire on one of the vehicles from the sunroof with an AK-47 assault rifle.Yassir Khatab, the driver, aged twenty-five, and Duraid `Issa Muhammad, a twenty-seven-year-old father of two, died of multiple gunshot wounds. A bullet grazed the headof CNN cameraman Scott McWhinnie.257On March 24, 2004, gunmen fatally shot an Iraqi translator and fixer working forTimeMagazine.Omar Hashim Kamal, aged forty-eight, was shot four times as he drove towork, Time said. He died two days later, leaving a wife and four-year-old son.258Insurgent groups have also targeted foreign journalists in Iraq, often using them topressure their government to leave Iraq. The three most recent abduction cases have allended in the journalists’ release after lengthy periods of illegal detention. On March 4,2005, insurgents freed the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena fromIl Manifestoafter onemonth in captivity. Just after her release, U.S. soldiers near Baghdad Airport opened fireon her car, killing an Italian intelligence agent who had negotiated her release. The U.S.military said the car failed to stop as it approached a checkpoint. Sgrena disputed thataccount.259A group called the Islamic Jihad Organization said it had kidnapped Sgrena andthreatened to kill her if Italian forces did not leave Iraq. “We call upon our brothers inthe Association of Muslim Scholars to be careful in their call to release the ItalianPOW,” a statement posted on the Internet said. “We are still investigating the POW andthe judicial committee in the organization will take its decision on that soon.” TheAssociation of Muslim Scholars had previously called for Sgrena’s release, saying, “shewas doing a humanitarian job in Iraq and has nothing to do with the occupation
“2 CNN Employees Killed in Attack,”CNN News,http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/01/27/sprj.nirq.cnn.casualties/, accessed March 5, 2005, and“Journalists Remember Slain CNN Colleauges,”CNN News,http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/01/28/cnn.colleagues/, accessed March 5, 2005.258
257
Romesh Ratnesar, “Omar Hashim Kamal,”Time Magazine,April 5, 2004,http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,993770,00.html, accessed March 5, 2005.
Angela Doland, “Ex-Hostage Disputes U.S. on Iraq Shooting,” Associated Press, March 6, 2005, andGabriele Polo, “La Vita e La Morte,” Il Manifesto, March 5, 2005. See also Human Rights Watch statement, Iraq:Shooting of Italian Civilians by U.S. Forces, March 6, 2005, available athttp://www.hrw.org/campaigns/iraq/shooting/.
259
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forces.”260Other Iraqi organizations and media also had called on insurgents to releaseSgrena, along with the French journalist Florence Aubenas, who was being held at thetime (see below). In an appeal on February 7,al-Jazeerastated that, “kidnappingjournalists while doing their job is considered a blatant violation of human rights.”261On May 22, an armed group released three Romanian journalists and their Iraqi-American guide after nearly two months in captivity—the reporter Marie Jeanne Ion andcameraman Sorin Miscoci for Bucharest-based Prima TV, reporter Ovidiu Ohanesianfor the dailyRomania Liberaand their guide Muhammad Monaf.262The four had gonemissing in Baghdad on March 28. On April 23, a previously unknown group calling itselfMu`adh bin Jabal263claimed responsibility for the abduction in a video broadcast on al-Jazeera, in which they demanded that Romania pull its 800 troops out of Iraq.264Romania did not agree to withdraw its troops, but the group later said it had freed thehostages after an appeal by Romania’s Muslims and a prominent Saudi preacher. U.S.authorities in Iraq are reportedly holding the guide Monaf under suspicion that heparticipated in the abduction, and Romanian authorities have arrested an allegedaccomplice, `Umar Hayssam.265On June 11, unknown insurgents released theFrench journalist Florence Aubenas of thenewspaperLibérationand her Iraqi translator andguide Hussain Hanun al-Sa`di after 158 days incaptivity.266The insurgents had abductedAubenas, a veteran war reporter, and al-Sa`di, aHussain Hanun al-Sa`di, a translator and driver forLibération,holds his son during a news conference onJuly 16, 2005, in Paris. An insurgent group had released him andLibérationjournalist Florence Aubenassix days before, after holding them hostage for five months.� 2005 John Schults/ REUTERS
“Purported Kidnappers of Italian Journalist Issue Final Warning to Rome to Withdraw Troops From Iraq,”Associated Press,February 6, 2005.261
260
Group Vows to Free Italian Journalist,” al-Jazeera.net, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4705B7F9-AB22-448F-95B1-51E2D2E1FF0D.htm, accessed March 5, 2005. For the full statement, see the Il Manifestowebsite at http://ilmanifesto.it/pag/sgrena/en/420dc1262b13d.html, accessed March 5, 2005.Alison Mutler, “Freed Romanian Journalists Arrive Home,”Associated Press,May 23, 2005.
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Mu`adh bin Jabal was a friend of the Prophet Muhammad—one of a group of six who collected the Qur'anduring the prophet’s lifetime.264265266
Alexandru Alexe, “Romania Hostages Said Victims of Bad Plans,”Associated Press,June 6, 2005.“Romanian Journalist, Held Hostage in Iraq, Plans to Sue Kidnappers,”Associated Press,June 11, 2005.
“French, Iraqi hostages freed, 20 bodies found elsewhere,”Agence France-Presse,June 12, 2005. For moreinformation and background on Aubenas and al-Sa’di, see the “For Florence and Hussein” website atwww.pourflorenceethussein.org/english/index.shtml, as of June 12, 2005.
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colonel in the Iraqi Air Force until 1991, after they left the Melia Mansour Hotel inBaghdad on January 5, 2005. Aubenas was working on a story about Iraqis displaced bythe latest U.S. offensive in al-Falluja.267On March 1, a released video showed Aubenaspleading for help. “My name is Florence Aubenas. I’m French. I’m a journalist withLibération,”she said, looking frail and distraught. “My health is very bad. I am very badpsychologically also.”268Upon her release, she told reporters that her conditions incaptivity had been “severe.” Most of the time she was held in a basement wearing ablindfold and her wrists and ankles tied.269After her release, the three Romanianjournalists released on May 22 said they had been held together with Aubenas, butAubenas declined to comment on their claim.270Some insurgent groups have conducted armed attacks against foreign journalists. OnMay 27, 2004, insurgents killed two freelance Japanese journalists, Shinsuke Hashida andKotaro Ogawa, an uncle and nephew team, with their Iraqi translator, MuhammadNajmuddin, as they returned to Baghdad from the southern town of al-Samawa, wherethey had visited a Japanese military base. According to press reports, gunmen in al-Mahmudiyya opened fire on the car, which then crashed into a tree and caught fire.271On May 7, 2004, gunmen shot and killed a leading Polish war correspondent, WaldemarMilewicz, and his Polish-Algerian colleague, Mounir Bouamrane, both from Polish statetelevision. Gunmen opened fire on their car as they drove through al-Latifiyya south ofBaghdad. According to the driver, who survived, a car chased them down from behindand gunmen opened fire into the car. The journalists’ car spun around and stopped, butthe attacking car turned and opened fire again.272“Suddenly we found ourselves underheavy machine-gun fire,” recalled Polish cameraman Jerzy Ernst, who was injured in theattack. “All of us crouched. The driver didn’t stop but the windows were shattered.” Hecontinued, “Mounir and the driver jumped out of the car and were trying to pull out
267
“Joy Sweeps France as Journalist Returns Home From Captivity in Iraq,”Agence France-Presse,June 12,2005.
Michael Georgy, “French Hostage in Iraq Pleads for Help,”Reuters,March 1, 2005. The video can be viewedat www.pourflorenceethussein.org/english/index.shtml, as of March 6, 2005.“Freed French Journalist Thanks Public, Media for Campaign of Support,”Agence France-Presse,June 12,2005.Elaine Ganley, “Former Hostage Describes Endless Wait During 157 Days in Baghdad Cellar,”AssociatedPress,June 14, 2005, and “Romanian Secret Agents Helped Free French Hostage in Iraq: PM,”AgenceFrance-Presse,June 14, 2005.“Third Body Found in Iraq Where Japanese Died,” Reuters, May 28, 2004, and “Kyodo Agency DetailsAttack on Japanese Journalists,”BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,May 28, 2004., and “Two Japanese Journalists,Iraqi Translator Killed in Iraq: Hospital,”Agence France-Presse,May 28, 2004.272271270269
268
“Algerian, Polish Journalists Killed in Iraq Drive-by Shooting,”Agence France-Presse,May 7, 2004.
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Milewicz but then they started shooting again.”273The team was driving to a Polishmilitary base south of Baghdad, Ernst said. At the time, Poland had about 2,400 troopsin Iraq.International humanitarian law protects from attack both civilian journalists and “warcorrespondents” who accompany a state’s armed forces, so long as they are not taking adirect part in hostilities.274Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which applies duringinternational armed conflicts and occupations, states that journalists in areas of armedconflict “shall be considered as civilians.”275Likewise, journalists during internal armedconflicts are considered to be civilians as a matter of customary internationalhumanitarian law.276This protection extends to journalists who are embedded with an armed force.According to ICRC Commentary to Article 79 of Protocol I, “a journalist, who isundoubtedly a civilian, does not lose this status by entering an area of armed conflict ona professional mission, even if he is accompanying the armed forces or if he takesadvantage of their logistic support.”277Journalists in war zones, embedded with amilitary force or on their own, are putting themselves in danger. Their accidental deathas collateral damage in an attack on a military target is not a violation of internationalhumanitarian law, unless the attacker made no effort to discriminate betweencombatants and civilians.
X. Attacks on Intellectuals and ProfessionalsSince late 2003, various armed groups have targeted Iraq’s intellectual and professionalclass, including professors, doctors and lawyers. The goals are diverse. In some cases,abductions are criminally motivated, because professionals are believed to have moremoney to pay in ransom. But some killings appear politically motivated, either becausethe victim had expressed support for the U.S.-led invasion or criticism of the insurgency,or because the attackers believed the person held such views.
Monte Morin and Ela Kasprzycka, “Foreign Journalists Killed in Ambush South of Baghdad,”Los AngelesTimes,May 8, 2004.274
273
See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 34 (“Civilian journalists are not to be confusedwith ‘war correspondents’. The latter are journalists who accompany the armed forces of a State without beingmembers thereof.”).Protocol I, article 79.See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 34.ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 920.
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Some Iraqi academics see the attacks as a way to destroy Iraq’s intellectual elite. “Thevictims cover a wide spectrum of research interests, different politics and differentreligious convictions. The only common denominator is their excellence,” said Sa`adun`Issa, vice-chancellor of al-Nahrain University in Baghdad. “I think there’s a plan to stripIraq of its scientific backbone.”278“We think it’s politically motivated,” a senior Education Ministry official said. Theattacks are a devastating blow—“not only because of the number killed, but because oftheir quality.”279The intimidation and killing of intellectuals and professionals impedes governance,complicates work for security forces and weakens the economy, according to AnthonyH. Cordesman, an insurgency expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studiesin Washington D.C. The pattern of attacks on professionals, he says, “exacerbates thefeeling of insecurity to the point where people lose faith in the Iraqi government,Coalition, and political process.”280Precise figures are difficult to obtain, but studies suggest that doctors and academics areparticularly at risk. According to a study by the Iraqi Ministry of Health concluded inApril 2005, armed groups have abducted between 160 and 300 Iraqi doctors since April2003, and killed more than twenty-five, although the study did not distinguish betweencriminal and politically motivated attacks. Nearly 1,000 doctors have fled the country,the study said, with an average of thirty more following each month.281To stem theoutflow, the ministry broadcast a public service announcement on television in spring2005, with a message that said: “Dear Citizens, please do not kill doctors—you may needthem one day.”282In May 2005, the Interior Ministry gave doctors the right to carry aweapon for self-defense.283Professors at Iraq’s once prestigious universities and technical colleges are also underattack. According to an April 2005 United Nations University report, assassins have
278279280
Ed Blanche, “Exodus From Terror,”The Middle East,April 1, 2005.Ibid.
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Updatedas of May 19, 2005.Ali Rifat and Hala Jaber, “Kidnap Gangs Force Doctors to Flee Iraq,”The Times,June 5, 2005.Deborah Amos, “Iraqi Seeks to Protect Medical Workers,” aired onNational Public Radio,June 13, 2005.
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Scott Peterson, “Iraq’s Ministries Struggle to Serve,”Christian Science Monitor,May 13, 2005. For anotherarticle about attacks on doctors, see Robin Shulman, “Violence Targets Iraqi Doctors Seen as Rich,Connected,”Washington Post,September 12, 2004.
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killed forty-eight academics since 2003, and many more teachers and professors bravedaily threats.284According to the Iraqi Minister of Higher Education, as of June 2005,attackers had killed more than sixty professors since the beginning of the war, althoughhe did not specify how they died. The highest percentage of those had scientificbackgrounds, he said.285One of the first victims was Falah Hussein, deputy dean of the college of sciences at al-Mustansiriya University in Baghdad, who unknown gunmen killed in May 2003. Nextwas the assassination by unknown gunmen of Dr. Muhammad al-Rawi, president ofBaghdad University, that July.286One of the more prominent cases was the killing of `Abd al-Latif al-Mayah, a humanrights advocate and political science professor at al-Mustansiriya University. On January19, 2004, eight masked gunmen stopped him as he drove to work. They pulled him tothe street, the Iraqi police said, and shot him dead in front of his bodyguard and anotheruniversity lecturer.287On June 19, 2005, unknown gunmen shot and killed engineer Sattar Sabbar al-Khazraji,a professor at the Technology University in Baghdad. According to the Iraqi newspaperal-Sharqiyah,two men on a motorcycle shot al-Khazraji in front of his house in thewestern Baghdad area of al-Hurriyah al-Thaniyah.288Most recently, in the last week of August, three more Baghdad academics died.According toAzzaman,an Iraqi daily newspaper, unknown gunmen killed Zaki al-Anifrom al-Mustansiriyya University’s College of Arts, and Hashim `Abd al-Amir from theCollege of Education on August 27 near the university’s main entrance. A thirdprofessor, Samir Yalda of the College of Economics and Administration had beenkidnapped two days earlier, and his body was found the same day.289
United Nations University press release, “5/6ths of Iraq’s Higher Learning Institutions Burnt, Looted,Wrecked; 48 Profs Slain; UNU Calls for World Help to Repair System,” April 27, 2005.285286287288289
284
Al-Mashriq,June 18, 2005.Annia Ciezadlo, “Death to Those Who Dare to Speak Out,Christian Science Monitor,April 30, 2004.Jeffrey Gettleman, “Assassinations Tear into Iraq’s Educated Class,”New York Times,February 6, 2004.Al-Sharqiyah,June 19, 2005.
Katherine Zoepf, “3 More Professors Are Killed in Iraq, as Flight of Academics Intensifies,”The Chronicle ofHigher Education,August 31, 2005.
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The violence has hit other cities as well. In November 2003, unknown men reportedlyassassinated Asa`ad al-Sharida, dean of the engineering college in Basra. Two monthslater, assailants stabbed to death Muhammad Qasim, a teacher in Basra’s technicalcollege.290In Mosul on June 22, 2004, unknown assailants killed the dean of Mosul University’sLaw School, Laila `Abdullah Sa`ad, together with her husband Munir al-Khairu.According to the Iraqi police, the attackers slit both their throats.291Hundreds of academics and professionals have been threatened with death and told toleave Iraq. According to the Association of University Teachers, 2,000 professors haveleft Iraq since 2003, joining the 10,000 professors the association says left the country inthe twelve years after the Gulf War.292“I was given one week,” the director of the Institute of Radiotherapy and NuclearMedicine in Baghdad told one journalist. “But I can’t quit. If I step down, nobody wouldcome and take my place.”293Others have taken the threats to heart and fled the country,usually for Damascus or Amman.“We are losing the brain power of our most brilliant doctors,” said Dr. Sami Salman,director of the Special Care Hospital at Baghdad’s Medical City complex. “You just can’treplace them overnight.”294
XI. Attacks on WomenSome insurgent groups have targeted women who are politicians, civil servants,journalists, women’s rights activists or who work as cleaners or translators for foreigngovernments or militaries. They have also attacked women for what they considered“immoral” or “un-Islamic” behavior, like dancing, socializing with men or not wearing a
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Jeffrey Gettleman, “Assassinations Tear into Iraq’s Educated Class,”New York Times,February 6, 2004.
“Head of Mosul Law Faculty and Her Husband Killed in Northern Iraq: Police,”Agence France-Presse,June22, 2004,and Peter Y. Hong and Barbara Demick, “South Korean Held in Iraq is Beheaded,”Los AngelesTimes,June 23, 2004.292293294
Howard LaFranchi, “Iraq Losing its Best and Brightest,”Christian Science Monitor,September 21, 2004.Jeffrey Gettleman, “Assassinations Tear into Iraq’s Educated Class,”New York Times,February 6, 2004.
Ahmed Mukhtar, “Where is This Going?”Al-Ahram Weekly,June 10-16, 2004, available athttp://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/694/re7.htm, as of July 16, 2005.
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hijab,the Islamic headscarf. And some groups have abducted and at times killed foreignwomen to pressure governments or humanitarian organizations into leaving Iraq.Not all of these attacks are on account of gender. Many of these attacks appear to havebeen motivated primarily by the victim’s perceived connection to the foreign militarypresence or the current Iraqi government, as described in the chapters in this report thatcover those targeted groups. The attacks against women’s rights activists and womenwho exhibited behavior deemed “immoral” or “un-Islamic,” however, do seemmotivated by the fact that the targets were women or were helping women.In general, the violence and lack of security, as well as religious and culturalconservatism, are having a major impact on Iraqi women, who once enjoyed aprominent role in their country’s public life. The danger of kidnappings and assaultskeeps many professional women at home, and limits their participation in the country’sevolving political institutionsAccording to a January 2005 report by Women for Women International, the violence ispreventing Iraqi women from playing a role in civic life:Women with Western dress and progressive ideas have been attacked.The abduction and murders of these prominent women have sent aripple of fear through local communities. Though the press has coveredthe stories of high-profile foreign aid workers, Iraqi women have seenmembers of their own communities—pharmacists, lawyers,councilwomen —assassinated. The effect is chilling and threatens theparticipation of Iraq’s most educated women.295The report continues, “Fear of violence, abduction and rape have emptied the streets ofwomen and caused disruptions to education as children are also increasingly kept athome. Growing numbers of women are also leaving the country.”
295
Women for Women International,Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq,January 2005. For a media account of the threats women receive, see Sahar al-Haideri and Wa'ad Ibraheem,“Insurgents Impose Curbs on Women,”Institute for War and Peace Reporting,July 5, 2005.
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The number of known attacks against women reflects only a fraction of the real figure.The majority of attacks remain unreported due to fear and social taboos, especially thoseinvolving crimes of sexual violence.296Like many of the attacks on men documented in this report, there is a nexus betweenpolitics, religion and crime. Insurgent groups have not always claimed responsibility forattacks on women, so it is not always clear if a criminal or political group committed theattack. The abduction of women professionals is a common occurrence that often endswith a ransom being paid.297At least four prominent women politicians and government officials have been targetedbetween March 2003 and July 2005—‘Aqila al-Hashimi, Salama al-Khafaji, NasrinBarwari and Lamia Abid Khaduri al-Sagri (al-Hashimi and al-Sagri died)—although theywere most likely attacked because of their political activity rather than gender (seechapter VI of this report, “Attacks on Government Officials and Politicians”). Attackson lower-ranking women officials, however, seem to have been motivated by their workon behalf of women.
Iraqi Governing Council member Salama al-Khafaji in her Baghdad home on May28, 2004. The day before, unidentified assailants ambushed her convoy south ofBaghdad, killing her bodyguard and eldest son. “It’s the women who have sufferedthe most under this occupation,” she told a journalist. “And that’s why it’s womenwho want peace the most.”� 2004 Thaier Al-Sudan/REUTERS
On November 20, 2004, insurgents in Baghdad shot and killed an adviser at the Ministryof Municipalities and Public Works and a women’s rights activist, Amal al-Ma’amalchi,together with her secretary, bodyguard and driver. According to press accounts, gunmenopened fire on Amal al-Ma’amalchi’s car as she went to work.298“An Opel car with fourMany women and girls do not report sexual violence because they fear doing so may provoke “honor” killingsand social stigmatization. For others, the obstacles to filing and pursuing a police complaint or obtaining aforensic examination that would provide legal proof of sexual violence hamper them from receiving medicalattention and pursuing justice. See Human Rights Watch report,Climate of Fear: Sexual Violence andAbduction of Women and Girls in Baghdad,July 2003.See Hala Jaber, “Rebels Kill Iraqi Women as ‘Betrayers’ of Islam,”The Times (London),March 20, 2005.See also James Glanz, “Rings That Kidnap Iraqis Thrive on Big Threats and Bigger Profits,”New York Times,March 28, 2005. According to the article, up to 5,000 Iraqi men and women have been kidnapped in the lastyear and a half, mostly for money.298297296
Anthony Shadid, “Baghdad Suffers a Day of Attacks, Assassinations,”Washington Post,November 21,2004,BBC Monitoring Middle East,Iraqi Press Highlights 21 November, 2004, al-Dustur Newspaper, “Woman
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masked passengers on board attacked another white car which was driving ahead, andwhich had three or four passengers inside,” a witness told al-Jazeera.299Amal al-Ma’amalachi was co-founder of the Advisory Committee for Women’s Affairs in Iraqand the Independent Iraqi Women’s Assembly—an organization established after April2003.300Other female politicians and government employees have reported receiving threats onaccount of their work in defense of women’s rights. According to an AmnestyInternational report on women in Iraq, unidentified individuals threatened a femalemember of the Interim Governing Council, Dr. Raja Khuza`i, in early 2004 after sheopposed amendments to the Personal Status Law (governing marriage, divorce,inheritance, and child custody), which would have replaced civil personal status lawswithShari`a,or Islamic law.301“There was a proposal, Resolution 137, which was againstwomen’s rights, insisting that marriages and family law and whatever had to be under thesyariah [shari`a],” Khuza’i told an interviewer. “I succeeded in having this resolutioncancelled in February. After that I received so many death threats, telephone calls,letters, to me and to my family.”302Yanar Muhammad, who founded the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq, saidshe received death threats in early 2004 after she defended women’s rights on Iraqitelevision. “Stop speaking out for women’s rights, or we will kill you,” an e-mail signedby the Jaysh al-Sahaba (Army of the Prophet’s Companions) reportedly said. “They said,because of my psychologically disturbed ideas, they would have to kill me and crucifyme,” Yanar Muhammad told the press. “It sounded to me like a serious warning.”303
Civil Servant, Three Aides Assassinated in Baghdad,”Agence France-Presse,November 20, 2004, BabakDehghanpisheh, Eve Conant and Rod Nordland, “Iraq’s Hidden War; Extremists Have Shot Women Activists inthe Streets and Killed Them in Private,”Newsweek,March 7, 2005, and “Gunmen Kill Iraqi Government Officialin Baghdad,”Reuters,November 20, 2004. The articles spelled the victim’s name different ways, including:Amal al-Damarji, Amal Abdel Hamid, Amal Mamalchi and Amal Abdel-Hamid al-Maamalji.BBC Monitoring Middle East,Al-Jazeera Television, “Gunmen Kill Iraqi Official, Three Policemen inBaghdad,” November 20 2004.Amnesty International,Iraq: Decades of Suffering, Now Women Deserve Better,February 22, 2005, andAaron D. Pina,Women in Iraq: Background and Issues for U.S. Policy,Congressional Research Service, June23, 2005.301302300299
Amnesty International,Iraq: Decades of Suffering, Now Women Deserve Better,February 22, 2005.
Anthony Paul, “Grandmother Lends Voice to Iraq’s Women”Straights Times,August 23, 2004. See alsoBBC Monitoring Middle East,Iraqi Press Highlights 29 February 2004,Al-DusturNewspaper, and Iraqi PressHighlights 16 March 2004,Al-DusturNewspaper.“Women’s Groups Under Threat in the New Iraq,”IRIN News,March 24, 2004. Seehttp://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=40230&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ,accessed March 28, 2005. See also Annia Ciezadlo, “After an Advocate’s Killing, Iraqi Women Try to Stay theCourse,”Christian Science Monitor,April 1, 2004.303
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One woman who founded two arts and culture organizations in Baghdad said that shealso received death threats by e-mail. “We will kill you all,” the e-mail warned, signed“Zarqawi.” She told Human Rights Watch: “The first day was terrible. I didn’t tell myfamily because I was afraid they would force me to leave the country.”304According to Amnesty International’s 2005 report on women in Iraq, several women’scenters established with U.S. government funds had to reduce their activities afterthreats and attacks, although it is not clear if armed groups threatened them because oftheir activity with women or because they received funding from the United States.Amira Salih, manager of the Zainab al-Hawra’ center in Karbala, which gave womenclasses in computers, catering and sewing, said she resigned after getting death threats.305On March 9, 2004, gunmen opened fire on a car carrying center staffers and killed twoof the women who helped found the center, an Iraqi and an American, together with anAmerican male press officer from the CPA. Fern Holland, a women’s rights coordinatorfor the CPA who was the driving force behind the center, and her assistant SalwaOumashi were driving with Bob Zangas from Karbala to Baghdad when armed gunmenattacked. “I pulled them out of the car with my hands,” said the al-Hilla police chief,Brigadier Qaed al-Ma’muri, who knew Holland. “Fern had been driving,” he said, “andmost of the bullets targeted her. The man was shot in the head, but the bullets were fired360 degrees around the car. Probably thirty or more.”306Armed groups have attacked women because of behavior deemed immoral or contraryto Islamic codes. On March 8, 2005, for example, unknown gunmen reportedly shot andkilled three women as they stood on a street corner in Baghdad’s Sadr City. According toIraqi police, an unspecified religious movement had accused them of being prostitutes.307According toNewsweekmagazine, armed groups killed twenty women in Mosul and adozen more in Baghdad between March 2003 and mid-January 2005. One example thearticle gives, confirmed by other press accounts, is the abduction and death of Zina al-Qushtaini, a divorced mother in her late thirties who ran a pharmacy in Baghdad andhad many women activist friends. Gunmen burst into her pharmacy last year, abductingal-Qushtaini and her business partner Dr. Ziad Bahu. Their bodies appeared ten days304305
Human Rights Watch interview with woman, Sulaimaniyya, Iraq, February 2, 2005.
Annia Ciezadlo, “After an Advocate’s Killing, Iraqi Women Try to Stay the Course,”Christian ScienceMonitor,April 1, 2004.306307
Elizabeth Rubin, “Fern Holland’s War,”New York Times Magazine,September 19, 2004.
“IraqiWomen Shot Dead in Baghdad,”BBC,March 8, 2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4329075.stm, accessed August 17, 2005. See also Hussein Aliand Ali Marzook, “Baghdad Prostitutes Fall on Hard Times,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Iraqi CrisisReport 92, November 29, 2004, www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_92_8_eng.txt, accessed August 17, 2005.
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later near a highway south of Baghdad. Bahu was beheaded and al-Qushtaini, shot in thehead, was wearing a long black `abaya and a headscarf, which she did not normallywear.308
XII. Abduction and Execution of Non-Iraqi CiviliansSome insurgent groups have repeatedly targeted non-Iraqi civilians working in Iraq asdrivers, businesspeople, contractors, journalists and humanitarian workers. Abductions,sometimes followed by execution, have been the most common abuse.The goal of the abductions is often to pressure the victim’s government into removingits forces from Iraq, or other concessions, such as the release of prisoners. Insurgentgroups have also abducted drivers to force a company to stop doing business in Iraq.A common motivation behind the abductions is money. Non-Iraqis are targeted becauseof the ransom from a country or a company that the insurgents, or a criminal group,hope to extract.Since April 2003, insurgent groups have abducted more than 200 non-Iraqis from atleast twenty-two different countries.309The abductors killed fifty-two of these people,and at least forty-three are still missing.310The rest were released.The first reported summary execution of a non-Iraqi civilian by an insurgent groupresulting in death happened on April 14, 2004. A group called the Mujahadin Brigadessaid it had detained four Italian civilian security guards in al-Falluja, and it demanded thatItaly withdraw its military from Iraq in order for them to be released. “The Italiangovernment...should vow and give guarantees to withdraw its forces from Iraq and givea time schedule and to free Muslim clerics in Iraq,” a voice on a video broadcast on al-
Babak Dehghanpisheh, Eve Conant and Rod Nordland, “Iraq’s Hidden War; Extremists Have Shot WomenActivists in the Streets and Killed Them in Private,”Newsweek,March 7, 2005, and Robin Fields, “Women onIraq Ballot Lie Low,”Los Angeles Times,January 17, 2005.For a list of foreign hostages taken in Iraq,see,“Foreign Hostages Still Held Captive in Iraq,”AgenceFrance-Presse,July 3, 2005, and “Foreign Hostages in Iraq,”Reuters,July 27, 2005. The names of the missingand killed is believed to be accurate, but the list excludes dozens of non-Iraqis who were abducted and thenreleased.The abducted non-Iraqis still missing are from the following countries: Australia, Canada, Jordan, Kuwait,Somalia, Turkey, Syria, Sudan, U.S., Lebanon, South Korea, Egypt and Brazil. The abductees who were killedcame from: Italy, U.S., Lebanon, South Korea, Bulgaria, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Italy, Nepal, United Kingdom,Macedonia, Japan, Jordan, Sudan, Somalia and Algeria.310309
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Jazeera said.311The group eventually freed three of the men but they executed thefourth, Fabrizio Quattrocchi.312The executions of non-Iraqi civilians became headline news in the international mediathe next month with the videotaped beheading of U.S. businessman Nicholas Berg, agedtwenty-six, who had been abducted in mid-April 2004. On May 11, a video circulatedwidely on the Internet, entitled “Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi Shown Slaughtering anAmerican.” It showed a group of masked men standing behind Berg, who sat on theground in an orange jump-suit, similar to those worn by detainees at Guantanamo Bay.“For the mothers and wives of American soldiers, we tell you that we offered the U.S.administration to exchange this hostage with some of the detainees in Abu Ghraib andthey refused,” one of five men wearing headscarves and black masks read from astatement. “So we tell you that the dignity of the Muslim men and women in AbuGhraib and others is not redeemed except by blood and souls.”313One of the men thenbeheaded Berg with a large, curved knife. Millions of Internet users around the worlddownloaded the video, making al-Zarqawi a household name.314In August 2004, Ansar al-Sunna abducted and executed twelve Nepalese, who wereworking in Iraq as cleaners and cooks for a Jordanian company, including one bybeheading. On August 31, the group posted pictures and video of the executions on theInternet, with a statement that said they had been killed because they “came from theircountry to fight the Muslims and to serve the Jews and the Christians.”315On September 16, 2004, armed men abducted three civil engineers, two Americans and aBriton, from their home in the al-Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad.316Two days later,al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group announced it would kill the hostages—Eugene311312
Andrew Hammond, “Iraqis Show Italian Hostages, Want Italy Out—TV,”Reuters,April 13, 2004.
“Italy Confirms Hostage Killed in Iraq,”Reuters,April 14, 2004. Since Quattrocchi, three other Italian civilianshave been abducted and killed: the journalist Enzo Baldoni, Italian-Iraqi businessman Ayad Anwar Wali and theaid worker Salvatore Santoro. (“Italian Soldier Killed in Iraq Auto Accident,”ANSA,July 14, 2005.)
Niko Price, “Video on Islamic Militant Web Site Shows Beheading of American,”Associated Press,May 11,2004.Susan B. Glasser and Steve Coll, “The Web as Weapon; Zarqawi Intertwines Acts on Ground in Iraq WithPropaganda Campaign on the Internet,”Washington Post,August 9, 2005.“Nepalese Hostages Killed in Iraq,”BBC,August 31, 2004, accessible athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3614866.stm, as of June 22, 2004, “Militants Kill 12 Nepal Hostages,”CNN,August 31, 2004, accessible at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/08/31/iraq.main/, accessedJune 22, 2005, and Stephen Farrell and Charles Bremner, “Hostage Fears After Mass Killing,”The Times,September 1, 2004, accessible at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1240841,00.html, as of June 22,2005.The men were working on Iraqi reconstruction projects for Gulf Supplies and Commercial Services, a UnitedArab Emirates-based company.316315314
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Armstrong, Jack Hensley and Kenneth Bigley—in forty-eight hours if the U.S. did notrelease the Iraqi women it held in detention. After the deadline passed, on September 20,a website used by radical Islamic groups posted a video that showed the beheading of aman identified as Eugene Armstrong. “You, sister, rejoice. God’s soldiers are coming toget you out of your chains and restore your purity by returning you to your mother andfather,” the man said before grabbing the hostage and cutting his throat. “The fate of thefirst infidel was cutting off the head before your eyes and ears. You have a 24-houropportunity. Abide by our demand in full and release all the Muslim women, otherwisethe head of the other will follow this one,” the speaker said.317Twenty-four hours later, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad posted a message that the other American,Jack Hensley, had also been killed. “Thank God, the lions of the Tawhid and Jihad haveslaughtered the second American hostage at the expiration of the set deadline,” themessage said. “The British hostage will face the same fate unless the British governmentdoes what’s necessary to free him.”318The next day, September 22, the British engineerKenneth Bigley appeared in a video posted to the Internet, pleading with British PrimeMinister Tony Blair to: “Please, please release the female prisoners that are held in Iraqiprisons.”319The group executed Bigley three weeks later.320Some of the abductions were to pressure a foreign government into withdrawing itsforces from Iraq. In July 2004, for example, the Islamic Army in Iraq abducted theFilipino truck driver Angelo de la Cruz, aged forty-six, and threatened to kill him if thePhilippine military did not withdraw from Iraq. On July 12, the Philippine governmentannounced it was withdrawing all of its forces from Iraq to save de la Cruz. “In responseto your request, the Philippines ... will withdraw its humanitarian forces as soon aspossible,” the government said.321A week later the insurgents released de la Cruz.Insurgents released another Filipino hostage on June 22, 2005, after holding him fornearly eight months. According to media reports, a group called Jaysh al-Mujahidin(Mujahadin Army) released Robert Tarongoy, a thirty-one-year-old accountant for a317
Bassem Mroue, “Video on Website Shows Beheading of Man Said to Be American Hostage,”AssociatedPress,September 20, 2004.“Body of Slain American Hostage Found,”CNN,September 22, 2004, available athttp://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/09/22/iraq.beheading/, as of August 18, 2005.“British Hostage Pleads For His Life Amid Claim Italians Killed in Iraq,”Agence France-Presse,September23, 2004.320321319318
“BritishHostage Beheaded in Iraq,” Reuters,October 10, 2004.
Alistair Lyon, “Philippines Announces Pullout to Save Iraq Hostage,”Reuters,July 13, 2004. Thegovernment claimed that it was already planning to withdraw its fifty-one-person contingent at the end of themonth.
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Saudi firm, after the Philippine government agreed to ban its nationals from traveling toIraq and to adopt a new law that punished those who disobey the order.322The grouphad abducted Tarongoy on November 1, 2004, along with five co-workers. The groupquickly released four of them, a Nepali and three Iraqis, but is believed to still be holdingthe U.S. citizen Roy Hallums, who worked for a Saudi company that does catering forthe Iraqi army.323Other abducted non-Iraqis have pleaded in videos for soldiers from their respectivecountries to leave Iraq, such as the Italian journalist Enzo Baldoni in August 2004 (seechapter IX of this report, “Attacks on Media”) and the British-born director of CAREMargaret Hassan (see chapter VIII, “Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations”), both ofwhom were killed.The abductions of truck drivers are sometimes meant to pressure a company into haltingits business operations in Iraq. “This work is an abandonment of Islam,” two Sudanesetruck drivers held by the Islamic Army in Iraq said in a March 2005 video. “I adviseothers to leave any work with the occupying infidel because the hand of justice will reachthem wherever they are.”324The group eventually released the two men.325On June 7, 2005, a group using the name the `Ali bin Abi Talib Brigades warned that itwould kill a Turkish businessman named `Ali Musluoglu it had abducted and two of hiscompanions “unless the Turkish authorities cease all forms of logistical support to theU.S. military as well as cooperation with U.S. firms doing business in Iraq.”326The grouplater said it would release their hostage if his family paid “several million dollars,”Musluoglu’s brother said.327In August 2004, an insurgent group made a demand not directly related to the conflict inIraq: the Islamic Army in Iraq, holding the French journalists Christian Chesnot andGeorges Malbrunot, said they wanted France to lift its ban on headscarves in schools.
322
Al-Jazeera Television, June 22, 2005.“Filipino Returns Home After Hostage Ordeal in Iraq,”Reuters,June 23, 2005.
323324325
“Iraq Militants Post Video of Two Sudanese Hostages,”Reuters,March 9, 2005.
“Two Sudanese Hostages to Be Released by Islamic Army in Iraq: Video,”Agence France-Presse,April 6,2005.“Family of Turkish Hostage Implore Iraqi Kidnappers to Spare Him,”Agence France-Presse,June 8, 2005,and “Iraq Militants Threaten to Kill Turkish Hostage,”Agence France-Presse,June 7, 2005, and “DubaiTelevision Shows Video of Turkish Businessman Kidnapped in Iraq,”Associated Press,June 7, 2005.“Iraqi Kidnappers Demand Multi-million Dollar Ransom for Turkish Hostage,”Agence France-Presse,June18, 2005.327326
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The French government ignored refused the demand, and the captors eventuallyreleased the two men.328In summer 2005 insurgent groups began abducting foreign diplomats from MiddleEastern countries—an apparent attempt to isolate Iraq’s government from the Arab andMuslim world—and three of them were killed. The first victim was Egyptian envoy Ihabal-Sharif, who was seized on July 2, and al-Qaeda in Iraq later claimed he had been killedbecause of his country’s allegiance “to Jews and Christians.”329The previous monthEgypt had announced it would be the first Arab country to upgrade its mission in Iraq toa full embassy. Then, on July 21, al-Qaeda in Iraq abducted two Algerian diplomats, `AliBelaroussi and Azzedine Belkadi. A statement posted to the Internet six days laterclaimed the group had killed the two men because of their government’s ties to the U.S.and its crackdown on Islamic militants. “Didn’t we warn you, O enemies of God, not tobe loyal to the Jews and the Christians and to stand by the side of America or to carryout its plans,” the statement said.330
XIII. Unlawful Attacks on Government Security ForcesInsurgent groups have conducted numerous armed attacks against Iraqi security forces,which as of June 2005 numbered more than 160,000 soldiers and police,331as well asagainst the U.S.-led Multi-National Force. Attacks against a state’s armed forces are notunlawful under international humanitarian law, although such acts do violate local Iraqilaw and subject the perpetrator to criminal prosecution (see section on CriminalResponsibility in Chapter XVI of this report, “Legal Standards and the Conflict inIraq”).Under the laws of war, police forces are civilian and individual police may not be subjectto attack unless they directly participate in hostilities. However, police units that becomeformally attached to the state’s armed forces or take on military functions, including
328329
“Hostage Takers Widen Demands Beyond Iraqi Affairs,Agence France-Presse,August 29, 2004.
Marian Fam, “Kidnappers of Egyptian Diplomat Raise Stakes, Threaten to Kill Him to Punish Egypt,”Associated Press,July 6, 2005, and “Al-Qaida Claims to Have Killed Top Egyptian Diplomat in Iraq,”AssociatedPress,July 7, 2005.Robert H. Reid, “Al-Qaida Says It Killed Algerian Diplomats,”Associated Press,July 27, 2005.
330331
According to the U.S. government, the Iraqi security forces had 168,227 personnel as of June 1, 2005(91,256 in the police and 76,971 in forces of the Ministry of Defense). See U.S. Department of State, IraqWeekly Status Report, June 1, 2005, available athttp://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/Iraq%20Weekly%20Status%20Report_20050601.pdf, as of June 14,2005.
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participating in military operations against insurgents, will become legitimate objects ofattack.332International humanitarian law does, however, limit the means and manner in whichlegitimate military targets may be attacked. Attacks that do not distinguish betweencombatants and civilians or are likely to cause disproportionate harm to the civilianpopulation in excess of the expected military advantage are prohibited. Attackers musttake all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm.In addition, captured military and police personal are considered no longer participatingin hostilities (horsde combat).Such persons must be treated humanely; torture and othermistreatment, and summary executions are strictly forbidden.Insurgent groups have conducted many attacks against the Iraqi army and police and theMulti-National Force that violated the laws of war. First, various insurgent groups havetortured and summarily executed dozens if not hundreds of captured Iraqi police andsoldiers they have in custody. Some captured Multi-National Force soldiers have alsobeen killed. Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, binding on governmentarmed forces and non-state armed groups, states that members of armed forces whohave laid down their arms due to sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause “shallin all circumstances be treated humanely.” Violence to life and person, in particularmurder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, are forbidden. And no party to theconflict may pass sentences or carry out executions without previous judgment by aregularly constituted court that has afforded the defendant all judicial guarantees.333Second, many insurgent attacks on legitimate military targets have been carried out usingunlawful means, namely perfidy. A perfidious attack is one in which the attacker feigns aprotected status in order to carry out the attack. Thus, while suicide attacks are not inthemselves unlawful, a suicide bomber who pretends to be an unarmed civilian whileapproaching a military checkpoint or group of soldiers before carrying out an attack iscommitting a war crime. Unlike the use of decoys, camouflage and other lawful forms ofdeception, perfidy places noncombatants at unnecessary risk by causing soldiers to
See ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, Protocol II, article 1(1), p. 1352: “The term ‘armedforces’ of the High Contracting Party should be understood in the broadest sense. In fact, this term was chosenin preference to others suggested such as, for example, ‘regular armed forces’, in order to cover all the armedforces, including those not included in the definition of the army in the national legislation of some countries(national guard, customs, police forces or any other similar force).”333
332
Common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
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disregard the protected status of civilians and incapacitated fighters out of fear of beingattacked.Third, many attacks that appeared to be targeting a valid military object, such as massivecar bombings outside police stations used for military purposes, have causeddisproportionate harm to civilians. That is, the attackers carried out the operationknowing that the loss to civilians was going to be greater than any foreseeable militaryadvantage to be gained from the attack. Indeed, some operations appear designed to linkattacks on military targets with high civilian casualties, to undermine public support for,interaction with, and recruitment by the security forces.334
Summary Executions of Government ForcesSome insurgent groups have summarily executed, often by beheading, captured Iraqipolice and army personnel, as well as soldiers from the Multi-National Force. Thenumber of security force members murdered in the custody of insurgent groups is notknown, but groups like Ansar al-Sunna and al-Tawhid wal-Jihad have repeatedly claimedresponsibility for executing soldiers and police.The case with the most deaths occurred on October 23, 2004, when insurgents executedforty-six Iraqi soldiers and three drivers taking them home on leave. Insurgents dressedas Iraqi soldiers or police manning a checkpoint stopped three buses with the U.S.-trained soldiers near the Iranian border between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m. The insurgentsapparently ordered the soldiers off the bus, forced them to lie in rows and shot themsystematically from behind. “Most of them were shot in their backs and the back of theirheads,” a local official said.335Officials found thirty-seven bodies lying in rows and, according to the Interior Ministry,the victims’ hands were tied behind their backs. They found twelve others the next day ashort distance away in one of the buses. The three drivers were among the dead. Most ofthe victims were from Basra, al-`Amara and al-Nasiriyya.336In an Internet posting, al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for theexecutions. “The mujahadeen killed them all, stole two vehicles and the salaries they had
334335336
Protocol I, article 51(5).Monte Morin, “Dozens of Iraqi Soldiers Found Slain,”Los Angeles Times,October 25, 2004.Karl Vick, “Insurgents Massacre 49 Iraqi Recruits,”Washington Post,October 25, 2004.
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just received from their masters,” a statement said.337Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad`Allawi faulted “foreign troops” for their “gross negligence” in failing to provide securityfor recruits on leave.338Other examples of summary executions are:•On April 9, 2004, armed men attacked a seventeen-truck U.S. fuel convoy nearAbu Ghraib and captured two U.S. servicemen, Sgt. Elmer C. Krause and Pfc.Keith M. Maupin from the Army Reserve’s 724th Transportation Company, andseven contractors.339Bodies of four of the contractors were later found, as wasthe body of Sgt. Krause. One of the contractors, Thomas Hamill, escaped afterone month, but the two other contractors and Pfc. Maupin remained missing.On April 16, al-Jazeera broadcast a video from an unnamed armed group thatshowed Pfc. Maupin sitting on the ground, apparently in good health,surrounded by six masked men. Ten weeks later, on June 28, al-Jazeera airedanother video that showed Pfc. Maupin, along with a statement that he had beenexecuted. Al-Jazeera did not broadcast the execution but said the video showeda gunman shooting Pfc. Maupin in the head from behind. U.S. officials said theycould not confirm the execution due to the poor quality of the video.340Pfc.Maupin remains the only missing U.S. soldier in Iraq.On October 26, 2004, Ansar al-Sunna announced the abduction of eleven Iraqisoldiers south of Baghdad. Two days later, a statement posted on the Internetalong with photographs said the group had executed the eleven men. “Theruling of God has been implemented against them by slaughtering one andkilling the others by firing squad,” the statement reportedly said.341On November 20, 2004, U.S. and Iraqi soldiers found the bodies of nine Iraqisoldiers in an industrial area of central Mosul. Each of the victims reportedly hada bullet wound in the head, and four of them were badly burned in manner
•
•
Monte Morin, “Dozens of Iraqi Soldiers Found Slain,”Los Angeles Times,October 25, 2004 and Faris al-Madhdawi, “Rebels Admit Massacre - Al-Qaeda Ally Claims Credit for Slaughter of 50 Cadets,”Daily Telegraph,October 26, 2004.Jackie Spinner, “Allawi Accuses Foreign Troops of Negligence in Massacre,”Washington Post,October 27,2004.“DOD Announces Army Soldiers as Wherabouts-Unknown,” U.S. Department of Defense Releases, April 12,2004.Dana Priest, “Iraqi Militants Allege Slaying of U.S. Soldier; Identity Unclear From Video, Officials Say,”Washington Post,June 29, 2004, and John Nolan, “Army Unsure if Taped Execution Was Real,” AssociatedPress, August 9, 2004.“Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Executes 11 Iraqi National Guards: Website,”Agence France-Presse,”October 28,2004.341340339338
337
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suggesting they might have first been tortured.342Eight days later, al-Qaeda inIraq claimed responsibility for killing seventeen members of Iraq’s securityforces in Mosul, although it is not clear if some of these victims were the menfound on November 20. In a statement posted on a website, the groupreportedly said it had killed seven “apostates” from the armed forces, as well as aKurdish militiaman. Three members of the Iraqi government’s EmergencyResponse Units were executed after being “investigated,” the group said.343•On January 1, 2005, a group claiming to be al-Qaeda Group of Jihad inMesopotamia in al-Ramadi posted a video on the Internet that reportedlyshowed the execution of five Iraqi soldiers. Entitled “Confessions andImplementations of God’s Judgment on the American Dogs,” the video showedfive men in civilian clothes on a deserted city street with their hands tied behindtheir backs. One of the five men had identified himself as Bashar Latif Jassim,who “confessed” that his assignment was to “prevent the terrorists fromentering Iraq.”344Men with handguns shot them repeatedly in their backs.345On January 23, 2005, Ansar al-Sunna released a video that showed the executionof an Iraqi soldier. Posted on the Internet, it reportedly showed a man in a chairwith an identity card that read, “Defense Ministry, `Abd al-Jabbar `Ali`Abdullah, colonel.” An insurgent in a hood then shot the man. A statementwith the video said, “the colonel was taken captive in Mosul, where he had beensent to help U.S. forces seeking to recapture the town from the mujahadin. Hewas executed by firing squad after confessing to his crimes.”346On February 2, 2005, insurgents stopped a minibus carrying Iraqi soldiers southof Kirkuk. They reportedly ordered the fourteen soldiers off the bus and thenexecuted twelve of them. The insurgents allowed two wounded men to liveapparently as a warning to others. According to the Iraqi military commander inKirkuk, Maj. Gen. Anwar Muhammad, “they deliberately wounded them and
•
•
“Iraqis Slain in Mosul as US Soldier Killed in Baghdad Ambush,”Agence France-Presse,November 20,2004.343
342
“Al-Zarqawi’s Group Claims Responsibility for Killing Security Troops in Northern Iraq,”Associated Press,November 28, 2004. The Emergency Response Units were announced by then-Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad‘Allawi in late June 2004 as part of the government’s plan to establish new security structures within the policeand armed forces. The units were meant to take part in “special operations,” he said, but he did not elaborateon their nature.“Zarqawi Group Executes Five Iraqi National Guards: Video,”Agence France-Presse,January 1, 2005.Christine Hauser, “5 in Iraq Force Are Shot Dead in Rebel Video,”New York Times,January 2, 2005.“Ansar al-Sunna Executes Iraqi Soldier: Video,”Agence France-Presse,January 23, 2005.
344345346
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told them: go and tell your village what we did.”347The assailants identifiedthemselves as members of al-Takfir wal-Hijra (Atonement and Pilgrimage).348•On April 20, 2005, officials discovered the corpses of nineteen Iraqi soldiers in astadium in the largely Sunni Arab city of Haditha, about 130 miles northwest ofBaghdad. Unknown insurgents apparently kidnapped the soldiers while theywere on leave from their posts. According to a local health official, “the armedgroup threatened the people and the medical staff of the hospital not to evacuatethe bodies from the stadium,” so Iraqis would be warned not to join the Iraqiarmy or police.349Two witnesses said they ran to the stadium after hearing shotsand saw the nineteen bodies slumped up against a wall stained with blood.350
Perfidious AttacksPerfidious attacks by insurgent groups on legitimate military targets (attacks in which acombatant pretends to be a civilian or other “protected person”) have directly causedhundreds of civilian casualties and have in general placed all civilians in Iraq at greaterrisk of harm. Suicide attacks in which the attacker conceals his or her identity as acombatant are war crimes for which those organizing such attacks can be prosecuted.Perfidious attacks increase the risk to all civilians at checkpoints and at other defendedzones. Attackers who unlawfully feign civilian status to carry out attacks increase thelikelihood that armed forces will use force against civilians who are perceived to bedisguised combatants. Many of the shootings of civilians at U.S. and Iraqi checkpoints,however unlawful, occurred in part as a result of the fear the soldiers had of beingattacked by insurgents pretending to be civilians (see Chapter XVI of this report, “LegalStandards and the Conflict in Iraq”).Not all insurgent groups use suicide attacks. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Sunna haveclaimed responsibility for most of the major suicide attacks, both on civilian targets andgovernment armed forces, and in most of those attacks the attacker feigned civilianstatus.
347
“Military Chief Says Al-Takfir Group Killed Soldiers Near Kirkuk,”BBC Monitoring,KurdSat TV, February 3,2005.
Jason Keyser, “Vengeful Insurgents Ramp Up Iraq Attacks,”Associated Press,February 3, 2005, and“Surge in Violence in Iraq Ends Post-election Lull,”Associated Press,February 3, 2005. An Islamic group calledal-Takfir wal-Hijrah emerged in Egypt in the 1960s, but it is not clear if it is linked to the group in Iraq.Patrick J. McDonnell, “Iraqis Find 70 Bodies in River, Arena,”Los Angeles Times,April 21, 2005, and“Insurgents Kill 19 Iraqi Guards,”Reuters,April 20, 2005.350349
348
“19 Bodies Left in Iraqi Soccer Stadium,”Associated Press,April 20, 2005.
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On June 25 and 26, 2005, unknown insurgents in Mosul attacked Iraqi police and armypersonnel four times using perfidious methods, killing at least thirty-eight. The firstattack came Saturday night, June 25, when a suicide car bomb exploded at a policecheckpoint around 8:00 p.m., killing five officers and wounding two more. The nextmorning just after dawn, a man drove a red pick-up truck full of explosives into the Babal-Tub police station in the center of town, killing ten policemen and two civilians.According to an Iraqi policeman at the scene, the explosives were hidden beneath a pileof melon and fruit. A policeman at the front gate said that he “opened the barbed wiresfor [the truck], thinking that he was trying to cross the street to unload his cargo in thenearby wholesale market… The suicide bomber was able to get close to the gate of thepolice station and blow himself up.”351A short time later, a suicide car bomber blewhimself up outside the al-Kasik army base west of the city, killing fifteen civilians whoworked at the base and wounding seven, although it is not clear if he was dressed as acivilian or driving a civilian car. Finally, that afternoon, a man wearing a hidden explosivevest pretended he needed medical attention and then blew himself up inside a smallpolice station at al-Jamuri Hospital in Mosul, where many of the dead and woundedfrom the previous three attacks had been taken. That attack killed four policemen andwounded six.352On September 14 and 15, 2005, more than one dozen suicide bomb attacks in Shi`aneighborhoods around Baghdad killed nearly 200 people, including civilians and Iraqipolice. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility and said the attacks were retaliation for ajoint U.S.-Iraqi counter-insurgency operation in the town of Tal Afar.353In one of theattacks, a suicide bomber driving a civilian car rammed into a police bus in the al-Doradistrict, killing fifteen policemen and five civilians. Four hours later, two suicide bombersin the same area killed another nine members of the police, although it is not clear if theywere feigning civilian status.354In the most deadly incident, a suicide bomber in theKadhimiyya neighborhood lured a large group of Shi`a men around his car withpromises of work. In the midst of a large crowd, he detonated his explosives, killing atleast 112 people.355
351
Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Eric Schmitt, “Bombing Attacks on Iraqi Forces Kill 38 in North,”New York Times,June 27, 2005.
“Iraq Bombings Kill 25 as Rumsfeld Confirms US Rebel Contact,”Agence France-Presse,June 26, 2005,Andy Mosher and Dhlovan Brwari, “Three Suicide Attacks Kill 26 in Mosul,”Washington Post,June 27, 2005.353354
352
Mohammed Ramahi, “Suicide Bomber Kills 24 Policemen in Baghdad,”Reuters,September 15, 2005.
Michael Howard, “Suicide Bombers Maintain Intense Attack on Baghdad,”The Guardian,September 16,2005, and “New Suicide Attacks Kill Nine Iraqi Policemen,”Reuters,September 15, 2005.Robert F. Worth and Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Multiple Attacks Kill Nearly 150 in Iraqi Capital,”New York Times,September 15, 2005.355
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Attacks on Security Forces Causing Disproportionate Civilian HarmAttacks by insurgents against legitimate military targets, such as Iraqi and multinationalforces, have at times apparently caused harm to civilians far exceeding any expectedmilitary advantage. Such attacks violate the laws of war.356Insurgent groups that use carbombs and suicide bombs in crowded civilian areas have shown a blatant disregard forcivilian lives.On April 21, 2004, for example, four car bombs exploded just after 7:00 a.m. in thesouthern city of Basra, killing sixty-eight people and wounding 200. The attackersdetonated the bombs outside three police stations and a police academy, which would belegitimate targets if used for military purposes. Fifty-nine of the dead were civilians,including at least sixteen children.357Human Rights Watch did not conduct field researchin Basra to determine whether the police stations and police academy were performing amilitary function and therefore were legitimate targets, and if so, whether the expectedmilitary gains from the attacks justified the expected loss of civilian life. The availableevidence, however, strongly suggests that the expected harm to civilians far exceeded theexpected military gain.“I saw a minibus full of children on fire,” said one man, who lived near the Sa`udiyyapolice station, which came under attack. “Fifteen of the eighteen passengers were killedand three badly wounded. I looked around and saw my leg bleeding and my neighborlying dead on the floor torn apart.”358A fifteen-year-old girl was about to board the bus when the explosion went off. “I hadjust left the house,” she told a journalist. “I opened the door and went out. I could seethe bus. I found myself flying in the air and falling on the ground. I saw fire and smoke.It was a huge explosion. I couldn’t get up again.”359
See ICRC, CIHL, rule 14 (“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilianlife, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relationto the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”) The principle of proportionality iscodified in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, Article 51.Abbas Fayadh, “Suicide Car Bomb Attacks Kill At Least 68 People in Southern Iraqi City of Basra, IncludingChildren,”Associated Press,April 21, 2004.358357
356
Luke Harding and Mohammad Haidar, “Iraq British-controlled Basra Suffers Its Worst Day Since Saddam’sFall as Bombs Destroy Buses Full of Children: School Sees All Her Friends Perish in Blast,”The Guardian,April22, 2004.Ibid.
359
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On November 11, 2004, a suicide bomber in a Kia microbus detonated his explosives onBagdhad’s Sadun Street, a busy commercial strip, during the morning rush hour. Thetarget was a five-car convoy of Iraqi police, but the blast killed seventeen civilians andwounded twenty people, including some police, incinerated ten cars and destroyed shopsalong the street. Seven bodies arrived at al-Kindi hospital, six of them burnt beyondrecognition, a doctor said. The blast carved a crater in the road and caused a building tocollapse.360Again, although Human Rights Watch did not investigate this case itself, theevidence strongly suggests that the expected harm to civilians far exceeded the expectedmilitary gain.“No one should see what I saw: pieces of flesh, cut legs, burned bodies,” said ThaeKhudhair Jasim, a twenty-three-year-old taxi driver, who suffered wounds to his neckand chest when the windshield of his taxi shattered from the blast.361“I entered the shop, then suddenly there was a huge blast that brought down the roof.Then I don’t know what happened next,” said Sami Hanun, a thirty-four-year-oldworker who was wounded in the attack. “Right now, I can’t feel my legs. I don’t know ifI can walk again.”362“It was a car bomb directed at our patrol, but it hit civilians,” said Iraqi police officerHadi `Umar, who cut his head on broken glass. “We’re still trying to find people underthe rubble.”363In a number of reported incidents, insurgents have apparently caused disproportionatecivilian deaths in attacks on U.S. forces. On September 30, 2004, for example, two carbombs exploded at a ribbon-cutting ceremony outside a recently reconstructed sewagepumping station in Baghdad’s Hay al-`Amal neighborhood, killing forty-one people,more than thirty of them children. The target was apparently a convoy of U.S. soldiersfrom the First Calvary Division who were attending the ceremony and distributing candyto children outside the station when the bombs exploded. Ten soldiers were injured, theU.S. military said.364
360361
Waleed Ibrahim, “Central Baghdad Car Bomb Kills 17, Wounds 20,”Reuters,November 11, 2004.
Karl Vick and Bassam Sebti, “Violence Spreads in Iraq; Car Bomb Kills 17 in Baghdad,”Washington Post,November 12, 2004.Alex Rodriguez and James Janega, “Iraq Rebels Step Up Attacks; 6 Police Stations in Mosul Hit; 17 Killed inBaghdad,”Chicago Tribune,November 12, 2004.363364362
Ibid.Dexter Filkins, “2 Car Bombings in Iraq Kill 41, Many Children,”New York Times,October 1, 2004.
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“I went out after the first explosion and then got hit by the second. I felt my leg crack,and I fell,” said Karab `Abd al-Karim, aged sixteen.365“I hate the people who did this.But I also blame the Americans, they came into our neighborhood and brought this withthem,” said the father of nine-year-old Muhammad Akhbar Yunis, who was hit byshrapnel in the arm.366Again, Human Rights Watch did not conduct field research into this incident, but thefact that forty-one civilians died, many of them children, in an attack on soldiers openinga pumping station strongly suggests that the expected civilian cost far outweighed anyanticipated military gain.
XIV. Violations by U.S. ForcesThe violations of international humanitarian law documented in this report occurred inthe context of an armed conflict in which abuses have been committed by all sides. Thisin no way lessens the responsibility of those implicated in war crimes and other offenses.It is a fundamental principle of the laws of war that violations by one side never justifyviolations by the other.Human Rights Watch has previously documented violations of internationalhumanitarian law by the U.S.-led coalition forces during the invasion of Iraq untilPresident Bush’s declaration of the end of active hostilities on May 1, 2003.367Theorganization has also reported on abuses by U.S. forces during the military occupation ofIraq and since that time, including the torture and humiliation of detainees at AbuGhraib prison and other detention centers.368The following is only a summary ofHuman Rights Watch’s major concerns.During the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military took inadequate steps to minimizecivilian casualties. The widespread use of cluster munitions in populated areas, especiallyby U.S. and U.K. ground forces, caused at least hundreds of civilian casualties. Inaddition, fifty so-called “decapitation strikes” on Iraqi leaders relied on satellite phone
365366367
Kim Sengupta, “Dozens of Iraqi Children Die in Baghdad Bomb Attack”The Independent,October 1, 2004.Ibid.
See, e.g. Human Rights Watch report,Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq,December 2003. Available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/.See, e.g. Human Rights Watch reports, Violent Response: the U.S. Army in al-Falluja, June 2003, availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraqfalluja/, andHearts and Minds: Post-War Civilian Deaths in BaghdadCaused by U.S. Forces,October 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq1003/index.htm.368
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call intercepts and corroborating intelligence that proved inadequate, missing all fiftytargets but causing dozens of civilian deaths.369While U.S. and U.K. air forces generallyavoided civilian infrastructure, air strikes on civilian power distribution facilities in al-Nasiriyya caused considerable civilian suffering and attacks on Iraqi media installationswere of questionable legality. In some instances of direct combat, especially in Baghdadand al-Nasiriyya, problems with training and the rules of engagement for U.S. groundforces may have contributed to loss of civilian life.After the fall of the Saddam Hussein government and throughout the militaryoccupation of Iraq, the United States had a legal obligation under internationalhumanitarian law to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far aspossible, public order and safety—an obligation the United States failed to meet.370U.S.and coalition forces largely stood by as individual Iraqis and organized groups lootedgovernment offices, hospitals, and, most dangerously for the country’s security,abandoned police and army depots filled with arms and ammunition.In the intervening two years, the U.S. military’s use of force has resulted in hundreds ofcivilian deaths and injuries that warrant investigation as possible indiscriminate ordisproportionate attacks in violation of the laws of war. A September 2003 HumanRights Watch study of civilian deaths in Baghdad revealed a pattern by U.S. forces ofover-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate shooting in residential areas and a reliance onlethal force rather than control measures at checkpoints. In some cases, U.S. forces faceda legitimate threat, which gave them the right to respond with force. But that responsewas often disproportionate to the threat or inadequately targeted, thereby harmingcivilians or putting them at unnecessary risk.371Human Rights Watch has also criticizedthe U.S. military for overaggressive reactions that put journalists in unnecessary
369370
Human Rights Watch,Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq,December 2003.
Under the Hague Regulations, to which the U.S. is a party, an occupying power has a duty to restore andensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the territory under its authority. Hague Regulations, article43. Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the duty to ensure public order and safety attaches as soon as theoccupying force is in contact with the civilians of that territory, that is, at the soonest possible moment. SeeICRCCommentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention,article 6. This principle is reflected in the U.S. Army FieldManual 27-10, Law of Land Warfare:Military commanders on the spot must prevent and where necessary suppress serious violations involving thelocal population under their control or subject to their authority. Ensuring local security includes protectingpeople from reprisals and revenge attacks, such as against minority groups or local officials. Commanders areresponsible for restoring and ensuring public order and safety as far as possible, and shall take all appropriatemeasures within their power to do this. See ICRC Commentary to Protocol I, article 87.Human Rights Watch report,Hearts and Minds: Post-War Civilian Deaths in Baghdad Caused by U.S.Forces,October 2003. For documentation of the first major incident in al-Falluja in April 2003, when the U.S.opened fire on a demonstration, killing seventeen and wounding more than seventy, see Human Rights Watchreport,Violent Response: the U.S. Army in al-Falluja,June 2003.371
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danger.372U.S. forces have failed to conduct investigations into the loss of civilian livesduring military operations and thus have made insufficient effort to take steps to reducecivilian casualties.
A boy watches a U.S. military vehicle on the main road in al-Falluja in May 2003.U.S. soldiers have used excessive and indiscriminate force there and in othertowns.� 2003 Fred Abrahams/Human Rights Watch
Due to security considerations, Human Rights Watch has not been able to investigateviolations of international humanitarian law by both sides during U.S. military assaultsand counter-insurgency sweeps, such as in al-Falluja and along the Syrian border.Reported summary executions, torture and other mistreatment by U.S. forces againstIraqi insurgents and civilians captured on the battlefield are a major concern. ASeptember 2005 Human Rights Watch report,Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts ofTorture of Iraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army’s 82ndAirborne Division,provides U.S. soldiertestimony of the torture and other mistreatment of Iraqis in detention. The failure of theU.S. military to undertake criminal prosecutions where there is strong evidence of warcrimes—the videotaped incident of a U.S. Marine shooting to death an incapacitatedinsurgent in an al-Falluja mosque being among the most highly publicized incidents373—reinforces these concerns.
372373
Human Rights Watch press release, “Iraq: U.S. Military Responses Imperil Journalists,” September 24, 2003.
See Andrew Marshall, “Reporter Recounts Killing of Wounded Iraqi by Marine,”Reuters,November 22,2004.
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U.S. forces have also been implicated in acts of torture and other mistreatment ofsuspected insurgents at Abu Ghraib prison and other detention facilities in Iraq.Methods of interrogation include harsh and coercive techniques such as subjectingdetainees to painful stress positions and prolonged sleep deprivation. The Schlesingerpanel appointed by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted fifty-fivesubstantiated cases of detainee abuse in Iraq, plus twenty instances of detainee deathsunder investigation. An earlier report by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba found “numerousincidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” that constituted “systematicand illegal abuse of detainees” at Abu Ghraib. Another U.S. Defense Department reportdocumented forty-four allegations of such war crimes at Abu Ghraib.374Human Rights Watch reiterates its call that the U.S. government investigate all credibleallegations of unlawful killings by U.S. soldiers, and punish soldiers and officers found tohave used or tolerated the use of excessive or indiscriminate force. Human Rights Watchhas also found that high-ranking U.S. civilian and military leaders—including Secretaryof Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former CIA Director George Tenet, Lt. Gen. RicardoSanchez, formerly the top U.S. commander in Iraq, and Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, whocommanded Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq—made decisions and issued policies concerningdetainees that facilitated serious and widespread violations of the law in Iraq, as well asin Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay. The circumstances of the abuse strongly suggestthat they either knew or should have known that such violations would take place orwere taking place as a result of their actions. There is also information indicating that,when presented with evidence that abuse was in fact occurring, they failed to act to stopthe abuse.375
XV. Violations by the Iraqi GovernmentAs this report documents, members of the Iraqi army and police are under regular attackby insurgent groups using suicide bombers, roadside bombs and car bombs, andsubjecting those in custody to torture and summary execution. But this does not absolvethe government from its obligations to respect Iraqi and international law in its lawenforcement and counter-insurgency operations.
Human Rights Watch press statement, “U.S.: Abu Ghraib Only the ‘Tip of the Iceberg,’” April 27, 2005.Available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/27/usint10545.htm#below.Human Rights Watch report,Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse ofDetainees,April 2005.375
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Thus far, these obligations are not being met. One area of concern is the Iraqigovernment’s treatment of persons in detention. A January 2005 Human Rights Watchreport found that Iraqi security forces were committing systematic torture and otherabuses against detainees, including children.376In particular, the report documented thesystematic use of arbitrary arrest, prolonged pre-trial detention without judicial review,torture and ill-treatment, denial of access by families and lawyers and abysmal conditionsin pre-trial detention facilities. Trials were marred by inadequate legal representation andthe acceptance of coerced confessions as evidence. Persons tortured or mistreated hadinadequate access to health care and no realistic avenue for legal redress. With rareexception, Iraqi authorities have failed to investigate and punish officials responsible forviolations. Human Rights Watch found that international police advisers, primarily U.S.citizens funded through the United States, had turned a blind eye to these rampantabuses.A human rights report by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)documented the use of excessive force and other violations by Iraqi security forcesthroughout the summer of 2005. According to an UNAMI report released in September,“UNAMI received consistent reports of excessive use of force with regard to personsand property as well as mass arrests carried out by Iraqi police and special forces actingalone or in association with the MNF [Multi-National Force].” In addition, “massdetentions of persons without warrants continue to be used in military operations byIraqi police, special forces of the Ministry of Interior and by MNF-I.”377Iraqi authorities have mistreated in detention both alleged common criminals andsuspected insurgents. Regardless of the reasons for detention or arrest, the Iraqigovernment is legally bound to treat all detainees and arrested individuals humanely andto prosecute them in accordance with international fair trial standards.378
Human Rights Watch report,The New Iraq? Torture and Ill-treatment of Detainees in Iraqi Custody,January2005. Available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/iraq0105/.377378
376
U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, July 1-August 31, 2005.
As explained in chapter XVI, “Legal Standards and the Conflict in Iraq,” insurgents operating in Iraq do notenjoy the so-called “combatant’s privilege” under international humanitarian law, which means that they may bearrested and charged with taking up arms under domestic crimes like treason, murder or the illegal possessionof arms. They still enjoy the basic rights to be treated humanely and to have fair and independent trial. Seegenerally ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,chapter 32 on fundamental guarantees andchapter 37 on persons deprived of their liberty.
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A growing area of concern is the Iraqi government’s counter-insurgency campaign, withincreasingly frequent reports in 2005 that Iraqi forces were committing torture againstdetainees and some extra-judicial executions.379On May 26, 2005, the Iraqi Interior and Defense Ministers announced a major counter-insurgency campaign across Iraq in cooperation with the Multi-National Force called“Operation al-Barq” (Lightning), which involved 40,000 Iraqi security forces.380Sunnipolitical and religious leaders quickly complained that the operation was indiscriminatelytargeting Sunni communities and arbitrarily detaining Sunni civilians arbitrarily orwithout legal basis in dragnets.381Due to security concerns, Human Rights Watch wasnot able to investigate the charge.Of particular concern is the growing number of security units and militias, some ofwhich enjoy nominal autonomy but cooperate to varying degrees with Iraqi securityforces. Sunni leaders have accused elements within SCIRI’s Badr Organization,382andthe Special Police Commandos of illegal killings and abuse against detainees. AnAmerican journalist who accompanied the Special Police Commandos for one week inSamarra witnessed a commander threatening the son of a suspected insurgent with deathand the beating of other detainees. U.S. military advisors, some of them with counter-insurgency experience from El Salvador, were working closely with the commandogroup.383
379
See Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru, “Militias on the Rise Across Iraq,”Washington Post,August 21,2005, and Peter Beaumont and Martin Bright, “UK Aid Funds Iraqi Torture Units,”The Observer,July 3, 2005.
U.S. Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, June 1, 2005, available athttp://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/Iraq%20Weekly%20Status%20Report_20050601.pdf, as of June 14,2005.“Iraq’s Sunni Clerics Thunder Against Operation Lightning,”Agence France-Presse,June 7, 2005, andNancy A. Youssef, “Offensive Unfairly Targets Us, Sunni Say,”Seattle Times,June 4, 2005.SCIRI’s first militia was the Badr Brigade, founded in the 1980’s in Iran, where SCIRI leaders were living.After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it transformed itself into the Badr Organization of Reconstruction andDevelopment and pledged to disarm. Active mostly in Baghdad and Shi`a-controlled southern Iraq, the BadrOrganization remained armed and maintains ties to the Ministry of Interior, currently run by a former high-ranking Badr Brigade official. See Edward Wong, “Leaders of Iraq Support Militias and Widen Rift,”New YorkTimes,June 9, 2005, and Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq: Militia Groups, June 9, 2005, available athttp://www.cfr.org/pub8175/lionel_beehner/iraqmilitia_groups.php, as of June 19, 2005.Peter Maass, “The Salvadorization of Iraq,” New York Times Magazine, May 1, 2005, available athttp://www.petermaass.com/core.cfm?p=1&mag=123&magtype=1, as of June 15, 2005. According to thearticle, the Iraqi Human Rights Ministry is investigating the case.383382381
380
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In May 2005 the Association of Muslim Scholars accused the Badr Organization ofkilling fourteen Sunnis, including three imams, but Human Rights Watch could notverify the claim.384A recent example of Iraqi government abuse occurred on July 10, when ten Sunni Arabmen suffocated after Iraqi commandos locked them in a police van in temperaturesexceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The details of the case remain in dispute but, by allaccounts, the commandos seized the men (who the police claim were insurgents) fromNur Hospital near Abu Ghraib and threw them into the van, where ten of them died andtwo survived. “We were left from 5:30 that evening inside a kind of container that hadno air vents,” one of the survivors later told the press. “After one hour, we lostconsciousness and some people began to die, the others were dead by one o’clock in themorning.”385According to doctors who examined the bodies, the commandos hadtortured the men with electric shock. Witnesses told the press the commandos werefrom the First Brigade, but one of the officers in charge of the commando unit, Brig.Gen. Rashid Flayih, said the unit was a police paramilitary force known as the SpecialSecurity Force.386Iraq’s Human Rights Ministry condemned the deaths as “an inhuman act that violates allinternational norms and standards,” and said it had established a team of experts toinvestigate. “If proved guilty, the commandos must be tried to receive just penaltyfor their deeds,” a ministry statement said.387In the north, Kurdish security forces have also been responsible for abuses. Mostrecently, Kurdish security forces have been implicated in a concerted effort to illegallydetain Arabs and Turkomans in the city of Kirkuk. In mid-June, theWashington Postreported that Kurdish police and security forces, backed by the U.S. military, hadabducted hundreds of minority Arabs and Turkomans in the city, detaining them inprisons in Arbil and Sulaimaniyya, where some were tortured. According to aconfidential U.S. State Department cable the paper obtained, the “extra-judicial
384385
“Sunni Religious Leaders Accuse Shiite Militias of Killing 14,”Agence France-Presse,May 18, 2005.
Richard Galpin, “Iraq Police Accused of Torture,”BBC,July 28, 2005, available athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4718999.stm, as of August 19, 2005.386387
John F. Burns, “10 Sunnis Suffocate in Iraqi Police Custody,”New York Times,July 13, 2005.Khayoun Saleh, “Rights Ministry Wants Iraqi Soldiers to Face Trial Over Killing of
Inmates,”Azzaman,July 20, 2005.
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detentions” were part of a “concerted and widespread initiative” by Kurdish politicalparties “to exercise authority in Kirkuk in an increasingly provocative manner.”388In 2005, the Iraqi Interior Ministry began participating in a television show called“Terrorism in the Grip of Justice,” which airs almost nightly on al-`Iraqiya, Iraq’s U.S.-funded national station. Very popular among Iraqis, the program shows allegedinsurgents, some of them cut and bruised, purportedly confessing to rapes, kidnappingsand executions. Given the Interior Ministry’s record of systematic torture, HumanRights Watch is deeply concerned that some of the detainees may have suffered physicalabuse or due process violations, as well as public humiliation, which are forbidden byinternational humanitarian and human rights law. In transcripts of four shows reviewedby Human Rights Watch, the interrogator repeatedly mocks the detainees.389In oneshow described in the English-language press, a former policeman with two black eyesconfessed to killing two police officers in Samarra; a few days after the broadcast, theformer policeman’s family told reporters that someone had delivered to them the man’scorpse.390
XVI. Legal Standards and the Conflict in IraqInternational Humanitarian Law in IraqAll parties to the military conflict in Iraq—Iraqi government forces, U. S. and othercoalition forces and insurgent groups—are bound by international humanitarian law (orthe laws of war). International humanitarian law imposes upon warring parties legalobligations to reduce unnecessary suffering and to protect civilians and other non-combatants. An important guiding principle of international humanitarian law is todistinguish between combatants and those not taking part in the hostilities.International humanitarian law is applicable to situations of armed conflict withoutregard to the legal basis for the conflict. That is, it applies whether the armed conflictitself is legal or illegal under international law, and whether those fighting are regulararmies or non-state armed groups. U.S. and other coalition forces, Iraqi governmentforces and insurgent groups are all obligated to respect the laws of war regardless ofwhether the armed conflict and resulting occupation are considered lawful or not.Steve Fainaru and Anthony Shadid, “Kurdish Officials Sanction Abductions in Kirkuk,”Washington Post,June 15, 2005.389390388
Human Rights Watch reviewed the transcripts of the program from April 11-14, 2005.
Maass, “The Salvadorization of Iraq,”New York Times Magazine,May 1, 2005. According to the article, theIraqi Human Rights Ministry is investigating the case.
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Likewise, insurgency is not in itself a violation of international humanitarian law. Thelaws of war do not prohibit the existence of insurgent groups or their attacks onlegitimate military targets. Rather, it restricts the means and manner of insurgent attacksand imposes upon them a duty to protect civilians and other non-combatants. In otherwords, international humanitarian law does not regulateifstates and armed groupsengage in hostilities, but ratherhowstates and armed groups engage in hostilities. HumanRights Watch, consistent with our position of neutrality in armed conflicts, takes noposition on the legality under international law of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq or theresulting insurgency.The specific international humanitarian law provisions applicable in Iraq have changedas the nature of the conflict has evolved over the past two years. The U.S.-led attack onIraq that began on March 20, 2003 is considered to be an international armed conflict—a conflict between opposing states. The law applicable to international conflicts includesthe four Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which Iraq and the United States are party,391and the Hague Regulations of 1907,392which are considered reflective of customaryinternational law.With the fall of the Iraqi government in April 2003, the United States along with theUnited Kingdom became occupying powers under international law, regulated primarilyby the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.393Occupying powershave a legal obligation to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety inthe territory under their authority.394Military commanders on the ground must act toprevent and where necessary suppress serious violations involving the local population
The four Geneva Conventions are: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Woundedand Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force October21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and ShipwreckedMembers of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force October 21,1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 75U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force October 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of CivilianPersons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force October 21, 1950.Hague Regulations annexed to the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,1907 (Hague Regulations).International humanitarian law provides that once an occupying power has assumedauthority over a territory, it is obliged to restore and maintain, as far as possible, public orderand safety. Hague Regulations, article 43. U.S. President George W. Bush declared an end to major combatoperations on May 1, 2003, but the U.S. government did not contest that it was an occupying power. U.N.Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003), recognized the situation in Iraq as one of occupation underinternational law. In a September 2003 meeting with Human Rights Watch, officials from the U.S. JudgeAdvocate General and the CPA General Counsel’s office said that there had been no cessation of hostilities inIraq, and therefore the coalition was in “a state of armed conflict and a state of occupation.” Human RightsWatch interview with Col. Marc Warren, Col. Mike Kelly and Maj. P.J. Perrone, Baghdad, September 23, 2003.394Hague Regulations, article 43.393392
391
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under their control or subject to their authority. The occupying force is responsible forprotecting the population from violence by third parties, such as newly formed armedgroups or forces of the former government. Ensuring local security includes protectingcivilians, including minority group members and other targeted groups, from reprisalsand revenge attacks. Until such time that local police can be organized for securingpublic order, occupying armed forces may have to be deployed in this role. Unless suchforces are facing hostilities, the use of force is governed by international human rightsstandards for law enforcement. That is, only necessary and proportionate force may beused and only to the extent required.395The occupying powers in Iraq exercised power through the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA), headed by U.S. diplomat L. Paul Bremer.396From 2003 to 2004, theCPA gradually transferred power to Iraqi bodies it had established. On July 13, 2003, theCPA created the Interim Governing Council as a stated step towards transferringauthority to Iraqis, followed by the Iraqi Interim Government on June 1, 2004, run byPrime Minister Ayad `Allawi.397On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred all governmentauthority to the Iraqi Interim Government. The Transitional Administration Law,prepared by the CPA, became supreme law of the land until an elected assembly drafteda new permanent constitution. Under the Geneva Conventions an occupation isconsidered ended when control by the occupying power is no longer exercised.398TheUnited Nations, via U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546,399and the ICRC eachdetermined that the occupation of Iraq under international law ended with the June 28transfer of power.400SeeBasic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,Eighth United NationsCongress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, August 27 to September 7,1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990).The CPA passed regulations, orders and memoranda on issues ranging from security to taxes. It alsoprepared the Law on Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (Transitional AdministrationLaw, or TAL), which was intended as temporary constitutional law. The validity of certain provisions of the TALunder the law of occupation is a matter of dispute.See,e.g. Naomi Klein, “Iraq is Not America’s to Sell,”TheGuardian (UK),Nov. 7, 2003; Antonia Juhasz, “The Handover That Wasn’t,” Foreign Policy in Focus, postedJuly 20, 2004.The U.N. Security Council endorsed the Iraqi Interim Government on June 8, 2004, in resolution 1546. TheCPA acknowledged the members of the interim government the next day (CPA Regulation 10, Members ofDesignated Iraqi Interim Government with Annex A, June 9, 2004).398399397396395
See ICRC Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 6.
The U.N. Security Council endorsed the Interim Iraqi Government on June 8, 2004, in resolution 1546. TheCPA acknowledged the members of the interim government the next day (CPA Regulation 10, Members ofDesignated Iraqi Interim Government with Annex A, June 9, 2004).400
The ICRC issued a statement on August 5, 2004 that stated in part:
After the hand-over of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the interim Iraqi Government on 28 June2004, following the United Nations Security Council resolution 1546 stating the end of the foreign occupation,the legal situation has changed. As stated in the resolution, the presence and the military operations of theMulti-National Forces in Iraq are based on the consent of the Interim Government of Iraq. The ICRC therefore
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The hostilities in Iraq since the end of the formal occupation are considered a non-international (internal) armed conflict, governed primarily by common article 3 to theGeneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law.401Many provisionsof the 1977 Protocols, including most of those concerned with protecting the civilianpopulation, are considered reflective of customary international law.402During armed conflicts, international human rights law remains in effect, though it maybe superseded by more specific provisions of international humanitarian law (theprinciple oflex specialis).403Human rights law may also be limited by so-called derogationclauses imposed under a state of emergency.404Some rights can never be derogatedfrom, including the right to life, the right not to be tortured or otherwise mistreated, theright not to be chargedex post facto,and the right to freedom of thought, conscience andreligion.405International humanitarian law has been increasingly interpreted to beno longer considers the situation in Iraq to be that of an international armed conflict between the US-ledcoalition and the state of Iraq and covered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in their entirety. The currenthostilities in Iraq between armed fighters on one hand opposing the Multi-National Force (MNF-I) and/or thenewly established authorities on the other, amount to a non-international armed conflict. This means that allparties including MNF-I are bound by Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, and by customaryrules applicable to non-international armed conflicts.(ICRC, “Iraq post 28 June 2004: protecting persons deprived of freedom remains a priority,” August 5, 2004,available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList265/89060107D77D7299C1256EE7005200E8, asof September 15, 2005.For an analysis of the occupation’s legal end, see Sir Adam Roberts, “The End of Occupation in Iraq,”International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative,June 28, 2004, available athttp://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/feature.php?a=51, as of September 15, 2005.An authoritative study of customary international humanitarian law is the two-volume ICRCCustomaryInternational Humanitarian Law(2005). Important sources of customary international humanitarian law are theFirst and Second Additional Protocols of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (respectively Protocol I andProtocol II). Protocol I, which has been ratified by Iraq, applies to international armed conflicts but manyprovisions on the methods and means of warfare are recognized as reflective of customary law during internalarmed conflicts. Protocol II applies during internal armed conflicts and virtually all of its provisions areconsidered indicative of customary law. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June1977 and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection ofVictims of Non- International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977.See, e.g.Theodore Meron,Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law,1989, pp.62-70, 74-78 (discussing the customary law character of certain aspects of Protocol I). In 1987, the U.S. State DepartmentDeputy Legal Advisor gave a speech in which he enumerated many of the principles enshrined in Protocol I thatthe U.S. considers customary international law. See “The Sixth Annual American Red-Cross WashingtonCollege of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Lawand the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,”The American University Journal ofInternational Law and Policy,Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 1987, pp. 419-427 (containing remarks of Michael J. Matheson).403404402401
See International Court of Justice,Nuclear Weapons Case,Advisory Opinion (1996).
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 4. See also, Human RightsCommittee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency, article 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001),reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human RightsTreaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 186 (2003).405
ICCPR, art. 4(2).
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consistent with the requirements of human rights law. Thus the fundamental guaranteesprovided to all persons in custody under common article 3 to the 1949 GenevaConventions and customary international humanitarian law also can be found ininternational human rights law.406On October 16, 2003, the U.N. Security Council authorized a Multi-National Force inIraq. Dominated by the United States but including other members of the coalition, theSecurity Council gave the force the authority “to take all necessary measures tocontribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”407As of September 2005,the United States had approximately 140,000 soldiers in Iraq.408Twenty-six countries inthe coalition were contributing another 23,000 military personnel.409National and regional elections were held on January 30, 2005. In addition to eighteenprovincial bodies, Iraqis voted for a 275-member Transitional National Assembly. TheAssembly appointed a transitional government run by Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja`fari,but its main task over 2005 is to draft the constitution, to be presented to the Iraqis forapproval in a general referendum scheduled for October 15, 2005.410
International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of CiviliansThe changed designation of the conflict since 2003 from an international to an internalarmed conflict is largely irrelevant when dealing with the basic issue of civilianprotection. Regardless of how a conflict is defined, all forces must respect the principlesof preventing unnecessary suffering, ensuring humane treatment, and upholding thedistinction between combatants and civilians. It is always forbidden to target civilians,and government armed forces and non-state armed groups must take all feasibleprecautions to minimize civilian harm.
See generally the discussion of fundamental guarantees, ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,pp. 299-383..407408409
406
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, October 16, 2003.“Two Infantry Battalions to Deploy to Iraq for Election Period,”States News Service,August 24, 2005.
The countries in the Multi-National Force as of July 1, 2005, were: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan,Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea,Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, United Kingdom,and Ukraine.If the constitution is accepted by more than 50 percent of voters, elections for a new Assembly will be heldwithin two months. If the constitution is rejected, the Transitional Assembly will be dissolved and Iraqis will electa second Transitional Assembly to redraft the constitution. The permanent constitution also will fail if rejected bytwo-thirds of the voters of any three provinces.410
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The principle of distinction between civilians and combatants is recognized as afundamental principle of international humanitarian law in both international andinternal armed conflicts. This principle provides that all parties to a conflict:must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacksmay only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directedagainst civilians.411All parties must also distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives; attacksmay not be directed against civilian objects.412Attacks that are primarily designed tospread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.413A civilian is defined under international humanitarian law as a person who is not amember of the armed forces. The term “civilian” also includes some employees of themilitary establishment who assist the armed force.414This would include, for instance,the numerous civilians serving on military bases as cleaners, translators and constructionworkers. While as civilians they may not be targeted, these civilian employees of militaryestablishments or those who indirectly assist combatants assume the risk of death orinjury incidental to attacks against legitimate military targets while they are in theimmediate vicinity of military targets.Civilians are protected from attack unless and for only such time as they take a directpart in hostilities. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person isconsidered a civilian.415
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,Rule 1, citing Protocol I, articles 48, 51(2), 52(2); ProtocolII, article 13(2).412413
411
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,Rule 7, citing Protocol I, arts. 48 and 52(2).
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,Rule 2, citing Protocol I, art. 51(2); Protocol II, article13(2).Civilians include those persons who are “directly linked to the armed forces, including those who accompanythe armed forces without being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, supplycontractors, members of labour units, or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, members ofthe crew of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft employed in the transportation of militarypersonnel, material or supplies. . . . Civilians employed in the production, distribution and storage of munitionsof war. . . .” See M. Bothe, K. Partsch, and W. Solf,New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary onthe Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp.293-94.Protocol I, Article 50(1). Some states have expressed reservations about the military implications of a strictinterpretation of this rule. According to the ICRC, “when there is a situation of doubt, a careful assessment hasto be made as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an attack. One cannot automatically attackanyone who might appear dubious.” See ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,pp. 23-24.415414
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The meaning of “taking a direct part in hostilities” has never been fully clarified.According to the ICRC commentary to Protocol I, “direct participation [in hostilities]means acts of war which by their nature and purpose are likely to cause actual harm tothe personnel and equipment of enemy armed forces,” and includes acts of defense.416Direct participation in hostilities “implies a direct causal relationship between the activityengaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activitytakes place.” Civilians lose their immunity from attack for as long as they directlyparticipate in hostilities.417Typically, civilians who fire weapons or directly assist combatants on the battlefield, suchas by loading weapons or acting as artillery spotters, are considered to be directlyparticipating in the hostilities. “Hostilities” not only covers the time when the civilianactually makes use of a weapon but also the time that he is carrying it, as well assituations in which he undertakes hostile acts without using a weapon.418Personsplanning military operations or directing attacks would also be considered directlyparticipating in hostilities.There are a number of gray areas in the phrase “direct participation in the hostilities.”These relate not only to the civilian’s activity and whether it is direct participation or not,but also to its geographic or temporal beginning and end. That is, there is little clarity asto when a civilian with a weapon actually begins participating in the hostilities, and atwhat point the participation ends. However, civilians subjected to attack documented inthis report were unambiguously not directly participating in the hostilities. Iraqipoliticians or government employees, civilian officials and staff of foreign governments,humanitarian aid workers, journalists and contractors without a military function are allprotected civilians under the laws of war.Police normally have the status of civilians.419Police units that take part in militaryoperations or otherwise engage in military functions may be targeted as combatants.Individual police may only be targeted during such time that they take a direct part in the
416417418
ICRC,Commentary on the Additional Protocols,p. 619.Bothe,New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts,p. 303.
ICRC,Commentary on the Additional Protocols,p. 618-19. This is a broader definition than “attacks” andincludes at a minimum preparation for combat and return from combat. Bothe,New Rules for Victims of ArmedConflicts,p. 303.See Bothe,New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts,p. 240; Report of Working Group B, Committee I, 18March 1975 (CDDH/I/238/Rev.1; X, 93), in Howard S. Levie, ed.,The Law of Non International Armed Conflict,(Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 67.419
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hostilities.420Recruitment candidates for the police or military, such as those waiting inline outside police stations or army recruitment centers, are also civilians not consideredto be participating in hostilities.The principle of distinction is also enshrined in common article 3 of the four GenevaConventions, which imposes legal obligations on all parties to a conflict to ensurehumane treatment of persons not, or no longer, taking an active role in hostilities.Common article 3 states:Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members ofarmed forces who had laid down their arms and those placedhors decombat[out of combat] by sickness, wounds, detention, or any othercause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without anyadverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth orwealth, or any other similar criteria.Common article 3 expressly binds “each Party to the conflict,” that is, governmentforces and non-state armed groups, even though the latter do not have the legal capacityto sign the Geneva Conventions. In Iraq, the Multi-National Force, Iraqi governmentforces and organized insurgent groups are parties to the conflict and therefore bound bycommon article 3’s provisions.The obligation to apply common article 3 is absolute for all parties to the conflict andindependent of the obligation of the other parties. In other words, Iraqi insurgentgroups cannot excuse themselves from complying with common article 3 on thegrounds that the Multi-National Force or Iraqi government forces are violating commonarticle 3, and vice versa.With regard to civilians and captured combatants, both government and insurgent forcesare prohibited from using violence to life and person, in particular murder, mutilation,cruel treatment and torture. The taking of hostages is forbidden, as is humiliating anddegrading treatment. No party to the conflict may pass sentences or carry out executions
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 4, citing Protocol I, article 43(1). The commentary torule 4 states: “Incorporation of paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies into armed forces is usuallycarried out through a formal act, for example, an act of parliament. In the absence of formal incorporation, thestatus of such groups will be judged on the facts and in the light of the criteria for defining armed forces. Whenthese units take part in hostilities and fulfill the criteria of armed forces, they are considered combatants.” Ibid.p. 17.
420
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without previous judgment by a regularly constituted court that has afforded thedefendant all judicial guarantees.421Customary international humanitarian law provides a more encompassing list ofprotections for civilians in internal armed conflicts. While not an all-inclusive list, thefollowing practices, orders, and actions are prohibited by all sides:••••••Rape and other forms of sexual violence.422Enforced disappearance.423Arbitrary deprivation of liberty.424Convictions or sentencing without a fair trial.425Collective punishments.426Desecration of corpses.427
In addition parties must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage ofhumanitarian relief for civilians in need.428The freedom of movement of humanitarianrelief workers must be ensured.429
Designation of Military ObjectivesUnder international humanitarian law, a legitimate military objective is an object or atarget, selected by its nature, location, purpose, or use, that contributes effectively to theenemy’s military capability, and whose destruction or neutralization offers a definite
421422
Common article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 93, citing 1949 Geneva Conventions, common article3; Protocol I, art. 75(2); Protocol II, art. 4(2).423424
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 98.
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 99. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty violates the right tohumane treatment under common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 100, citing Protocol I, art. 75; common article 3 to theGeneva Conventions.ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 103, citing Hague Regulations, art. 50; Third GenevaConvention, art. 87; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 33.ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 113, citing Hague Regulations, article 16; 1949Geneva Conventions; Protocol I, article 34; and Protocol II, article 8.ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 55, citing Fourth Geneva, article 23; Protocol I, art.70(2).ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 56, citing Protocol I, article 71(3); Protocol II, article18(2).429428427426425
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military advantage in the circumstances.430Legitimate military objectives include theenemy’s forces, weapons, convoys, installations, and supplies. In addition, objectsgenerally used for civilian purposes, such as houses, buses, taxicabs, or a civilian airfield,can become military objectives if their location or use meets the criteria for a militaryobjective.”431The laws of war characterize all objects as civilian unless they satisfy the two-fold testmentioned above. Objects normally dedicated to civilian use, such as houses, mosques,churches and schools, are presumed not to be military objectives. If they do in fact assistthe enemy’s military action, they can lose their immunity from direct attack. Thispresumption only attaches to objects that ordinarily have no significant military use orpurpose. For example, this presumption would not include objects such astransportation and communications systems that under applicable criteria are militaryobjectives.The attacker must take all feasible precautions to verify that the objectives to be attackedare military and not civilian. “Feasible” means “that which is practical or practicallypossible taking into account all the circumstances at the time, including those relevant tothe success of military operations.”432At the same time, defenders must take all feasibleprecautions to protect civilians under their control from the effects of attacks.433Duringinternational armed conflicts and arguably during internal ones, all parties must avoidlocating military objectives near densely populated areas and they must, to the extentfeasible, remove civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives.434
Prohibition on Attacks Causing Disproportionate Civilian Harmand Indiscriminate AttacksInternational humanitarian law prohibits attacks that cause disproportionate harm tocivilians or which cannot discriminate between civilians and military objectives.The principle of proportionality obliges combatants to choose a means of attack thatavoids or minimizes damage to civilians. Attacks are prohibited if they may be expectedto cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
430431432
ICRCCustomary International Humanitarian Law,rule 8, citing Protocol I, art. 52(2).Bothe,New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts,pp. 306-07.
ICRCCustomary International Humanitarian Law,rule 16, citing Protocol I, article 57(2)(a); see also Bothe,New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict,p. 362.433434
ICRCCustomary International Humanitarian Law,rule 22, citing Protocol I, article 58(c).ICRCCustomary International Humanitarian Law,rules 23-24, citing Protocol I, article 58(a-b)..
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combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and directmilitary advantage anticipated.435If an attack can be expected to cause incidental civilian casualties or damage, tworequirements must be met before that attack is launched. First, there must be ananticipated “concrete and direct” military advantage. Thus, a remote advantage to begained at some unknown time in the future would not be a proper consideration toweigh against expected civilian losses.”436Creating conditions “conducive to surrender” by conducting attacks that incidentallyharm the civilian population437is too remote to qualify as a “concrete and direct”military advantage.438The second requirement of the principle of proportionality is that the foreseeable injuryto civilians and damage to civilian objects not be disproportionate, that is, “excessive” incomparison to the expected “concrete and definite military advantage.”Excessive damage is a relative concept. For instance, the presence of a single soldiercannot serve as a justification to destroy the entire village. If the destruction of a bridgeis of paramount importance for the occupation of a strategic zone, “it is understood thatsome houses may be hit, but not that a whole urban area be leveled.”439There is never ajustification for excessive civilian casualties, no matter how valuable the military target.440Indiscriminate attacks are also prohibited. An indiscriminate attack has been defined asan attack that:1) is not directed at a specific military objective;2) employs a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specificmilitary objective; or
435436437438
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 14; see also Protocol I, arts. 51(5)(b) & 57(2)(iii).Bothe,New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict,p. 365.ICRC,Commentary on the Additional Protocols,p. 685.
Ibid., p. 685. As set out above, to constitute a legitimate military objective, the object, selected by its nature,location, purpose or use must contribute effectively to the enemy's military capability or activity, and its total orpartial destruction or neutralization must offer a "definite" military advantage in the circumstances. See ProtocolI, art. 52(2) where this definition is codified.439440
ICRC,Commentary on the Additional Protocols,p. 684.Ibid.,p. 626.
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3) employs a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited asrequired by international humanitarian law; and consequently, in each such case,are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objectswithout distinction.441
Suicide Attacks and International LawSuicide attacks are a method of warfare that in themselves do not violate the laws of war.For example, Japanese kamikaze attacks against U.S. military forces during World War IIwere lawful attacks on military targets. In Iraq, most suicide attacks have been carriedout by persons carrying explosive devices on their person or driving vehicles packedwith explosives. As weapons they are very discriminate: a suicide bomber is able todetonate with an accuracy that exceeds that of the most sophisticated guided weapon. Itis not an inherently indiscriminate weapon, such as land mines or roadside bombsdetonated by a timing mechanism.Yet for several reasons, many if not most of the suicide bomb attacks carried out in Iraqhave been in violation of the laws of war. First, many of the suicide bombers havetargeted civilians or civilian objects, not military targets. Second, attacks conductedagainst military targets have been against police stations or convoys surrounded bycivilians, such that the attacks caused disproportionate civilian casualties compared tothe expected military advantage. Third, most suicide bombers have carried out theirattacks dressed as civilians with their explosives hidden, although they are combatantsunder the law; any attempt to feign civilian or noncombatant status to deceive the enemyinto letting down their guard is perfidy, and violates international humanitarian law.442Perfidy poses particular dangers because it blurs the distinction between enemy soldiers,who are a valid target, and civilians and other noncombatants, who are not. Soldiersfearful of perfidious attacks are more likely to fire upon civilians and wounded orsurrendering soldiers, however unlawfully. Perfidy is distinguished from ruses of war,such as mock operations, misinformation, surprises, ambushes, or the use of camouflageor decoys. Ruses are permissible acts of warfare intended to trick the enemy; they do not
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ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 14, citing Protocol I, arts. 51(4)(a).
ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,rule 65, citing Hague Regulations, article 23(b); Protocol I,art. 37(1). Acts of perfidy include pretending to be a civilian, who cannot be attacked, or feigning surrender(surrendering soldiers also cannot be attacked) so that opposing forces let down their guard at the moment ofattack. Other examples include feigning protective status by the misuse of emblems of the United Nations or thered cross and red crescent.
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violate international law to the extent that they do not depend on taking advantage of anenemy’s willingness to abide by the law protecting noncombatants.443
Criminal ResponsibilitySerious violations of international humanitarian law are war crimes. All individuals—combatants and civilians—are criminally responsible for war crimes they commit.Military commanders, whether of regular armed forces or non-state armed groups, maybe held responsible for war crimes committed under their orders. They may also be heldculpable as a matter of command responsibility for crimes committed by theirsubordinates if they knew or should have known of the crimes and did not take allnecessary and reasonable measures to prevent such crimes or to punish thoseresponsible.444The law governing internal armed conflicts does not recognize what is known as thecombatant’s privilege—the license to kill or capture enemy troops, and destroy militaryobjectives. The privilege immunizes combatants from criminal prosecution by theircaptors for violent acts that do not violate the laws of war but would otherwise becrimes under domestic law. Members of armed groups may be prosecuted underdomestic law for participating in the hostilities.445Specifically, Iraqi courts can prosecutecaptured insurgents taken into custody according to international fair trial standards forsuch offenses under Iraqi law. They may also be prosecuted under a CPA order thatprohibits the possession, transport, concealment, sale, and use of unauthorized firearms,and military weapons, by any individuals other than the coalition forces, Iraqi security
443444
See ICRCCommentary to Protocol I,pp. 439-441.
See generally, ICRC,Customary International Humanitarian Law,chapter 43. Regarding commandresponsibility of commanders of non-state armed groups, see ICTY,Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,Trial Chamber,Judgment, case no. IT-95-14/1, June 25, 1999. (“Superior responsibility is thus not reserved for officialauthorities. Any person actingde factoas a superior may be held responsible under Article 7(3) [of the ICTYstatute on individual criminal responsibility]. The decisive criterion in determining who is a superior according tocustomary international law is not only the accused’s formal legal status but also his ability, as demonstrated byhis duties and competence, to exercise control.” Para. 76).Under the laws of war, during a military occupation the criminal laws of the occupied country remain in effect.The occupying power may only set aside or modify laws that pose a security threat to the occupying power orwhich contradict international legal standards (Fourth Geneva, art. 64). Any new criminal laws must bepublicized andex post facto(retroactive) laws are prohibited (Fourth Geneva, art. 65).The Iraqi Penal Code (Law No. 111 of 1969), as amended, includes broad categories of offenses under whichthose involved in insurgent activities might be prosecuted: offenses against the internal security of the state (pt.II, ch. 2); offences that endanger the public (pt. II, ch. 7); offenses affecting the life and physical safety of others(pt. III, ch. 1); offenses affecting the freedom of an individual and the deprivation of such freedom (pt. III, ch. 2);and, offenses against property (pt. III, ch. 3).445
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police and personnel under the supervision of the coalition and private securitycompanies licensed by the Ministry of the Interior.446Any non-Iraqis taking part in insurgent activities in Iraq would generally be governed bythe same laws that apply to Iraqis, that is, they could be prosecuted for taking up arms.Such persons could also be legally returned to their home country unless there aresubstantial grounds for believing they will be subjected to torture, ill-treatment orpersecution upon return.447
Crimes Against HumanitySome insurgent groups have committed murder, torture and other offenses as part ofwidespread or systematic attacks against the civilian population. When carried out as partof a group’s policy or plan—evidenced for instance by claims of responsibility forsuicide attacks against civilians—such attacks are crimes against humanity.Crimes against humanity were first codified in the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal of1945 to prohibit crimes “which either by their magnitude and savagery or by their largenumber or by the fact that a similar pattern was applied…endangered the internationalcommunity or shocked the conscience of mankind.”448The concept has beenincorporated into a number of international treaties and the statutes of internationalcriminal tribunals, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.449The definition of crimes against humanity varies slightly by treaty, but as a matter ofcustomary international law the term “crimes against humanity” includes a range ofserious human rights abuses committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack by agovernment or non-state group against a civilian population.450Murder and torture all
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CPA Order 3 (revised and amended), Weapons Control, December 31, 2003.
International law prohibits the transfer, return (refoulement) or expulsion of persons to countries where thereare substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The prohibitionagainst torture and refoulement is absolute and cannot be waived under any circumstances. See Conventionagainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 3. Both Iraq and theUnited States are party to the convention.History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War(1943), p.179, quoted in Rodney Dixon, “Crimes against humanity,” inCommentary on the Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court(O. Triffterer, ed.) (1999), p. 123.449450448
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3,entered into forceJuly 1, 2002.
See Rodney Dixon, “Crimes against humanity,” inCommentary on the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court(O. Triffterer, ed.) (1999), p. 122. This is the standard applied by Article 7 of the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court. Iraq is not a state party to the Rome Statute and is therefore not bound by it,but the definition in Article 7 accords with the conception of crimes against humanity in customary internationallaw.
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fall within the range of acts that can qualify as crimes against humanity.451Unlike warcrimes, crimes against humanity may be committed in times of peace or in periods ofunrest that do not rise to the level of an armed conflict.Crimes against humanity include only abuses that take place as part of an attack against acivilian population. So long as the targeted population is of a predominantly civiliannature, the presence of some combatants does not alter its classification as a “civilianpopulation” as a matter of law.452Rather, it is necessary only that the civilian populationbe the primary object of the attack.453The attack against a civilian population underlyingthe commission of crimes against humanity needs only to be widespreadorsystematic; itneed not be both.454“Widespread” refers to the scale of the acts or number of victims.455A “systematic” attack indicates “a pattern or methodical plan.”456Finally, the perpetratormust have known that the conduct was part of a widespread or systematic attack againsta civilian population.457Those who commit crimes against humanity, like war crimes, are held individuallycriminally responsible for their actions. Crimes against humanity give rise to universaljurisdiction, they do not permit the defense of following superior orders, and they doMurder and torture are among the core offenses that have been included within the definition of crimesagainst humanity at least since the adoption of the charter establishing the Nuremberg tribunal after World WarII. The ICC Statute also lists: extermination, rape, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, persecution,enforced disappearance, apartheid, and “other inhumane acts.” ICC Statute, article 7(1).See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic,InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(ICTY), Trial Chamber, March 31 2003, par. 235 (“The population against whom the attack is directed isconsidered civilian if it is predominantly civilian”);Prosecutor v. Akayesu,International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda (ICTR), Trial Chamber, September 2, 1998, par. 582 (“Where there are certain individuals within thecivilian population who do not come within the definition of civilians, this does not deprive the population of itscivilian character”);Prosecutor v. Jelisic,ICTY Trial Chamber, December 14, 1999, par. 54 (“The presencewithin the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive thepopulation of its civilian character.”).453454452451
SeeNaletilic and Martinovic,para. 235.
SeeProsecutor v. Tadic,ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 646 (“it is now well established that…theacts…can…occur on either a widespread basis or in a systematic manner. Either one of these is sufficient toexclude isolated or random acts.”).Akayesudefined widespread as “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively withconsiderable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims,”Prosecutor v. Akayesu,ICTR TrialChamber, September 2, 1998, para. 579; seealso Kordic and Cerkez,ICTY Trial Chamber, February 26, 2001,para. 179;Kayishema and Ruzindana,ICTR Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999, para. 123.456455
Tadic,para. 648. InKunarac, Kovac and Vokovic,the Appeals Chamber stated that “patterns of crimes—thatis the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis—are a common expression of [a]systematic occurrence.” Para. 94.
SeeKupreskic et al.,ICTY Trial Chamber, January 14, 2000, para. 556: “[T]he requisite mens rea for crimesagainst humanity appears to be comprised by (1) the intent to commit the underlying offence, combined with (2)knowledge of the broader context in which that offence occurs.” See also Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para.271;Kayishema and Ruzindana,ICTR Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999, paras. 133-134.
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not benefit from statutes of limitation. There is an emerging trend in internationaljurisprudence and standard setting that those responsible for crimes against humanityand other serious violations of human rights should not be granted amnesty.458As in thecase of war crimes, all states are responsible for bringing those who commit crimesagainst humanity to justice.
For example, on July 7, 1999, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General attached a disclaimer tothe Sierra Leone Peace Agreement, saying “The United Nations interprets that the amnesty and pardon inarticle nine of this agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, warcrimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.” See also, Commission on Human Rights,resolutions 1999/34 and 1999/32; the Annual Report of the U.N. Committee Against Torture to the GeneralAssembly, 09/07/1996,A/51/44, para. 117; and U.N. Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, April 10,1992.
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Appendix AMajor Attacks with Civilian Deaths by Insurgent Groups in IraqA major attack is defined as having resulted in ten or more civilian deaths. The list is based on majormedia sources (see below) and may not include all attacks.Attacks in 2003August 7 - A truck bomb outside the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad kills sixteen andinjures more than fifty.August 19 - A suicide bomber in a truck demolishes U.N. headquarters in Baghdad,killing twenty-two people, including U.N. Special Representative to theSecretary-General Sergio Vieira de Mello, and wounding more than 150.August 29 - Car bomb kills at least eight-three at the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf,including Shi`a Muslim leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim.October 27 - A truck bomb explodes outside the headquarters of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Baghdad, killing twelve. Bombs atthree police stations in the city kill at least twenty-three more.Attacks in 2004January 18 - Suicide car bomber kills at least twenty-five, mostly Iraqi civilians, atentrance to the main U.S. headquarters in Baghdad.February 1 - Ninety-nine Kurdish civilians are killed and 246 wounded when two suicidebombers detonate bombs at the offices of the main Kurdish political parties inArbil.February 10 - Suicide car bomb explodes in a police station in al-Iskandariyya south ofBaghdad, killing fifty-three civilians.February 11 - Suicide car bomb explodes outside an Iraqi army recruitment center inBaghdad, killing up to forty-seven and wounding fifty.March 2 - More than 181 die and 573 are wounded when multiple blasts erupt inBaghdad and Karbala while Shi`a pilgrims are observing `Ashura’, the holiestday of the Shi`a calendar.April 20 - Insurgents fire twelve mortar rounds into Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.According to U.S. military officials, the attacks kill twenty-two prisoners andwound ninety-two.
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April 21 - Car bombs outside three Iraqi police stations and a police academy in Basrakill sixty-eight people, including sixteen children, and wound 200. Nine of thesixty-eight victims were police.April 24 - Fourteen Iraqi civilians are killed when insurgents fire mortars and rocketsinto a crowded market in Baghdad’s Sadr City.April 24 - A roadside bomb in al-Iskandariyya kills fourteen Iraqis traveling to Baghdadon a bus.June 17 - A car bomb kills thirty-five Iraqis and wounds more than 100 outside an armyrecruiting station in Baghdad.June 25 - A wave of attacks by insurgents in six cities kills more than 100 and woundsmore than 300. In Mosul, sixty-two people die and 220 are injured from carbombs at the police academy, two police stations and a hospital, although it isnot clear how many of the victims were civilians.July 14 - A suicide car bomber blows himself up at the gates of the U.S.-fortified GreenZone, killing at least ten Iraqi civilians and injuring dozens.July 28 - A suicide car bomb kills sixty-eight people and wounds fifty-six in Ba`qubaintended for men lined up outside a police recruiting center.August 1 - Coordinated car bomb attacks on five churches, four in Baghdad and one inMosul, kill eleven and wound more than forty.August 26 - A mortar attack on a mosque in Kufa kills twenty-seven Iraqis and woundssixty-three.August 27 - Unidentified gunmen fire into a group walking on the main road from Kufato Najaf, killing fifteen.August 31 - Ansar al-Sunna announce the execution of twelve Nepalese contractors,including one beheading, on a web site.September 14 - A car bomb near a police station in Baghdad kills at least forty-sevenpeople and wounds 114 in a nearby market. Recruits were lining up out thestation to sign up for the police.September 30 - Insurgents detonate three car bombs in Baghdad’s Hay al-‘Amelneighborhood as U.S. soldiers hand out candy for the opening of a renovatedwater pumping station, killing forty-one people, thirty-four of them children.October 10 - A suicide car bomb near the Oil Ministry in Baghdad killed an estimatedten Iraqis.October 15 - A suicide bomber in a car explodes near a police station in Baghdad, killingten civilians, including a family of four.October 23 - Insurgents capture and execute forty-six soldiers from the Iraqi armedforces and three drivers taking them home for the weekend on leave.October 31 - A rocket slams into a hotel in Tikrit, killing fifteen and wounding eight.
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November 11 - A car bomb explodes just after a U.S. patrol passes, killing seventeenIraqi civilians and wounding thirty.December 3 - A car bomb kills at least fourteen people outside a Shi`a mosque inBaghdad and heavily damages the mosque.December 16 - An explosion outside a Shi`a shrine in Karbala kills ten Iraqis andwounds forty-one, including Grand Ayatollah `Ali al-Sistani’s representative inthe holy city.December 19 - A suicide car bomb in Najaf, 300 yards from the Imam Ali shrine killsand wounds more than 120. On the same day, a car bomb explodes atKarbala’s bus station, killing fourteen and injuring at least forty.December 27 - A suicide car bomber kills thirteen people outside the offices of SCIRI,one of the main Shi`a Muslim political parties, in Baghdad.December 28 - Twenty-eight people are killed in an explosion that flattens severalhouses in Baghdad, apparently when a police unit was lured into a trap laid byinsurgents.
Attacks in 2005 (through mid-September)January 19 - A suicide car bomb explodes near a police station in Baghdad’s Karradaneighborhood, killing an estimated eleven civilians.January 21 - A suicide car bomb blows up outside a Shi`a mosque in Baghdad killingfourteen and wounding fortyJanuary 30 - Insurgents execute at least nine suicide bombings on Iraq’s election day,killing at least thirty-five.February 7 - Suicide bombers kill at least twenty-seven in two Iraqi cities; outside aBa`quba police station and a Mosul hospital.February 7 – A suicide car bomb kills fifteen civilians and wounds seventeen outside themain police headquarters in Ba`quba.February 8 - A suicide bomber killed twenty-one people waiting to sign up for the Iraqipolice and wounded twenty-seven in Baghdad.February 11 - A car bomb kills at least twelve Iraqis and wounds forty outside a Shi`amosque in Balad Ruz, 45 miles northeast of Baghdad.February 11 - Masked gunmen kill at least ten at a bakery in a Shi`a area of Baghdad. Itremains unclear if the attack was by insurgents or the result of a tribal dispute.February 12 - A suicide car bomber kills seventeen Iraqis outside a hospital south ofBaghdad.
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February 18 - A suicide bomber kills fifteen and wounds twenty-four as Shi`a Muslimscelebrate the religious festival of `Ashura’in a procession to al-Kadhimiyyamosque in southern Baghdad.February 28 - A suicide car bomb attack on a crowd of mostly Shi`a police and armyrecruits in al-Hilla kills 125 and wounds about 130. Most of the dead werepolice and army recruits, but civilians from the market across the street werealso killed.March 10 - A suicide bomber strikes a Shi`a mosque during a funeral in Mosul, killing atleast forty-seven and wounding more than 100.April 20 - Nineteen Iraqi soldiers are found executed in a stadium in Haditha.April 24 - Two bombs kill fifteen Iraqis and wound fifty-seven near the Shi`a Ahl al-Baytmosque in Baghdad.May 1 - A car bomb kills at least twenty-five and wounds more than fifty at the funeralof Sayyid Talib Sayyid Wahhab, an official of the Kurdistan Democratic Party,in Tal Afar.May 4 - A suicide bomber kills forty-six civilians and wounds about 100 as they arewaiting to sign up for the police in Arbil.May 5 - A suicide bomber blew himself up outside an army recruitment center inBaghdad, killing thirteen and wounding fifteen.May 6 - A suicide car bomber kills fifty-eight Iraqi civilians and wounds 44 more at avegetable market in the mostly Shi`a town of Suwayra.May 11 - A suicide bomber kills at least thirty-one people and wounds more than sixty-six in Tikrit.May 11 - A suicide bomber kills thirty-two and wounds more than forty outside a policeand army recruitment center in Hawija.May 15 - Police find the bodies of twelve Iraqi men killed execution-style in northeasternBaghdad, thirteen bodies in eastern Baghdad, and eleven more near al-Iskandariyya.May 23 - Two suicide car bombs kill fifteen Iraqis outside the home of Hasan Bagdash, aTurkoman politician, in Tal Afar. Bagdash survived the attack.May 23 - A suicide car bomber kills at least ten people and wounds thirty outside a Shi`amosque in al-Mahmudiyya.May 23 - A car bomb kills eleven Iraqis and wounds more than 110 outside a Baghdadrestaurant popular with the police.June 2 - An explosion at a restaurant in Tuz Khormatu kills twelve people.June 3 - A suicide bomber kills ten Iraqis and wounds ten more at a home in Sa`ud, aremote village near Balad.
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June 7 - Three explosions in and around Hawija kill thirty-four people; the deadliest killsten people at a checkpoint on the outskirts of town.June 11 - Gunmen open fire on a minibus in Diyara, killing eleven Iraqi constructionworkers.June 14 - A suicide bomber kills twenty-three people outside a bank in Kirkuk, amongthem some pensioners.June 19 - A suicide bomber detonates his charges in a popular Baghdad restaurantduring lunchtime, killing twenty-three people.June 20 - A suicide bomber kills fifteen traffic police officers and wounds 100 people inArbil.July 2 - A suicide bomber with explosives hidden beneath his clothing targets a policerecruitment center in Baghdad, killing sixteen people and wounding twenty-two.July 10 - An attacker detonates an explosive vest outside a Baghdad army recruitmentcenter, killing twenty-five and wounding forty-seven.July 13 - A suicide car bomb explodes next to U.S. troops handing out candy and toys tochildren, killing thirty-two children and one U.S. soldier.July 16 - A suicide car bomber detonates his explosives underneath a propane tankerthat insurgents had hijacked and parked near a Shi`a mosque south ofBaghdad. At least ninety-eight people die and 156 are wounded.July 24 - A suicide car bomber kills twenty-five people and wounds thirty-three othersnear al-Rashad police station in Baghdad. Iraqi police are among the casualtiesbut most of the victims are civilians.July 29 - At least forty-eight people are killed and fifty-eight wounded in a suicide bombattack on an army recruitment center in the northern town of Rabi`a.August 17 - Three car bombs near the Nadha bus station in Baghdad and at the nearbyal-Kindi Hospital kill up to forty-three people.September 14-15 – More than one dozen car bombs and suicide bomb attacks in Shi`aneighborhoods of Baghdad killed nearly 200 people. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claimedresponsibility for the attacks and declared “all-out war” on the Shi`apopulation.September 17 - A suicide car bomb killed eleven Shi`a worshippers as they left aBaghdad mosque, and wounded twenty-four.
SourcesAssociated Press (see in particular “Some of the Deadliest Attacks by InsurgentsTargeting Iraqi Citizens, September 14, 2005.)
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Agence France-Presse (see in particular “Deadliest Attacks in Iraq Insurgency,September 14, 2005)Reuters (see in particular “Major Bomb Attacks in Iraq, May 8, 2005)Council on Foreign Relations (see http://cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=6|35||12])
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AcknowledgmentsThis report is based primarily on research from in January and February 2005 inKurdish-controlled northern Iraq, where Human Rights Watch researchers interviewedvictims and witnesses of insurgent attacks. More victims and international humanitarianorganizations were interviewed during a subsequent week in Amman, Jordan. Securityconditions prohibited travel to Iraq’s center or south.The report was edited by Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of Human RightsWatch’s Middle East and North Africa Division, Joe Stork, deputy director of theMiddle East and North Africa Division, Widney Brown, deputy program director ofHuman Rights Watch, and Joe Saunders, deputy program director of Human RightsWatch. James Ross, senior legal adviser to Human Rights Watch, edited the report andwrote the sections on legal standards. Assef Ashraf, associate for the Middle East andNorth Africa Division, and Andrea Holley, manager of outreach and publications,prepared this report for production. Additional production assistance was provided byFitzroy Hepkins, mail manager, and Jagdish Parikh, online communications contentcoordinator.Human Rights Watch acknowledges the cooperation of numerous individuals andorganizations in Iraq and Jordan who provided assistance and logistical support, but whocannot be named due to security concerns. Sincere thanks go to the victims andwitnesses who gave testimony about the atrocities they had experienced or seen.Human Rights Watch would also like to thank the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the JohnD. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Stichting Vluchteling, NOVIB, the J.M.Kaplan Fund, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the Oak Foundation, the RuthMcLean Bowman Bowers Foundation, ACT Netherlands, a joint project of Kerkinactieand ICCO, and the many individuals who contributed to Human Rights Watch’s Iraqemergency fund.
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